Agrégateur de flux

FBF
Droit institutionnel
Les orientations sur les modalités de gouvernance et de surveillance des produits bancaires de détail de l’Autorité bancaire européenne sont valides

Ministrstvo za obrambo
Libre circulation des personnes
La Cour précise les cas dans lesquels la directive concernant certains aspects de l’aménagement du temps de travail ne s’applique pas aux activités exercées par des militaires

Commission / Pologne (Régime disciplinaire des juges)
Principes du droit communautaire
Le régime disciplinaire des juges en Pologne n’est pas conforme au droit de l’Union

Allemagne / Pologne
Énergie
La légalité de tout acte des institutions de l’Union relevant de la politique de celleci dans le domaine de l’énergie doit être appréciée au regard du principe de solidarité énergétique

WABE
SOPO
L’interdiction de porter toute forme visible d’expression des convictions politiques, philosophiques ou religieuses sur le lieu de travail peut être justifiée par le besoin de l’employeur de se présenter de manière neutre à l’égard des clients ou de prévenir des conflits sociaux

Matthias Lehmann (University of Vienna) has posted National Blockchain Laws as a Threat to Capital Markets Integration on SSRN. The paper, which appeared in the European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 2021, analyses the legislation adopted by a number of countries in Europe and the US for dealing with crypto assets and distributed ledger technology for investment purposes, the risks of fragmentation and divergent rules, and regional solutions towards a harmonised approach.

The abstract reads as follows:

Various states have started providing private law frameworks for blockchain transfers and crypto assets. The first acts have been adopted by France and Liechtenstein, while a commission of the British government sees no difficulties in extending property protection under the Common law to crypto assets. In the US, an amendment to the Uniform Commercial Code has been suggested, which has not stopped some States going their own, different way. The aim in all cases is to promote the use of modern distributed ledger technology and enhance investor protection. While these initiatives will increase legal certainty, they differ significantly. This has an important downside: there is a strong risk that the blockchain will be made subject to diverging legal rules. Similar to the world of intermediated securities, various national laws will need to be consulted to determine the rights and privileges of investors. This may increase transaction costs, thwart interoperability and produce thorny conflict-of-laws problems. Markets risk being fragmented into national segments, with an inevitable diminution of their depth and liquidity. As a remedy, this article suggests developing uniform rules for the blockchain. Before national legislators and judges once again divide the world through idiosyncratic rules, the private law of crypto assets should be harmonised to the highest degree possible. Uniform rules should ideally be forged at the global level, by fora like the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and the Hague Conference on Private International Law. In the absence of world-wide rules, uniformisation of private law should take place at the regional level, for instance by the European Union. The article makes specific suggestions as to how this can be achieved and what the content of those rules should be.

On Thursday, 15 July from 15.30-17.30 CET the seminar European Civil Justice in Transition: Past, Present & Future will take place, organized by Erasmus School of Law in the context of the ERC project Building EU Civil Justice. You can register here.

In this last seminar of a series of six, key experts on European civil justice will share their views on current and future issues, including digitisation, collective redress, the Brussels I-bis reform, private and public justice, the funding of civil justice and the role of civil justice in today’s society.

Thursday, 15 July (15.30-17.30 CET) – Program

15.15 Waiting room opens

15.30 Opening

15.35-15.45 Xandra Kramer (Erasmus University Rotterdam/Utrecht University)

Introduction – Past, present and future: Highlights of European civil justice

15.45-16.00 Burkhard Hess (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg )

Reforming the Brussels Ibis Regulation in January 2022 – taking up the next reform step

16.00-16.15 John Sorabji (University College London; Barrister, 9 St John Street)

Digitisation and the development of Integrated Dispute Resolution

16.15-16.30 Eva Storskrubb (Uppsala University/Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Trust and Quality in Civil Justice

16.30-16.45 Alan Uzelac (University of Zagreb)

It’s better to burn out than to fade away: is civil justice here to stay?

16.45-17.30 Comments & discussion (moderated by Xandra Kramer and Alexandre Biard, Erasmus University Rotterdam)

 

Nike European Operations Netherlands et Converse Netherlands / Commission
Aide d'État
Tax rulings émis par l’administration fiscale néerlandaise au bénéfice de Nike et de Converse : le Tribunal rejette le recours contre la décision de la Commission d’ouvrir la procédure formelle d’examen

Commission / Pologne
La Pologne doit suspendre immédiatement l’application des dispositions nationales relatives notamment aux compétences de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême

NB / Cour de justice de l'Union européenne
Statut des fonctionnaires
Tax rulings émis par l’administration fiscale néerlandaise au bénéfice de Nike et de Converse : le Tribunal rejette le recours contre la décision de la Commission d’ouvrir la procédure formelle d’examen

Ryanair et Laudamotion / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal confirme que l’aide accordée par l’Autriche à Austrian Airlines afin de l’indemniser pour les dommages résultant de l’annulation ou de la reprogrammation de ses vols en raison de la pandémie de Covid-19 est compatible avec le marché intérieur

Guerlain / EUIPO (Forme d'un rouge à lèvres oblongue, conique et cylindrique)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Marque de l’Union européenne : la marque tridimensionnelle de la forme d’un rouge à lèvres de Guerlain peut être enregistrée

On 20 July 2021, the University of Milan will host the (on-line) Annual Conference of the EU-funded project Jean Monnet Module on Multilevel, Multiparty and Multisector Cross-Border Litigation in Europe.

This year’s topic, Incentives and Challenges to Transnational Access to Justice, will be discussed in the framework of two roundtables concerning, respectively, Third-party Funding in International Dispute Resolution and E-Justice in International Dispute Resolution.

The complete programme is available here. Registrations are open until 15 July 2021, through this form.

Eastern Pacific Chartering Inc v Pola Maritime Ltd [2021] EWHC 1707 (Comm) is a highly unusual case which shows that dormant Conventions can be awoken from their slumber.  I merely dabble in EU external relations law, I am no expert in it. The application of that law in the context of private international law is an issue I have tasked one or two students with – let’s just say they find it challenging.

On the specific issue at hand, parties agree that consequential to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (Gibraltar) Order 1997, matters of jurisdiction between the E&W Courts and the Supreme Court of Gibraltar are governed by the Brussels Convention 1968 and that this remains the case notwithstanding Brexit. That core issue of external relations law pre and post Brexit is therefore not sub judice. One imagines that had it been, it could have led to extensive to and fro, among others within the context of the UK having revoked the 1968 Convention per the jurisdiction and Judgments Exit Regulations SI 2019/479, and of the Withdrawal Agreement.

In July 2020, claimant had a ship arrested in Gibraltar, with the purpose to serve as security for claims under a charterparty between both, claims that were to be brought in London, consistently with an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the charterparty. Roberston DJ classifies that action as one for provisional measures under Article 24 Convention (35 of the Brussels Ia Regulation).  The legality of that arrest (which ended upon claimant releasing it) continues to be disputed (ia viz the actual ownership of the ship).

Claimant (not domiciled in a 1968 Convention Contracting State) now sues  in E&W (pursuant to the choice of court) Defendant (domiciled at Cyprus) for outstanding monies. In current proceedings it applies to dismiss and strike out that part of the Defendant’s counterclaim at the E&W courts which seeks to advance claims in tort based on the alleged wrongful Gibraltar arrest.  In essence claimant submits that the High Court court has no jurisdiction to try the Defendant’s tort claims and should decline jurisdiction in favour of the Supreme Court of Gibraltar.

After a swipe [18 ff] at both parties having engaged, without court approval, experts on Gibraltarian law (which, she holds, bear no relevance for the jurisdictional issues anyways), Roberston DJ proceeds to discuss the lis pendens issue.

Defendant’s primary case is that, on the facts of this case, Article 17 Convention (A25 BIa) applies to confer jurisdiction, because the exclusive jurisdiction clause is broad enough to cover the tort claims. The Defendant’s fallback position is that, if that is wrong, the Court nevertheless has jurisdiction in respect of its counterclaims, not on the basis of A5(3) Convention (the Claimant (defendant on the counterclaim) not being domiciled in a Convention State) either because that necessarily follows from the Claimant’s decision to litigate its own claims here, or because Claimant has taken steps since service of the Defence and Counterclaim which waived any right to object to jurisdiction in respect of the counterclaims.

The discussion revolves around the contractual and statutory interpretation of the action radius of choice of court. This also involves the classic issue of tort claims between contractual parties (compare Wikingerhof) with the judge opting for the one stop shop approach (distinguishing ia Ryanair Ltd v Esso Italiana Srl [2015] 1 All ER (Comm) 152): 42: ‘there is a clear causal connection [between the contractual and tort claims, GAVC], which seems to be sufficient for the purposes of a clause worded “in connection with“.’ In conclusion: [52]: ‘whether damages are recoverable for an allegedly wrongful arrest made in seeking security for claims under the charter, ..is a claim “in connection with” the charter’ hence the E&W courts have jurisdiction. [39]: this ‘allows a single accounting, as regards the overall financial position of the parties as a result of the legal relationship created between them by the charter, and their dispute about what rights and obligations properly flow from that legal relationship.’

Obiter jurisdiction on the alternative grounds, under English residual rules, is also accepted (with the interesting note of the absence, in the Convention, of a gateway for counterclaims, in contrast with Brussels I and Brussels Ia).

Coming then to lis pendens under Article 21 Convention, this is dismissed. [70] The arrest claim plainly does not involve either the same cause of action or the same object as the Defendant’s tort claims seeking to recover damages for wrongful arrest, which are advanced solely by way of counterclaim in E&W. The factual and legal foundation for that counterclaim needs, on any view, to travel substantially beyond the matters the Claimant relies on for its own cause of action and the object of the counterclaim is to recover damages.

Neither [73] is an acknowledgment of service in the Gibraltar arrest proceedings does not amount to a submission to that jurisdiction which would preclude the Defendant from raising its distinct tort claims in E&W.

A stay on ‘related proceedings’ (Article 22 Convention) is also rejected for the reasons listed at [83]. Core reference here is Research in Motion v Visto [2007] EWHC 900 (Ch).

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Chapter 1 Heading 1.7, Chapter 2 para 2.375, 2.469.

Eastern Pacific Chartering v Pola Maritime [2021] EWHC 1707 (Comm)
Interesting and unusual case involving the UK and Gibraltar and applying the 1968 Brussels Convention (!)
Lis pendens, choice of court (charterparty), whether issues arises out of samehttps://t.co/eNp2jpl4Zw

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 28, 2021

Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) can be defined as lawsuits intended to intimidate and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense, until they abandon their criticism or opposition.

Some jurisdictions have already passed anti-SLAPP laws. In its Action plan for democracy, of 2020, the Commission had already announced its intention to present an initiative to protect journalists and civil society against SLAPPs in 2021. An Expert group was created in December 2020.

The topic is of course not new. It has gained momentum again – possibly following the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia in October 2017- also at the Council of Europe, and within the civil society (see, for instance on the need for a EU legislative proposal to protect public watchdogs from legal harassment  here and here.)

On 5 July 2020, a study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee on SLAPP and PIL instruments was published, authored by J. Borg-Barthet (who is one of the members of the Expert Group mentioned above), Benedetta Lobina and Magdalena Zabrocka.

The document analyses legal definitions of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP), assesses the compatibility of anti-SLAPP legislation with EU law, and recommends that an anti-SLAPP Directive be adopted.

Of special interest for PIL is that it also recommends that the Brussels I bis Regulation and Rome II Regulation be recast to limit the incidence of SLAPPs. The final conclusion in this regard reads as follows:

In addition to the adoption of an anti-SLAPP Directive, it is recommended that the Brussels Ia Regulation be recast with a view to adopting a bespoke rule concerning defamation claims and thereby to distinguish jurisdiction in defamation cases from ordinary torts. To this end, it is recommended that jurisdiction should be grounded in the forum of the defendant’s domicile unless the parties agree otherwise. This would enable public interest speakers to foresee where they will be expected to defend themselves, and would be in keeping with the core values of the Brussels Ia Regulation, namely predictability and the limitation of forum shopping.
Greater predictability as to the outcomes of choice of law processes is also needed to dissuade meritless litigation intended to suppress public participation. Accordingly, it is recommended that a new rule be included in the Rome II Regulation which would harmonise national choice of law rules in defamation cases. It is recommended that this rule should focus on the closest connection with the publication and its audience, namely the law of the place to which the publication is directed.

I  expect comments – here or elsewhere- to both proposals and their underlying rationale.

The first impression is a little bit disappointing. The proposal regarding the applicable law is a general one for defamation cases, i.e., it is not SLAPP-specific. On jurisdiction, I would be cautious to spouse the assertion on page 39:

(…), the Court of Justice has developed a body of case law whose net effect is to afford further opportunities for forum shopping and vexatious litigation strategies in defamation cases, particularly where the claimed defamatory content is posted online.

Moreover  a solution which entails giving up eDate and Martinez looks unrealistic to me (in this regard, though, C-800/19 is worth considering; the Opinion was available in February 2021). Vexatious claims have always existed. The lis pendens and related actions rules provide a solution at the jurisdictional level for a plurality of claims within the EU: a word on why they would (or not) be fit in an anti-SLAPP scenario is missing. In addition, and more important, the Brussels regime does not prevent reacting against vexatious claims with the procedural tools available at the national level, such as abuse of process. That is why I am not convinced either by the following sentence, on page 42:

‘In particular, judgments concerning the deployment of antisuit injunctions reveal a Court that is reluctant to replace the ex ante general analysis deployed by the legislator with its, or a national court’s, judgement of the merits of jurisdictional justice in individual cases‘

Even if the bottom line was correct, antisuit injunctions would not have provided the pertinent example.

Beyond the EU borders, with the exception of Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels I bis Regulation, which have no parallel in the Lugano Convention, the situation is left to the Member States; simultaneous proceedings before the courts of the UK and the USA is simply a situation that cannot be solved by the European lawmaker.

There is indeed a need to balance the interests of the claimants and of the defendant (the target of the strategic lawsuit) also in relation to international jurisdiction and to the conflict of law rule.

In my opinion, achieving the goal requires a more grounded examination; also, and mainly, to acknowledge that the problem is to be addressed at a different level – something that the Study does in its 5th part devoted to an anti-SLAPP directive.

But, just like the authors say, the adoption and implementation of such a directive may take too long. The time to react is now, and it is not imperative (not even for reasons of distribution of competences) to wait for Brussels to take the lead.

(Photo: The use of SLAPPs © Image used under the license of Adobe Stock)

La commission européenne vient de diffuser son tableau de bord annuel de la justice dans l’Union européenne. Ces chiffres soulèvent la question des moyens de la justice française et de ses retards informatiques.

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Prestations familiales - Contrôle

Non lieu à renvoi

1) L'article R 663-20 du code de commerce résultant du décret n° 85-1390 du 27 décembre 1985 modifié par le décret 2006-1709 du 23/12/2006 s'applique-t-il en cas de remplacement de liquidateurs successifs dans une même procédure ?
2) La majoration de 30% des émoluments des liquidateurs prévue à l'article R 663-35 du code de commerce résultant du décret n° 85-1390 du 27 décembre 1985 modifié par le décret 2006-1709 du 23/12/2006 s'applique-t-elle en cas de remplacement de liquidateurs successifs dans une même procédure ?
3) Les émoluments fixés par l'article R 663-29 du code de commerce issu du décret n° 85-1390 du 27 décembre 1985 modifié par le décret 2006-1709 du 23/12/2006 se calculent-t-ils par liquidateur successivement désignés ou pour la totalité des actifs réalisés au cours de la procédure, quel que soit le liquidateur désigné lors de la réalisation de l'actif ?
4) La demande de fixation définitive des émoluments formée par le liquidateur ayant été désigné en cours de procédure en remplacement du liquidateur initialement désigné doit-elle mentionner la totalité des émoluments déjà perçus par le premier liquidateur ou se limiter aux émoluments dont le dernier liquidateur demande la fixation ?
5) En cas de remplacement de l'un des mandataires de justice en cours de procédure, la demande de fixation définitive des émoluments doit-elle préciser le partage des émoluments entre les mandataires de justice successivement désignés pour la même mission ? Le cas échéant, l'accord du mandataire de justice initialement désigné doit-il être justifié dans la demande de fixation définitive des émoluments ?