Droit international général

When my tweets on the CJEU are not followed quickly by a blog post, assume I got snowed under. Or that other developments require more immediate analysis. Taser, Case C-175/15, is easily dismissed perhaps as not all that stunning or shocking (puns abound), yet as often, it is worthwhile highlighting what the case does not answer, rather than what it did elucidate.

Taser International, whose seat is in the United States, entered into two non-exclusive distribution agreements with Gate 4. Under those agreements, Gate 4 and its administrator, Mr Anastasiu, undertook to assign to the other contracting party the Taser International trade marks which they had registered, or for which they had applied for registration, in Romania.

Following Gate 4’s and Mr Anastasiu’s refusal to fulfil that contractual obligation, Taser International brought an action before the District Court, Bucharest. Regardless of the existence in those contracts of clauses conferring jurisdiction on a court situated in the US, Gate 4 and Mr Anastasiu entered an appearance before the Romanian court without challenging its jurisdiction. The Court ordered them to undertake all the formalities necessary for the registration of the assignment.

The appeals court seeks clarification as to whether the Brussels I Regulation is applicable to the dispute before it, since the parties elected, for the resolution of their disputes, the courts of a third country. The referring court considers that such a clause conferring jurisdiction on a third country may, for this reason alone, preclude the tacit prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 24 (Article 26 in the Brussels I Recast). 

On the assumption, however, that that latter rule is applicable, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether it should, nevertheless, decline jurisdiction on another ground. It also queried whether the exclusive jurisdictional rules of Article 22 are applicable: does a dispute concerning an obligation to assign a trade mark, likely to result in a registration under national law, fall within paragraph 4 of that article.

The CJEU firstly recalled its finding in C-111/09 CPP Vienna Insurance Group: choice of court made per Article 23 (now Article 25) Brussels I, can be overruled by voluntary appearance. The latter in that case simply acts as an amended choice of court. In Taser (at 24) the court now adds that this applies also if that initial choice of court was made ex-EU. The deliberate, later choice, remains a deliberate choice. The Court makes no reference to discussions e.g.  in the context of Gothaer, whether the Brussels I Regulation at all should be concerned with choice of court ex-EU or should be entirely indifferent. Arguably, in the Recast Regulation, there is consideration for choice of court ex-EU, in particular in recital 24 combined with Article 33.

Intellectual property lawyers will be disappointed with the Court’s answer to the issue of whether trade mark assignment falls within Article 22(4) [now 24(4)]: Romanian courts in any event had jurisdiction. (at 29).

Plenty left open, therefore. Geert.

(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, chapter 2, heading 2.2.6.7, heading 2.2.7 .

Happy Saint’s day to all fellow lawyers. Whatever Faith or non-Faith we profess, Dean Wigmore’s 1936’s paper is worth a read.

Geert.

The rather long judgment in T-47/15 Germany v Commission is neatly summarised by the CJEU here. I have reported before on both the State Aid and the free movement implications of the Court’s seminal findings in Preussen Elektra. In current case, the Court essentially upholds the EC’s finding of the more recent German regime amounting to illegal State aid and incompatibility with the Internal Market – in contrast with its earlier findings in Preussen Elektra.

Disappointingly, Preussen Elektra was distinguished rather than its merits called into question. Rather like Advocate-General Bot I stubbornly insist that Preussen Elektra is bad case-law and I continue to call upon the Court to scrap its findings in same.

Geert.

Sergio Carbone, Chiara Tuo, Il nuovo spazio giudiziario europeo in materia civile e commerciale – Il regolamento UE n. 1215/2012, 7a ed., Giappichelli, 2016, pp. XII + 428, ISBN: 9788892103436, Euro 39.

[Dall’indice del volume] Capo I. L’evoluzione della disciplina dello spazio giudiziario europeo e il suo àmbito di applicazione. – Capo II. I criteri di distribuzione di competenza giurisdizionale nello spazio giudiziario europeo. Il foro generale e i fori speciali. – Capo III. In particolare, i fori speciali delle domande connesse e delle controversie riguardanti i contraenti deboli. – Capo IV. I fori esclusivi. – Capo V. I fori delle misure cautelari e i criteri di coordinamento dell’attività giurisdizionale. – Capo VI. La libera circolazione (in particolare gli effetti e i controlli) dei provvedimenti giurisdizionali nello spazio giudiziario europeo.

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Il Dipartimento di Scienze giuridiche dell’Università degli Studi di Verona organizza una Summer School su L’industria della moda nell’Unione europea dal 20 al 25 giugno 2016. L’iniziativa rientra nell’ambito del progetto “Univr Fashion Week” co-finanziato dall’Unione europea come Modulo Jean Monnet 2015-2018, coordinato da Maria Caterina Baruffi.

La Summer School è finalizzata ad un approfondimento, sotto un profilo europeo e internazionale, di temi di interesse per il settore della moda, quali proprietà intellettuale, diritto della concorrenza, contrattualistica, responsabilità sociale d’impresa e management. Le lezioni e i workshops, tenuti da docenti universitari, professionisti ed esperti di innovazione e consulenza manageriale, intendono fornire ai partecipanti competenze spendibili per una attività professionale nell’industria della moda.

Il corso si rivolge a laureati, giovani professionisti, avvocati e praticanti, nonché a studenti dell’ultimo anno delle lauree magistrali in discipline giuridiche ed economiche.

Il programma dell’edizione 2016 è disponibile qui.

Il termine per l’iscrizione è il 15 giugno 2016. Per maggiori informazioni su iscrizioni e accreditamenti, consultare questa pagina.

Nell’ordinanza 18 marzo 2016 n. 5420, le Sezioni unite della Corte di cassazione hanno dichiarato l’insussistenza della giurisdizione italiana rispetto a un giudizio proposto ai sensi dell’art. 333 del codice civile dalla madre di un minore, cittadina italiana, per l’adozione di provvedimenti limitativi della potestà genitoriale del padre, cittadino francese, alla luce di comportamenti che sarebbero stati tenuti da quest’ultimo in pregiudizio del figlio.

La Corte è giunta a questa conclusione sulla scorta di un ragionamento in cui si intrecciano, secondo un filo logico che non è del tutto agevole dipanare, considerazioni legate — per l’appunto — alla giurisdizione del giudice italiano e considerazioni legate alla previa pendenza della medesima causa di fronte a un giudice straniero.

Il padre, autore del regolamento preventivo di giurisdizione con cui le Sezioni unite sono state chiamate a pronunciarsi sul caso, aveva rilevato, in effetti, che, al momento dell’instaurazione del procedimento italiano risultava pendente negli Stati Uniti un procedimento di divorzio fra sé e la madre, nell’ambito del quale erano stati adottati dei provvedimenti non definitivi in tema di responsabilità genitoriale, comportanti, in particolare, l’autorizzazione della madre a trasferirsi in Italia con il figlio.

Nell’ordinanza, le Sezioni unite si preoccupano innanzitutto di dichiarare la proponibilità del regolamento di giurisdizione “in ragione della pendenza presso un paese extraeuropeo del giudizio tra i genitori sull’affidamento del minore”.

Impostato il ragionamento sui binari della litispendenza, i giudici del Supremo Collegio osservano che la questione del coordinamento fra il procedimento italiano e quello statunitense non trova la sua disciplina nel regolamento n. 2201/2003 relativo alla competenza giurisdizionale e all’efficacia delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e di responsabilità genitoriale (Bruxelles II bis), dato che la fattispecie interessa un giudizio instaurato in uno Stato estraneo all’Unione europea.

La norma che viene in rilievo è semmai, per la Corte, l’art. 7 della legge 31 maggio 1995 n. 218, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato, ai sensi del quale “quando, nel corso del giudizio, sia eccepita la previa pendenza tra le stesse parti di domanda avente il medesimo oggetto e il medesimo titolo dinanzi a un giudice straniero, il giudice italiano, se ritiene che il provvedimento straniero possa produrre effetto per l’ordinamento italiano, sospende il giudizio”.

Il procedimento statunitense, osserva il Supremo Collegio in funzione di quanto stabilito nell’art. 7 della legge, ha avuto inizio prima di quello italiano ed è tuttora pendente.

Solo a questo punto, la Corte rileva che, alla data dell’introduzione del giudizio italiano, il minore non aveva ancora stabilito la sua residenza abituale in Italia. Si osserva infatti nella motivazione che, a fronte di un ricorso ex art. 333 del codice civile proposto nel settembre 2014, “non viene riferito alcun episodio concreto” che segnali il continuativo svolgimento della vita personale del piccolo in Italia, dove solo nel dicembre 2014 ne è stato autorizzato dal giudice statunitense il trasferimento con la affidataria.

Sulla base di tutto quanto precede, le Sezioni unite concludono nel senso della carenza di giurisdizione del giudice italiano.

Vale la pena di aggiungere che le Sezioni unite potrebbero presto tornare ad occuparsi dell’applicabilità e degli effetti del regime comune della litispendenza rispetto a una situazione ricompresa (ai fini della giurisdizione) nella sfera applicativa del regolamento Bruxelles II bis, e sulla configurabilità della relativa questione come questione di sospensione necessaria del procedimento o come questione di giurisdizione, anche alla luce di quanto rilevato dalle stesse Sezioni unite (ma in relazione alla diversa previsione contenuta nell’art. 27 del regolamento n. 44/2001) in precedenti occasioni (come l’ordinanza 8 giugno 2011 n. 12410).

Come segnalato da Marina Castellaneta nel suo blog, la Sesta Sezione della Corte, con ordinanza 2 maggio 2016 n. 8619, ha infatti sollecitato il Presidente a investire del problema le Sezioni unite ai sensi dell’art. 374 del codice di procedura civile, in ragione della particolare importanza della questione di massima in discussione.

È disponibile il fascicolo inaugurale di European papers, un quadrimestrale on-line in lingua inglese frutto di un progetto che coinvolge studiosi del diritto dell’Unione europea provenienti da diversi paesi d’Europa.

La rivista si propone di trattare i temi afferenti al diritto dell’Unione europea, nei diversi profili della dimensione costituzionale dell’Unione europea, del mercato interno e della libertà di circolazione delle persone, dell’integrazione europea attraverso i diritti umani, della dimensione internazionale dell’integrazione europea e delle politiche dell’Unione relative allo spazio di libertà sicurezza e giustizia. In quest’ultimo ambito si inserisce la trattazione delle questioni collegate al diritto internazionale privato dell’Unione europea.

[Dal manifesto della Rivista] – Quaderni europei è l’espressione di un progetto culturale: nelle intenzioni dei suoi fondatori, essa intende costituire un luogo di riflessione sull’integrazione europea come strumento per la creazione di una nuova comunità politica. … [L]a realizzazione di un progetto culturale sul tema dell’integrazione europea comporta la necessità di riconciliare esigenze apparentemente antitetiche: da un lato, la pressante esigenza di rimeditare le categorie fondamentali di analisi dell’integrazione europea; d’altro lato, quella di seguire l’incessante dibattito che fluisce, da una varietà di fonti, su tali temi. … L’ispirazione ideale di Quaderni europei è unicamente di carattere metodologico. Essa intende offrire uno spazio pubblico nell’ambito del quale le varie ipotesi sul processo d’integrazione europeo possano essere sottoposte a vaglio critico e al dibattito aperto, scevro di condizionamenti ideologici. Quaderni europei vuole essere un laboratorio vivente per l’analisi di un fenomeno sociale la cui unicità, nell’ambito delle categorie del pensiero scientifico, è oggi ampiamente riconosciuta.

L’E-Journal, gratuitamente accessibile, è corredato da un forum inteso a promuovere “il costante aggiornamento e il dibattito ‘a seconda lettura’ sui temi europei”.

L’organico completo della direzione della rivista è disponibile a questo indirizzo.

L’archivio dei fascicoli è consultabile qui.

Si terrà a Bergamo il 30 maggio 2016, presso il Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza della locale Università, un incontro dedicato al regolamento n. 650/2012 sul diritto internazionale privato delle successioni mortis causa.

Interverranno, fra gli altri, Sergio Carbone (Univ. Genova), Angelo Davì (Univ. Roma La Sapienza) e i notai Arrigo Roveda (Milano) e Guido De Rosa (Bergamo).

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Dal 23 al 27 maggio 2016 si terrà presso l’Ordine degli Avvocati di Vicenza e presso il Polo Universitario di Vicenza una summer school in tema di Transnational Commercial Agreements, Litigation and Arbitration.

Le lezioni tratteranno i temi della giurisdizione e della legge applicabile secondo il diritto dell’Unione europea e secondo il diritto statunitense, con riferimento sia alle controversie dinanzi alle giurisdizioni nazionali sia a quelle arbitrali.

La  summer school vedrà come docenti, fra gli altri, Massimo Benedettelli (Univ. Bari), Franco Ferrari (Univ. Verona), Chiara Giovannucci Orlandi (Univ. Bologna), Luca Radicati di Brozolo (Univ. Cattolica di Milano), Marco Torsello (Univ. Verona) e Francesco Cortesi (Corte di Cassazione).

Il programma completo del corso ed il relativo modulo di iscrizione sono disponibili a questo indirizzo. Il termine per la presentazione della domanda di partecipazione scade il 21 maggio 2016.

The evidentiary effects of authentic acts in the Member States of the European Union, in the context of successions

This study was conducted in 25 EU Member States, under the coordination of the Centre for Private International Law at the University Aberdeen. It additionally includes input from the notariats of the CNUE. It sets out the typical domestic types of authentic instruments (and their usual evidentiary effects) arising in successions in the 22 Member States of origin (that allow their creation) and also deals with the ways in which they may interact with Art 59 of Regulation 650/2012 in each of the 25 Member States considered as Member States addressed. The authors looked at the meaning of ‘acceptance’  and the meaning of public policy in the context of Art 59 650/2012. They made various suggestions for improvements in best practice and for various legislative reforms of the Succession Regulation.

The abstract reads:

The EU Succession Regulation (Regulation 650/2012) allows for cross-border circulation of authentic instruments in a matter of succession. Authentic instruments are documents created by authorised authorities which benefit from certain evidential advantages. As this Regulation does not harmonise Member State substantive laws or procedures concerning succession the laws relating to the domestic evidentiary effects of succession authentic instruments remain diverse. Article 59 of the Succession Regulation requires the Member States party to the Regulation to give succession authentic instruments the evidentiary effects they would enjoy in their Member State of origin. The only limits on this obligation being public policy or the irreconcilability of the authentic instrument with a court decision, court settlement or another authentic instrument. This study, which was commissioned by the Policy Department for Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament upon request of the Committee on Legal Affairs, provides an information resource for legal practitioners concerning the evidentiary effects of succession authentic instruments in the 25 Member States bound by the Succession Regulation. It also makes recommendations for best practice.

Full study available here (in English, but it is being translated into French and German).

Ministry of Defence [MOD] v Iraqi civilians highlights a classic in private international law (statutes of limitation), with an interesting link to State immunity. Procedural issues are considered to be part of the lex fori. Meaning, a court always applies its own procedural rules. For the discussions in the Rome II context, see an earlier posting. However what is less settled is whether statutes of limitation fall under procedure or substantial law. If the former, then they follow the lex fori. If the latter, then they follow lex causae: the law applicable to the substantive matter at issue.

Limitation, which deprives the litigant of a forensic remedy but does not extinguish his right, was traditionally classified by the English courts as procedural. The result was that until the position was altered by statute in 1984, the English courts disregarded foreign limitation law and applied the English statutes of limitation irrespective of the lex causae. This was widely regarded as unsatisfactory, mainly because of the rather technical character of the distinction on which it was based between barring the remedy and extinguishing the right.

The Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 changed the position and provided for the English courts, with limited exceptions, to apply the limitation rules of the lex causae. 

Now, in MOD v Iraqi Civilians, on appeal from [2015] EWCA Civ 1241, the civilians claim to have suffered unlawful detention and/or physical maltreatment at the hands of British armed forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2009, for which the MOD is liable in tort. It is agreed between the parties that any liability of the Ministry in tort is governed by Iraqi law. Under article 232 of the Civil Code of Iraq, the standard limitation period applicable to claims of this kind in Iraqi law is three years from the day on which the claimant became aware of the injury and of the person who caused it. The action sub judice was begun more than three years after most of the claimants must have been aware of these matters.

However, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17, which had and still has the force of law in Iraq, made it impossible for claimants to sue the British government in Iraq. Section 2(1) of the Order provides that coalition forces in Iraq (including British forces) are “immune from Iraqi legal process.” Claimants argue that Order 17 needs to be seen as an ‘impediment’ within the meaning of article 435 of the Iraqi Civil Code, which is one of a number of provisions suspending the running of time in particular cases. It provides:

” Article 435 – (1) The time limit barring the hearing of the case is suspended by a lawful excuse such as where the plaintiff is a minor or interdicted and has no guardian or is absent in a remote foreign country, or where the case is between spouses or ascendants and descendants, or if there is another impediment rendering it impossible for the plaintiff to claim his right.

(2) The period which lapses while the excuse still exists (lasts) shall not be taken into account (for the running of the time limitation).”

Lord Sumption leading, held (at 11) that Order 17 is not a rule of limitation, but a particular form of state immunity, which serves as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the courts. It is therefore necessarily procedural and local in nature. It is not legally relevant, given the claimants have brought proceedings in England, what impediments might have prevented similar proceedings in Iraq [at 13]. Claimants could have always and did eventually sue in the UK. Claimants’ submission, if accepted, would mean that there was no limitation period at all affecting the present proceedings in England, by reason of a consideration (CPA Order 17) which had no relevance to English proceedings because it has no application outside Iraq and has never impeded resort to the English court (at 16).

The Appeal was dismissed. In the wider context of immunity, it is important precedent. Claimants faced with immunity obstacles to litigation in a jurisdiction, must not hesitate to start proceedings elsewhere, where no such obstacles exist. In proceedings before the English courts, any delay in doing so is subject to the ordinary limitation periods of the lex causae.

Geert.

EU Civil Justice. Current Issues and Future Outlook, a cura di B. Hess, M. Bergström, E. Storskrubb, Hart Publishing, 2016, pp. 384, ISBN: 9781849466820, GBP 60.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – This seventh volume in the Swedish Studies in European Law series brings together some of the most prominent scholars working within the fast-evolving field of EU civil justice. Civil justice has an impact on matters involving, inter alia, family relationships, consumers, entrepreneurs, employees, small and medium-sized businesses and large multinational corporations. It therefore has great power and potential. Over the past 15 years a wealth of EU measures have been enacted in this field. Issues arising from the implementation thereof and practice in relation to these measures are now emerging. Hence, this volume will explore the benefits as well as the challenges of these measures. The particular themes covered include forum shopping, alternative dispute resolution, simplified procedures and debt collection, family matters and collective redress. In addition, the deepening of the field that continues post-Lisbon has occasioned a new level of regulatory and policy challenges. These are discussed in the final part of the volume which focuses on mutual recognition also in the broader European law context of integration in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

L’indice del volume e ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

Dal 4 al 9 luglio 2016, si terrà a Ravenna la Summer School su European and Comparative Environmental Law, organizzata dalla Scuola di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Bologna in collaborazione con la Lewis and Clark Law School (Oregon) e con la Fondazione Flaminia.

L’iniziativa mira a promuovere la conoscenza della cornice giuridica attuale in materia di ambiente, con particolare attenzione alla sua dimensione europea ed internazionale.

Il tema del contenzioso transazionale in materia ambientale verrà approfondito con un ciclo di incontri curati da Alessandra Zanobetti ed Enrico Al Mureden dell’Università di Bologna, e Robert Klonoff della Lewis and Clark Law School.

Il programma completo dei corsi è disponibile qui.

Il corso dà diritto al riconoscimento di 6 crediti per gli studenti universitari, e 18 crediti per gli Avvocati. È previsto un esame finale di verifica delle conoscenze acquisite.

Il termine per l’iscrizione è  il 3 giugno 2016. Ulteriori informazioni e copia del bando sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

This post has been written by Martina Mantovani.

On 4 May 2016, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR) was published on the Official Journal. It shall apply as of 25 May 2018.

Adopted on the basis of Article 16(2) TFEU, the Regulation is the core element of the Commission’s Data protection reform package, which also includes a Directive for the protection of personal data with regard to the processing by criminal law enforcement authorities.

The new measure aims at modernising the legislative framework for data protection, so as to allow both businesses and citizens to seize the opportunities of the Digital Single Market.

First and foremost, businesses will benefit from a simplified legal landscape, as the detailed and uniform provisions laid down by the GDPR, which are directly applicable throughout the EU, will overcome most of the difficulties experienced with the divergent national implementations of Directive 95/46/EC, and with the rather complex conflict-of-law provision which appeared in Article 4 of the Directive.

Nevertheless, some coordination will still be required between the laws of the various Member States, since the new regime does not entirely rule out the relevance of national provisions. As stated in Recitals 8 and 10, the GDPR ‘provides a margin of manoeuvre for Member States’ to restrict or specify its rules. For example, Member States are allowed to specify or introduce further conditions for the processing depending, inter alia, on the nature of the data concerned (Recital 53 refers, in particular, to genetic, biometric, or health-related data).

Secondly, the new Regulation marks a significant extension of the extraterritorial application of EU data protection law, with the express intent of leveling the playing field between European businesses and non-EU established companies operatig in the Single Market. In delimiting the territorial scope of application of the new rules, Article 3 of the GDPR borrows on the case-law of the Court of Justice regarding Article 4 of Directive 96/45/EC. Pursuant to Article 3(1), the Regulation applies to any processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, ‘regardless of whether the processing itself takes place within the Union or not’ (along the lines of the Google Spain case).

Moreover, Article 3(2) refers to the targeting, by non-EU established controllers and processors, of individuals ‘who are in the Union’, for the purposes of offering goods or services to such subjects or monitoring their behaviours. This connecting factor, further specified by Recital 23 in keeping with the findings of the Court of Justice in Weltimmo, is somehow more specific than the former ‘equipment/means’ criteria set out by the Directive (cfr. Opinion 8/2010 of the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, on applicable law).

One of the key innovations brought along by the GDPR is the so-called one-stop-shop mechanism. The idea, in essence, is that where a data controller or processor processes information relating to individuals in more than one Member State, a supervisory authority in one EU Member State should be in charge of controlling the controller’s or processor’s activities, with the assistance and oversight of the corresponding authorities of the other Member States concerned (Article 52). It remains to be seen whether the watered down version which in the end found its way into the final text of the Regulation will effectively deliver the cutting of red tape promised to businesses.

The other goal of the GDPR is to provide individuals with a stronger control on their personal data, so as to restore consumers’ trust in the digital economy.  To this end, the new legislative framework updates some of the basic principles set out by Directive 95/46/EC — which are believed to ‘remain sound’ (Recital 9) — and devises some new ones, in order to further buttress the position of data subjects with respect to their own data.

The power of individuals to access and control their personal data is strengthened, inter alia, by the introduction of a ‘right to be forgotten’ (Article 17) and a right to data portability, aimed at facilitating the transmission of personal data between service providers (Article 20). The data subject additionally acquires a right to be notified, ‘without undue delay’ of any personal data breach which may result in ‘a high risk to [his or her] rights and freedoms’ (Article 33).

The effective protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data also depends on the availability of adequate remedies in case of infringement. The Regulation acknowledges that the infringement of the rules on the processing of personal data may result in physical, material or non-material damage, ‘of varying likelihood or severity’ (Recital 75). The two-track system has been maintained, whereby the data subject is entitled to lodge a complaint against the data controller or processor either with the competente courts (Article 79) or with the competent supervisory authority (Article 77). Furthermore, pursuant to Article 78, any legally binding decision of a supervisory authority concerning the position of a data subject — or the lack of thereof — may be appealed before the courts of the Member State where the supervisory authority is established.

The GDPR additionally sets forth an embryonic procedural regime for proceedings in connection with the alleged infringement of data protection legislation.

In the first place, it introduces two unprecedented special rules of jurisdiction, the application of which should not be prejudiced, as stated in Recital 147, by ‘general jurisdiction rules such as those of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012’, ie, the Brussels Ia Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (by the way, the primacy of the GDPR over Brussels Ia could equally be asserted under Article 67 of the latter Regulation). Article 79 of the GDPR provides that the data subject who considers that his or her rights under the Regulation have been infringed, may choose to bring proceedings before the courts of the Member State where the controller or processor has an establishment or, alternatively, before the courts of the Member State where the data subject himself or herself resides, unless the controller is a public authority of a Member State acting in the exercise of its public powers. Article 82(6) clarifies that the courts of the same Member State have jurisdiction over actions for compensation of the damage suffered as a result of the said infringements.

Article 81 of the GDPR deals with lis pendens. If proceedings concerning the same activities are already pending before a court in another Member State, any court other than the one first seised has the discretion (not the obligation) to stay its proceedings. The same court may also decide to decline jurisdiction in favour of the court first seized, provided that the latter court has jurisdiction over the proceedings in question and its law permits the consolidation of related proceedings.

Finally, the Regulation includes a provision concerning the recognition and enforcement of ‘any judgment of a court or tribunal and any decision of an administrative authority of a third country requiring a controller or processor to transfer or disclose personal data’. Pursuant to Article 48, such judgments or decisions may be recognised or enforced solely on the basis of an international agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty, in force between the requesting third country and the Union or a Member State..

This provision mirrors the stance recently taken by some Member States and their representatives in connection to an important cross-border dispute, where a similar question had arisen, which was in fact the object of different solutions on the two sides of the Atlantic.

In fact, in the light of the approach taken by US law enforcement authorities, search warrants seeking access to personal data stored in European data centres are regarded as a form of compelled disclosure, akin to a subpoena, requiring the recipient of the order to turn over information within its control, irrespective of the place in which data is effectively stored. What matters is the sheer existence of personal jurisdiction over the data controller, that is the ISP who receives the warrant, which would enable criminal prosecutors to unilaterally order seizure of the data stored abroad, without necessarily seeking cooperation thorough official channels such as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties.

Article 48 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 may accordingly be read as the EU counter-reaction to these law enforcement claims.

Slovakia and the Netherlands concluded a BIT in 1992 which included an arbitration agreement for disputes between foreign investors and one of the contracting parties. Slovakia became a EU member state in 2004. Later, a health insurance company from the Netherlands that had operated on the Slovakian market obtained an award from an arbitral court in Frankfurt, Germany, granting € 22 million damages against Slovakia.

Slovakia now argues before German state courts that by its accession to the EU its offer for concluding an arbitration agreement had become invalid because of its incompatibility with EU law. The Upper Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Frankfurt, decision of 18 December 2014, docket no. 26 Sch 3/13, decided against Slovakia. By its appeal to the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) Slovakia continues seeking the setting aside of the arbitral award for lack of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. The Bundesgerichtshof, by its decision of 3 March 2016, docket no. I ZB 2/15, requested the Court of Justice of the European Union to give a ruling on the validity of arbitration agreements in BITs between Member States of the European Union, in particular in light of Articles 344, 267 and 18 I TFEU.

The Bundesgerichtshof expressed its view that there should be no conflict with Articles 344, 267. However, the Court poses the question whether there might be a discrimination against investors of other Member States unable to proceed under equivalent BIT proceedings. Even if this were the case, the Court further holds that the consequence of a dicrimination of this kind would not necessarily be the invalidity of the arbitration clause but rather the access of discriminated investors to the BIT dispute settlement mechanism.

For those who read German, the Court’s press release of today about its decision (full text is not yet available) can be found here:

http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&Datum=2016&Sort=3&nr=74606&pos=1&anz=82

Si terrà a Firenze, il 30 maggio 2016, un corso di aggiornamento professionale dedicato all’applicazione pratica, nell’ordinamento italiano, della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea, organizzato dal Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche dell’Università di Firenze, in collaborazione con la Fondazione per la Formazione Forense dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Firenze.

[Descrizione del corso] – Il corso si propone di fornire ai partecipanti gli strumenti tecnici e conoscitivi necessari ai fini della corretta applicazione della “Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’UE” (c.d. Carta di Nizza) nell’ordinamento italiano. … In concreto, la Carta assume rilevanza rispetto a settori di particolare importanza ai fini della tutela giurisdizionale delle persone, quali il diritto dell’immigrazione, il diritto di famiglia e dei minori, il diritto del lavoro e dei consumatori, il diritto antidiscriminatorio. La sua applicazione rispetto alle norme interne, oltre ad essere richiesta ai fini dell’adempimento degli obblighi posti dal diritto dell’Unione, arricchisce gli strumenti di tutela a vantaggio delle persone determinando, in molti casi, una protezione maggiore rispetto a quella fornita dalle fonti interne. Il corso fornirà ai partecipanti le conoscenze necessarie per comprendere se in casi concreti, relativi ai settori di particolare rilevanza, la Carta debba trovare applicazione e con quali conseguenze.

Alcune relazioni avranno ad oggetto i rapporti tra la Carta e la CEDU (Ornella Feraci, Univ. Firenze), il rilievo della Carta nel diritto internazionale privato e processuale europeo, con specifica attenzione alle garanzie dell’equo processo (Olivia Lopes Pegna, Univ. Firenze), nonché la rilevanza della Carta nel diritto internazionale privato europeo della famiglia (Ester di Napoli, Univ. Magna Graecia, Catanzaro).

Per la partecipazione al corso è prevista l’attribuzione di 12 crediti formativi per gli avvocati. Le domande di partecipazione devono essere inviate all’indirizzo email perfezionamenti@adm.unifi.it, entro il 18 maggio 2016.

Maggiori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

On 4 May 2016, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR) was published on the Official Journal. It shall apply as of 25 May 2018.

Adopted on the basis of Article 16(2) TFEU, the Regulation is the core element of the Commission’s Data protection reform package, which also includes a Directive for the protection of personal data with regard to the processing by criminal law enforcement authorities.

The new measure aims at modernising the legislative framework for data protection, so as to allow both businesses and citizens to seize the opportunities of the Digital Single Market.

First and foremost, businesses will benefit from a simplified legal landscape, as the detailed and uniform provisions laid down by the GDPR, which are directly applicable throughout the EU, will overcome most of the difficulties experienced with the divergent national implementations of Directive 95/46/EC, and with the rather complex conflict-of-law provision which appeared in Article 4 of the Directive.

Nevertheless, some coordination will still be required between the laws of the various Member States, since the new regime does not entirely rule out the relevance of national provisions. As stated in Recitals 8 and 10, the GDPR ‘provides a margin of manoeuvre for Member States’ to restrict or specify its rules. For example, Member States are allowed to specify or introduce further conditions for the processing depending, inter alia, on the nature of the data concerned (Recital 53 refers, in particular, to genetic, biometric, or health-related data).

Secondly, the new Regulation marks a significant extension of the extraterritorial application of EU data protection law, with the express intent of leveling the playing field between European businesses and non-EU established companies operatig in the Single Market. In delimiting the territorial scope of application of the new rules, Article 3 of the GDPR borrows on the case-law of the Court of Justice regarding Article 4 of Directive 96/45/EC. Pursuant to Article 3(1), the Regulation applies to any processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, ‘regardless of whether the processing itself takes place within the Union or not’ (along the lines of the Google Spain case).

Moreover, Article 3(2) refers to the targeting, by non-EU established controllers and processors, of individuals ‘who are in the Union’, for the purposes of offering goods or services to such subjects or monitoring their behaviours. This connecting factor, further specified by Recital 23 in keeping with the findings of the Court of Justice in Weltimmo, is somehow more specific than the former ‘equipment/means’ criteria set out by the Directive (cfr. Opinion 8/2010 of the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, on applicable law).

One of the key innovations brought along by the GDPR is the so-called one-stop-shop mechanism. The idea, in essence, is that where a data controller or processor processes information relating to individuals in more than one Member State, a supervisory authority in one EU Member State should be in charge of controlling the controller’s or processor’s activities, with the assistance and oversight of the corresponding authorities of the other Member States concerned (Article 52). It remains to be seen whether the watered down version which in the end found its way into the final text of the Regulation will effectively deliver the cutting of red tape promised to businesses.

The other goal of the GDPR is to provide individuals with a stronger control on their personal data, so as to restore consumers’ trust in the digital economy.  To this end, the new legislative framework updates some of the basic principles set out by Directive 95/46/EC — which are believed to ‘remain sound’ (Recital 9) — and devises some new ones, in order to further buttress the position of data subjects with respect to their own data.

The power of individuals to access and control their personal data is strengthened, inter alia, by the introduction of a ‘right to be forgotten’ (Article 17) and a right to data portability, aimed at facilitating the transmission of personal data between service providers (Article 20). The data subject additionally acquires a right to be notified, ‘without undue delay’ of any personal data breach which may result in ‘a high risk to [his or her] rights and freedoms’ (Article 33).

The effective protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data also depends on the availability of adequate remedies in case of infringement. The Regulation acknowledges that the infringement of the rules on the processing of personal data may result in physical, material or non-material damage, ‘of varying likelihood or severity’ (Recital 75). The two-track system has been maintained, whereby the data subject is entitled to lodge a complaint against the data controller or processor either with the competente courts (Article 79) or with the competent supervisory authority (Article 77). Furthermore, pursuant to Article 78, any legally binding decision of a supervisory authority concerning the position of a data subject — or the lack of thereof — may be appealed before the courts of the Member State where the supervisory authority is established.

The GDPR additionally sets forth an embryonic procedural regime for proceedings in connection with the alleged infringement of data protection legislation.

In the first place, it introduces two unprecedented special rules of jurisdiction, the application of which should not be prejudiced, as stated in Recital 147, by ‘general jurisdiction rules such as those of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012’, ie, the Brussels Ia Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (by the way, the primacy of the GDPR over Brussels Ia could equally be asserted under Article 67 of the latter Regulation). Article 79 of the GDPR provides that the data subject who considers that his or her rights under the Regulation have been infringed, may choose to bring proceedings before the courts of the Member State where the controller or processor has an establishment or, alternatively, before the courts of the Member State where the data subject himself or herself resides, unless the controller is a public authority of a Member State acting in the exercise of its public powers. Article 82(6) clarifies that the courts of the same Member State have jurisdiction over actions for compensation of the damage suffered as a result of the said infringements.

Article 81 of the GDPR deals with lis pendens. If proceedings concerning the same activities are already pending before a court in another Member State, any court other than the one first seised has the discretion (not the obligation) to stay its proceedings. The same court may also decide to decline jurisdiction in favour of the court first seized, provided that the latter court has jurisdiction over the proceedings in question and its law permits the consolidation of related proceedings.

Finally, the Regulation includes a provision concerning the recognition and enforcement of ‘any judgment of a court or tribunal and any decision of an administrative authority of a third country requiring a controller or processor to transfer or disclose personal data’. Pursuant to Article 48, such judgments or decisions may be recognised or enforced solely on the basis of an international agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty, in force between the requesting third country and the Union or a Member State..

This provision mirrors the stance recently taken by some Member States and their representatives in connection to an important cross-border dispute, where a similar question had arisen, which was in fact the object of different solutions on the two sides of the Atlantic.

In fact, in the light of the approach taken by US law enforcement authorities, search warrants seeking access to personal data stored in European data centres are regarded as a form of compelled disclosure, akin to a subpoena, requiring the recipient of the order to turn over information within its control, irrespective of the place in which data is effectively stored. What matters is the sheer existence of personal jurisdiction over the data controller, that is the ISP who receives the warrant, which would enable criminal prosecutors to unilaterally order seizure of the data stored abroad, without necessarily seeking cooperation thorough official channels such as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties.

Article 48 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 may accordingly be read as the EU counter-reaction to these law enforcement claims.

The School of Legal and Social Sciences of the Carlos III University of Madrid has issued a call for papers on the topic of International Family Law Reforms.

The initiative, addressed to young researchers, is intended to select the papers that will be presented in the Young Researchers Round Table, in the framework of the  International Congress on International Family Law Reforms, which will be held in Madrid on 17 and 18 November 2016.

The selected papers may also be published on Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional.

The deadline for the submission of the abstracts (in English or Spanish) is 15 June 2016.

Further information on the call for papers and on the final conference are available here.

Michael Bogdan, Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law, 3a ed., Europa Law Publishing, 2016, pp. 230, ISBN 9789089521774, Euro 38.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – This concise book is mainly intended to be used as an introduction to the rules of private international law belonging to the legal system of the European Union. It provides legal practitioners with an overview of this highly complex field of law and can serve as an introductory textbook in elective undergraduate courses and master programs offered today by many law schools both to their own students and to exchange students from other countries. The book will hopefully also be useful as a spring-board towards more profound studies of statutory texts, case law and legal literature.

L’indice dell’opera è consultabile qui. Maggiori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

The Max Planck Institute Luxembourg is currently recruiting new members for its team. Two types of positions are currently open:

1. Research Fellow in EU Procedural Law:

The Max Planck Institute Luxembourg would like to appoint highly qualified candidates for 2 open positions as Research Fellow (PhD candidate) for the Research Department of European and Comparative Procedural Law

Job description

The research fellow will conduct legal research (contribution to common research projects and own publications), particularly in the field of comparative civil procedural law (including European law and international arbitration).

Your tasks

The successful candidate will have the great opportunity to contribute to the development of the Department of European Comparative Procedural Law led by Prof. Burkhard Hess and, in parallel, work on her/his PhD project.

The Research Fellow is expected to write her/his PhD thesis and perform the major part of her/his PhD research work in the premises of the institute in Luxembourg, but also in close collaboration with her/his external supervisor and with the university or institution delivering her/his PhD diploma. A supervision of a PhD-thesis by Prof. Hess will also be possible.

Your profile

The applicants are required to have obtained at least a Master degree in Law with outstanding results and to have a deep knowledge of domestic procedural and European procedural law. According to the academic grades already received, candidates must rank within the top 10 %.

The successful candidates should demonstrate a great interest and curiosity for fundamental research and have a high potential to develop excellence in academic research. Proficiency in English is compulsory (in written and oral); further language skills (in French and German notably) are of advantage.

Our offer

The MPI Luxembourg will offer scientific guidance, a fully-equipped office and an access to its noteworthy library to foster legal research activities. You will be free to write your thesis in English or in any other language which suits you, as long as you are able to communicate on its content in English.

The MPI Luxembourg offers outstanding conditions to undertake fundamental legal research, and a very conducive work climate in an international team, while being in depth knowledge exchange and support among other research fellows.

Salary and social benefits are provided according to the Luxembourgish legal requirements. Positions are full-time but may be considered as part-time as well.

Joining us

If you are interested in joining our Institute, please apply online and follow our usual application process.

Documents required

A detailed CV incl. list of publications; copies of academic records; a PhD project description of no more than 1-2 pages with the name of the foreseen PhD supervisor and the name of the institution awarding the PhD certificate; the name and contact details of two referees.

2. Research Fellow (PhD candidate) in EU Family Law

For a period of thirty-six months, the Research Fellow will conduct legal research and cooperate at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg (research Department of European and Comparative Procedural Law) within the Project ‘Planning the future of cross-border families: a path through coordination – “EUFam’s” (JUST/2014/JCOO/AG/CIVI 4000007729)’ which aims (i) at assessing the effectiveness of the functioning ‘in concreto’ of the EU Regulations in family matters, as well as the 2007 Hague Protocol and the 2007 Hague Recovery Convention; and (ii) at identifying the paths that lead to further improvement of such effectiveness.

Your tasks

The successful candidate will benefit from the opportunity to partake in the development of the Department of Procedural Law led by Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Burkhard Hess by becoming an active and integrated part of the Project team.

The Research Fellow is expected to assist in the achievement of the objectives of the Project, namely by carrying out and developing legal research with a view to contributing to the drafting of the Project’s Final Study and by participating in the presentation of the scientific outcomes of the Project.

Moreover, she/he will actively cooperate in the organization of meetings and of an international seminar, and will cooperate with the Project team in reporting on financial matters, in carrying out the research activities and in analysing potential interplays of research activities with cross-cultural issues. The project will be terminated with 14 months. The remaining time shall be (mainly) dedicated to the elaboration of the PhD.

Your profile

Applicants must have earned a degree in law and be PhD candidates working on a thesis on EU private international and procedural law in family matters. According to the academic grades already received, candidates must rank within the top 10 %.

The successful candidate shall demonstrate a strong interest and aptitude for legal research and have a high potential to develop excellence in academic research.

Her/His CV must portray a consolidated background in EU private international and procedural law in family matters: to this aim, prior publications in this field of the law shall be highly regarded in the selection process.

Full proficiency in English is compulsory (written and oral); further language skills are greatly valued.

Our offer

The MPI Luxembourg offers scientific guidance, a productive working environment within an international team of researchers, and the possibility to develop connections and fruitful exchanges with academia, judges and practitioners from many EU Member States. Moreover, the Institute will provide a fully-equipped office and access to its renowned legal library.

Salary and social benefits are provided according to the Luxembourgish legal requirements. The position is full-time, for a period of thirty-six months.

Joining us

If you are interested in joining our Institute, please apply online and follow our usual application process.

Documents required

A detailed CV incl. list of publications; copy of academic records; a PhD project description of no more than 1-2 pages with the name of the PhD supervisor and the name of the institution awarding the PhD certificate; the name and contact details of two referees.

Note for all positions:

Full information and access to application platform: here.

Contact person is Diana Castellaneta: diana.castellaneta@mpi.lu

Deadline: 31 May 2016