Agrégateur de flux

Visite à la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne de S. Exc. Mme Katerina Sakellaropoulou, présidente de la République Hellénique

As announced on this blog, the final conference of the DXB – Identities on the move – Documents cross borders will be held in Italy on 23-24 June 2022 and will be hosted at A.N.U.S.C.A.’s Academy in Castel San Pietro Terme (Bologna, Italy).

All interested scholars and registrars, public authorities and officials, lawyers and students are invited to take part to it for the outcomes of the research. This final event will offer an opportunity to become aware of the Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 on promoting the free movement of citizens by simplifying the requirements for presenting certain public documents in the European Union and to discover the strengths and the challenges of this still relatively unknown instrument. The conference will connect the scientific and applicative dimension of the Regulation, sharing, inter alia, the Commentary on the Regulation and an EU-wide Comparative Survey placing the Regulation into the context of daily national practice.

The event will be held in person, in compliance with health safety regulations, and will also be broadcast online in live streaming for free. Deadline registration for on-line attendance is 21 June 2022 and working languages of the conference will be English, German and Italian.

The Conference programme is available here and includes as speakers Maria Caterina Baruffi, Elsa Bernard, Giacomo Biagioni, Laura Calafà, Matteo Caldironi, Renzo Calvigioni, Cristina Campiglio, Giacomo Cardaci, Gregor Christandl, Mădălina Cocoșatu, Diletta Danieli, Sanjay Dharwadker, Ester di Napoli, Ornella Feraci, Caterina Fratea, Marco Gerbaudo, Susanne Gössl, Paride Gullini, Steve Heylen, Marion Ho-Dac, Fabienne Jault-Seseke, Eva Kaseva, Dafni Lima, Balwicka-Szczyrba Małgorzata, Francesca Maoli, Claudia Elena Marinică, Martina Melcher, Dominik Damian Mielewczyk, Nicolas Nord, Guillermo Palao Moreno, Lina Papadopoulou, Paolo Pasqualis, Paul Patreider, Cinzia Peraro, Stefania Pia Perrino, Marco Poli, Camille Reitzer, Simon Rijsdijk, Alexander Schuster, Sharon Shakargy, Nicole Sims, Thomas Stigari, Anna Sylwestrzak, Marie Vautravers, Rob van der Velde, Jinske Verhellen and Brody Warren.

If you have any questions or inquiries, please write an email to info@identitisonthemove.eu.

As previously announced, the Journal of Private International Law-Singapore Management University Virtual Conference on Conflicts of Jurisdiction will be held online on 23 to 24 June 2022 (6.00 pm to 10.20 pm Singapore time, 11.00 am to 3.20 pm British Summer Time on each day). The event is supported by the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH). Complimentary registration for academics, government and international organisation officials, JPrivIntL Advisory Board members and students will close on 22 June 2022. More information on the conference and the link to register can be found here.

Ligue des droits humains
PDON
La Cour estime que le respect des droits fondamentaux exige une limitation des pouvoirs prévus par la directive PNR au strict nécessaire

In the context of the Vici project Affordable Access to Justice at Erasmus School of Law (financed by the Dutch Research Council – NWO), the project team has organised a series of seminars titled Trends and Challenges in Costs and Funding of Civil Justice.

The concluding seminar in the series will take place on 22 June 2022, on the Future Regulation of Third-Party Litigation Funding.

The seminar, opened by Xandra Kramer and Geert Van Calster, will feature two sessions. The first session, on the current status and the need for further regulation, will include a stakeholder roundtable moderated by Xandra Kramer with the participation of Paulien van der Grinten, Johan Skog and David Greene. The second session, on modes and levels of regulation, chaired by Eva Storskrubb, will include a panel discussion involving Kai Zenner, Tets Ishikawa, Victoria Sahani and Albert Henke.

Attendance is possible in person and online. The programme is available here.

The Grand Chamber of the CJEU delivered today its judgment in case C‑700/20 (London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Limited v Kingdom of Spain), which is about Article 34 Brussels I:

“1. Article 34(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 […] must be interpreted as meaning that a judgment entered by a court of a Member State in the terms of an arbitral award does not constitute a ‘judgment’, within the meaning of that provision, where a judicial decision resulting in an outcome equivalent to the outcome of that award could not have been adopted by a court of that Member State without infringing the provisions and the fundamental objectives of that regulation, in particular as regards the relative effect of an arbitration clause included in the insurance contract in question and the rules on lis pendens contained in Article 27 of that regulation, and that, in that situation, the judgment in question cannot prevent, in that Member State, the recognition of a judgment given by a court in another Member State.

2. Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event that Article 34(3) of that regulation does not apply to a judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award, the recognition or enforcement of a judgment from another Member State cannot be refused as being contrary to public policy on the ground that it would disregard the force of res judicata acquired by the judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=261144&text=&dir=&doclang=EN&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=4584727

AG Szpunar delivered last week (16 June 2022) his opinion in case C‑265/21 (AB, AB-CD v Z EF), which is about Article 5 Brussels I. The opinion is available in the vast majority of EU official languages (save notably German), albeit not in English. Here is the French version:

« 1) L’article 5, point 1, du règlement (CE) nº 44/2001 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que son application présuppose la détermination d’une obligation juridique librement consentie par une personne à l’égard d’une autre et sur laquelle se fonde l’action du demandeur, même lorsque cette obligation ne lie pas directement les parties au litige. Dans le cadre de l’interprétation de cette disposition, la juridiction nationale doit veiller au respect de l’équilibre entre l’objectif de prévisibilité et de sécurité juridique et celui de proximité et de bonne administration de la justice.

2) Aux fins d’apprécier le fondement d’une action en vue de déterminer si elle relève de la « matière contractuelle », au sens de l’article 5, point 1, du règlement nº 44/2001, la juridiction saisie n’est pas tenue d’examiner, au stade de la vérification de la compétence, l’obligation contractuelle ou, le cas échéant, le contenu du ou des contrats en cause. Afin de vérifier si les conditions essentielles de sa compétence sont remplies, cette juridiction identifie uniquement les points de rattachement avec l’État du for justifiant sa compétence en vertu de cette disposition et apprécie tous les éléments dont elle dispose, notamment les allégations pertinentes du demandeur quant à la nature des obligations sur lesquelles se fonde son action et, le cas échéant, les contestations émises par le défendeur. La circonstance que l’action en cause au principal est une action en reconnaissance d’un droit de propriété est sans incidence sur le fait que cette action relève de la « matière contractuelle » et, partant, sur l’application de l’article 5, point 1, du règlement nº 44/2001.

3) L’action en reconnaissance d’un droit de propriété portant sur un bien meuble, lorsqu’elle est fondée sur deux contrats qui ne lient pas directement les parties au litige, relève de la « matière contractuelle », au sens de l’article 5, point 1, du règlement nº 44/2001. Le contrat à prendre en compte pour déterminer le lieu de l’obligation qui sert de base à la demande est le contrat original faisant l’objet du litige ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=261006&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4632834

This morning, the CJEU has pronounced on the interplay between the Brussels I bis Regulation and arbitration, this time in the context of the recognition in the UK of a judgment given by a Spanish court.

I. Facts

This case C-700/20 results from the event taking place two decades ago. Some of you may recall that in November 2002, the Greek-owned and Bahamas-operated oil tanker Prestige encountered a storm in the seas close to Galicia coast in Spain. Being damaged, the tanker eventually sunk leaving oil spill and causing significant damage to northern coast of Spain and the western coast of France.

The Spanish state and some other parties sought damage compensation, in the context of the criminal proceedings before the Audiencia Provincial de A Coruña commenced against the master, owners, and the London P&I Club, the liability insurer of both the vessel and its owners, in 2003. In 2012, the London P&I Club commenced arbitration proceedings in London seeking a declaration that, pursuant to the arbitration clause in the insurance contract concluded with the owners of the Prestige, the Spanish state was required to pursue its claims in the arbitration proceedings, and that it could not be liable to the Spain in respect of those claims due to the ‘pay to be paid’ clause.

The arbitration was quicker and the award was made in 2013, upheld the claims also limiting the the London P&I Club’s liability up to USD 1 billion. The P&I Club applied to the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court), under Section 66 (1) and (2) of the Arbitration Act 1996, for leave to enforce the arbitral award in that jurisdiction in the same manner as a judgment or order and for a judgment to be entered in the terms of that award. The leave was granted in 2013 along with a judgment in the terms of the award.

The Spanish proceedings ended in 2018 by the judgment of the Tribunal Supremo whereby it confirmed that the master, ship owners and the P&I Club were liable to over 200 parties, including the Spanish state, subject, in the case of the P&I Club, to the contractual limit of liability of USD 1 billion. In 2019, the Audiencia Provincial de A Coruña issued an order setting out the amounts that each of the claimants was entitled to obtain from the respective defendants, entitling the Spanish State to be paid approximately EUR 2.3 billion, subject in the case of the P&I Club to the limit of EUR 855 million. Soon after, the Spanish state made an application to the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division, on the basis of Article 33 of the Brussels I Regulation, for recognition of the latter enforcement order. Slightly prior to the expiration of the Brexit transition period, the UK court made a reference for preliminary ruling concerning the Brussels I Regulation, Article 1(2)(d) – exclusion of arbitration, and Article 34(1) and (3) – grounds for refusal of recognition and/or enforcement.

II. The Issues

At issue was whether that recognition or enforcement could be refused on the basis of the existence, in the UK, of a judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award and the effects of which are irreconcilable with those of the abovementioned judicial ruling (first and second question). And, if not, whether recognition or enforcement may be refused as being contrary to public policy on the ground that it would disregard the force of res judicata acquired by the judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award (third question).

III. Decision and Reasoning

Not following the opinion of AG Collins delivered in May this year, the CJEU held that a judgment entered by a court of a MS (in this case, UK) in the terms of an arbitral award cannot prevent the recognition there of a judgment given in another MS (in this case, Spain) where a judicial decision resulting in an outcome equivalent to the outcome of that award could not have been adopted by a court of the first MS without infringing the provisions and the fundamental objectives of the Brussels I Regulation. In the case at hand, this means that the Spanish judgment could have been refused recognition and enforcement only if the UK judgment entered by the UK court in the terms of an arbitral award could have been adopted by a UK court without infringing the provisions and the fundamental objectives of that Regulation.
However, the CJEU went on to explain that such fundamental objectives include the principles of free movement of judgments in civil matters, predictability as to the courts having jurisdiction and therefore legal certainty for litigants, sound administration of justice, minimisation of the risk of concurrent proceedings, and mutual trust in the administration of justice (para. 56). It added another requirement –that such judgment should not violate the right to an effective remedy guaranteed in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (para. 58).

Turning to the facts of the case, the CJEU concludes that the respective UK judgment could not have been rendered on the basis of the Brussels I Regulation without infringing two fundamental rules of the Regulation: first, the rule on the relative effect of an arbitration clause included in an insurance contract which does not extend to claims against a victim of insured damage who bring a direct action against the insurer, in tort, delict or quasi-delict, before the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or before the courts for the place where the victim is domiciled and, second, the rule on lis pendens which coordinates parallel proceedings based on the priority principle favouring the court first seised.

In answering the third question, the CJEU has relied on the opinion of the AG Collins, who stated the EU legislature intended to regulate exhaustively the issue of the force of res judicata acquired by a judgment given previously and, in particular, the question of the irreconcilability of the judgment to be recognised with that earlier judgment by means of Article 34(3) and (4) of the Brussels I Regulation, thereby excluding the possibility that recourse be had, in that context, to the public-policy exception set out in Article 34(1) of that Regulation. Therefore, res judicata cannot be contained in the notion of public policy for the purpose of recognition and enforcement of judgments under Article 34 of the Brussels I Regulation.

Undoubtedly, this judgment will provoke different reactions, but one thing is certain this is a one-hit wonder in UK given that UK is no longer bound by the Brussels regime.

The CJEU judgment has been made availalbe online yet, but the CJEU issued the Press Release.

First Instance where a Mainland China Civil Mediation Decision has been Recognized and Enforced in New South Wales, Australia

 

I Introduction

 

Bank of China Limited v Chen [2022] NSWSC 749 (‘Bank of China v Chen’), decided on the 7 June 2022, is the first instance where the New South Wales Supreme Court (‘NSWSC’) has recognised and enforced a Chinese civil mediation decision (i.e.,?????).

 

II Background

 

This case concerned the enforcement of two civil mediation decisions obtained from the People’s Court of District Jimo, Qingdao Shi, Shandong Province China (which arose out of a financial loan dispute) in Australia.[1]

 

A foreign judgement may be enforced in Australia either at common law or pursuant to the Foreign Judgements Act 1991(Cth).[2] As the People’s Republic of China is not designated as a jurisdiction of substantial reciprocity under the Foreign Judgements Regulation 1992 (Cth) schedule 1, the judgements of Chinese courts may only be enforced at common law.[3]

 

For a foreign judgement to be enforced at common law, four requirements must be met:[4] (1) the foreign court must have exercised jurisdiction in the international sense; (2) the foreign judgement must be final and conclusive; (3) there must be identity of parties between the judgement debtor(s) and the defendant(s) in any enforcement action; and (4) the judgement must be for a fixed, liquidated sum. The onus rests on the party seeking to enforce the foreign judgement.[5]

 

Bank of China Ltd (‘plaintiff’) served the originating process on Ying Chen (‘defendant’) pursuant to r 11.4 and Schedule 6(m) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (‘UCPR’) which provides that an originating process may be served outside of Australia without leave of the court to recognise or enforce any ‘judgement’.[6] Central to this dispute was whether a civil mediation decision constituted a ‘judgement’ within the meaning of schedule 6(m).

 

III Parties’ Submission

 

A Defendant’s Submission

 

The defendant filed a notice of motion seeking for (1) the originating process to be set aside pursuant to rr 11.6 and 12.11 of the UCPR, (2) service of the originating process on the defendant to be set aside pursuant to r 12.11 of the UCPR and (3) a declaration that the originating process had not been duly served on the defendant pursuant to r 12.11 of the UCPR.[7]

 

The defendant argued that the civil mediation decisions are not ‘judgements’ within the meaning of UCPR Schedule 6(m).[8] Moreover, the enforcement of foreign judgment at common law pre-supposes the existence of a foreign judgement which is absent in this case.[9]

 

The defendant submitted that the question that must be asked in this case is whether the civil mediation decisions were judgements as a matter of Chinese law which is a question of fact.[10] This was a separate question to whether, as a matter of domestic law, the foreign judgements ought to be recognised at common law.[11]

 

B Plaintiff’s Submission

 

In response, the plaintiff submitted that all four common law requirements were satisfied in this case.[12] Firstly, there was jurisdiction in the international sense as the defendant appeared before the Chinese Court by her authorised legal representative.[13] The authorised legal representative made no objection to the civil mediation decisions.[14] Secondly, the judgement was final and conclusive as it was binding on the parties, unappealable and can be enforced without further order.[15] Thirdly, there was an identity of parties as Ying Chen was the defendant in both the civil mediation decisions and the enforcement proceedings.[16] Fourthly, the judgement was for a fixed, liquidated sum as the civil mediation decisions provided a fixed amount for principal and interest.[17]

 

In relation to the defendant’s notice of motion, the plaintiff argued that the question for the court was whether the civil mediation decisions fell within the meaning of ‘judgement’ in the UCPR, that is, according to New South Wales law, not Chinese law (as the defendant submitted).[18] On this question, there was no controversy.[19] While the UCPR does not define ‘judgement’, the elements of a ‘judgement’ are well settled according to Australian common law and Chinese law expert evidence supports the view that civil mediation decisions have those essential elements required by Australian law.[20]

 

Under common law, a judgement is an order of Court which gives rise to res judicata and takes effect through the authority of the court.[21] The plaintiff relied on Chinese law expert evidence which indicated that a civil mediation decision possesses those characteristics, namely by establishing res judicata and having mandatory enforceability and coercive authority.[22] The expert evidence noted that a civil mediation decision is a type of consent judgement resulting from mediation which becomes effective once all parties have acknowledged receipt by affixing their signature to the Certificate of Service.[23] The Certificate of Service in respect of the civil mediation decisions in this case had been signed by the legal representatives of the parties on the day that the civil mediation decisions were made.[24] While a civil mediation decision is distinct to a civil judgement (i.e., ?????),[25] a civil mediation decision nonetheless has the same binding force as a legally effective civil judgement and can be enforced in the same manner.[26]

 

The expert evidence further noted that Mainland China civil mediation decisions have been recognised and enforced as foreign judgements in the Courts of British Columbia, Hong Kong and New Zealand.[27] The factors which characterise a ‘judgement’ under those jurisdictions are the same factors which characterise a ‘judgement’ under Australian law.[28]This supports the view that the same recognition should be afforded under the laws of New South Wales.[29]Accordingly, the plaintiff submitted the a civil mediation decision possesses all the necessary characteristics of a ‘judgement’ under Australian law such that service could be effected without leave under schedule 6(m).[30]

 

IV Resolution

 

Harrison AsJ noted that the judgements of Chinese courts may be enforceable at common law and found that all four requirements was satisfied in this case.[31] There was jurisdiction in the international sense as the defendant’s authorised legal representative appeared before the People’s Court on her behalf, the parties had agreed to mediation, the representatives of the parties came to an agreement during the mediation, and this was recorded in a transcript.[32] The parties’ representatives further signed the transcript and a civil mediation decision had been issued by the people’s courts.[33] Moreover, the civil mediation decision was final and binding as it had been signed by the parties.[34] The third and fourth requirements were also clearly satisfied in this case.[35]

 

In relation to the central question of whether the civil mediation decisions constituted  ‘judgements’ in the relevant sense, Harrison AsJ found in favour of the plaintiff.[36] Harrison AsJ first noted that this question should not be decided on the arbitrary basis of which of the many possible translations of ????? should be preferred.[37] Moreover, the evidence of the enforcement of civil mediation decisions as judgements in the jurisdictions of British Columbia, Hong Kong and New Zealand was helpful, though also not determinative.[38]

 

Rather, this question must be determined by reference to whether civil mediation decisions constituted judgements under Australian law as opposed to Chinese law, accepting the plaintiff’s submission.[39] The civil mediation decisions were enforceable against the defendant immediately according to their terms in China without the need for further order or judgement of the People’s Court.[40] The parties could not vary or cancel the civil mediation decisions without the permission of the Jimo District Court.[41] The civil mediation decisions also had the same legal effects as a civil judgement.[42] Therefore, Harrison AsJ concluded that the civil mediation decisions were judgements for the purposes of Australian law as they established res judicata and were mandatorily enforceable and had coercive authority.[43] It then followed that the civil mediation decisions fell within the scope of UCPR schedule 6(m) and did not require leave to be served.[44]

 

V Orders

 

In light of the analysis above, Harrison AsJ held that the Chinese civil mediation decisions were enforceable and dismissed the defendant’s motion.[45] Costs were further awarded in favour of the plaintiff.[46]

 

 

 

Author: Hao Yang Joshua Mok, LLB Student at the University of Sydney Law School

Supervised by Associate Professor Jeanne Huang, Sydney Law School

 

References:

[1]

This is an update on my monthly post on the Court of Justice of the European Union, in order to announce the publication today (Monday 20) of the decision in case C-700/20,  The London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association.

I reported on the facts and the questions referred by the High Court of Justice Business and Property Courts of England and Wales, United Kingdom here, but I believe it worth reproducing them again. The main proceedings are based on a dispute between London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Limited (‘the Insurer’), having its registered office in the United Kingdom, and the Kingdom of Spain; it concerns claims for damages arising from the sinking off the coast of Spain of a vessel carrying fuel oil – the Prestige. The insurance contract contained, inter alia, an arbitration agreement governed by English law.

The Kingdom of Spain asserted its rights to receive compensation from the Insurer under the insurance contract, in the context of criminal proceedings instituted in Spain in 2002. Following a first-instance decision in 2013 and several appeals, the Spanish proceedings culminated in a finding that the Insurer was liable for the loss caused by the shipping accident subject to the limitation of liability provided for in the insurance contract. The Spanish court issued an execution order on 1 March 2019. On 25 March 2019, the Kingdom of Spain applied for recognition and enforcement of that order in the United Kingdom in accordance with Article 33 of the Brussels I Regulation. That application was granted. The Insurer appealed against that decision in accordance with Article 43 of the Brussels I Regulation.

The Insurer, for its part, initiated arbitration proceedings in London in 2012. In the resulting award it was established that the Kingdom of Spain would have to initiate arbitration proceedings in London in order to assert claims under the insurance contract. The Commercial Court of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, before which enforcement of the award was sought under section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, entered a judgment in the terms of the award against the Kingdom of Spain in October 2013, which was confirmed on appeal. The Kingdom of Spain took part neither in the arbitration proceedings nor in the judicial proceedings in the United Kingdom.

The referring court asked the Court of Justice the following questions:

(1) Given the nature of the issues which the national court is required to determine in deciding whether to enter judgment in the terms of an award under Section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, is a judgment granted pursuant to that provision capable of constituting a relevant “judgment” of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of EC Regulation No 44/2001?

(2) Given that a judgment entered in the terms of an award, such as a judgment under Section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, is a judgment falling outside the material scope of Regulation No 44/2001 by reason of the Article 1(2)(d) arbitration exception, is such a judgment capable of constituting a relevant “judgment” of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of the Regulation?

(3) On the hypothesis that Article 34(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 does not apply, if recognition and enforcement of a judgment of another Member State would be contrary to domestic public policy on the grounds that it would violate the principle of res judicata by reason of a prior domestic arbitration award or a prior judgment entered in the terms of the award granted by the court of the Member State in which recognition is sought, is it permissible to rely on Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 as a ground of refusing recognition and enforcement or do Articles 34(3) and (4) of the Regulation provide the exhaustive grounds by which res judicata and/or irreconcilability can prevent recognition and enforcement of a Regulation judgment?

An opinion by AG Collins was published on May 5, 2022. He proposed the Court of Justice to answer that

“A judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award pursuant to section 66(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 is capable of constituting a relevant ‘judgment’ of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, notwithstanding that such a judgment falls outside the scope of that regulation by reason of Article 1(2)(d) thereof.”

In practical terms, if followed by the Court of Justice, the Spanish decision would not be recognized in the UK under the Brussels Regulation. Very bad news for the Spanish government and also for all those, many, affected by the heavy oil spill, the worst marea negra ever experienced in Galicia.

The Grand Chamber, with M. Safjan acting as reporting judge, has decided otherwise in a decision already available  in English and French.

On the first and second questions, that she addresses together, the Court of Justice has decided

“Article 34(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a judgment entered by a court of a Member State in the terms of an arbitral award does not constitute a ‘judgment’, within the meaning of that provision, where a judicial decision resulting in an outcome equivalent to the outcome of that award could not have been adopted by a court of that Member State without infringing the provisions and the fundamental objectives of that regulation, in particular as regards the relative effect of an arbitration clause included in the insurance contract in question and the rules on lis pendens contained in Article 27 of that regulation, and that, in that situation, the judgment in question cannot prevent, in that Member State, the recognition of a judgment given by a court in another Member State.”

And on the third

“Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event that Article 34(3) of that regulation does not apply to a judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award, the recognition or enforcement of a judgment from another Member State cannot be refused as being contrary to public policy on the ground that it would disregard the force of res judicata acquired by the judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award.”

I expect the judgement and its reasoning to be very much commented in academic circles.

For the record, Prof. Adrian Briggs very kindly provided this piece of information in a comment to my post: “So far as concerns C-700/20, it should be noted that on March 1, the Court of Appeal, in The Prestige (No 5) [2022] EWCA Civ 238, ruled that the reference should not have been made as a matter of European law, and (in effect) remitted the matter to the judge with its advice that he should withdraw the reference. On March 31 the Supreme Court gave permission to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal.” If I am not wrong, the UKSC decision on the issue will be known this week as well.

London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Naufrage du Prestige : l’arbitrage initié au Royaume-Uni ne peut bloquer la reconnaissance de l’arrêt espagnol condamnant l’assureur à réparer les dommages causés par la marée noire

Lydia Lundstedt (University of Stockholm) has posted Gtflix TV V Dr: ‘Same Ole Same Ole’ or Has the CJEU Broken New Ground? on SSRN.

In Gtflix Tv v DR, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) handed down an important decision confirming the mosaic approach and the accessibility approach to the application of the damage head of jurisdiction to infringements of personality rights on the internet pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Pursuant to the mosaic approach, an injured party can bring proceedings in every Member State where the damage occurs but only with respect to the damage taking place in that Member State’s territory. Pursuant to the accessibility approach, the sole criterium for the occurrence of damage in a Member State is that the content that is placed online ‘is or has been accessible’ in that Member State. Both these approaches have been criticised by commentators and resisted by the Member States courts. Nevertheless, the CJEU arguably forges new ground as the decision seems to expand the mosaic and accessibility approaches into the realm of unfair competition law. Lastly, questions remain concerning whether the courts of the Member State where the damage occurred have jurisdiction to order other territorially limited remedies such as geo-blocking measures, in addition to compensation for damage.

For previous reports on this case, see here, here and here.

Dans un avis contentieux du 9 juin, le Conseil d’État précise la procédure applicable à la contestation, d’une part, d’une décision d’interdiction de retour sur le territoire français et, d’autre part, de la décision prolongeant cette interdiction.

en lire plus

This is a guest post by Izaak Weaver-Herrera, JD student at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law

Third-party discovery in the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 has often represented a pragmatic, if contentious, tool for international counsel. However, in a decision this week, the U.S. Supreme Court held that § 1782 discovery may be ordered only if the assembled “foreign or international tribunal” is a body which has been conferred governmental or intergovernmental authority. There has already been a wealth of reaction to this decision, including on this site. This post will offer a few additional perspectives.

As a bit of background, ZF Automotive arrived on the Court’s docket as a consolidation of two cases: ZF Automotive US, Inc., et al. v. Luxshare, Ltd. and Alixpartners, LLP, et al., v. the Fund for Protection of Investor’s Rights in Foreign States. Both cases questioned an open aspect of § 1782’s use: whether the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” included private commercial arbitrations between parties of different States and whether it included arbitral panels assembled pursuant to bilateral investment treaties. The Court ruled that since neither panel was conferred governmental authority, § 1782 discovery would be inappropriate in both instances.

Justice Barrett, writing for a unanimous Court, adopted a textual approach to the question. In other words, this was less of a decision on international policy, and more a reflection of what Congress said and meant. The Court paid particular attention to the use of “foreign” and “international” as modifiers to the word “tribunal.” The latter was more critical than the former. The term “[t]ribunal” has peculiar governmental or sovereign connotations, the Court said, “so ‘foreign tribunal’ more naturally refers to a body belonging to a foreign nation than to a tribunal that is simply located in a foreign nation.” Similarly, the Court found that “international tribunal” under the statute more naturally referred to tribunals between nations, rather than arbitral panels composed of or adjudicating issues between nationals of different States.

The Court also reasoned that this understanding of the statute more uniformly aligned with principles underlying both § 1782’s origin and the Federal Arbitration Act. The express purpose of § 1782 was to foster international comity. An overly broad application of § 1782, the Court’s view, would permit the use of district court resources in furtherance of “purely private bodies adjudicating purely private disputes abroad,” positioning the U.S. court system as a persistent presence in potentially limitless international disputes. The Court’s opinion also recognized the tension such a reading would create between the discovery permitted under the FAA. While the FAA restricts discovery to the discretion of arbitration panels, § 1782 permits both the tribunal itself and any “interested person” to submit requests for discovery. Thus, the Court reasoned, a narrower reading of § 1782 also serves to harmonize the scope of arbitration in the United States.

With these observations, the private arbitral tribunal in ZF Automotive was not a “foreign or international tribunal” under § 1782. This was deemed “straightforward.” The Court found the arbitration panel in the Alixpartners dispute more complicated, but ultimately reached the same conclusion. The opinion noted the BIT “simply references the set of rules that govern the panel’s formation and procedure if an investor chooses that forum,” and therefore did not confer permanent sovereign authority on the ad hoc tribunal. Rather, Lithuania simply consented to an arbitration much in the same way two private entities might. Thus, although the Alixpartners tribunal could render a judgment against Lithuania based on its consent in a treaty, it had not been conferred permanent sovereign authority and could not be considered a “foreign or international tribunal.”

The Court did not “foreclose[] the possibility that sovereigns might imbue an ad hoc arbitration panel with official authority.” So although Mixed Claims Commissions of years’ past didn’t quit analogize to modern BIT tribunals, the Court acknowledged that the former may indeed fall on the permissible side of the Court’s new bright line. As international tribunals keep specializing and proliferating (think of the proposed Multilateral Investment Court, or bodies entrusted to handle international criminal law), future questions as to whether a body is “imbued with governmental authority” will for sure arise—but, of course, private commercial arbitration is clearly outside the bounds of section 1782.

The JUDGTUST Project (Regulation BIa: a standard for free circulation of judgments and mutual trust in the EU) conducted by the T.M.C. Asser Instituut in cooperation with Universität Hamburg, University of Antwerp and Internationaal Juridisch Instituut has come to its completion. The findings of the this research are available online here.

The project was animated by the aim to identify best practices and provide guidelines in the interpretation and application of the Brussels I-bis Regulation (also known as Brussels Ia). For this the analysis carried across the EU Member states sought to evaluate to what extent the changes introduced (compared to the Brussels I Regulation) achieved their objective, what are the remaining shortcomings, and how can these be overcome by considering future useful changes. Together with this, the research has analysed how legislative projects at global level – e.g. the Hague Judgment Convention – and political developments – e.g. Brexit – influence the way the Brussels I-bis is applied.

In analysing the interaction between the Brussels I bis Regulation and the other EU private international law instruments, the project combines a primarily comparative legal approach with the use of empirical research methods. The comparative legal research relies on the analysis of legislation, case law of national courts in EU Member States and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and scholarly writings. This endeavour identifies the difficulties in the application of the Brussels I-bis provisions and best practices in applying the provisions of the Regulation. This is done without neglecting the outcomes of the previous regulation – the Brussels I – and other closely related private international law sources. The empirical research relies on various methods, both qualitative and quantitative. On the basis of a dedicated Questionnaire, the national reporters from EU Member States provided information on relevant domestic case law and legal literature.

With its findings the JUDGTRUST project seeks to enhance the general understanding of the autonomous nature of the EU legal sources. Further it looks to contribute to the uniform interpretation and application of the Regulation and consequently promotes mutual trust and efficiency of cross-border resolution of civil and commercial disputes. Furthermore, the analysis provides suggestions on how to reach a greater degree of consistency of the EU private international law legislation.

The outputs of the Project include various materials available online such as the National Reports, a Consolidated Report, and materials of the Final Conference.

Together with these open access materials a Handbook on the Interpretation and Application of the Brussels I bis is expected in the coming period.

In addition to the comparative and analytical research, the project also contributed to the development of a Moot Court Competition (PAX Moot) for law students. With this the project seeks to contribute to the education of a new generation of practitioners dealing with EU private international law.

Junqueras i Vies / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
Selon l’avocat général Szpunar, le pourvoi de M. Junqueras i Vies contre l’ordonnance rendue par le Tribunal de l’Union européenne le 15 décembre 2020 doit être rejeté

Projet de traité sur la Charte de l’énergie modernisé : la demande d’avis de la Belgique est irrecevable, en raison de son caractère prématuré

Written by Mayela Celis, UNED

Yesterday (15 June 2022) the US Supreme Court rendered its Opinion in the case of Golan v. Saada regarding the HCCH Child Abduction Convention. The decision was written by Justice Sotomayor, click here. For our previous analysis of the case, click here.

This case dealt with the following question: whether upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding. (our emphasis)

In a nutshell, the US Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. The syllabus of the judgment says: “A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures [also known as undertakings] before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.” The Court has also wisely concluded that “Nothing in the Convention’s text either forbids or requires consideration of ameliorative measures in exercising this discretion” (however, this is different in the European Union context where a EU regulation complements the Child Abduction Convention).

While admittedly not everyone will be satisfied with this Opinion, it is a good and well-thought through decision that will make a great impact on how child abduction cases are decided in the USA; and more broadly, on the way we perceive what the ultimate goal of the treaty is and how to strike a right balance between the different interests at stake and the need to act expeditiously.

In particular, the Court stresses that the Convention “does not pursue return exclusively or at all costs”. And while the Court does not make a human rights analysis, it could be argued that this Opinion is in perfect harmony with the current approaches taken in human rights law.

In my view, this is a good decision and is in line with our detailed analysis of the case in our previous post. In contrast to other decisions (see recent post from Matthias Lehmann), for Child Abduction – and human rights law in general – this is definitely good news from Capitol Hill.

Below I include a few excerpts of the decision (our emphasis, we omit footnotes):

“In addition, the court’s consideration of ameliorative measures must be guided by the legal principles and other requirements set forth in the Convention and ICARA. The Second Circuit’s rule, by instructing district courts to order return “if at all possible,” improperly elevated return above the Convention’s other objectives. Blondin I, 189 F. 3d, at 248. The Convention does not pursue return exclusively or at all costs. Rather, the Convention “is designed to protect the interests of children and their parents,” Lozano, 572 U. S., at 19 (ALITO , J., concurring), and children’s interests may point against return in some circumstances. Courts must remain conscious of this purpose, as well as the Convention’s other objectives and requirements, which constrain courts’ discretion to consider ameliorative measures
in at least three ways.

“First, any consideration of ameliorative measures must prioritize the child’s physical and psychological safety. The Convention explicitly recognizes that the child’s interest in avoiding physical or psychological harm, in addition to other interests, “may overcome the return remedy.” Id., at 16 (majority opinion) (cataloging interests). A court may therefore decline to consider imposing ameliorative measures where it is clear that they would not work because the risk is so grave. Sexual abuse of a child is one example of an intolerable situation. See 51 Fed. Reg. 10510. Other physical or psychological abuse, serious neglect, and domestic violence in the home may also constitute an obvious grave risk to the child’s safety that could not readily be ameliorated. A court may also decline to consider imposing ameliorative measures where it reasonably expects that they will not be followed. See, e.g., Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F. 3d 204, 221 (CA1 2000) (providing example of parent with history of violating court orders).

“Second, consideration of ameliorative measures should abide by the Convention’s requirement that courts addressing return petitions do not usurp the role of the court that will adjudicate the underlying custody dispute. The Convention and ICARA prohibit courts from resolving any underlying custody dispute in adjudicating a return petition. See Art. 16, Treaty Doc., at 10; 22 U. S. C. §9001(b)(4). Accordingly, a court ordering ameliorative measures in making a return determination should limit those measures in time and scope to conditions that would permit safe return, without purporting to decide subsequent custody matters or weighing in on permanent arrangements.

“Third, any consideration of ameliorative measures must accord with the Convention’s requirement that courts “act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.” Art. 11, Treaty Doc., at 9. Timely resolution of return petitions is important in part because return is a “provisional” remedy to enable final custody determinations to proceed. Monasky, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Convention also prioritizes expeditious determinations as being in the best interests of the child because “[e]xpedition will help minimize the extent to which uncertainty adds to the challenges confronting both parents and child.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 180 (2013). A requirement to “examine the full range of options that might make possible the safe return of a child,” Blondin II, 238 F. 3d, at 163, n. 11, is in tension with this focus on expeditious resolution. In this case, for example, it took the District Court nine months to comply with the Second Circuit’s directive on remand. Remember, the Convention requires courts to resolve return petitions “us[ing] the most expeditious procedures available,” Art. 2, Treaty Doc., at 7, and to provide parties that request it with an explanation if proceedings extend longer than six weeks, Art. 11, id., at 9. Courts should structure return proceedings with these instructions in mind. Consideration of ameliorative measures should not cause undue delay in resolution of return petitions.

“To summarize, although nothing in the Convention prohibits a district court from considering ameliorative measures, and such consideration often may be appropriate, a district court reasonably may decline to consider ameliorative measures that have not been raised by the parties, are unworkable, draw the court into determinations properly resolved in custodial proceedings, or risk overly prolonging return proceedings. The court may also find the grave risk so unequivocal, or the potential harm so severe, that ameliorative measures would be inappropriate. Ultimately, a district court must exercise its discretion to consider ameliorative measures in a manner consistent with its general obligation to address the parties’ substantive arguments and its specific obligations under the Convention. A district court’s compliance with these requirements is subject to review under an ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard.”

Commission / Autriche (Indexation des prestations familiales)
Sécurité sociale des travailleurs migrants
L’adaptation des allocations familiales et de divers avantages fiscaux, accordés par l’Autriche en faveur des travailleurs, en fonction de l’état de résidence de leurs enfants est contraire au droit de l’Union

C-698/19 P & Sony Optiarc et Sony Optiarc America/Commission, C-699/19 P & Quanta Storage/Commission et C-700/19 P & Toshiba Samsung Storage Technology et Toshiba Samsung Storage Technology Korea/Commission
Concurrence
Entente sur le marché des lecteurs de disques optiques : la Cour annule partiellement la décision de la Commission mais maintient les montants des amendes infligées