Agrégateur de flux

Tribunal judiciaire de Paris

Tribunal judiciaire de Boulogne-sur-Mer

Jindal Society of International Law, in pursuance of fostering fruitful conversations on international law, is delighted to present and host the Fall Lecture Series of 2021, titled ‘Exploring the Ecosystem of International Law’. The lecture on ‘Private Law Remedy for Breaches of International Law Norms’ is the first lecture in this twenty-three part lecture series, which is being held from August to November 2021.

About Jindal Society of International Law

The Jindal Society of International Law is a student-led initiative under the aegis of the Centre for the Study of United Nations of Jindal Global Law School, and the guidance of Faculty Coordinator Professor (Dr.) Vesselin Popovski. Founded in 2020, this Society is an initiative to provide a platform to young international law enthusiasts.The purpose of this Society is to increase student interaction with the subject matter of International Law through its various initiatives. Rather than being primarily research-driven, we intend to offer a host of experiences that contribute towards skill-building, thereby increasing the knowledge database available to students. This Society is an attempt to bridge the lacuna by streamlining resources and inculcating an overall interest in the vast expanses of International Law. We aim to provide a space to young international law enthusiasts to nurture their interest in the field.

About the Lecture Series ‘Exploring the Ecosystem of International Law’

Our Fall Lecture Series of 2021, ‘Exploring the Ecosystem of International Law’, builds upon the introduction given on internationalism and international law by the concluded Spring Lecture Series, titled ‘Future of Internationalism and International Law’. The Fall Series endeavours to study the different contours of international law. To assist in this study, the speakers will cover and address their respective areas of expertise, based upon their years of research and practice. Given the vast ecosystem and the engagement of international law in it, the Society aims to study the fragmentation and fertilisation of the various disciplines in this ecosystem.

The lowest common denominator in this Fall Lecture Series is to enhance and provide a deeper understanding of international law through international lawyers. The Society, for its Members, is a well of knowledge and a quorum of thought provoking discussions, which will be resultant of this engagement with experts aimed at exploring the ecosystem of international law.

About the Lecture ‘Private Remedy for Breaches of International Law Norms’

The first lecture of our Fall 2021 Lecture Series, ‘Exploring the Ecosystem of International Law’, is on the topic ‘Private Remedy for Breaches of International Law Norms’. The lecture will be hosted online and is scheduled for 17:00 IST on 6th August 2021. The distinguished speaker for this lecture is Ms. Vasuda Sinha and with this lecture being the inaugural session, the opening remarks shall be given by Professor Dr. Vesselin Popovski.

Join Us for this Interesting Lecture!

In order to be a part of this lecture, attendees are requested to register themselves for the lecture through the following the link: https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/164448390563. Kindly register yourself as soon as possible to not miss out on this lecture, given that there are limited number of seats!

The lecture will be held online on Zoom and will also be simultaneously be live-streamed on YouTube. The registration link provides for all the necessary information regarding this.

For any further queries or for additional information regarding the Fall 2021 Lecture Series or other initiatives of Jindal Society of International Law, kindly visit our website.You can also follow and engage with us on LinkedIn, Twitter and Instagram!

A thought-provoking and much welcome contribution was posted by Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Burkhard Hess on SSRN, setting the stage for the discussion on the status quo in the application and the prospects of the Brussels IbisRegulation.

The article, titled “Reforming the Brussels Ibis Regulation: Perspectives and Prospects”, may be retrieved here.

The abstract reads as follows:

According to article 79 of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, the EU Commission shall present a report on the application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation by 11 January 2022. This paper intends to open the discussion about the present state of affairs and the necessary adjustments of the Regulation. Although there is no need to change its basic structure, the relationship of the Brussels Ibis Regulation with other EU instruments (as the General Data Protection Regulation) should be reviewed. There is also a need to address third-State relationships and cross-border collective redress. In addition, the paper addresses several inconsistencies within the present Regulation evidenced by the case law of the CJEU: such as the concept of contract (article 7 no 1), the place of damage (article 7 no 2), the protection of privacy and the concept of consumers (articles 17 – 19). Finally, some implementing procedural rules of the EU Member States should be harmonised, i.e. on the assessment of jurisdiction by national courts, on judicial communication and on procedural time limits. Overall, the upcoming review of the Brussels Ibis Regulation opens up an opportunity to improve further a central and widely accepted instrument of the European law of civil procedure.

The new issue of International & Comparative Law Quarterly (Volume 70, Issue 3) is out. Some of articles concern directly or indirectly questions of private international law. Their abstracts are provided below.

The whole issue is available here. Some of articles are available in open access.

A. Poon, Determining the Place of Performance under Article 7(1) of the Brussels I Recast, pp. 635-663

This article calls for a reassessment of the methodology in determining the place of contractual performance under Article 7(1) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast. The first part of the article deals with Article 7(1)(a). It argues that in light of the adoption of autonomous linking factors under Article 7(1)(b), more types of contracts presently not covered within the ambits of Article 7(1)(b) should centralise jurisdiction at the places of performance of their characteristic obligations. The second part of the article considers the way Article 7(1) operates when there are multiple places of performance under the contract. The test devised by the Court of Justice of the European Union in this regard is not only difficult to apply, but the application of the test also often does not guarantee a close connection between the claim and the court taking jurisdiction. This article argues that when a claim is made in respect of a contractual obligation to be performed in more than one Member State, Article 4 should be applied instead of Article 7(1).

A. Xu, A New Solution Concerning Choice-of-Law for the Assignment of Debts, pp. 665-696. Available in open access.

This article explores a solution to the choice-of-law issues concerning both voluntary and involuntary assignments arising in a domestic forum. The focus is on English private international law rules relating to cross-border assignments. A distinction is made between primary and extended parties as the foundation for choice-of-law analysis. Drawing on insights from the distinction of the use value and exchange value of debts found in economics, this article proposes a new analytical framework for choice-of-law based on a modified choice-of-law theory of interest-analysis.

S. Caserta, P. Cebulak, Resilience Techniques of International Courts in Times of Resistance to International Law, pp. 737-768

International courts are increasingly called upon to adjudicate socially divisive disputes. They are therefore exposed to a heightened risk of backlash that questions their authority and impedes the implementation of their judgments. This article puts forward an analytical framework for mapping the resilience techniques used by international courts to counter this growing resistance. Case studies involve the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has been cautious in its stance regarding democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland, and the Caribbean Court of Justice, which has engaged in legal diplomacy while adjudicating both on the land rights of indigenous groups and on Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer and Intersex (LGBTQI) rights. It is argued that, in order to effectively avoid and mitigate backlash, international courts should deploy resilience techniques that go beyond merely exercising their judicial function. The successful deployment of resilience techniques can allow international courts to become significant actors in global governance during a time of crisis for the international liberal order.

Non lieu à renvoi

Non lieu à renvoi

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel d'Aix-en-Provence du 29 mars 2021

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel de Paris du 3 mars 2021

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel de Paris du 3 mars 2021

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel d'Aix-en-Provence du 26 janvier 2021

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel de Paris du 29 septembre 2020

The Centre for Private International Law (CPIL) of the University of Aberdeen is pleased to host its first postgraduate conference, which is to be held on 17 November 2021. The Postgraduate Law Conference aims at bringing together early career scholars working in the private international law field or at the intersection of European Union law and Private International Law. The purpose is for scholars to present their research before esteemed peers with relevant expertise and receive valuable feedback for further development from academic experts.

The Conference will include panels on Private International Law aspects of International Family Law, International Commercial Law and ADR as well as European Union Law and will be complete with the unrivalled expertise of the Members and Associate Members of the CPIL and external scholars. For a full list of the participating scholars and to download the Call for Papers form, please click here. The deadline for the Call for Papers is 31 August 2021.

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel d'Orléans du 26 janvier 2021

Tribunal judiciaire de Meaux

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel de Paris du 16 février 2021

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel d'Aix-en-Provence du 4 février 2021

This guest  post was written by Ahmed Alzaabi, a legal researcher based at Abu Dhabi. It is great material for comparative conflicts purposes, as it highlights issues like ‘clearly demonstrated’ choice of court, hybrid jurisdiction clauses, and lex contractus for choice of court. Geert.

Introduction

The Dubai International Financial Center Court of Appeal (DIFC CA) delivered an interesting judgment in Goel and others v Credit Suisse (Switzerland) Limited [CA-002-2021} on 26 April 2021, which addresses the DIFC Courts opt-in jurisdiction. It is the most important decision since the opt-in clauses came into force in 2011. The case deals with personal guarantees entered into by Goel and others as Guarantors, and Credit Suisse AG as Lender. A term of the guarantee agreements refers to the jurisdiction of the “Courts of Dubai”.

An ex parte application was filed before the DIFC Court of First Instance (CFI) and was dismissed by H.E. Justice Ali Al Madhani on ground that the words “Courts of Dubai” were not specific, clear and express as required by Article 5(A)(2) of the DIFC Judicial Authority Law[i] (“JAL”) to opt-in into the DIFC jurisdiction.

The application was appealed and determined by Justice Wayne Martin, who ruled that the DIFC CFI has the jurisdiction to hear and decide any substantive claim filed by the Respondent. Justice Wayne Martin issued a world-wide freezing order (WFO) against the Guarantors and the order was appealed on the basis that the jurisdiction term in the Guarantee Agreements refers to the Courts of Dubai, and not to the DIFC Courts, therefore, the DIFC Courts shall have no jurisdiction to decide on this matter. The DIFC CA dismissed the appeal and upheld the ruling of Justice Wayne Martin.

Overview of the dispute:

• Description of the parties. Credit Suisse AG (was a DIFC Establishment), and Credit Suisse (Switzerland) LIMITED (Respondent) are both subsidiary banks wholly owned by a Credit Suisse Group (a company registered in Switzerland). Goel and others (Appellants) are shareholders and directors of GP FZC (a parent company of GP Group of companies and offices all over the world).

• Facts. On 13 May 2016, the Appellants entered into Guarantee Agreements with the Credit Suisse AG guarantying the performance of various borrowers of GP Group under a Credit Facility Agreement. Furthermore, on September 2016, Guarantee Transfer Agreements were signed between the Credit Suisse AG and the Appellants providing for the transfer of the rights and obligations of the guarantees to benefit the Respondent. The Appellants undertook to perform their obligations toward the Respondent as if the Respondent has been a party to the original Guarantee Agreements. At the time of signing the Guarantee and Transfer Agreements, the Credit Suisse AG was a “DIFC Establishment” within the definition of DIFC JAL. Neither Appellants nor Respondent were a DIFC Establishment.

The Guarantee Agreements provide in its clause 16 that the governing law is the Law of the Emirate of Dubai and the Applicable Federal Law of the United Arab Emirates. Clause 17 of the Guarantees (enforcement provision) refers to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Dubai, and clause 17.1 entitles the lender, Credit Suisse AG, to initiate legal proceedings before any other competent court. On the other hand, clause 7 of the Guarantee Transfer Agreements[ii] refers to the applicable law and jurisdiction, which states that any contractual or non- contractual obligations of the Transfer Agreements shall be governed by the Laws of the Emirate of Dubai, and the applicable Federal Laws of the United Arab Emirates. In addition, any dispute arising out of the Transfer Agreements which relates to any provisions of the Guarantees (as transferred and amended) shall be subject to the same jurisdictional provisions of the Guarantee Agreements.

• Proceedings. The Respondent filed an application before the DIFC CFI requesting for a world-wide freezing order (WFO) to restrain the Appellants from dealing or disposing of their assets until the determination of the Respondent’s substantive claim. The CFI dismissed the claim on the ground that it has no jurisdiction, and stated that the order sought would have been granted if the court has the jurisdiction, as the Respondent made all the grounds for making such order. The Respondent appealed that decision, and the CA allowed the appeal and upheld that the judge of CFI should have granted that order on the basis that there is a good arguable case to the extent that the court has the jurisdiction. The CA added that, the CFI judge should have leave it open to the Appellants to challenge the court’s jurisdiction. Following this decision, the WFO was issued on 13 September 2020 and served on the Appellants. The Appellants filed an application to challenge the court’s jurisdiction arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue that decision, and requested to dismiss the proceedings. Justice Martin, the assigned judge to hear the Appellants’ application, dismissed the application and held that DIFC Courts had the jurisdiction to hear and determine the Respondent’s substantive claim and the WFO against the Appellants, and he published his interesting reasoning for that decision on 4 October 2020.

• CFI Decision. It was common ground for the judge and the parties that the applicable law governing the guarantees are the laws of the Emirate of Dubai and the applicable Federal Law of the United Arab Emirates. Justice Martin referred to Article 6 of the JAL, which provides that “the Court shall apply the DIFC Laws and Regulations, except where the parties have explicitly agreed to another law to govern the dispute, provided that that law doesn’t contradict with the public policy and morals”. Accordingly, he pointed that this article clarifies that the parties may select another governing law than DIFC Laws. However, the choice made by the parties will not place the dispute outside the DIFC Courts jurisdiction.

Justice Martin then focused on whether the Court has the jurisdiction to enter the WFO in support of the Respondent’s substantive claim. He had to determine a question of if the Respondent could establish that the claim against the Appellants passed through one or other of the “gateways” to the jurisdiction of the CFI as stipulated in Article 5 of the JAL. His finding was that the only available “gateway” is Article 5(A)(2) of the JAL, which states the following: “the Court of First Instance may hear and determine any civil or commercial claims or actions where the parties agree in writing to file such claim or action with it whether before or after the dispute arises, provided that such agreement is made pursuant to specific, clear and express provisions”. He further noted that the Respondent submitted and Appellants denied that clauses 17.1 and 17.2 of the Guarantee Agreements constitute an agreement in writing within the meaning of Article (5)(A)(2) of the JAL.

Justice Martin analysed the UAE Civil Transactions Code as a governing law applied to the contract and cited Articles 258 and 265, which address the intention of the parties to a contract. He also looked at a commentary on the Civil Transactions Code approved by the Ministry of Justice. The result of his analysis is that: “the both UAE legal system and the common law require the Court to confirm the join intention of the parties. The joint intention could be ascertained by interpreting words which the parties have used to record their agreement objectively, as they would be understood by a reasonable business person having the knowledge of the circumstances known to the parties at the time they entered into their contract”.

Justice Martin then referred to three prior decisions of DIFC Courts (Sunteck, Taalem, and IGPL), in which the CA rejected the proposition that the words “Dubai Courts” mean only non-DIFC Courts. He extracted from these three decisions the following propositions:

(a) it is not mandatory for the contract to specifically refer to the jurisdiction of the “DIFC Courts” to consider the gateway to the jurisdiction specified by Article 5(A)(2) of the JAL;

(b) the Court is to determine the question whether the joint intention of the parties meant to select the jurisdiction of DIFC Courts to hear such kind of dispute;

(c) that question could be resolved by referring to the natural and ordinary meaning of the jurisdictional words as the parties would have been mutually understood them having regard to the circumstances, the nature of the agreement and the context in which the words are used;

(d) if the Court concluded that the parties intended to refer to the DIFC jurisdiction when using the words recorded in their contract, those words will satisfy the requirements set by Article 5(A)(2) ““specific, clear and express provisions”;

(e) the words (Dubai Courts) or (Courts of Dubai) in their natural and ordinary meaning refer to all courts established in the Emirates of Dubai, including the DIFC Courts and the non-DIFC Courts;

(f) if one of the parties was a DIFC establishment at the time of signing a jurisdiction agreement, the other party would have taken into consideration and understood that the DIFC Courts, by default, would have the exclusive jurisdiction within Dubai to hear and determine any dispute arising out of that agreement. It would require a clear and express words to come to the result that the parties’ mutual intention is to exclude the jurisdiction of DIFC Courts.

Justice Martin selected the IGPL among the other two decisions, although it was an opt-out and not op-in case, but it shares common facts which are relevant to the question that the judge has to decide. The similarities with IGPL being (a) the relevant agreements were governed by the applicable Laws of UAE; (b) the words used in the jurisdiction agreements were identical (c) one of the party was a DIFC establishment at the time that the jurisdiction agreements were signed. Given those similarities, Justice Martin was bound to apply the reasoning in IGPL to conclude that clause 17.1 of the Guarantee Agreements indicates the mutual intention of the parties at the time that the agreements were signed. He highlighted that Credit Suisse AG was a DIFC Establishment at the time the guarantee agreements were signed. This constitutes a strong indication that the mutual intention of the parties was to include DIFC Courts within the meaning of the words “Courts of Dubai”. There was no indication of mutual intention of the parties to exclude DIFC Courts jurisdiction.

The judge stated the following circumstances which support the proposition that the words ‘Courts of Dubai’ should hold ordinary meaning to include DIFC Courts: “(a) the agreements are all in English language (the DIFC Courts operate in English); (b) Credit Suisse AG is a Foreign Company, incorporated in Switzerland; (c) a number of the borrowers under the Credit Facility Agreement were incorporated in foreign jurisdictions; (d) the Guarantors are all Indian nationals with Indian passports; and (e) clause 17.3 of each Guarantee expressly recognises the prospect of enforcement proceedings in foreign jurisdictions. These circumstances support the proposition that the parties have intended to refer to a court within the Emirate of Dubai which has an international characteristic as well as an onshore court of Dubai.

• DIFC CA Decision. The Appellants challenged the CFI decision after the permission of appeal has been granted and provided that the CFI does not have jurisdiction to determine the substantive claim against the Appellants including the WTO application. The appeal was unsuccessful. The CA upheld that the jurisdiction clause used in the contract was a solid agreement to opt-in to the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction in accordance with article 5 (A)(2) of the JAL. The CA added that when the term “the courts of Dubai” is used in an agreement, it has an ordinary meaning that refers to all courts incorporated within the Emirate of Dubai, including DIFC’s and non-DIFC’s Courts. Furthermore, the CA confirmed that the intention of the parties when they signed the agreement with a DIFC Establishment did not change the obligations on the Appellants when the Guarantee Transfer Agreements are signed in favour of a non DIFC Establishment. The CA then looked at the question of whether the clarity of the term “the courts of Dubai” is enough for the purposes of the gateway to jurisdiction within Article 5(A) (2) of the JAL.  The CA added that if as a matter of contractual construction, the parties had intended to agree that the DIFC Courts should have jurisdiction over their disputes, it would be a triumph of form over substance to hold that they failed because they did not use the term “DIFC Courts. On that note, the CA ruled that the parties’ contract was “specific, clear and express” enough to opt-in to the jurisdiction of the DIFC Court.

The CA highlighted in its conclusion that the construction of terms such as “courts of Dubai” will rely upon their context. Moreover, the transactions’ history matter in this case is significant to the constructional conclusion.

• Conclusion. This case points out that the parties wishing to include or exclude DIFC jurisdiction should use a clear and express language in their contract to minimise jurisdictional disputes risk and avoid any ambiguity.

Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd v Browitt [2021] FCA 653 is a great addition to the comparative conflicts binder, particularly from the angle of ‘consent’ in business to consumer contracts. It also engages a classic tripartite relation between the consumer, signing a contract with a travel agent, whose GTCS in turn incorporate the GTCS of the carrier.

The case follows on from the December 2019 volcanic eruption at Whakaari.  (Mrs Browitt), for herself and as representative of the deceased estates of her late husband Paul and late daughter Krystal, and Stephanie (Ms Browitt), a daughter who survived the eruption with horrific injuries, are suing Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd (RCCL), a Liberian registered company headquartered and operating in Miami, Florida, in the courts at Miami. There are applicable law and procedural advantages (incl discovery and trial (both on culpability and level of damages) by jury).

RCL Cruises Ltd (RCL) and RCCL apply for anti-suit in the FCA arguing that the Browitts were passengers on the Ovation of the Seas pursuant to a contract of carriage between the Browitts and RCL as the disponent owner and operator of the vessel. They seek a declaration that it was a term of the contract, signed at Flight Centre in Victoria, Australia, that any disputes between the parties would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of New South Wales.

The list of issues to be determined is long but I repeat it here anyways for they highlight the complexity of issues following a routine purchase of a cruise:

(1)    Was Flight Centre the agent of Mrs Browitt, RCL or both?

(2)    Were the RCL AU terms, including the exclusive jurisdiction clause, incorporated into the contract of carriage by: (a)    reference in the Flight Centre terms and conditions signed by Mrs Browitt on 14 February 2019? (b)    the text of a Royal Caribbean brochure? (c)    links on the RCL AU website? (d)    links in emails? (e)    links in the electronic guestbook?

(3)    As to the construction of the RCL AU terms: (a)    is RCL entitled to invoke the exclusive jurisdiction clause to restrain the Florida proceedings? (b)    is RCCL entitled to rely on the exclusive jurisdiction clause? (c)    did the purchase of insurance exclude the operation of the terms (cl 1)? (The respondents later dropped reliance on the purchase of insurance as excluding the operation of the exclusive jurisdiction clause, so this issue fell away.) (d)    does the contract of carriage apply to shore excursions (cl 25)? If not, does the exclusive jurisdiction clause nonetheless operate to restrain the Florida proceedings? (e)    does the exclusive jurisdiction clause permit a proceeding to be brought in the Federal Court of Australia sitting in New South Wales, and if not, what consequence follows from the commencement of this proceeding (cl 1, cl 37/38)? (f)    does the exclusive jurisdiction clause cover the Florida proceeding?

(4)    Is RCCL entitled to relief on the basis of the RCL AU terms?

(5)    Is the Florida proceeding vexatious and oppressive such that RCL and RCCL are entitled to an anti-suit injunction?

The judge held that although the Browitts were bound by the RCL AU terms, the Florida proceeding is not in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction agreement in those terms because RCCL is not a party to the agreement and RCCL does not enjoy the benefit of it. Also, there is no basis for the alternative case that the Florida proceeding is in any event vexatious and oppressive such as to justify an order restraining Mrs Browitt and Ms Browitt from pursuing it.

Terms and conditions were available on relevant websites and brochures, shown to and browsed by Mrs Browitt but not for the purposes of terms and conditions. Rather, as one would expect, for details of the journey, vessels etc. Unlike a quote, the eventual invoice included as part of the document three pages of booking terms and conditions. Some of those were highlighted in the copy made available to Mrs Browitt  Mrs Browitt could have read the GTCS but there was no inidcation she had or had been specifically pointed to them. Nothing in either version of the invoice, i.e., that which was printed for and signed by Mrs Browitt and that which was emailed by the agency, identifies which of RCCL and RCL was offering the cruise or operating the vessel.

The judgment, which I would invite readers to consult, eventually boils down to limitations of ‘agency’, privity of contract, and clear determination of contractual clauses. It does not decide for the Browitts on the basis of a particular concern for the weaker party in a classic B2C transaction, rather on the need for parties clearly to think through their spaghetti bowl of overlapping arrangements and GTCs when hoping to rely on them in court.

Geert.

Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd v Browitt [2021] FCA 653
Consumer contracts, exclusive choice of court, privity (and sloppy drafting)
|Federal Court clears the way for victims of the White Island Volcano to sue in Florida https://t.co/qGjGc4DUaQ

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 13, 2021

To celebrate the 25th anniversary of the HCCH 1996 Child Protection Convention, the HCCH is pleased to announce the launch of the Advancing and Promoting the Protection of All Children (Approach) Initiative!

The HCCH|Approach Initiative will consist of a series of activities and events culminating in the HCCH|Approach Event, to be held online on Tuesday 19 October 2021. Information on registration and the programme of the HCCH|Approach Event will be made available in due course.

Leading up to the HCCH|Approach Event, the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH is organising two competitions: the HCCH|Approach Essay Competition, and the HCCH|Approach Media and Design Competition. Entries can be submitted up until Friday 1 October 2021, 5.00 p.m. (CEST).

More information on the HCCH|Approach Initiative and its competitions is available here.

This post is published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law (HCCH).