Agrégateur de flux

The call as posted last week contained an error – the deadline for submission of the poster is not 1 October, but 1 November. My apologies. Find the correct text below.

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The conference Challenge Accepted! Exploring Pathways to Civil Justice in Europe will take place at Erasmus School of Law on 19-20 November. You are invited to join us and young researchers are reminded to send in their poster. The deadline is 1 November 2018

Young researchers will have the possibility to present and discuss their work during the poster on 20 November. Posters should focus on the topics of the conference, and show originality. We invite PhD researchers or young academics to present their research in a poster format. The three best posters will be awarded a prize during the closing drinks.

More information on submitting a poster proposal can be found here.

This conference is organised by Erasmus School of Law at Rotterdam University under the ERC project ‘Building EU Civil Justice’ (www.euciviljustice.eu).

For more information, do not hesitate to contact us at hoevenaars@law.eur.nl (Jos) or biard@law.eur.nl (Alexandre).

Le droit européen ne s’oppose pas à une réglementation nationale qui, tout en prévoyant un appel contre un jugement de première instance confirmant une décision rejetant une demande de protection internationale et imposant une obligation de retour, n’assortit pas cette voie de recours d’un effet suspensif de plein droit. Et ceci même si l’intéressé invoque un risque sérieux de violation du principe de non-refoulement, juge la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne.

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Surendettement

Expert judiciaire

[2018] EWCA Civ 1889 Committeri v Club Med , appeal against Dingeman J’s findings in [2016] EHWC 1510 (QB) featured in a recent resit exam of mine, slightly later reporting therefore. Dingeman J’s analysis was confirmed by the Court of Appeal.

Mr Committeri lived and worked in London. He was injured when climbing an ice wall in Chamonix in France in 2011. He brought proceedings in England against Club Med and their insurers: they had provided the relevant travel and accommodation pursuant to a ‘team-building’ contract with the appellant’s employers, a Bank. The claim is pleaded by reference to that contract and Article L211-16 of the French Code de Tourisme (which imposes strict (safety) liability upon the providers of tourist accomodation: une obligation de résultat); contrary to English law which foresees in une obligation de moyens).

French law has considered that “proper performance of the contract” in a package holiday setting requires the absolute safety of the consumer, so that (unless the exceptions in the Code apply) when there is an injury on a package holiday the organiser will be liable.

The central issue is the proper characterisation of that claim. If it is a contractual claim then English law applies (the lex contractus agreed between the Bank and Club Med) and it is common ground that it will fail. If it is properly characterised as a non-contractual claim, French law applies and it is agreed that it will succeed.

CJEU authorities considered by Coulson LJ were in particular Brogsitter, Ergo, Verein Fur Konsumenteninformation v Amazon, and flightright. 

At 52 Coulson LJ summarises the modus operandi per the European precedents as follows:

‘(a) The mere fact that a contracting party brings a civil liability claim against the other party does not by itself mean that the claim concerns “matters relating to a contract” but it will be sufficient if the conduct complained of may be considered a breach of contract (Brogsitter [24]) or if the purpose of the claim is to seek damages, the legal basis for which can reasonably be regarded as a breach of the rights and obligations set out in the contract (Brogsitter [26]).

(b) Only an obligation freely consented to by one person towards another and on which the claimant’s action is based is a ‘matter relating to contract’ (Ergo [44]).

(c) The classification of an obligation for the purposes of Rome I or Rome II depends on the (contractual or non-contractual) source of that obligation (Amazon, AG’s opinion [48]). A contractual obligation implies at the very least an actual and existing commitment (Amazon [50]).’

I would have added what I called Sharpston AG‘s ‘pedigree’ (one of my students seems to have mistakenly noted this down as ‘Paddy Pee’), ‘ancestry’, or ‘centre of gravity’ test in Ergo.

At 53: ‘On an application of all or any of those principles, it is clear that the pleaded strict liability claim can only be characterised as a contractual claim. …That contract is the source of the relevant obligations and imposed the necessary commitments. To put it another way, to use Judge Waksman’s words in AXA ([2015] EWHC 3431 (Comm), the contract was not “a stepping stone to the ultimate liability of [the respondent but] the basis for the obligation actually relied upon…”.

A very useful reminder of the relevant precedents.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.1.

The conference Challenge Accepted! Exploring Pathways to Civil Justice in Europe will take place at Erasmus School of Law on 19-20 November. You are invited to join us and young researchers are reminded to send in their poster. The deadline is 1 October.

Young researchers will have the possibility to present and discuss their work during the poster on 20 November. Posters should focus on the topics of the conference, and show originality. We invite PhD researchers or young academics to present their research in a poster format. The three best posters will be awarded a prize during the closing drinks.

More information on submitting a poster proposal can be found here.

This conference is organised by Erasmus School of Law at Rotterdam University under the ERC project ‘Building EU Civil Justice’ (www.euciviljustice.eu).

For more information, do not hesitate to contact us at hoevenaars@law.eur.nl (Jos) or biard@law.eur.nl (Alexandre).

Wahl AG advised  last week in Case C-497/17, Oeuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoirs. In this case an NGO requests a certification body to stop certifying as ‘organic’, products obtained from religious slaughter, even though neither Council Regulation 834/2007 nor the Commission implementing Regulation 889/2008 on organic production and labelling of organic products with regard to organic production, labelling and control, mention stunned or unstunned slaughter.

I suggested earlier that the case turns around scope of application, albeit that the shadow of the human rights implications hangs over it. The Advocate General agrees: at 33: ‘the Court is therefore not strictly speaking required to rule on a question of interference with the freedom to manifest one’s religion’. In essence, what is not forbidden is allowed: the legislation on organic farming is silent on the question of ritual slaughter; (at 91) this silence on the matter is not the result of oversight for the ‘slaughter’ of animals is mentioned on several occasions in the legislation – is it just simply not regulated.

I believe the AG is right. I also, on substance, believe that unstunned slaughter, properly carried out, meets with the ethos of organic farming.

Geert.

 

 

 

Rittinger e.a.
Aide d'État
L’avocat général Campos Sánchez-Bordona propose à la Cour de déclarer que la modification du critère d’exigibilité de la contribution qui finance les organismes publics de radiodiffusion en Allemagne n’est pas constitutive d’une aide d’État illégale

Philips et Philips France / Commission
Concurrence
Dans le cadre de l’entente sur le marché des puces pour cartes, la Cour renvoie l’affaire d’Infineon Technologies au Tribunal afin que celui-ci apprécie la proportionnalité de l’amende infligée et rejette le pourvoi formé par Philips

L’exclusion d’une justiciable – simple citoyenne, ne représentant pas l’État – de la salle d’audience d’un tribunal en raison de son refus d’ôter son hijab constitue une « restriction » dans l’exercice par cette dernière du droit de manifester sa religion. Cette restriction poursuit cependant comme but légitime la « protection de l’ordre », afin notamment de prévenir les comportements irrespectueux à l’égard de l’institution judiciaire et/ou perturbateurs du bon déroulement d’une audience. À défaut de comportement irrespectueux ou ne constituant pas – ou ne risquant pas de constituer – une menace pour le bon déroulement de l’audience, la nécessité de la restriction litigieuse ne se trouve pas établie et l’atteinte portée au droit de la requérante à la liberté de manifester sa religion n’est pas justifiée dans une société démocratique.

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Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Paris, pôle 7, 4e chambre de 'l'instruction, 30 juin 2017

Conseil de prud'hommes de Paris, 12 septembre 2018

Tribunal correctionnel de Chartres, 6 septembre 2018

Tribunal correctionnel de Marseille, 10 septembre 2018

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Versailles, chambre sociale, 22 mars 2018