Droit international général

Scade il 15 luglio 2016 il termine per iscriversi all’edizione 2016 di EULoS, una summer school sui temi del diritto del mare rivolta a laureati e dottorandi, organizzata dalle Università di Genova e Brema, dalla Hochschule Bremerhaven e dall’Institut für Seevölkerrecht und Internationales Meeresumweltrecht di Brema.

I corsi si terranno a Brema, fra il 22 agosto e il 2 settembre 2016.

Come la passata edizione, anche le lezioni di quest’anno toccheranno, fra gli altri, argomenti di interesse internazionalprivatistico.

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

On 17 June 2016 the University Milano-Bicocca will host a conference on Divorce and parental responsibility under the Brussels II bis Regulation.

Presentations will be given by academics from Croatia, Spain and Lithuania on issues such as the habitual residence and the hearing of the child, prorogation of jurisdiction and transfer of proceedings.

Further information may be found in the flyer of the initiative, available here.

According to a document of 3 June 2016 (9770/16), the Council of the European Union is expected to confirm a general approach on the Commission’s proposals for two regulations on the property regimes of international couples.

The regulations are meant to implement enhanced cooperation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, and on the property consequences of registered partnerships.

The general approach refers to the texts of the regulations as result, respectively, from document 8115/16 and document 8118/16 of the Council, both dated 30 May 2016.

As noticed in an earlier post, eighteen Member States have expressed the intention to take part in the enhanced cooperation.

The adoption of the regulations will take place once the European Parliament has given its opinion in accordance with Article 81(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

In Case C-185/15 Kostanjevec, Kokott AG (not available in English at the time of writing) advised on a number of issues in relation to a counterclaim under Article 6(3) Brussels I (now 8(3) of the Recast). At the core of the dispute lies a leasing contract and the consumer counterclaiming for restitution per unjust enrichment, of the sums she had transferred to counterparty. The counterclaim follows the annulment of the contract between the two, even though Marjan Kostanjevec had initially been ordered to pay.

The first relates to the temporal scope not of the Recast Brussels I Regulation viz Brussels I, but rather simply of Regulation 44/2001, in particular with respect to a Member State (Slovenia) which joined the EU on 1 May 2004. The Brussels Convention had never applied to Slovenia. The proceedings between parties  go back to 1995, prompting the EC among others to suggest that per Article 66 of the Regulation (This Regulation shall apply only to legal proceedings instituted…after the entry into force thereof) it simply does not apply. Kokott AG however suggests first of all that the new claim in restitution, followed the use of a separate means of redress under Slovenian law, instituted after the initial claim by the leasing company had been wrapped up in its entirety. Moreover, other language versions refer not to ‘proceedings’ but rather to a claim (defined in C-341/93 Danvaern Production as claims by defendants which seek the pronouncement of a separate judgment or decree. It does not apply to the situation where a defendant raises, as a pure defence, a claim which he allegedly has against the plaintiff (at 18). 

Regulation 44/2001 applies therefore, in the view of the AG. I would agree that it should: this is particularly relevant where parties have a long and complex history of litigation. (Similarities here may exist with Nikiforidis, which is in my blog pile). Applying Danvaern Production however for the interpretation of Article 66 I think may be problematic. The raison d’être of Article 6(3) is to help avoid conflicting decisions in cases that are closely related. Even if, per Danvaern, they seek a separate pronouncement, they do essentially relate to reciprocal commitments which are part of the same bundle of facts. (See also Kokott AG herself, in para 44 of her Opinion with reference to the Jenard Report and to Léger AG in Danvaern). It feels a little inconsistent to call upon arguments developed viz inseparable claims (under Art.6(3): Danvaern) to support a thesis of separability (viz the application ratione temporis: they are separate claims even if they have a common history in fact and in contractual liaison).

With reference to C-297/14 Hobohm, the AG subsequently also advises that the counterclaim is covered by the Regulation’s consumer contracts title as having a ‘close link’ with the consumer contract, and, for the sake of completeness, and with reference to Profit SIM, that claims for restitution are covered by (now) Article 7(1) ‘s forum contractus even if they are grounded in the contract at issue not actually having existed.

I am curious how the Court will approach the temporal application issue.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International law, 2nd ed. 2016, chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.1.a, Heading 2.2.21.3, Heading 2.1.1

 

 

Under the State Immunity Act, foreign states are generally immune from being sued in Canada.  This includes being sued on a foreign judgment.  However, in 2012 Canada enacted legislation to give victims of terrorism the ability to sue a foreign state that sponsored the terrorism.  It also made it easier for foreign judgments against such a state to be enforced in Canada.

In Tracy v The Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, 2016 ONSC 3759 (released June 9, 2016; likely to be posted in the week of June 13, 2016, in CanLII) the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had to consider these legislative reforms and how they applied to a series of American judgments rendered against Iran in favour of American victims of terrorist acts which Iran was found to have sponsored.  The court held that Iran was not immune from the enforcement proceedings and that accordingly the American judgments were enforceable against certain assets of Iran in Ontario.

The decision is reasonably detailed.  It involves interpretation of the State Immunity Act and the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.  It also considers issues relating to the limitation period and the enforcement of punitive damages awards (in this case, in the hundreds of millions of dollars).  Not all of the analysis resonates as convincing and there is considerable scope for a possible appeal.  For example, Iran’s argument that the loss or damage suffered by the victim had to have been, on the language of s 4(1) of the JVTA, suffered after January 1, 1985, did not prevent the enforcement of American decisions in respect of acts of terror which happened before that date because, the court held, the victims continued to suffer harm on an ongoing basis.  This seems vulnerable to challenge.  In addition, the court’s reasoning as to why the enormous punitive damages awards were not contrary to public policy is extremely brief.

However, on any appeal, Iran does have a significant procedural problem to overcome.  It did not defend the enforcement actions when they were initially brought in Ontario.  All of the immunity arguments were canvassed by the court as part of Iran’s motion to have the resulting default judgments set aside, on the issue of whether Iran might have a viable defence on the merits.  But at no point did Iran offer any explanation for the initial failure to defend.  While not conclusive, this weighs against setting the judgments aside even if Iran can show merit to its position on immunity.

The timing of the court’s decision against Iran could pose challenges for the current Canadian government, which is currently working to re-engage with Iran after the previous government cut ties in 2012 (see news story here).  In addition, a Montreal-based professor has recently been jailed in Iran and this has caused considerable concern in Canada (see news story here).

The University of Lucerne and the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) will be co-organizing a conference on the implementation of the Hague Choice of Law Principles ( “Towards a Global Framework for International Commercial Transactions: Implementing the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts”) on 8/9 September 2016. The conference serves to  analyze the impact and prospects of the 2015 Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (the Hague Principles)  in the context of other relevant legal instruments applicable to international commercial transactions. It brings together distinguished academics, experts, private practitioners and representatives from various international institutions.

Scholars and practitioners in the fields of private international law and commercial law and dispute resolution are encouraged to participate.

Conference Directors: Prof. Dr. Daniel Girsberger, University of Lucerne (Switzerland), Dr. Christophe Bernasconi, Secretary-General (HCCH)

Venue: University of Lucerne, Auditorium 9, Frohburgstrasse 3, CH-6002 Lucerne (Switzerland)

Speakers: Jürgen Basedow, Neil B. Cohen, Andrew Dickinson, Roberto Echandi, José Angelo Estrella Faria, Franco Ferrari, Lauro Da Gama e Souza Jr, Thomas Kadner Graziano, Peter Mankowski, Jan L. Neels, Emily O’Connor, J.A. Moreno Rodríguez, Geneviève Saumier, Linda Silberman, Renaud Sorieul

Participation fee: CHF 250.– (including documentation, catering and dinner on Thursday, 8 September 2016; accommodation not included)

Registration and further information: https://regis.buchertravel.ch/event/HCCH_2016

Contact: Mrs. Lisbeth Meule (lisbeth.meule@unilu.ch)

 

by Lukas Schmidt, Research Fellow at the Center for Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution (TCDR) of the EBS Law School, Wiesbaden, Germany.

UNCITRAL Working Group V (Insolvency Law) has issued a report on the work of  its forty-ninth session, which took place in New York from 2 – 6 May 2016. The Working Group continued its deliberations on the cross-border insolvency of multinational enterprise groups, the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-derived judgments and the obligations of directors of enterprise group companies in the period approaching insolvency. Furthermore the report communicates that a meeting of an open-ended informal group established to consider the feasibility of developing a convention on international insolvency issues has taken place. This is rather exciting, as the development of an international insolvency convention by UNCITRAL would constitute the next big step in international insolvency law leaving behind the defiencies of soft law. The report is available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/5Insolvency.html.

The ILA reminds you to join the celebration of yet another landmark – the Seventy7th Biennial International Conference 2016 – which is set to take place from the 7-11 August 2016 in Sandton, South Africa.

Come join an illustrious panel of distinguished local and international speakers, fellow law professionals, business leaders, academics, as well as young scholars from different parts of the world.

Judge Navi Pillay, who will participate in the panel on international criminal law, and former UN High Commissionar for Human Rights, will deliver the key note address at the opening session of the conference.

If you’ve not yet registered, please see the programme online and join us in Sandton. Should you have registered already, additional speaker sessions have been added and high profile speakers confirmed!The regular registration closes 30 June 2016.

Register, by clicking here.

In  AVOTIŅŠ v Latvia, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR at Strasbourg held late May that Article 6 ECHR (right to fair trial) was engaged but not infringed by the Latvian’s Supreme Court’s application of Article 34(2( Brussel I (now Article 45(1) b Brussels I Recast).

The Article reads ‘A judgment shall not be recognised: (…) 2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so;…

In the case at issue applicant sought refusal by the Latvian court of recognition of a Cypriot judgment issued against him. After review of the Regulation’s core pedigree of mutual recognition and mutual trust, burden of proof particularly exercised the Court: at 121:

‘The fact that the applicant relied on that Article (34(2), GAVC) without having challenged the judgment as required necessarily raised the question of the availability of that legal remedy in Cyprus in the circumstances of the present case. In such a situation the Senate was not entitled simply to criticise the applicant, as it did in its judgment of 31 January 2007, for not appealing against the judgment concerned, and to remain silent on the issue of the burden of proof with regard to the existence and availability of a remedy in the State of origin; Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, like Article 34(2) in fine of the Brussels I Regulation, required it to verify that this condition was satisfied, in the absence of which it could not refuse to examine the applicant’s complaint. The Court considers that the determination of the burden of proof, which, as the European Commission stressed (see paragraph 92 above), is not governed by European Union law, was therefore decisive in the present case. Hence, that point should have been examined in adversarial proceedings leading to reasoned findings. However, the Supreme Court tacitly presumed either that the burden of proof lay with the defendant or that such a remedy had in fact been available to the applicant. This approach, which reflects a literal and automatic application of Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation, could in theory lead to a finding that the protection afforded was manifestly deficient such that the presumption of equivalent protection of the rights of the defence guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 is rebutted. Nevertheless, in the specific circumstances of the present application the Court does not consider this to be the case, although this shortcoming is regrettable.’

Those ‘specific circumstances’ include in particular the applicant’s professional background: at 124:

‘the applicant, who was an investment consultant, should have been aware of the legal consequences of the acknowledgment of debt deed which he had signed. That deed was governed by Cypriot law, concerned a sum of money borrowed by the applicant from a Cypriot company and contained a clause conferring jurisdiction on the Cypriot courts. Accordingly, the applicant should have ensured that he was familiar with the manner in which possible proceedings would be conducted before the Cypriot courts (…). Having omitted to obtain information on the subject he contributed to a large extent, as a result of his inaction and lack of diligence, to bringing about the situation of which he complained before the Court and which he could have prevented so as to avoid incurring any damage’. 

I am not convinced by the Court’s view on the burden of proof ad on the national court’s duty to assess the law in the State of origin sua sponte. Judges Lemmens and Briede, jointly concurring but for different reasons as the court, in my view have the better argument where they say

‘If the applicant wanted to argue that no remedy had in fact been available to him in Cyprus, in our opinion it would have been for him to raise this issue explicitly before the Supreme Court. We question whether he could expect the Supreme Court to raise that issue of its own motion. And we definitely consider that he cannot complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the lack of an explicit response to an argument that was not explicitly made.’

The end result is the same at the ECtHR. For future application of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation however it makes a big difference.

Geert.

 

 

The EBS Law School in Wiesbaden, Germany, is looking for a highly skilled and motivated research fellow on a part-time basis (50%).

The position will entail research within the team of the Chair for Civil Law, Civil Procedure and Private International Law (Prof. Dr. Matthias Weller, Mag.rer.publ.) and within the EBS Research Center for Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution (TCDR) on a number of new and ongoing projects focusing on Private International Law, Transnational Commercial Law and International Civil Litigation.

The position includes teaching and programme management for the “EBS Law Term” on Transnational Commercial Law, an intense academic programme in English from September to December each year for incoming international students from all over the world, mainly from the partner law faculties of the EBS Law School. For further information on this programme: http://www.ebs.edu/lawterm.

Requirements: 

• a university law degree (e.g. JD, preferably the German “Erste Juristische Prüfung”)
• qualifications or at least substantial interest in Private International Law and Transnational Commercial Law
• excellent English language skills

The position is limited to two years but can be prolonged. The work location is Wiesbaden, a city close to Frankfurt, Germany. The work involves 19,75 hours per week (50%). The payment is subject to negotiations with the University, depending on the level of qualifications, but will not be lower than the average payment for research fellows (Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter) there. The faculty offers to obtain a doctoral degree on the basis of a thesis (Dissertation) if the faculty’s requirements for admission are met.

How to Apply:

Please send your application with reference to “ZRV_WiMi_Law Term” via email to antonella.nolten@ebs.edu. The application should include a cover letter, a CV containing, if applicable, list of publications and/or teaching evaluations and electronic copies of all relevant certificates. Please do not hesitate to contact Antonella Nolten in case of further questions.

We are looking forward to hearing from you!

 

by Lukas Schmidt, Research Fellow at the Center for Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution (TCDR) of the EBS Law School, Wiesbaden, Germany.

Claudia Pechstein, an internationally successful ice speed skater, claims damages against the International Skating Union (ISU) because of a two-year-suspension for doping. The essential question was whether an arbitration agreement signed by Pechstein is effective. This agreement includes amongst other things the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne. Pechstein claimed that the arbitration agreement was invalid under § 19 GWB (German Antitrust Legislation) because the ISU (nationally and internationally only the ISU organizes competitions in ice speed skating) has abused its dominant position. Pechstein had to sign the arbitration agreement to be admitted to the competition. She claimed that the list of arbitrators of the CAS, from which the parties must each select an arbitrator, has not been prepared impartially because the sports federations and Olympic committees have a clear predominance in creating the list.

However, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) does not agree with these propositions. The Court, by its decision of 7 June 2016, docket no. KZR 6/15, ruled that the action is inadmissible because of the arbitration agreement. The Court held that the ISU is indeed dominant in the organization of international speed skating competitions, but has shown no abusive conduct because the associations and the athletes do not confront each other as guided by fundamentally conflicting interests. There was no structural imbalance in the composition of the tribunal ruling on Pechstein‘s  suspension. Furthermore, in the Court’s view,  Pechstein has signed the agreement voluntarily in the sense of Art. 19 GWB, even if she otherwise could not have participated in the contest. A consideration of the mutual interests justifies the application of the arbitration clause. However Pechstein is entitled to invoke the internationally competent Swiss courts following the arbitral procedure.

 

I contratti internazionali di agenzia e distribuzione dall’Europa all’Oriente è il titolo dell’incontro in programma il 23 giugno 2016 a Vicenza, promosso dalla locale sezione dell’Associazione Italiana Giovani Avvocati (AIGA) con il patrocinio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Vicenza.

L’incontro vedrà il susseguirsi di interventi in tema di liquidazione dell’indennità di fine rapporto nei contratti internazionali di agenzia e distribuzione nella giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia (Silvia Petruzzino, Foro di Lugano), di agenzia e distribuzione in Vietnam e in Iran (Federico Vasoli, Foro di Milano) e di distribuzione e commercio elettronico in Cina (Roberto Luzi Crivellini, Foro di Verona).

Maggiori informazioni sull’incontro e sulle modalità d’iscrizione sono consultabili sulla locandina, qui disponibile.

Despite the fact that thousands of legal persons and personal relations are subject to Liechtenstein Private International Law, Liechtenstein law has retained some unique features.  Whether the unique features should be maintained, or provide the reasoning for a reform agenda, will be discussed at the 2nd Liechtenstein Conference on 30 June 2016 organised by the Propter Homines Chair for Banking and Securities Law at the University of Liechtenstein.

The presentations will deal with Liechtenstein international company, foundation and trust law,  conflicts of law relating to banks, prospectus liability and collectus investment schemes, as well as matters of succession and the potential of Liechtenstein as an arbitration venue. All presentations will be held in German.

Please find further information here.

In case of interests please contact: nadja.dobler@uni.li

Does Article 21 TEU on EU citisenship, facilitate one’s acquiring names bearing the tokens of nobility, acquired in one Member State (here: the flexible ‘deed poll’ regime available to citisens of the United Kingdom), for subsequent use in another Member State less keen on such (token or real) titles? In Case C-438/14 Bogendorff the CJEU held that it does not.

Applicant at issue had acquired UK nationality over and above German nationality (which he held by birth). Subsequent adoption but especially vanity had led to a change in first name and surname by deed poll, a very flexible name change regime available to UK citisens. German authorities however refused to recognise the name change upon the occasion of registration of applicant’s daughter, citing public order considerations in particular Germany’s long-standing objection against aristocratic titles, real or vanity, so as to emphasise equality before the law.  The court’s approach on free movement and names in my view has taken a better turn since Vardyn, Case C-391/09, where it left its insistence that only copy /paste recognition of names by authorities in other Member States can safeguard citisens free movement rights.

In the case of aristocratic titles, however, the court has always recognised in particular Austria’s and Germany’s right to extend domestic policies to incoming citisens, on the basis of public policy considerations. Current case differs from Sayn-Wittgenstein, C‑208/09. The latter concerned Austrian law, which has a strict prohibition on the use and transmission of titles of nobility. Under German law by contrast all privileges and inequalities connected with birth or position have been abolished in Germany. Titles of nobility which were actually borne when the Weimar Constitution entered into force may continue as elements of a name and may be transmitted as a fact of personal status. The creation of new titles of nobility and the grant of such titles are prohibited.

Hence for Germany to refuse to recognise such titles where they have been accidentally obtained abroad (by birth, marriage or adoption) would run counter EU citisenhip. By contrast, it would run counter to the intention of the German legislature for German nationals, using the law of another Member State, to adopt afresh abolished titles of nobility. Systematic recognition of changes of name such as that at issue in the main proceedings could lead to that result.

Name dropping undoubtedly will continue. Name shopping has been halted.

Geert.

 

Con un decreto depositato il 17 maggio 2016, il Tribunale per i minorenni di Bologna si è pronunciato sul riconoscimento di una sentenza di adozione emessa negli Stati Uniti con la quale era stata disposta l’adozione piena di una minore, cittadina americana, in favore della moglie della madre biologica.

Nel novembre del 2014, lo stesso Tribunale aveva sollevato una questione di legittimità costituzionale degli articoli 35 e 36 della legge 4 maggio 1983, n. 184, in materia di adozione, nella parte in cui non consentono al giudice di valutare, nel caso concreto, se risponda all’interesse del minore adottato all’estero il riconoscimento della sentenza straniera che abbia pronunciato la sua adozione da parte del coniuge del genitore, a prescindere dal fatto che il matrimonio abbia prodotto effetti in Italia (in proposito si veda questo post).

La Corte costituzionale, con sentenza n. 76 del 7 aprile 2016, aveva dichiarato inammissibile la questione. I giudici costituzionali hanno preso le mosse dalla ricostruzione dell’art. 41 della legge 31 maggio 1995 n. 218, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato, che prevede due diversi procedimenti per il riconoscimento di provvedimenti stranieri in materia di adozione. Accanto al riconoscimento “automatico” contemplato attraverso il richiamo agli articoli 64, 65 e 66 della stessa legge, la norma stabilisce, al secondo comma, che “restano ferme le disposizioni delle leggi speciali in materia di adozione dei minori”, ossia gli articoli 35 e 36 della legge 184/1983.  Secondo la Corte “l’applicazione della legislazione speciale in materia di riconoscimento della sentenza di adozione internazionale di minori – che richiede un previo vaglio giudiziale, ad opera del Tribunale per i minorenni – non può che escludere il contemporaneo rinvio alle disposizioni ordinarie sul riconoscimento ‘automatico’ dei provvedimenti stranieri”.

In virtù di tali rilievi, il Tribunale per i minorenni di Bologna – escludendo l’applicabilità della procedura di riconoscimento di cui all’art. 36, comma 4, della legge n. 184/1983 (che estende il controllo giudiziale del minore ad una particolare ipotesi di adozione di minori stranieri in stato di abbandono da parte di cittadini italiani), poiché al momento dell’adozione tanto la ricorrente quanto la minore erano cittadine americane – ha considerato che il provvedimento straniero dovesse essere sottoposto a riconoscimento automatico mediante trascrizione a cura dell’ufficiale di stato civile. Il Tribunale, evidenziando tuttavia che la Consulta ha disatteso il rilievo in merito alla cittadinanza (anche) italiana della ricorrente al momento della domanda, ha escluso la propria potestas decidendi non sussistendo i presupposti di cui all’art. 41, comma 2, della legge n. 218/95 per derogare alla competenza della Corte d’appello con riguardo al riconoscimento di provvedimenti stranieri e, di conseguenza, ha dichiarato l’inammissibilità della domanda.

Affinché la ricorrente possa poi “conseguire il risultato sperato”, il Tribunale ha infine suggerito di trarre spunto da un caso analogo a quello di specie e giunto dinanzi alla Corte d’appello di Milano (la decisione è consultabile qui).

Si ringrazia l’avv. Claudio Pezzi per la segnalazione.

The new 2007 Lugano Convention, establishing parallelism with the Brussels I Regulation (Reg. 44/2001), had just entered into force in Switzerland in 2010 when it faced a new challenge in the form of the Recast Regulation (Reg. 1215/2012). Therefore, in 2014, CIVPRO (University of Bern), CCR (University of Luzern) and the Swiss Institute for Comparative Law (Lausanne) invited professors, researchers, civil officers and practitioners from all over Europe to discuss the future of European civil procedure with a special focus on Lugano and third states. Alexander Markus (Bern), Andreas Furrer (Luzern) and Ilaria Pretelli (Lausanne) have now published the (English/German) volume containing the keynote speeches and the subsequent contributions to this conference as well as the reports on the discussion in the various panels. This book presents and analyzes the past, the present and the alternative conceivable futures of the Lugano model of a “parallel” convention. For further information, click here.

Institute of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society has recently come to my attention thanks to Juliett Hatchett over at Baker: her analysis is spot on and I am happy to refer to it. She summarises the case as the district court confirming that perpetrating and funding piracy and unsafe navigation are within the scope of ATS jurisdiction, but holding that there is no enforceable international norm against whaling or financing terrorism.

The case is not easy to find however Sea Shepherd tend to link to court documents in their updates on the litigation.

I flag the case mainly to bring it to readers’ attention that CSR litigation can be done proactively: one need not wait for alleged violations of relevant legal standards to seek to seize a court. Exactly a point I assessed in the context of vulture fund litigation, end of May. (And in forthcoming paper).

Geert.

 

Clayton P. Gillette, Advanced Introduction to International Sales Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, ISBN 9781784711870, pp. 160, GBP 58,50.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Providing a concise overview of the basic doctrines underlying the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Clayton Gillette explores their ambiguities and thus considers the extent to which uniform international commercial law is possible, as well as appraising the extent to which the doctrines in the UN Convention reflect those that commercial parties would prefer. With its compelling combination of doctrine and theory, this book makes an ideal companion for students and legal scholars alike.

Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

This post has kindly been provided by Dr. Susanne Gössl, LL.M.

“This post is meant to remind that the deadline for applications for the Young PIL Scholars’ Conference in Bonn, Germany, in April 2017 is approaching.

We accept applications of junior researchers to present a paper until 30 June 2016. The topic is “Politics and Private International Law (?)”. We envisage presentations of half an hour each in German language with subsequent discussion on the respective subject. The presented papers will be published in a conference transcript by Mohr Siebeck.

Please send an exposé of maximum 1,000 words to nachwuchs-ipr(at)institut-familienrecht.de. The exposé shall be in German language and composed anonymously that is without any reference to the authorship. The author including his/her position or other affiliation shall be identifiable from a separate file.

Additional information can be found at https://www.jura.uni-bonn.de/en/institut-fuer-deutsches-europaeisches-und-internationales-familienrecht/pil-conference/call-for-papers/

If you have any further questions, please contact Dr. Susanne Gössl, LL.M. (sgoessl(at)uni-bonn.de).”

On 24 June 2016, the University of Lincoln will host the conference titled Private and Public International Law: Strengthening Connections”.

As the final event of a two-year research project led by academics in Edinburgh and Lincoln, the conference aims at exploring the connections existing between Private and Public International Law across a wide range of interdisciplinary topics.

Subjects covered include jurisdiction, State immunity, corporate social responsibility, arbitration, and trade in medical services.

The full program of the conference is available here.

Further information can be found here.