Agrégateur de flux

La chambre sociale se prononce sur les rapports entre le privilège de nationalité de l’article 14 du code civil et l’exception de connexité internationale dans une affaire relevant du droit international privé commun.

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The conclusions of the EC-HCCH Joint Conference on the Cross-border Protection of Vulnerable Adults are now available here.

See also related post by Pietro Franzina here.

 

The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) is seeking to fill a Diplomat Lawyer (Secretary) position. The deadline for applications is 31 December 2018 (12.00 a.m. CET). For more information, click here.

Given diversity of geographic representation and of legal expertise requirements as set out in the HCCH Statute, candidates should preferably not have (exclusively) Swiss, Canadian, Italian, Portuguese, or Singaporean nationality. Currently, there are Diplomat Lawyers of those nationalities at the HCCH.

As announced, “[t]he main priorities for this position currently include the ongoing parentage/surrogacy project and the work relating to the HCCH Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. This said, the successful candidate will be expected to work on any other project or file that the work programme of the HCCH and related resource allocation may require (be it in relation to post-Convention services or the development of legislative projects).”

Marcus Teo has excellent analysis of Shanghai Turbo Enterprises Ltd v Liu Ming [2018] SGHC 172. The issue is well-known in contract law as such and takes one or two special forms in conflicts: what is the fate of a contract as a whole, and /or of contractual clauses individually, when part of a clause is defective.

In the case at issue, the relevant contractual clause read

“This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of Singapore/or People’s Republic of China and each of the parties hereto submits to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Singapore/or People’s Republic of China.”

As far as the choice of court part of this clause is concerned, non-exclusive choice of court comes with strings attached, depending on the laws of the States concerned: under the editorship of Mary Keyes, Michiel Poesen and I have contributed to an extensive comparative volume on same wich is forthcoming. However for choice of law one need not look at the specific laws of a State to appreciate that this clause thus formulated is simply a lame duck. No clear choice of law is made at all. The pragmatic solution is to ignore the useless clause and determine the proper law of the contract in the absence of a valid expression of parties’ autonomy. Yet conceptually an argument can, and has been made that to do so ignores the very high relevance of the lex contractus in the very contract formation – a conceptual quagmire which in EU law is addressed by Rome I’s ‘bootstrap’ principle.

In the case at issue, the High Court follows a pro-validation approach (favor contractus): the invalidity of the choice of law clause does not affect the formation of the main contract. A commercially sensible solution which Marcus analysis critically in excellent detail.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.7.

 

 

Indemnisation des victimes d'infraction

Hamas / Conseil
Relations extérieures
Le Tribunal rejette le recours formé par le Hamas contre les décisions de maintien du gel de ses fonds en tant qu’entité impliquée dans des actes de terrorisme

Thank you Jelle Flo for alerting us to the succinct Belgian Supreme Court ruling of 21 November 2018. A judge had published a scholarly piece on an issue of law, in tempore non suspecto, expressing a point of view which the Advocate General at the Court (here effectively acting as an amicus curiae) in a later specific case, agrees with.

The judiciary does publish regularly-ish. As do solicitors and barristers. For those of us who teach as well as practice, this at most leads to interesting times when opposing counsel or the bench points out a scholarly piece seemingly expressing a different point of view than our submissions; ordinarily, things are distinguishable…

For the judiciary, the Supreme Court sees no issue as long as the piece meets with scientific standards: ‘Le fait qu’un juge ait adopté un point de vue sur une question juridique dans une publication scientifique n’implique pas qu’il ne dispose plus de l’impartialité requise pour connaître d’un litige abordant ce sujet, pourvu qu’il ait développé sa pensée dans le respect des règles de la science du droit.’

The Court does not express guidance on what such standard might be – peer review perhaps comes to mind.

Geert.

En poursuivant les États-régions pour non-respect du taux limite d’émissions de dioxyde d’azote dans de nombreuses villes allemandes, une association de défense de l’allemande a contribué au développement d’une importante jurisprudence au sein des tribunaux administratifs allemands sur l’interdiction de circuler des véhicules diesel. 

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Le juge judiciaire ne peut pas se prononcer sur la légalité de la décision administrative fixant le pays de renvoi, rappelle la Cour de cassation.

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