Agrégateur de flux

La chambre criminelle choisit de privilégier les règles relatives au mandat d’arrêt européen, au détriment de celles contenues dans la Convention de Genève du 28 juillet 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés.

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La Commission européenne a commis une erreur de droit en ne démontrant pas, au moment de l’examen de l’existence d’une aide d’État, que celle-ci confère un avantage économique et sélectif vis-à-vis des concurrents. 

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Le lundi 22 août 2016 s’est tenue l’audience d’ouverture à la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) du premier procès de crime de guerre consistant en la destruction alléguée de monuments à caractère historique ou religieux à Tombouctou au Mali pendant l’été 2012. 

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À l’issue de son 33e rapport annuel relatif au contrôle de l’application du droit de l’Union publié le 15 juillet 2016, la Commission expose les principales avancées enregistrées et les statistiques pour l’année 2015, tout en incitant les États membres à redoubler d’effort pour se conformer davantage à la législation de l’Union.

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Thank you Alison Frankel at Reuters for bringing to my attention Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch. An immigration case which triggered a delightfully written judgment by Gorsuch CJ on the delegation of power to agencies. In particular the founding fathers’ intention, against the background of separation of powers,  with agencies room for statutory interpretation.

Both Ms Frankel’s article and judge Gorsuch’s pieces do much more justice to the debate than I can do in a blog post so I will leave readers first of all to read both. Judge Gorsuch, referring to precedent (Chevron in particular), notes

‘There’s an elephant in the room with us today. We have studiously attempted to work our way around it and even left it unremarked. But the fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.’

Ms Frankel notes that Chevron directed courts defer to executive-branch agencies in the interpretation of ambiguous statutes. Justice Gorsuch reviews what exactly was intended by Chevron and points to the difficulty in excessive deferring to agencies’ interpretation of statutes.

I would summarise his views as ‘Congress meant trias, not quattuor politica.’

My knowledge of US civil procedure does not stretch to understanding what impact Gorsuch CJ’s views have on current US administrative /public law. Anyone out there who can tell me please do. At any rate, the judgment is great material for comparative constitutional law classes, the CJEU’s ECB (C-270/12) case being an obvious port of call.

Geert.

Our co-editor Matthias Weller has written an article on jurisdiction clauses under the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the Hague Choice of Court Convention (Choice of Forum Agreements under the Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: Coherences and Clashes). The full version is available here. The abstract reads as follows:

Choice of forum agreements are widely used. International uniform law has entered into force recently, namely the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements on 1 October 2015, the Brussels Ibis Regulation on 10 January 2015. Both instruments are formally independent but in the legislative process the drafters of the Convention took notice of the Brussels I Regulation, and the European legislator took notice of the Convention while working on the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation in order to “strengthen” choice of forum agreements and to bring about “coherence” of the Brussels regime with the Hague Convention. Against this background, the two instruments now in place are compared in respect to its most important policy decisions: the definition of the internationality of the case as a prerequisite of the applicability of the respective instrument, the understanding of the choice of law rule on the nullity of the agreement, the scope and mode of a public policy control of the agreement and, most extensively, the respective mechanisms for coordinating parallel proceedings, in particular the new mechanism under the Brussels Ibis Regulation granting priority for the designated court. This new mechanisms turns out to be too complex, leaving important points open. Therefore, de lege ferenda an alternative mechanism is suggested along the lines of the Hague Convention by making use of the recent judgment of the ECJ in Gothaer Versicherung. This alternative would not only be much easier and thus more predictable, it would also be able to coordinate each and every parallel proceedings, not only those involving a choice of court agreement.

In C-195/15 Mulhaupt, the question referred reads 

Does the term ‘right in rem’ in Article 5(1) of (…) Regulation (…) 1346/2000 (…) on insolvency proceedings include a national rule such as that contained in Paragraph 12 of the Grundsteuergesetz (Law on real property tax, ‘GrStG’) in conjunction with the first sentence of Paragraph 77(2) of the Abgabenordnung (Tax Code, ‘AO’), pursuant to which real property tax debts are by operation of law a public charge on real property and the property owner must accept enforcement against the property in that respect?

Applicant is the trustee in bankruptcy of Société civile immobilière Senior Home, a French registered company. Gemeinde Wedemark is forcing the sale of rel estate belonging to Senior home, linked to arrays in real estate tax. It is suggested by the referring court that the qualification under German law, of real property tax (also known as ‘stamp duties’ or ‘estate taxes’), owed to public authorities, as rights in rem, mean that the forced sale of the site at issue, as a result of Article 5(1) of Regulation 1346/2000, is covered by German law and is therefore not subject to French law, which in the case at issue is the lex concursus of the insolvency proceedings that have been opened. Regulation 1346/2000 in the meantime has been replaced by Regulation 2015/848 however the provisions at issue have not materially changed.

Szpunar AG Opined end May (other than a Tweet I have kept schtum about the Opinion so far, for exam reasons).The Opinion is as yet not available in English.

In terms of applicable law, Article 4 of the Regulation is the general rule: unless otherwise stated by the Regulation, the law of the State of the opening of proceedings is applicable.

The general rule of Article 4 inevitably had to be softened for quite a number of instances. As noted in the introduction, insolvency proceedings involve a wide array of interests. The expediency, efficiency and effectiveness craved inter alia by recital 2 (old; now 3) of the Regulation, has led in particular to the automatic extension of all the effects of the application of the lex concursus by the courts in the State of opening of the proceedings. That could not be done without there being exceptions to the general rule:

In certain cases, the Regulation excludes some rights over assets located abroad from the effects of the insolvency proceedings (as in Articles 5, 6 and 7). In other cases, it ensures that certain effects of the insolvency proceedings are governed not by the law of the State of the opening, but by the law of another State, defined in the abstract by Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 and 15. In such cases, the effects to be given to the proceedings opened in other States are the same effects attributed to a domestic proceedings of equivalent nature (liquidation, composition, or reorganization proceedings) by the law of the State concerned. Of particular note are precisely Article 5 on third parties’ rights in rem, but also Article 10 on employment contracts, and Article 13 on ‘detrimental acts’.

The precise demarcation of rights in rem hovers between the classic interpretative rule of EU private international law, namely the principle of autonomous interpretation, and the lack of a European Ius Commune on what rights in rem are. The Advocate General completes his already extensive analysis in Lutz, with a combined reference to the recitals of the Regulation, and the Virgós/Schmit Report.

In particular, Article 5(2) does serve as something of a straightjacket, leading to the conclusion that rights in rem require restrictive interpretation: once the first hurdle of qualification using national law (of the rei sitae) is passed, the right also needs to  meet with the fundamentals of what the Virgos-Schmit report defines as rights in rem (at 41-45 of the Opinion): these are (at 103 of the Report): a right in rem basically has two characteristics

(a)its direct and immediate relationship with the asset it covers, which remains linked to its satisfaction, without depending on the asset belonging to a person’s estate or on the relationship between the holder of the right in rem and another person;

(b)the absolute nature of the allocation of the right to the holder. This means that the person who holds a right in rem can enforce it against anyone who breaches or harms his right without his assent (e.g. such rights are typically protected by actions to recover); that the right can resist the alienation of the asset to a third party (it can be claimed erga omnes, with the restrictions characteristic of the protection of the bona fide purchaser); and that the right can thus resist individual enforcement by third parties and in collective insolvency proceedings (by its separation or individual satisfaction).

The Virgos-Schmit report in this respect cross-refers to the 1968 Brussels Convention however it is noteworthy that the CJEU, in defining rights in rem under the now Brussels I recast Regulation, does not in turn refer to the Virgos-Schmit report.

In conclusion therefore the AG suggests that the right at issue is indeed a right in rem under Article 5. Finally, that it benefits a public authority (the inland revenue) rather than a private individual or legal person, does not impact upon that qualification: Szpunar AG correctly highlights that the public character of the creditor is not a determining criteria in either the recitals of the Regulation or the Virgos-Schmit report.

A prima facie straightforward question met by complete analysis of the AG which in passing solves more issues than those raised by the referring court: this Opinion may well become an important part of authoritative sources in applying the Insolvency Regulation..

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.7.1 ).

Project “unalex – multilingual information for the uniform interpretation of the instruments of judicial cooperation in civil matters”

English or German native speaker with law degree and knowledge / experience in international private and procedural law, for writing, editing, and translating of legal texts. French or Italian or Spanish native speakers with good German knowledge can also apply.

The project is conducted in cooperation with a group of universities from various EU Member States. The project work consists, inter alia, in the selection of international case law in the various areas of judicial cooperation in civil matters and its preparation with case headnotes and the development of so-called ‘compendia’ which provide systematic explanations of how the European Regulations are applied by the CJEU and the courts of the Member States in the European practice.

Part time preferred.
Particularly suited for younger private international law researchers.
Project period: between 12 up to 18 months

IPR Verlag is located in the heart of Munich, close to the university. Occasional home office may be considered.

If interested to join our team, please send your application and CV to:
thomas.simons[at]unalex.eu

IPR Verlag GmbH
Dr. Thomas Simons
Martiusstr. 1, 80802 Munich, Germany
For further information, please do not hesitate to contact us:
+49 (0)89 337 332

Irwin Law has published (August 2016) the second edition of Conflict of Laws by Stephen Pitel (Western University) and Nicholas Rafferty (University of Calgary).  This treatise aims to explain and analyze the rules of the conflict of laws in force in common law Canada in a clear and concise manner.  For the second edition, the chapter on jurisdiction has been rewritten in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda (2012) and the evolving jurisprudence under the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act.  In addition, a new chapter on matrimonial property division has been added.  All chapters have been updated to reflect new decisions, legislative changes and recent scholarship.

The first edition (2010) was shortlisted for the Walter Owen Book Prize and has been cited in decisions of courts across Canada including the Supreme Court of Canada.

More information is available here.

By Decision (EU) 2016/1366 of 10 August 2016, the European Commission confirmed the participation of Estonia in the enhanced cooperation that led to Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 on the law applicable to divorce and legal separation (Rome III).

The Rome III Regulation will apply to Estonia from 11 February 2018. Its rules will only apply in Estonia to legal proceedings instituted and to choice-of-law agreements concluded as from the latter date. However, effect shall also be given in Estonia to an agreement on the choice of the applicable law concluded before 11 February 2018, provided that it complies with Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation.

Seventeen Member States, including Estonia, are bound by the Rome III Regulation. Fourteen Member States have been taken part in this enhanced cooperation since the beginning (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia), and three more have joined in subsequently: Lithuania, under Decision (EU) 2012/714, Greece, under Decision (EU) 2014/39, and now Estonia.

Irrecevabilité

Irrecevabilité

Irrecevabilité

Non renvoyée au Conseil constitutionnel

Non renvoyée au Conseil constitutionnel

Non renvoyée au Conseil constitutionnel

Non renvoyée au Conseil constitutionnel

Stefan Arnold from the University of Graz has edited a volume on fundamental questions of European Private International Law (Grundfragen des Europäischen Kollisionsrechts, Mohr Siebeck 2016, VII + 167 pages, ISBN 978-3-16-153979-4). Published in German the volume contains, among others, chapters on party autonomy, renvoi, ordre public and connecting factors. The editor  has kindly provided us with the following more detailed information:

European Private International Law serves the European idea of an area of freedom, security and justice. For that task, it seems crucial that the legal actors of European Private International Law address its fundamentals. The fundamentals – or fundamental questions – of European Private International Law are manifold. Some of them are discussed in this volume. They concern the political framework within which European Law operates, the challenges of modern concepts of “family” or the relationship of Private International Law and Religious Law. Last not least, European Private International Law needs to ascertain the regulatory function of central Conflict of Laws concepts such as the idea of connecting factors, party autonomy, ordre public and renvoi.

Table of contents

• Christoph Althammer: Das Konzept der Familie im Europäischen Internationalen Familienrecht [The Concept of „Family“ in European International Family Law]
• Stefan Arnold: Gründe und Grenzen der Parteiautonomie im Europäischen Kollisionsrecht [The Foundations and Limits of Party Autonomy in European Private International Law]
• Gerald Mäsch: Der Renvoi im Europäischen Kollisionsrecht [Renvoi in European Private International Law]
• Mathias Rohe: Europäisches Kollisionsrecht und religiöses Recht [European Private International Law and Religious Law]
• Michael Stürner: Der ordre public im Europäischen Kollisionsrecht [Ordre Public in European Private International Law]
• Rolf Wagner: Das Europäische Kollisionsrecht im Spiegel der Rechtspolitik [European Private International Law and Legal Policy]
• Marc-Philippe Weller: Anknüpfungsprinzipien im Europäischen Kollisionsrecht – eine neue „kopernikanische Wende“? [Connecting Factors in European Private International Law – a New “Copernican Revolution”?]

Pourvoi c/ Chambre de l'instruction de la cour d'appel de Montpellier, 17 mars 2016

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Chambéry, Chambre civile 1re section, 15 décembre 2015