Agrégateur de flux

Achmea
DISC
Selon l’avocat général Wathelet, la clause d’arbitrage incluse dans l’accord conclu entre les Pays-Bas et la Slovaquie sur la protection des investissements est compatible avec le droit de l’Union

Back in March the the Child & Family Law Quarterly together with Cambridge Family Law hosted a conference on the the impact of Brexit on international family law (see our previous post). Some of the academic papers that were presented at this occasion have now been published in a special Brexit issue of the Child & Family Law Quarterly.

Here is the table of content:

• Brexit and international family law from a continental perspective, Anatol Dutta
• Private international law concerning children in the UK after Brexit: comparing Hague Treaty law with EU Regulations, Paul Beaumont
• Divorcing Europe: reflections from a Scottish perspective on the implications of Brexit for cross-border divorce proceedings, Janeen M Carruthers and Elizabeth B Crawford
• What are the implications of the Brexit vote for the law on international child abduction?, Nigel Lowe
• Not a European family: implications of ‘Brexit’ for international family law, Ruth Lamont

 

L’article 13, point 5, du règlement Bruxelles I, considéré conjointement avec l’article 14, point 2, sous a), de ce règlement, doit être interprété en ce sens qu’une victime disposant d’une action directe contre l’assureur de l’auteur du dommage qu’elle a subi n’est pas liée par une clause attributive de juridiction conclue entre cet assureur et cet auteur.

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La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) considère que le Tribunal de l’Union a correctement jugé qu’une initiative citoyenne européenne (ICE) ayant pour objectif d’effacer la dette publique des pays en état de nécessité ne peut être enregistrée.

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Les règles de la directive Accueil du 26 juin 2013 relatives au placement en rétention d’un demandeur d’asile pour établir ou vérifier son identité ou sa nationalité ou lorsqu’il existe un risque de fuite sont compatibles avec le droit fondamental à la liberté. 

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Pourvoi c./ Cour d'appel de Paris, Pôle 5, 23 janvier 2017

Pourvoi c./ Cour d'appel d'Aix en Provence, 5e chambre correctionnelle, 8 février 2017

Cour d'appel de Versailles, 16e Chambre, 7 septembre 2017

Pourvoi c./ Cour d'appel de Paris, Pôle 5, 21 février 2017

Pourvoi c./ Cour d'appel de Nancy, 4ème Chambre des Appels Correctionnels, 12 janvier 2017.

Cour d'appel d'Amiens, Chambre Baux Ruraux, 12 septembre 2017

In Case C-372/16 Sahyouni SAUGMANDSGAARD ØE Opined Friday last (Opinion not yet available in EN at the time of writing of this post; the curia press release on the case helps). The case concerns the scope of application of Rome III, Regulation 1259/2010 (on enhanced co-operation Regulation on divorce and legal separation), as well as the application of its Article 10.  This Article inserts the lex fori for the lex causae, where the lex causae as identified by the Regulation makes no provision for divorce or does not grant one of the spouses equal access to divorce or legal separation on grounds of their sex.

In the previous Sahyouni Case C‑281/15, the request was considered inadmissible for lack of factual beef to the bone to allow the Court to apply its Dzodzi case-law (Joined Cases C‑297/88 and C‑197/89). In that case, the Court had held that the authors of the Treaty did not intend to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court requests for a preliminary ruling on a provision of EU law in the specific case where the national law of a Member State refers to the content of that provision in order to determine rules applicable to a situation which is purely internal to that State and that, on the contrary, it is manifestly in the interest of the EU legal order that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, every provision of EU law should be given a uniform interpretation irrespective of the circumstances in which it is to be applied.

In the case at hand, Rome III is not generally applicable to decisions on divorce and legal separation issued by the authorities of third States. German residual private international law on the matter, however, makes it so applicable.

SAUGMANDSGAARD ØE first of all opines that the national court now does give the CJEU enough information for it to rule on the case. Contrary to what the German legislature
assumed, however, the AG suggests Rome III does not cover divorces which are declared without a constitutive decision of a court or other public authority, such as a divorce resulting from the unilateral declaration of a spouse which is registered by a religious court. Note that the AG for this purpose employs lex fori in the sense of EU law (the Regulation and its preparatory works), to determine whether such divorce is ‘private’ or not; not as might be considered an alternative in the case at hand, Syrian law. Those of us with an interest in Vorfrage may find this interesting.

Next, the AG does complete the analysis should the Court disagree with his view on scope of application. The question whether access to divorce provided for by the foreign law is discriminatory (this is the test of the aforementioned Article 10) must, in the view of the AG, be assessed in the abstract, and not specifically in the light of the circumstances of the case. Therefore, it suffices that the applicable foreign law be discriminatory by virtue of its content for it to be disapplied. This AG suggests that the EU legislature considered that the discrimination at issue, namely that based on the sex of the spouse, is so serious as to warrant unqualified rejection, without the possibility of exception on a case-by-case basis, of the entirety of the law which should have been applied in the absence of such discrimination. This interpretation differs from the standard application of another well-known mechanism, that of ordre public, where any assessment needs to be based on a case-by-case basis.

Finally, the AG examines whether the fact that the spouse discriminated against
possibly consented to the divorce allows the national court not to disapply the foreign law despite its discriminatory nature, and therefore to apply that law. He suggests that question be answered in the negative. The rule set out in Article 10 of the ‘Rome III’ Regulation, which is based on compliance with values considered to be fundamental, is mandatory in nature and therefore, as a result of the intention of the EU legislature, does not fall within the sphere in which the persons at issue can freely waive the protection of their rights.

A judgment to look out for.

Geert.

 

 

 

On 5/6 April 2018 Dr. Ana Mercedes López Rodríguez, Ph.D. and Dr. Katia Fach Gómez, LL.M will convene a conference to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The conference will take place at University Loyola Andalucia (Seville/Spain) and is expected to comprise 3-4 Keynote Lectures and round tables with approximately 36 speakers.

Academics, practitioners and policymakers are invited to submit extended abstracts or unpublished full papers on the referred topic to the conference directors (amlopez@uloyola.es; katiafachgomez@gmail.com) by 30 November 2017.  Practitioners at all stages of their careers and senior and junior scholars (including Ph.D. students) are encouraged to participate.

The Conference directors expect to publish an edited volume in English by a relevant legal publishing house containing the most relevant papers presented in the Conference.

Further information about the submission and publication process can be found here and at the Conference website.

The European Law Institute has approved and published its new instrument, the report on the Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law. The report is available on SSRN as well as on the website of the ELI. The abstract on SSRN reads as follows:

Since the global financial crisis, insolvency and restructuring law have been at the forefront of law reform initiatives in Europe and elsewhere. The specific topic of business rescue appears to rank top on the insolvency law related agenda of both the European Union (EU) and national legislators faced by a rapid growth of insolvencies, which clearly highlighted the importance of efficient mechanisms for dealing with distressed, but viable business. For the European Law Institute (ELI), this fuelled the momentum to launch an in-depth project on furthering the rescue of such businesses across Europe. The European Law Institute, established in 2011, is an independent non-profit organisation established to initiate, conduct and facilitate research, make recommendations and provide practical guidance in the field of European legal development. Building on the wealth of diverse legal traditions, ELI’s mission is the quest for better law-making in Europe and the enhancement of European legal integration. By its endeavours, ELI seeks to contribute to the formation of a more vigorous European legal community, integrating the achievements of the various legal cultures, endorsing the value of comparative knowledge, and taking a genuinely pan-European perspective. As such, its work covers all branches of the law: substantive and procedural; private and public (see http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/).

In September 2013, the ELI Council approved the proposal for a project on the ‘Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law’ (‘Business Rescue Project’) and appointed Prof. em. Bob Wessels (Leiden, Netherlands) and Prof. Stephan Madaus (Halle-Wittenberg, Germany) as Project Reporters to lead this two-stage project. The first stage comprised the drafting of National Inventory and Normative reports by National Correspondents (NCs) from 13 EU countries. In addition, Gert-Jan Boon, University of Leiden, prepared an inventory report on international recommendations from standard-setting organisations, such as UNCITRAL, the World Bank, the American Bankruptcy Institute or the Nordic-Baltic Business Rescue Recommendations, under the supervision of the Reporters. Based primarily on these detailed reports, the second stage consisted of drafting the ELI Instrument on Business Rescue (‘ELI Business Rescue Report’) that elaborates recommendations for a legal framework enabling the further development of coherent and functional rules for business rescue in Europe. After the Project Team finalised the draft Instrument in early 2017, ELI Fellows and Members of the ELI Council voted to approve the ‘ELI Business Rescue Report’ at the ELI General Assembly, representing ELI Members, and Annual Conference in Vienna (Austria) on 6 September 2017 with no objection. It consists of 115 recommendations explained on more than 375 pages. Oxford University Press will published it soon. The Report is electronically available here as well as on the website of the ELI.

The Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law project is timely and may have a significant and positive impact on the harmonisation efforts of the European Commission as laid down in the November 2016 Proposal for a Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks. The Report contains recommendations on a variety of themes affected by the rescue of financially distressed businesses: legal rules for practitioners and courts, contract law, treatment and ranking of creditors’ claims, labour law, laws relating to transaction avoidance and corporate law. The Report’s ten chapters cover: (1) Actors and procedural design, (2) Financing a rescue, (3) Executory contracts, (4) Ranking of creditor claims; governance role of creditors, (5) Labour, benefit and pension issues, (6) Avoidance transactions in out-of-court workouts and pre-insolvency procedures and possible safe harbours, (7) Sales on a going-concern basis, (8) Rescue plan issues: procedure and structure; distributional issues, (9) Corporate group issues, and (10) Special arrangements for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) including natural persons (but not consumers). The Report also includes a glossary of terms and expressions commonly used in restructuring and insolvency law.

The topics addressed in the Report are intended to present a tool for better regulation in the EU, developed in the spirit of providing a coherent, dynamic, flexible and responsive European legislative framework for business rescue. Mindful of the European Commission’s commitment to better legal drafting, the Report’s proposals are formulated as comprehensibly, clearly, and as consistently as possible. Still, the recommendations are not designed to be overly prescriptive of specific outcomes, given the need for commercial flexibility and in recognition of the fact that parties will bargain in the ‘shadow of insolvency law’. The Report is addressed to the European Union, Member States of the EU, insolvency practitioners and judges, as well as scholars. The targeted group many times flows explicitly from the text of a recommendation or the context in which such a recommendation is developed and presented. The Reporters cherish the belief that the report will assist in taking a next, decisive step in the evolutionary process of the European side of business rescue and insolvency law.

En application de la convention franco-tunisienne du 28 juin 1972, un jugement tunisien n’est pas reconnu de plein droit en France s’il est contraire à une décision prononcée en France et y ayant l’autorité de la chose jugée.

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The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) has just released the final French and English versions of the draft Guide to Good Practice on Article 13(1)(b) of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Child Abduction Convention) for the attention of the Special Commission meeting of October 2017 on the practical operation of the 1980 Child Abduction Convention and of the 1996 Child Protection Convention.  A Spanish translation of the document is also available.

Further information relating to the Special Commission meeting is available here: https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=6545&dtid=57

In my view, this topic will likely spark some debate at the meeting given the heightened awareness of some of the pitfalls of the Child Abduction Convention in relation to cases of domestic violence. See, for example, Taryn Lindhorst and Jeffrey L. Edleson, Battered Women, their Children, and International Law – the Unintended Consequences of the Hague Child Abduction Convention (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2012) and Honourable Brenda Hale (Baroness Hale of Richmond), “Taking Flight—Domestic Violence and Child Abduction”, Current Legal Problems (13 August 2017).

Please note that the meeting above-mentioned is open only to delegates or experts designated by the Members of the Hague Conference, invited non-Member States and International Organisations that have been granted observer status.

It does not happen too often that (the notion of) European Private International Law hits the front pages of the daily news. But on Friday it happened: Germany’s foremost (conservative) newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), addressed A.G. Saugmandsgaard’s recent opinion on the recognition of private (Sharia) divorces under the Rome III Regulation. In so doing the FAZ expressly pointed out, on page 1, that it was unclear whether “European rules on choice of law (“Europäisches Kollisionsrecht”) actually applied in the case at bar.

The A.G.’s full opinion according to which the Rome III Regulation (if it applies at all) does not allow a private divorce to be recognized as valid where the applicable foreign law is discriminatory, is available here (in a number of languages, but not in English). The official press release can be downloaded here.

Written by Veerle Van Den Eeckhout

In February 2017, the working paper “Internationaal privaatrecht in tijden van globalisering. “Neutraal” internationaal privaatrecht!?”) of Veerle Van Den Eeckhout was posted on ssrn. This paper was written in Dutch.

Meanwhile, an English, slightly extended version of the paper (“Private International Law in an Era of Globalisation. “Neutral” Private International Law? I could be brown, I could be blue, I could be violet sky”) has been made available.

The abstract reads as follows: “In times of (discussions about) globalisation, due attention must be given to the operation of rules of private international law. Examination of the ongoing developments in private international law itself and in private international law in its interaction with other disciplines from the perspective of “protection of weak parties” and “protection of planetary common goods” allows carrying out the analysis to which current developments invite.”

The English paper can be found here.

I reported earlier on Saugmandsgaard ØE’s opinion in Cases C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, Nogueira et al and Osacar v Ryanair. The CJEU yesterday held and as I put it in immediate comment on the case reported in the FT, the Court’s view clearly resonates with the current mood against social dumping.

The case here ostensibly concerns jurisdiction only, however the Rome I Regulation includes mandatory protection of the employee guaranteed by the laws of the same place where (s)he habitually carries out his /her work. Hence a finding in the context of the Brussels I Recast inevitably has an impact on applicable law, too.

Firstly the Court has no mercy for the limiting choice of court agreement in the relevant contracts (at 53): in the case of employment contracts, a jurisdiction clause cannot apply exclusively and thus prohibit the employee from bringing proceedings before the courts which have jurisdiction under the protective regime of the Brussels I Recast.

The Court then essentially reiterates its AG: The concept of ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’ must be interpreted as referring to the place where, or from which, the employee in fact performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer (at 59). Referring to its earlier case-law, the Court reiterates that national courts must, in particular, determine in which Member State is situated (i) the place from which the employee carries out his transport-related tasks, (ii) the place where he returns after his tasks, receives instructions concerning his tasks and organises his work, and (iii) the place where his work tools are to be found. (at 63). The place where the aircraft aboard which the work is habitually performed are stationed must also be taken into account (at 64).

The CJEU’s judgment then zooms in particularly on the notion of ‘home base’, a term used in relevant EU civil aviation law. The concept of ‘place where, or from which, the employee habitually performs his work’ cannot be equated with any concept referred to in another act of EU law (at 65).  However that does not mean that it is irrelevant to determine the place from which an employee habitually carries out his work. In fact, the Court held, the concept is likely to play a significant role in the identification of place of habitual employment in cases as these (at 69). In fact, taking account of the facts of each of the present cases, it would only be if applications, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, were to display closer connections with a place other than the ‘home base’ that the relevance of the latter for the identification of ‘the place from which employees habitually carry out their work’ would be undermined (at 73).

Nationality of the aircraft is summarily dismissed at 75, as being of any relevance at all.

At 62, the Court, importantly, also wars against fraudulent forum shopping: ‘That circumstantial method makes it possible not only to reflect the true nature of legal relationships, in that it must take account of all the factors which characterise the activity of the employee (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 March 2011, Koelzsch, C‑29/10, EU:C:2011:151, paragraph 48), but also to prevent a concept such as that of ‘place where, or from which, the employee habitually performs his work’ from being exploited or contributing to the achievement of circumvention strategies (see, by analogy, judgment of 27 October 2016, D’Oultremont andOthers, C‑290/15, EU:C:2016:816, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).‘

The case now goes back to Mons howeer as has been reported, it is almost inconceivable for that court not to find Charleroi to be the place of habitual employment. Despite Ryanairs bravado, it is clear this judgment blows a hole in its regulatory strategy.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed 2016, Chapter 2, Heading , Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.5.

Michael Broeders and Ulrike Verboom have excellent overview of the decision back in May by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal not to recognise the Russian liquidation order of 1 August 2006 regarding OAO Yukos Oil Company. The refusal to recognise is based on ordre public: in particular, a finding was made that the Russian order contravenes the principles of due process hence also ordre public. Reference was made in extenso to decisions by the European Court of Human rights against Russia in related cases in 2011 and 2014.

Michael and Ulrike also refer to previous case-law of the Dutch Supreme Court which held that on the basis of the lex concursus (here: Russian), there is no principled objection to the Russian trustee in bankruptcy to exercise his powers as such trustee in The Netherlands.

Geert.