Agrégateur de flux

Symeon Symeonides posted on SSRN the Annual Survey of American Choice-of-Law Cases for 2019, now in its 33rd year.

This is the Thirty-Third Survey of American Choice-of-Law Cases. It was written at the request of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws. It is intended as a service to fellow teachers and to students of conflicts law, both inside and outside of the United States. Its purpose remains the same as it has been in the previous 32 years: to inform, rather than to advocate. This Survey covers cases decided by American state and federal appellate courts during 2019 and posted on Westlaw by December 31, 2019. Of the 1,404 appellate cases that meet these parameters, the Survey focuses on those cases that may contribute something new to the development or understanding of conflicts law—and in particular choice of law. The Survey proceeds in four parts. The first describes fourteen cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. The second part discusses judgments delineating the reach of federal law in cases with foreign elements (extraterritoriality). The third part focuses on the choice-of-law part of conflicts law, in both interstate and international cases. The fourth part deals with the recognition of sister state and foreign country judgments, as well as domestic and international arbitral awards.

In C-15/19 A.m.a. – Azienda Municipale Ambiente SpA v Consorzio Laziale Rifiuti, Kokott AG opined mid-January. Her opinion relies heavily on the specific provisions which the Landfill Directive 1999/31 includes for what one could effectively call legacy issues in waste management: how does one roll-out stricter requirements, including with respect to polluter pays, unto landfill sites that were already in existence?

I shall not repeat said provisions for the Advocate General does so extensively. Suffice to say that her reasoned roll-out of the polluter pays principle (she puts the onus on the landfill sites’ operators; principles of legal certainty do not allow to charge those having deposited the waste at the site retroactively to pay for longer aftercare) is based to a large degree on the window which the Directive foresaw for Member States to close down sites whom they did not think could be expected to meet the new Directive’s stricter obligations before its lenghthy implementation periods; and on the fact that the operators of these sites, unlike the depositors of waste, can be expected to be properly au fait with its aftercare requirements and hence also of the proper amount of charges to be invoiced to users of the site.

Another good example of EU environmental /waste law not quite being the environmental zealot which its critics often try to make of it.

Geert.

Kokott AG #CJEU C-15/19 https://t.co/ktkeQlqP6X.#Waste, landfill Directive, polluter pays
Application of aftercare provisions to landfill sites in use before Dir entered into force (EIF & passing on increased costs for same to waste holders who used the site before that same EIF

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 16, 2020

Compared to January (with the hearings I had announced here, plus AG Szpunar’s opinion on Rina, delivered on the 14th), February 2020 will be a quiet month at the Court in terms of private international law, with just AG Bobek’s opinion in FX v GZ (case C-41/19) being scheduled for the 27th.

The case concerns both the Maintenance Regulation and the Brussels I bis Regulation, in the context of judicial proceedings instituted in Germany whereby the applicant, residing in Germany, tries to resist the enforcement of a Polish decision to pay monthly maintenance for his daughter.

As grounds for his application, the applicant argues that the defendant’s maintenance claim underlying the Polish decision had been settled by payment (for the record, the Polish judgment was given in 2009; the request for enforcement in Germany was filed in 2016).

The referring court hesitates about its jurisdiction. If the application opposing enforcement made by the applicant constitutes a matter relating to maintenance for the purposes of Article 1 of the Maintenance Regulation, then no international jurisdiction of the court seised results from the Regulation, since the conditions of Article 3 of the Maintenance Regulation are evidently not satisfied.

By contrast, the courts in Poland, where the order was made, would, pursuant to Article 3(a) and (b) of the Regulation, be directly called upon to deal with the applicant’s defence of fulfilment. Conversely, the view that applications opposing enforcement are not matters relating to maintenance within the meaning of the maintenance Regulation is the prevailing opinion in Germany, where it is argued that the objective of an application against opposing enforcement is directed solely against the enforcement itself, which is not covered by the manintenance Regulation.

Should the latter view on the interpretation of the maintenance Regulation be right, the question arises whether proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments within the meaning of Article 24(5) of the Brussels I bis Regulation are involved. In this regard, the German court claims that an answer is not apparent from the decisions of the Court of Justice in AS Autoteile Service (case C-220/84) and in Prism Investments (case C-139/10).

At the same time, because both decisions concerned general civil and commercial matters and were delivered before the entry into force of the Maintenance Regulation and the Brussels I bis Regulation – which, according to its Article 1(2)(e), is not intended to cover matters relating to maintenance – the court doubts they are transferable to matters relating to maintenance.

While waiting for AG Bobek’s opinion, I would like to add that another request for a preliminary ruling on the maintenance Regulation is pending (still at an early stage) where its relationship with the Brussels I bis Regulation for the purposes of interpretation is also at stake.

Les cartons ont été faits la semaine dernière. Ce lundi 3 février, les magistrats du parquet de Paris inaugurent leur nouvelle organisation. S’ils sont toujours rassemblés à travers six divisions, de nombreuses sections ont joué aux chaises musicales, non sans susciter quelques inquiétudes.

en lire plus

In an unprecedented manner, the UK has dealt with its problems around Brexit and its relations with the Contracting States to two HCCH Conventions on the international plane. The Depositary (i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) has just announced that the UK has withdrawn its instruments of ratification of the HCCH Child Support Convention and instrument of accession to the HCCH Choice of Court Convention, together with its declarations and extension to Gibraltar, which actually never came into effect and were apparently only a backup option to a no-deal Brexit; see our previous posts (“some Brexit news” part 1, part 2 and part 3 and the more recent post “Brexit: No need to stop all the clocks” here).

As stated in the notification, the reason for the withdrawal of the instruments is the following: “Since the deposit of the Instrument of [Ratification and Accession], the United Kingdom and the European Union have signed, ratified and approved a Withdrawal Agreement, which will enter into force on 1 February 2020 (the “Withdrawal Agreement”). The Withdrawal Agreement includes provisions for a transition period to start on the date the Withdrawal Agreement enters into force and end on 31 December 2020 (the “transition period”). In accordance with the Withdrawal Agreement, during the transition period, European Union law, including the Agreement, will continue to be applicable to and in the United Kingdom” (our emphasis).

In its Note, the UK adds that it intends to deposit new instruments of ratification of and accession to the above-mentioned Conventions prior to the termination of the transition period. It remains to be seen whether the UK will submit the same declarations and whether it will extend those Conventions to Gibraltar.

The Depositary’s notifications are available here for the Child Support Convention and here for the Choice of Court Convention.

The last issue of the Revue critique de droit international privé has been released. It is a special edition on the Cloud Act and the General Regulation on Data Protection.

The abstracts of the articles, authored by Marie-Elodie Ancel, Patrick Jacob, Régis Bismuth and Théodore Christakis, are available here.

A full table of contents is available here.

As of today, Brexit has become reality – one more reason to think about the EU’s Judicial Cooperation with third states:

The largest proportion of EU economic growth in the 21st century is expected to arise in trade with third countries. This is why the EU is building up trade relations with many states and other regional integration communities in all parts of the world. The latest example is the EU-MERCOSUR Association Agreement concluded on 28 June 2019. With the United Kingdom’s exit of the Union on 31 January 2020, extra-EU trade with neighboring countries will further increase in importance. Another challenge for the EU is China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”, a powerful global development strategy that includes overland as well as sea routes in more than 100 states around the globe.

The increasing volume of trade with third states will inevitably lead to a rise in the number and importance of commercial disputes. This makes mechanisms for their orderly and efficient resolution indispensable. China is already setting up infrastructures for commercial dispute resolution alongside its belts and roads. In contrast, there seems to be no elaborate EU strategy on judicial cooperation in civil matters with countries outside of the Union, despite the DG Trade’s realisation that “trade is no longer just about trade”. Especially, there is no coherent plan for establishing mechanisms for the coordination of cross-border dispute resolution and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments. This is a glaring gap in the EU’s policy making in external trade relations (see also, in an earlier post by Matthias Weller  on CoL on this matter: Mutual trust and judicial cooperation in the EU’s external relations – the blind spot in the EU’s Foreign Trade and Private International Law policy?).

This is why the Bonn group of PIL colleagues – Moritz Brinkmann, Nina Dethloff, Matthias Lehmann, Philipp Reuss, and Matthias Weller – are hosting a conference on Friday and Saturday, 25 and 26 September 2020, at the University of Bonn that seeks to explore ways in which judicial cooperation in civil matters between the EU and third countries can be improved by the Hague Judgments Convention of 2019 as an important driver, if not game changer, of legal certainty in cross-border commercial relations.

The list of speakers includes internationally leading scholars, practitioners and experts from the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), the European Commission (DG Trade, DG Justice), and the German Ministry of Justice and for Consumers (Bundesjustizministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz).

For the HCCH as co-host, the event will be the European stop on their roadshow around the world to discuss their new Convention. The Conference will be further co-hosted by the Zentrum für europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht at the University of Bonn and The International Litigation Exchange (ILEX).

The Organizers will kindly ask participants to contribute with € 75.- to the costs of the event.  

Date:

Friday, 25 September 2020, and Saturday, 26 September 2020.

Venue:

Bonner Universitätsforum, Heussallee 18 – 22

Draft Programme

Friday, 25 September 2020

1.30 p.m.      Registration

2 p.m.           Welcome note

Prof Dr Wulf-Henning Roth, University of Bonn, Director of the Zentrum für Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht (ZEW)

2.10 p.m.      Part 1: Chances and Challenges of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019

Chairs of Part 1: Matthias Weller / Matthias Lehmann

Keynote: Hague Conference’s Perspective and Experiences

Hans van Loon, Former Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Hague

1. Scope of application

Prof Dr Xandra Kramer, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam

2. Judgments, Recognition, Enforcement

Prof Dr Wolfgang Hau, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich

Discussion

3.30 p.m.      Coffee Break

4.00 p.m.      Part 2: Chances and Challenges of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 continued

Chairs of Part 2: Nina Dethloff / Moritz Brinkman

3. Jurisdictional filters

Prof Dr Pietro Franzina, Catholic University of Milan

4. Grounds for refusal

Prof Dr Paco Garcimartín, University of Madrid

Discussion

5.30 p.m.      Part 3: Panel Discussion – Prospects for Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters between the EU and Third Countries, 60 min:

Chairs of Part 3: Matthias Weller / Matthias Lehmann

Colin Brown, Unit Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of Trade Policy, DG Trade (tbc); Andreas Stein, Head of Unit, DG JUST – A1 “Civil Justice”; Dr. Jan Teubel, German Ministry of Justice and for Consumers; RA Dr. Heiko Heppner, Attorney at Law (New York), Barrister and Solicitor Advocate (England and Wales), Chair of ILEX, Head of Dispute Resolution, Partner Dentons, Frankfurt, and perhaps more…

Discussion

7 p.m.           Conference Dinner

Saturday

9.30 a.m.      Part 4: The context of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019

Chairs: Moritz Brinkmann/Philipp Reuss

5. Relation to the HCCH 2005 Convention Choice of Court Agreements

Prof Paul Beaumont, University of Stirlin

6. Relations to the Brussels Regime / Lugano Convention

Prof Marie-Elodie Ancel, Université Paris-Est Crétei

7. Brexit…

Dr Pippa Rogerson, Reader in Private International Law, Faculty of Law, Cambridge

Discussion

11:00 a.m.    Coffee Break

11:30 a.m.    Part 4: The context of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 continued

Chairs: Nina Dethloff / Matthias Lehman

8. South European Neighbouring and Candidate Countries

Prof Dr Ilija Rumenov, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia

9. MERCOSUR – EU

Dr Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Director of Internationalisation, Senior Lecturer in International Private Law, School of Law, University of Edinburgh

10. Relations to International Commercial Arbitration

Jose Angelo Estrella-Faria, Former Secretary General of UNIDROIT, Senior Legal Officer UNCITRAL Secretariat, International Trade Law Division Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations (tbc)

Discussion

1 p.m.           Closing Remarks

                     Matthias Weller

La Cour de justice prend acte du retrait du Royaume-Uni de l’Union européenne

Written by Jonathan Fitchen.

‘The time has come’; a common enough phrase which may, depending on the reader’s mood and temperament, be attributed variously to Lewis Carroll’s discursive Walrus, to Richard Wagner’s villainous Klingsor, or to the conclusion of Victor Hugo’s epigrammatic comment      to the effect that nothing is as powerful as an idea whose time has come. In the present context however ‘the time has come’ refers more prosaically to another step in the process described as ‘Brexit’ by which the UK continues to disentangle itself from the EU.

On the 31st of January 2020 at 24.00 CET (23.00 UK time) the UK ceases to be an EU Member State. This event is one that some plan to celebrate and other to mourn. For those interested in private international law and the conflict of laws in the EU or in the legal systems of the UK, celebration is unlikely to seem apt. Whether for the mundane reason that the transition period of the Withdrawal Agreement preserves the practical application and operation of most EU law concerning our subject in the UK and within the EU27 until the projected end point of 31st December 2020, or for deeper reasons connected with the losses to the subject that the EU and the UK must each experience due to the departure of the UK from the EU. If celebration is not appropriate must we therefore opt to mourn? This post suggests that mourning is not the only option (nor if overindulged is it a useful option) and sets out some thoughts on the wider implications for the private international laws of the UK’s legal systems and the legal systems that will comprise the EU27 consequent on the UK’s departure.

This exercise is necessarily speculative and very much a matter of what one wishes to include in or omit from the equation under construction. If too little is included, the result may be of only abstract relevance; if too much is included, the equation may be incapable of solution and hence useless for the intended purpose of calculation. Such difficulties, albeit expressed in a non-mathematical form, are familiar to private international lawyers who while engaging with their subject routinely consider the macroscopic, the microscopic and many points in between. In what remains of this post I will offer some thoughts that hopefully will provoke further thoughts while avoiding useless abstraction and (at least for present purposes) ‘useless’ incalculability.

The loudest calls for the UK to leave the EU did not arise from UK private international law, nor from its practitioners; few UK private international lawyers appear to have wished for Brexit as a means of reforming private international law. Whatever appeals to nostalgia may have swayed opinions in other sectors of the UK and may have induced those within them to vote to leave, they were not expressed with reference to matters of private international law. Few who remember or know the law as it stood in any of the UK’s legal systems prior to the implementation of the UK’s accession to the Brussels Convention of 1968 would willingly journey back to the law as it then stood and regard it as an upgrade. Mercifully, aspects of this view are, at present, apparently shared by the UK Government and account for its wish, after ‘copying and pasting’ most EU law and private international law into the novel domestic category of ‘retained EU Law’, to then amend and allow that which does not depend on reciprocity to be re-presented as a domestic private international law to be applied within and by the UK’s legal systems: thus the Rome I and Rome II Regulations will be eventually so ‘imitated’ within the legal systems of the UK. Unfortunately, many other EU provisions do require reciprocity, and thus cannot be ‘saved’ in this manner; for these provisions the news in the UK is less good.  

There are however other available means of salvage. Because the UK will no longer be an EU Member State at 24.00 Brussels Time it may, but for the Withdrawal Agreement, thereafter participate more fully in proceedings and projects at the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The UK plans to domestically clarify the domestic understanding of certain existing Hague conventions, e.g. 1996 Parental Responsibility Convention, via the recently announced Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill 2019. Earlier in 2018 the UK deposited instruments of accession concerning conventions it plans to ratify at the end of the Withdrawal Agreement’s transition period to attempt to retain prospectively the salvageable aspects of certain reciprocity requiring EU private international law Regulations lost via Brexit: thus, the UK plans to ratify the 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the 2007 Maintenance Convention. After these ratifications it may be that the UK will also consider the ratification of the 2019 judgment enforcement convention, particularly it the EU takes this option too. In the medium and long term however, the UK, assuming it wishes to participate in an active sense, will have to accept the practical limitations of the HCCH as it (the UK) becomes accustomed to the differences, difficulties and frustrations of private international law reform via optional instruments that all the intended parties are entitled to refuse to opt-in to or ratify.

Over the medium term and longer term, it should additionally be noted that though the UK has left the EU it has not cast-off and sailed away from continental Europe at a speed in excess of normal tectonic progress: there may therefore eventually be further developments between the two. It may be that the UK can be induced at some point in the future, when Brexit has become more mundane and less politically volatile within the UK, to cooperate in relation to private international law in a deeper sense with the EU27; whether by negotiating to join the 2007 Lugano Convention or a new convention pertaining to aspects of private international law. If this last idea seems too controversial then maybe it would be possible for the UK to eventually negotiate with an existing EU Member State as a third country via Regulation 664/2009 or Regulation 662/2009 or perhaps via another yet to be produced Regulation with a somewhat analogous effect? Brexit, considered in terms of private international law, may well re-focus a number of existing questions for the EU27 pertaining to the interaction of its private international law with third States, whether former Member States or not.   

What is however unavoidably lost by Brexit is the UK’s direct influence on the development and particularly the periodic recasting of the EU’s private international law: this loss cuts both ways. For the EU27 the UK will no longer be at the negotiating table to offer suggestions, criticisms and improvements to the texts of new and recast Regulations. For the EU27 this loss is somewhat greater than it might appear from the list of Regulations that the UK did not opt-in to as the terms of the UK’s involvement in these matters permitted it to so participate without having opted-in to the draft Regulation.   

The suggested loss of influence will however probably be felt most acutely by the private international lawyers in the UK. Despite the momentary impetus and excitement of salvaging that which may be salvaged and ratifying that which may be ratified to mitigate the effect of Brexit on private international law, the reality is that we in the UK will have lost two of the motive forces that have seen our subject develop and flourish over decades: viz. the European Commission and the domestic political reaction thereunto. Post-Brexit, once the salvaging (etc.) is done, it seems unlikely that the UK Government will continue to regard a private international law now no longer affected by Commission initiatives or re-casting procedures as retaining its former importance or meriting any greater legislative relevance than other areas of potential law reform. The position may be otherwise in Scotland as private international law is a devolved competence that devolution entrusted to the Scottish Government. It may be that once the dust has settled and the returning UK competence related reforms have been applied that the comparatively EU-friendly Scottish Government may seek to domestically align aspects of Scots private international law with EU law equivalents. For he who would mourn for the effect of Brexit on the subject of private international law, it is the abovementioned loss of influence of the subject at both the EU level and particularly at the domestic level that most merits a brief period of mourning. After this, the natural but presently unanswerable question of, ‘What now?’ occurs. Though speculation is offered above, all in the short term will depend on the progress in negotiations over an unfortunately already shortened but technically still extendable transition period during which the EU and UK are to attempt to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement: thereafter for the medium term and long term all depends on the future political relationship of the EU and the UK.

Slovénie / Croatie
Principes du droit communautaire
La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne n’est pas compétente pour statuer sur un différend frontalier entre la Slovénie et la Croatie, ces deux États membres étant toutefois tenus, en vertu de l’article 4, paragraphe 3, TUE, d’œuvrer loyalement à la mise en place d’une solution juridique définitive à ce différend, conforme au droit international

Today, 31 January 2020, at midnight (11 PM GMT), the United Kingdom will leave the European Union. This is a historic event with innumerable implications, amongst others, for private international law.

However, during the transition period – which expires earliest at the end of 2020 – most things will stay the same. This is thanks to the Withdrawal Agreement, which governs the UK’s divorce from the Union.

The UK will apply EU law, and the EU will, in principle, treat the UK as if it were a Member State (Article 127(1) and (6) of the Withdrawal Agreement). The main exceptions are some institutional provisions, e.g. the participation of the UK in EU bodies, where it will no longer have voting rights (see Article 7(1) and 128(1) of the Withdrawal Agreement).

What will happen after the end of transition period, nobody knows for sure, as the EU and the UK have just started negotiating their future relationship. However, the Withdrawal Agreement makes some provision for the post-transitional period.

Basically, the Regulations on Judicial Cooperation (Brussels I bis, II bis, Rome I, II, the Insolvency Regulation, the Maintenance Regulation, amongst others) will continue to apply to proceedings that have been “instituted” before the end of the transition period, i.e. before 31 December 2020 (Article 66-69 of the Withdrawal Agreement).

Naturally, those EU texts to which the UK was never subject will also not apply after 2020, such as the Succession Regulation.

These transitory provisions seem rather straightforward. However, as always, the devil is in the detail. For starters, it is not easy to determine when proceedings are ‘instituted’ (see this study for the European Parliament, p. 15-16). Moreover, Article 66-69 of the Withdrawal Agreement originally referred only to provisions on ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘recognition and enforcement’. The provisions regarding lis pendens have been later included at the beginning of Article 67 of the Withdrawal Agreement. This is not a model for clear drafting!

One must also not forget that Brexit will change the UK’s relation to non-EU Member States, such as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. With the withdrawal from the EU, the Lugano Convention will no longer apply to the UK. As a consequence, British judgments will be subject to the recognition procedure under national law in the three Lugano States Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, and vice versa. This effect already applies as of tomorrow (1 February 2020)!

The Withdrawal Agreement between the EU and the UK has no impact on this, as it only concerns the relationship between those two parties. Article 129(1) of the Withdrawal Agreement binds the UK to “the obligations stemming from the international agreements concluded by the Union”, but cannot impose obligations on third parties.

The UK has, however, received assurances by Switzerland, Norway and Iceland that they support the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention before the end of the transition period. What is missing so far is the EU’s consent.

One can only hope that the relevant political actors will come to their senses and reestablish the network of binding texts as soon and as comprehensively as possible. Judicial Cooperation is about much more than trade deals. It directly affects every day life of ordinary people.

Le gouvernement vient de déposer un projet de loi relatif au Parquet européen et à la justice pénale spécialisée. Un texte fourre-tout, qui contient plusieurs dispositions sur le parquet national financier, la répression des délits environnementaux, la création de nouvelles peines ou le fonds interprofessionnel d’accès au droit et à la justice. Il sera en débat au Sénat dès le 26 février.

en lire plus