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Conventions & Instruments

On 1 July 2023, the 2000 Protection of Adults Convention entered into force for Malta. The Convention currently has 15 Contracting Parties. More information is available here.

 

Meetings & Events

On 12 June 2023, the kick-off meeting of the Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) Project was held online. During the meeting experts laid the foundation for the preparatory and exploratory work relating to the CBDCs Project, which will study the private international law implications of CBDCs. More information is available here.

 

Publications & Documentation

The report of the first meeting of the Working Group on the Financial Aspects of Intercountry Adoption is now available online. The mandate of the Working Group is to take stock of current practices, identify possible coordinated, targeted, practical approaches, and to prioritise them with the aim of raising standards.

 

Upcoming Events

Registration is now open for HCCH Asia Pacific Week 2023. The conference’s sixth edition will be held from 11 to 14 September in Hong Kong SAR, China, with the generous support of the Department of Justice of Hong Kong SAR and the University of Hong Kong. Participation from 12 to 14 September is open to the public, in person or online. More information is available here.

Save-the-date: On 5 October 2023, the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH will organise an online colloquium on the private international law implications of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs). More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

On 28 June 2023, the European Commission presented a package consisting of three proposals regarding the Euro currency. It includes a proposal for a regulation on the legal tender of Euro banknotes and coins, a proposal for a regulation on the establishment of the digital euro, accompanied by a proposal for a regulation of on the provision of digital Euro services by payment services providers incorporated in Member States whose currency is not the Euro.

While ensuring that individuals and businesses can continue to access and pay with Euro banknotes and coins across the Euro area, the package aims to set out a framework for a possible new digital form of the Euro that the European Central Bank could choose to issue in the future, as a complement to cash.

The package is not concerned, as such, with private international law. However, it appears to have some implications for private international law, which will be briefly discussed below.

Background

Digitalisation and new technology are progressively influencing the lives of Europeans and the European economy. As the European economy becomes more digital, Europeans are increasingly using private digital payment methods to transact. Banknotes and coins, the only existing forms of central bank money with legal tender available to the general public (including individuals, governments, and corporations), cannot support the EU’s economy in the digital age.

As online transactions expand and payment habits of the general public migrate to the wide range of private digital payment methods available in the EU, their use in payments declines. The lack of a widely available and useable form of central bank money that is technologically fitted to the digital era may also erode trust in commercial bank money, and eventually in the Euro itself.

In this context, the issuing of a retail CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) has acquired substantial attention in recent years: a retail CBDC, like cash, would be an official form of central bank money that is directly available to the general public and has the legal tender status. And attention would like to turn into reality also in the EU.

Indeed, many central banks across the world have started looking at the possibility of introducing CBDCs. They, like the European Central Bank, have been conducting research and piloting programmes to better understand their potential advantages and drawbacks. Sweden, for instance, began a research on the viability of an e-krona within the EU. Outside of the EU, the United Kingdom has published multiple consultations and begun research towards a digital pound, akin to the European Central Bank’s technical inquiry into a digital euro. China has previously produced a digital yuan outside of Europe, which is already accessible for payment in an increasing number of places, with major banks and payment service providers facilitating the process. The United States, then, is looking at the possibility of a digital dollar but has not yet concluded if it is necessary.

However, some underlying choices need to be faced. For example, CBDC can be of two different types: (a) Account-based: before allowing a user to make a payment, an account-based approach often entails the use of a trusted third party to authenticate the identification of the account holder and the check on account balance; the accounts are then debited and credited accordingly; or (b) Token-based: a form of money issued by a central bank whereby the monetary claim on the central bank is incorporated in a digital token and the transfer of the token equals transfer of the claim, without current-account relationship between the central bank and the holder.

To conclude this overall background, it is useful to clarify that it is not a matter of crypto-assets and blockchain. Crypto assets, indeed, are purely digital assets that use public ledgers over the internet to prove ownership. They use cryptography, peer-to-peer networks and a distributed ledger technology (DLT) – such as blockchain – to create, verify and secure transactions. While the digital euro, unlike crypto-assets, would be central bank money. The European Central Bank would guarantee its safety, stability, and ability to be exchanged for Euro currency at face value. In contrast, the value of crypto-assets might vary substantially, and their conversion into Euro currency or even commercial bank money cannot be guaranteed.

Proposal on Digital Euro

The goal of the proposal on digital Euro is to keep central bank money with legal tender status available to the general public, while also providing a cutting-edge and cost-effective payment method, ensuring a high level of privacy in digital payments, maintaining financial stability, and promoting accessibility and financial inclusion.

As a result, they offer the essential legal framework to guarantee the successful use of the digital Euro as a single currency throughout the eurozone, addressing the demands of users in the digital age, and supporting competitiveness, efficiency, innovation, and resilience in the EU’s digitalizing economy. They offer the essential legal framework to guarantee the successful use of the digital Euro as a single currency throughout the eurozone, addressing the demands of users in the digital age, and supporting competitiveness, efficiency, innovation, and resilience in the EU’s digitalizing economy.

Subject Matter, Establishment and Issuance of the Digital Euro

‘Digital euro’ means the digital form of the single currency available to natural and legal persons for the purpose of retail payments. It may be issued by the European Central Bank and, if authorised by the European Central Bank, by eurozone national central banks. This means that it would be public money or central bank money. Like Euro banknotes and coins, the digital Euro will be a direct liability of the European Central Bank or of eurozone national central banks vis-à-vis digital Euro users, i.e. those making use of a digital Euro payment service in the capacity of payer, payee, or both.

Several rules are being proposed to integrate the digital Euro into the current legal framework. In particular, digital Euro payment transactions shall be subject to Payment Services Directive (PSD2, as will be replaced by proposed PSD3 and PSR), the Cross-Border Payments Regulation (as will be amended by the proposed accompanying Regulation), the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5, as will be replaced by proposed AMLD6 and AMLR) and the Funds Transfer Regulation.

Legal Tender

The digital Euro will have legal tender status, which means that it must be accepted at face value with the ability to satisfy a payment obligation; this is not the case for existing electronic means of payments provided by commercial banks. Surcharges will be prohibited. To guarantee the effective preservation of the digital euro’s legal tender status as a unified currency throughout the eurozone, as well as the acceptance of digital Euro payments, provisions on sanctions for infringements will be adopted and implemented in the Member States.

Payees are entitled to refuse payment in digital Euro under the circumstances indicated in Article 9.
The digital Euro will be convertible in the same way as Euro banknotes and coins, scriptural money, and electronic money are. Where both digital Euro and Euro cash acceptance is required, the payer may choose between the two.

Distribution

(Private) Payment service companies would act as intermediaries for the digital euro. Banks and other payment service providers, indeed, would be in charge and in responsibility of distributing digital euros and providing payment services to natural and legal persons, primarily via offering a variety of digital Euro payment services (without the need for an extra licence). These services include first of all enabling users to access and use digital euro; persons, indeed, would be able to open a digital Euro account at any commercial bank or any other payment service provider, such as payment institutions and electronic money institutions. Then, other digital Euro payment services included cover initiating and receiving digital Euro payment transactions, managing their digital Euro payment accounts (which function similarly to digital wallets and have a unique account number), providing users with digital Euro payment instruments, and conducting funding (i.e., acquiring digital Euro in exchange for cash or other funds) / defunding operations.

There is also a list of basic digital Euro payment services that must be provided to individuals for free, such as opening and maintaining digital Euro payment accounts, funding/defunding from/into cash, initiating and receiving digital Euro payment transactions (person-to-person, person-to-government, government-to-person, or point of interaction including point-of-sale and e-commerce) via an electronic payment instrument, or providing such instruments. Users using digital euros can have one or more digital Euro payment accounts with the same or other payment services providers.

Access, Use and its Limits, Technical Features and Privacy

The proposal provides also other rules.

Chapter six, devoted to the access side, deals with the use of the digital Euro outside the Euro area, which depend on whether natural and legal persons reside or are established in a non-Euro area Member States or in a third country. It will be possible, subject to described conditions under Articles 18 to 21.

Technical features are also taken into account under chapter seven, where it is indicated that the digital Euro should be developed in a way that makes it easy to use for the general public, including financially excluded or at-risk individuals, those with impairments, functional limits, or inadequate digital skills, and the elderly. In order to achieve this aim, digital Euro users will not be needed to have a non-digital Euro payment account. And the digital Euro should be available for digital Euro payment transactions both offline and online as of the first issuance of the digital Euro and should allow for conditional payment transactions. Users may use the European Digital Identity Wallets established under the proposed Regulation on a European Digital Identity, described on this blog, to onboard and make payments. The digital Euro should enable digital users to switch their digital Euro payment accounts to another payment services provider at the request of the digital Euro user.

Finally, privacy and data protection issues are addressed.

Private International Law Implications

CBDCs are not free from private international law implications. Payment currency, indeed, is a component that private international law cannot ignore.

Basically, the problem of problems, which then concerns all the classic private international law issues, is that relating to the connecting factors to be used for this currency. Can the criteria of the locus rei sitae and lex rei sitae have any weight? And if so, where is this currency located? If not, what other criteria to use?

And, generally related to the latter, also the role of private autonomy and its possible limits is to be addressed. For instance, if the CBDC is included in a contract with cross-border elements, how do you provide for party autonomy? Should boundaries to CBDC, and the contract, be established?

In jurisdiction matter, it follows that identifying the court to deal with it is relevant, among intermediaries and account holders.

But also for the applicable law the problems are no less: opening CBDC accounts, holding, transactions, payments, settlements, and other aspect such as data flow can be dealt with.

An impact, also, in terms of recognition and enforcement, imagining having a judgement including CBDC matters to be recognized and enforced in different countries.

History tends to repeat itself: what to do then? Adapt existing rules, if they resist this tool, or devise new ones?

Surely a good starting point is to refer to the contribution in progress in this field, such as the Proposal for Exploratory Work: Private International Law Aspects of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) by the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Perhaps the HCCH is also the place to regulate these private international law issues at international level (so, with non-EU countries) on these topics?

Finally, since we are talking about dematerialized assets, can some help come from the system developed under the Convention of 5 July 2006 on the Applicable Law to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities held with an Intermediary (Securities Convention)?

Rishi Gulati, Associate Professor in International Law and Barrister, is hosting a new podcast series focusing on hot topics in international and transnational law, as well as domestic law developments with transnational impact. Significant developments impacting the legal profession are also discussed from time to time.

The podcasts are not only designed for a legal audience but also for the broader public using accessible language. They are also intended to be a teaching tool with the 50 or so minute episodes delving systematically on the issues discussed. Each episode invites a highly knowledgeable guest who can bring a unique perspective to the issue. A special attempt is made to include voices from all regions of the world.

Series 1 has now wrapped up and has seven episodes. The first three episodes concern challenges faced by the International Criminal Court, WTO and UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies respectively. The fourth episode discusses the impact of AI on the legal profession, a highly topical issue given the rise of generative AI. The fifth episode discusses the UK’s new subsidy control regime and the Levelling Up agenda. The sixth episode discusses animal rights law, with the final episode in Series 1 dealing with AI and international law from a substantive perspective. Series 2 will return after a short break!

You can subscribe to the podcast in various ways, including via SoundCloud, Spotify, and Google Podcasts

By Dr Johannes Ungerer, University of Oxford

The sunset of retained EU law in the UK has begun: the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 received Royal Assent at the end of June. The Act will revoke many EU laws that have so far been retained in the UK by the end of 2023.

The good news for the conflict of laws is that the retained Rome I and II Regulations are not included in the long list of EU legal instruments which are affected by the mass-revocation. Both Regulations have been retained in the UK post-Brexit by section 3 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and were modified by the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and Non-Contractual Obligations (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (as amended in 2020). The retained (modified) Rome I and II Regulations will thus be part of domestic law beyond the end of 2023. Yet this retained EU law must not be called by name anymore: it will be called “assimilated law” according to section 5 of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 (although the title of this enactment, like others, will strangely continue to contain the phrase “Retained EU Law” and will not be changed to “Assimilated Law”, see section 5(5)).

Equally, the special conflict of laws provision in regulation 1(3) of the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993 (as amended in 1998) is not revoked either. This is particularly interesting because these Regulations have not been updated since Brexit, which means they still refer, for instance, to “the law of the other member State”.

Although international jurisdiction of UK courts is largely determined by domestic law these days, which replaced the Brussels I Recast Regulation, the Regulation’s rules on jurisdiction in consumer and employment matters have been autonomously transposed into sections 15A–D of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (as amended in 2020). The mass-revocation will not affect them either, which means that they will continue to benefit consumers and employees in UK courts beyond the end of 2023.

However, a significant difference to the current situation will arise with regard to how strictly courts will continue to follow precedent on the interpretation of the “assimilated law”. This matters for decisions by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) as well as for UK court decisions on the interpretation of the Rome I and II Regulations (and the Commercial Agents Directive/Regulations). The concern is that continuing to apply the EU law which will not be sunsetted, but without continuing to strictly follow the established interpretations, has the potential of increasing the risk of uncertainty or, metaphorically speaking, sunburn.

So far, the risk of sunburn has been mitigated by section 6(3), (4)(a), and (5) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 as amended by the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020: the existing body of CJEU decisions has remained binding post-Brexit on the Supreme Court to the same extent as the Supreme Court’s own decisions. The Supreme Court can, like previously the House of Lords, depart from precedent in line with the Practice Statement [1966] 1 WLR 1234 (see Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Southwark [2010] UKSC 28, at [25]), but the Supreme Court is very hesitant to do so in order to maintain legal certainty and predictability. The Court of Appeal has been given a similar power to divert from CJEU case law, section 6(4)(b)(i) and (5A) of the amended European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. Decisions of the CJEU handed down after 2020 have in any event not been binding anymore on UK courts, section 6(1) of the amended European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, but it has been permitted to take them into account in the UK (“may have regard”, section 6(2)).

The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 will change how UK courts can deviate from CJEU case law and their own precedent. This will reduce the protection from uncertainty (or sunburn), which has been maintained so far.

• A UK court will in principle still be obliged to interpret “assimilated law” as established by the CJEU’s “assimilated case law” (only the “retained general principles of EU law” have been omitted in the new section 6(3)(a)).
• However, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal will not anymore be restricted by the ordinary domestic rules on deviation from precedent as mentioned above. Rather, according to the new section 6(5), CJEU case law will be treated like “decisions of a foreign court”, which in principle are not binding. When deviating from “assimilated case law” by the CJEU, UK courts are solely instructed to have regard to “any changes of circumstances which are relevant to the retained EU case law, and the extent to which the retained EU case law restricts the proper development of domestic law.”
• Furthermore, according to the newly inserted section 6(5ZA), a UK court will be permitted to depart from its own “assimilated domestic case law” (which means UK case law on “assimilated law” in contrast to “assimilated case law” by the CJEU) without the usual domestic restrictions on deviation from domestic precedent. Instead, when deviating from its own case law, the UK court will only have to consider “the extent to which the assimilated domestic case law is determined or influenced by assimilated EU case law from which the court has departed or would depart; any changes of circumstances which are relevant to the assimilated domestic case law; and the extent to which the assimilated domestic case law restricts the proper development of domestic law.”

Departing from CJEU and UK case law on the Rome Regulations (and the Commercial Agents Directive) will thus become a lot easier, at the expense of “assimilated” legal certainty and predictability. The time at which the change by the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 will become effective has yet to be determined in line with its section 22(3).

Interestingly, in the above-mentioned Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, section 15E(2) explicitly prescribes that the jurisdictional rules for consumers and employees in sections 15A–D are to be interpreted with regard to CJEU principles on consumer and employee jurisdiction under the Brussels regime. More precisely, “regard is to be had to any relevant principles laid down” before the end of 2020 by the CJEU in connection with the Brussels jurisdictional rules; by contrast, the phrases “retained EU law” or “retained case law” are not mentioned. Since the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 does not revoke any rules of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 or the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, this specific mandate to have regard to CJEU principles when interpreting the retained jurisdictional rules will be maintained in its own right beyond the end of 2023. And since the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 does not use the technical language of retained EU law or retained case law, whose binding character would be affected by the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023, the retained jurisdictional rules should not suffer from uncertainty and sunburn. Yet, despite this reasoning, the interpretation of the consumer and employee jurisdictional rules might in practice be condemned to the same fate as the assimilated case law that will be up for grabs.

Many thanks to Professor Andrew Dickinson for his comments on an earlier draft.

The Dickson Poon School of Law is seeking to appoint three outstanding candidates with research and teaching expertise in Intellectual Property (IP) law or Private International Law/Conflict of Laws (PIL/CoL) to Lectureships. The successful candidate/s will have a primary research interest in either IP law or PIL/CoL and the ability to produce internationally excellent research in this area.

This post will be offered on an indefinite contract (subject to a probation period). This is a full-time post.

Applications close on 10 August 2023.

Further information is available here.

Finally!!! A yearbook dedicated to public and private international law in the Arab world has recently been established by BRILL and is expected to be launched in the fall of 2024 called “The Arab Yearbook of Public & International Law” (the Yearbook).

One can only warmly welcome this initiative. It will certainly provide a space for fruitful discussions and a forum where experts from the Arab world and abroad can exchange views, all for the sake of the further development of these areas of law in the Arab region.

The Yearbook’s official website provides the following description:

The Arab Yearbook of Public & Private International Law is dedicated to exploring questions of public international law and private international law throughout the Arab World. The Yearbook has a broad intellectual agenda. It publishes high-quality scholarship submitted by authors both from the Arab region and across the world. The Yearbook publishes articles on any questions that relate to general public international law and its sub-fields, such as the law governing the use of force, international humanitarian law, human rights law, international economic law, the law of the sea, environmental law, and the law and practice of international organizations. The Yearbook also welcomes submissions on any topic of private international law, conflicts of laws, investor-state arbitration, and commercial arbitration.

 The Yearbook publishes scholarship that applies various jurisprudential and methodological perspectives. In addition to doctrinal scholarship, the Yearbook publishes research that explores legal questions from economic, critical, historical, feminist, and sociological perspectives, or that uses a diverse range of methodologies, such as empirical research and inter-disciplinary approaches that explore intersections between law & political science, law & international relations, and law & religion.

 The Yearbook publishes primary materials on international law in the Arab World. It provides a forum to preserve a permanent record of official positions of Arab governments, Arab inter-governmental and sub-regional organizations, international organizations active in the Arab region, in addition to materials, reports, and documents prepared by civil society and non-governmental organizations on questions of international law. In addition, the Yearbook publishes judicial materials that relate to international law in the region, including judgments of international courts and quasi-judicial bodies, such as human rights monitoring bodies, decisions of arbitral tribunals, including from investor-state and commercial arbitration panels, and judgments of national courts.

 

For its inaugural volume, the Yearbook has issued a call for submission:

Submission Deadline: October 1st.

Word limits: 10,000-15,000 words for articles;

7,000-10,000 words for notes or comments;

2,000-3,000 words for book or case reviews

(all word counts are inclusive of footnotes).

 Submission Address: helal.18@osu.edu

 

For details, please check the Yearbook’s website here and here.

 

Best wishes and good luck to the initiators of this wonderful project.

The authors of this post are Bernadette Boehl, Sophie Dannecker, Larissa Grundmann, Maira Gabriela Nino Pedraza (all University of Bonn). A series of webinars took place in May 2023 under the title The Future of Cross-Border Parenthood in the EU – Analysing the EU Parenthood Proposal. Experts from various Member States discussed the main elements of the proposal and possibilities for improvement. The key issues addressed  in  each webinar are illustrated  below. Those interested in the PowerPoint presentations prepared by the speakers, are invited to follow this link. 

Session One

The first webinar (3 May 2023) started with a presentation by Jens Scherpe about Surrogacy in comparative perspective. 

Scherpe emphasized the impossibility of avoiding surrogacy as a worldwide phenomenon, hence the global surrogacy market which affects people on an international level.  He classified the jurisdictions into three categories. The jurisdictions that prohibit (e.g., France, Germany), tolerate (e.g. England), and regulate surrogacy.

For Scherpe, surrogacy tourism is a consequence of the prohibitive as well as the tolerant approach to surrogacy. Surrogacy plays an important economic role. It can be a multi-million-dollar business. This is especially true in countries whose jurisdictions follow a free market approach, such as some Canadian provinces, which could be described as “Rolls Royce” jurisdictions. This allows the intended parent to be recognised on the birth certificate from the outset. Countries that allow surrogacy in a way that the intended parents can be documented on the birth certificate beforehand but leave the process more or less unregulated tend to be attractive to a lot of people from prohibitive or tolerant countries. Those “Wild-West” jurisdictions, as Scherpe calls them, are much cheaper for future parents. But as a matter of fact, they are less protective of the surrogate and of children, and exploitation may occur. According to Scherpe, the achievement of the seemingly morally better approaches, the prohibitive and the tolerant, has the effect of exporting exploitation to those countries.

After signaling the experiences of countries like England and Denmark, the speaker concluded that both models, the prohibitive and the tolerant, have failed to prevent surrogacy by not recognising parenthood. In fact, a clear regulation is necessary and unavoidable and could solve some of the legal problems. He ends with the prediction that good regulation will not wipe out all exploitation in surrogacy matters but will, with no doubt, reduce the number of cases drastically.

Afterwards, Cristina González Beilfuss introduced the Parenthood Proposal and explained in her presentation (What’s in it? The subject matter, scope and definitions) four of the most important issues regarding the scope of the proposal.

(1) The substantive scope of the proposal is described in Article 1. “jurisdiction and applicable law for the establishment of parenthood in a Member State in cross-Border situations”. To understand parenthood is also to be seen from a sociological perspective, the definition in Article 4 can be used. Beilfuss expresses her sympathy with the term used in the Spanish draft, which is not “parentalidad” but “filiación” because it puts the child in the center of the law. Filiation should also be the preferred term in the English version, since it is a more child-centered concept than parenthood. For González, the contestation of parenthood, which is included, should have a more significant role in the proposal.

(2) Following the traditional practice of the European Commission, Article 3 defines the scope of application in a negative way. This Article confirms that the Proposal focuses on the bond of filiation but not on its consequences (Articles 3, 2. (b), (f) or (g)). Parental responsibility is not covered and should be consistently distinguished from filiation.

(3) Among the excluded matters is the existence, validity or recognition of a marriage. Marriage, however, regularly arises as a preliminary question in filiation matters. This is due to the significance of the mother´s civil status in establishing  a second child-parent relationship. It would therefore be important that the Regulation included a common rule on the preliminary question in order to ensure that it is solved uniformly across the Member States.

(4) Another exclusion that is problematic is that of adoption. The English text is more correct than the French or the Spanish.  Only intercountry adoptions, e.g. adoptions where the child is taken from their country of habitual residence to the country of habitual residence of those adopting are excluded, The Proposal is however wrong in assuming that all other adoptions are domestic adoptions that do not give rise to Private international questions. Whenever the child or the prospective adopters hold a foreign nationality there is a need to determine jurisdiction and the applicable law. The rules proposed are not well suited for adoption cases.

(5) The proposed rules only apply to the recognition or, as the case may be, acceptance of documents issued in a Member (see Article 3.3). Documents, in particular, birth certificates may however be issued after the recognition or acceptance of a decision or document issued in a Third State. This entails that the dividing line between Third State and European Union cases is far from clear.

In conclusion, the examination conducted by Cristina González Beifuss, as well as the questions left open, highlights the need for further discussion about the Proposal from the European Commission.

Session Two

The second webinar (10 May 2023) opened with a look at EU Primary law and a presentation by Susanne Gössl titled The EU Proposal and primary EU law: a match made in heaven?

The presentation started with an overview of the case law of the CJEU regarding the free movement of citizens (Article 21 TFEU), Article 18 TFEU (discrimination on grounds of nationality) and Article 20 (EU citizenship) in questions of status. According to that case law, a limping status constitutes an obstacle to the free movement of EU citizens and EU primary law requires the Member States to remove the obstacle.

To avoid a limping status, courts need to recognize at least parts of a status validly established in another EU Member State. The EU has two possibilities to legislate: harmonization of substantial law (as happened in Company Law) and the harmonization of private international law which is the approach the EU has taken in family law matters. The Proposal follows the second path and transforms the CJEU case law into EU secondary law.

In that reading, Article 2 of the Proposal (relationship with other provisions of Union law) seems mysterious, as EU primary law is at another level of hierarchy than EU secondary law.

One reading could be that the provision allows Member States to give more room to free movement if the national law is more generous than the proposal. Another interpretation could be that the Proposal does not understand itself as exhaustive in transforming the case law into secondary law. The latter could be the case if the scope of application does not extend to situations where EU citizens are not domiciled and therefore not registered in a Member State. They would fall under EU primary law as EU citizens but not under the proposal.

Furthermore, Gössl criticized Article 17 para. 2 (applicable law) as it contains alternative connecting factors and discretion to the court in case the main rule does not establish two parents. Discretion of the court means that EU primary law could give an obligation to recognize as father an EU citizen no matter whether this is in the best interest of the child. Finally, it remains unclear whether the conflict of laws rules of the proposal can be used in EU Member States to accept a status if they use the method of “recognition via conflict of laws”.

In Sahyouni I & II, the CJEU rejected the use of Rome III for such a national method. It would enhance the free movement of citizens if the Parenthood Proposal allowed Member States to use the Proposal for that way of acceptance. At least a clarification would be helpful.

In this order of ideas, the relationship between the draft and European private law is, for Gössl, not a match made in heaven, but at least a match.

Afterwards, Tobias Helms talked about The law governing parenthood: are you my father?.

Helms emphasized in advance that the initiative of the European Commission is to be welcomed. However, there would still be room for improvement in detail. During his presentation, Tobias Helms mainly analysed Article 17 of the Proposal.

The primary connecting factor for the establishment of parenthood is, according to para. 1, the law of the state in which the person giving birth has their habitual residence at the time of birth. As Tobias Helms pointed out, this connecting factor would be particularly friendly to surrogate motherhood. However, the connecting factor is unchangeable because it is fixed forever at the time of birth, which is problematic. Therefore, Article 17 para. 1 of the draft should be applied only with regard to the time of the child’s birth; thereafter, the child’s habitual residence should be decisive.

Also, Article 17 would have to be supplemented by establishing an Article 17a concerning the termination of parenthood. Additionally, a new Article 18a should be introduced regarding adoptions. An extra Article 22a could deal with overriding mandatory provisions.

Session Three

The third webinar (17 May 2023) started with a presentation by Alina Tryfonidou on The mutual recognition of decisions under the EU Proposal: much ado about nothing?

Tryfonidou provided an overview of the EU provisions regarding the recognition of decisions concerning parenthood. The provisions broadly follow the approach of other EU private international law regulations in the field of family law.

Article 4 of the proposal defines court and court decisions. The definitions are more abstract than those used in other EU private international law provisions in family law. Therefore, further clarification is desirable. The EU proposal is only applicable to cases with cross-border elements between member states. Decisions in third-party states are excluded from the scope of the application (Article 3(3)). Recognition of those decisions remains a question of national law. Children subject to decisions in third states are at least protected by the ECHR.

The central provision regarding the recognition of decisions is Article 24(1). It states that a court decision on parenthood given in a Member State shall be recognized in all other Member States without any special procedure being required. Article 24(3) allows the court to determine the issue where the recognition of a court decision is only raised as an incidental question.

Article 26 specifies the documents to be produced for recognition of a decision. The required attestation is supposed to enable the authority to determine whether there are grounds for refusal. The exhaustive list of such grounds is laid down in Article 31(1). The most famous ground allows the refusal if the recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought. The provision must be applied in observance of fundamental rights and principles laid down in the CFR. Articles 32 and 25 regulate applications for the refusal of recognition or the decision that there are no grounds for the refusal of recognition.

The next presentation was given by Maria Caterina Baruffi on Who decides on parenthood? The rules of jurisdiction.

Baruffi started by referring to the heavy criticism aimed at the proposal. Although she admitted that some of these criticisms are partly justified, she emphasized the positive aspects, namely the protection of children and fundamental rights.

The general system of jurisdiction is laid down in Article 6 of the proposal. It lists six grounds for jurisdiction alternatively. That allows for additional flexibility and facilitates access to justice.

On the other hand, a different approach may have reduced the possibility of parallel proceedings and forum shopping. Article 7 combines the presence rule with these grounds. According to recital 42, this is supposed to allow the courts to exercise jurisdiction regarding third-country national children. Article 8 states that where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 6 or 7, jurisdiction is determined by national law. Article 9 adds the forum necessitatis rule. Articles 6 to 9 could be called exorbitant when combined. The reference to the national law of member states in Article 8 creates the additional possibility of taking recourse to exorbitant rules of jurisdiction in national law. However, the broad approach further facilitates access to justice and protects children’s fundamental rights.

Following this, Maria Caterina Baruffi briefly introduced Articles 10 and 14 which mirror the Brussels IIb Regulation, Article 15 which specifies the child’s right to be heard. She then touched on the child’s right to know its origin. This right was excluded from the proposal. Maria Caterina Baruffi argued that the Union does not have the competence to include such a right. It is not possible to predict the outcome of the proposal. It is a good starting point for a reasonable solution.

Session Four

The last webinar started with Patrick Wautelet who talked about Authentic documents and parenthood: between recognition and acceptance.

Wautelet discussed the recognition of court decisions in another Member State (Chapter IV, Section 1-2) together with the acceptance of other authentic instruments with either binding legal effect (Chapter IV, Section 3) or those with no binding legal effect (Chapter V) in the Member State of origin.

The most critical point of the proposal regarding Chapters IV and V is the distinction between the authentic instruments with binding or no binding legal effect since the question of whether an instrument has legally binding effect or not is a matter for the national law of the Member State in which the instrument was issued. It may therefore be answered differently in each Member State.

Wautelet illustrated the difficulties which this diversity may cause with an example from practice: when a child is born in France to married parents, the birth certificate drawn up must, of course, be regarded as an authentic instrument. Whether it also has a “binding legal effect” must be determined according to French family law. This question must be answered differently in France regarding maternity and paternity. However, this does not apply equally to every Member State, which means the question which category is relevant may not be answered in general for all birth certificates.

In the presentation and the following discussion, it was underlined that drawing the line between authentic instruments with binding and no binding legal effect can be complex, not least regarding other existing family arrangements (same-sex parenthood).

Furthermore, it was suggested that the terms used in the Proposal lack precision: even if an authentic act has a binding legal effect, it may be that it is not completely binding, as it may be amenable to challenge. The  term ‘no legal binding effect’ suggests further that the instrument is not legally effective although it actually is. Those labels are therefore confusing and should either be reconsidered or at least explained further. His preferred choice is to not differentiate between the two categories but to merge the two.

Another topic was the acceptance of authentic instruments with no binding legal effect, as stated in Article 45 of the Proposal. There are two options for an evidentiary effect of those documents: the text may provide that the effects the original instrument has in the Member State of origin will be extended to other Member States (“same evidentiary effects”). Article 45, however, also includes another possibility, i.e. that an instrument be giventhe “most comparable effect”. Understand the evidentiary effect exiting in the state of origin requires extensive and difficult work. Patrick Wautelet proposes simplifying the Regulation with regard to the comparable effect by striking it out.

To conclude, the speaker presented four points to be considered for further reflection. Firstly, it is important to work on the language, ensuring that all terms are clearly defined. Secondly, the alternative rules for acceptance and the relationship with public policy need to be cleared. Thirdly, it is advisable to merge the two categories of authentic instruments, which should help avoid confusion or ambiguity in their application. Finally, he would like to strive for a less complex regulation – not at least to keep the users in mind.

The very last presentation, given by Ilaria Pretelli, concerned The European certificate of Parenthood: a passport for parents and children?.

The last presentation refers to Chapter VI of the proposal and the creation of a “European Certificate of Parenthood”. The certificate is supposed to make a binding presumption of the status, which results only from the certificate itself. This certificate may not make a decisive difference in numerous cases because birth certificates are widely accepted even today. But especially for cases of co-maternity, it will help with an easier recognition of co-maternity and support same-sex couples by setting a reliable framework. Additionally, this framework will be useful regarding contractual arrangements, such as surrogacy. It eliminates the risk of the child being stateless.

The similarity between the proposed “European Certificate of Parenthood” and the “European Certificate of Succession” regarding the presumption of status should not be seen as extensive as it may seem at first sight. The presumption of the status of parenthood stated by Article 53 para. 2 of the proposal differs not in the wording but in the meaning, from the presumption of status regulated by the Certificate of Succession (Article 69 para. 2). According to Ilaria Pretelli there is a huge difference in the meaning of the “presumption of status” as it is used by the proposal, because of how it can be challenged. The granted status by the proposal states a much stronger binding effect than the certificate of succession. This she concludes from seeing the explanatory memorandum, which stresses the evidentiary effects of established parenthood in another Member State. But she suggests that this matter should be clarified because of the identical and therefore misleading wording. She points to the unanswered question about the possibility of challenging the certificate by another Member State as a main problem in the proposal.

Also, Ilaria Pretelli explained the background of the numerous specifications of the certificate’s content. The purpose of those elaborate regulations is to prevent attempts of manipulation. In this respect, the rights of the child should be more in the focus of the regulations, especially the right of the child to know their origin. To do so, appropriate safeguards could be introduced by means of ad hoc rules specially designed to meet the need of pursuing the best interests of the child.  In this matter, she points out that the language of the whole proposal is not focused enough on the child. She suggests to change the wording of the English version of the proposal, e.g. “filiation” instead of “parenthood”.

“Wishes” of the Organisers of the Series of Webinar

At the end of the seminar, the five organizers of the Webinars concluded the last session by expressing their “wishes” for improvement of the proposal.

These wishes were:
– Further definition of the concept of Court (Cristina Gonzalez Beilfuss);
– If the Regulation keeps the distinction between 2 types of authentic acts, that Member States and the Commission find a better way to distinguish them (Patrick Wautelet);
– Restrict the existing rule on the applicable law to designating the applicable law at the time of birth and find other rules for the time after birth (Tobias Helms);
– Introduce safeguards to prevent child-trafficking or exploitation (e.g. right of the child to know their origins or rules as those preventing illegal adoptions) (Ilaria Pretelli);
– Define the concept of “establishment” of parenthood in cases parenthood is established by the law and not by courts or authentic acts with binding effect (Susanne Gössl).

As it is usual at this time of the year, the EAPIL blog will slightly slow down its activity for a few weeks.

We’ll provide news on scholarship, recent case law and on-going legislative work every week, but we’ll limit ourselves to two or three post a week.

The usual five-post-a-week pace will resume at the beginning of September.

Enjoy your Summer, readers!

 

(authored by Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm)

 

Global Law and Sustainable Development. Conference Report.

On 26-27 April 2023 at the University of Medellín, Colombia, private international law scholars organised and hosted a conference that pushed the boundaries of the discipline and engaged with interdisciplinary and comparative perspectives around the theme of Global law and Sustainable Development. The conference, in Spanish, was organised by the University of Medellín and the Antioquian Institute of Private International Law (IADIP), and supported by D.E.C. Consultores, Edinburgh Law School, the Centre for C

ontemporary Latin American Studies of the University of Edinburgh (CCLAS), the Law School of University of Los Andes, and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law.

The conference opened with a warm welcome by José Luis Marín Fuentes and the Dean of the Law School of the University of Medellín, Alvaro García Restrepo, followed by an in memoriam honouring Professor Jürgen Basedow (1949-2023). Professor Basedow was highly admired by the Latin American Private International Law community, many of whom gathered at this conference.

The keynote address by Ralf Michaels and Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm on Law and Sustainability beyond the SDGs 2030 set the scene on the role of private law and private international law in the quest for sustainability and provided insightful threads for broader reflection that were revisited by the conference participants throughout the discussions during this two-day conference.

The keynote address was followed by a first panel on Global Supply Chains and Global Law, chaired by Ruiz Abou-Nigm with presentations from María Mercedes Albornoz (Mexico); Jeannette Tramhel (OAS), and Juan Amaya (Colombia). Albornoz explored conceptual issues around global supply and global value chains, exploring the role of private international law in enabling the contractual web that supports these. Tramhel focused on the agricultural sector and international private law issues relevant to SDG 2: Cero Hunger. She noted the governance gap in relation to urgent issues around food security, raising awareness of the critical need for immediate intervention in this sector and highlighting the importance of transnational law developments for social, economic and environmental sustainability in the food industry. In turn, Amaya explained the importance of traceability, and conceptualised social traceability, with illustrations based on interesting judicial cases pending resolution in the Global North in relation to alleged unsustainable practices in the Global South by Global North MNCs.

The first afternoon panel on Comparative Law Perspectives on Sustainable Development was chaired by Nuria González Martín (Mexico) with presentations from Eleonora Lozano (Colombia); Laura Carballo Piñeiro (Spain) and Alberto Alonso (Spain). Lozano shared her research on tax law and sustainable development, with very enlightening results based on her work on fiscal sustainability from a law and economics perspective. Carballo focused on the role of private international law in relation to some of the objectives in SDGs 10 and 8, particularly focusing on labour migration, and sharing the work of a research group that is currently working on sustainable circular labour migration at the crossroads of private international law, labour law and migration law perspectives. The final speaker in this panel, Alonso, explored criminal law issues connected to SDG 16.

The final session on the first day was a round-table discussion on the new challenges for private international law in Latin America coordinated by Albornoz with the participation of Ignacio Goicoechea (HCCH-ROLAC), Maria Julia Ochoa (Colombia/Spain), Claudia Madrid Martínez (Colombia) and Marcos Dotta (Uruguay). Undoubtedly this was a great way to conclude the first day with a lively discussion about the several challenges facing the region, as well as the importance of capacity building in private international law tailored to the needs of the region, reflecting on the role of institutions like the HCCH, national authorities, academia and the private sector in this endeavour.

The second day opened with an interactive presentation of Karen Leiva Chavarría from the Justice Department of Costa Rica, presented by Goicoechea. Costa Rica has been a pioneer in the inclusion of markers of transnational access to justice in its annual reporting on SDG 16, and a leader in the region in relation to the work of judicial authorities in connection with the UN Agenda 2030. The presentation emphasised the role of the profession, and addressed, in particular, the soon-to-be-lawyers in the audience, from the University of Medellín and other local universities.

The next panel on the SDGs and International Dispute Resolution, chaired by Carballo Piñeiro, included the presentations of Lenin Moreno Navarro (Ecuador), Eugenio Hernández Bretón (Venezuela), Lidia Mercado (Panamá) and Nuria González Martín (Mexico). The panellists discussed issues around international commercial litigation, arbitration and mediation, and reflected upon the tensions inherent in pursuing sustainability in relation to the needs for development in the region, particularly in relation to dispute resolution services.

A panel on International Contracts and Sustainable Development followed in the afternoon. This panel was chaired by Madrid Martínez and included the presentations of Rosario Espinosa Calabuig (Spain), Nestor Londoño (Colombia), Maria Blanca Noodt Taquela (Argentina) and Anabela Sousa Gonçalves (Portugal). The panellists tackled a wide range of issues around sustainability in a variety of international contracts, from contractual issues in the cruise industry in shipping, to case studies of sustainability costs in extractive industries in Argentina, to more general private international law methodologies relevant to international contracts including issues of applicable law and jurisdiction clauses.

The final round-table brought to the conference enlightening interdisciplinary perspectives on applied research in sustainable development and urbanism. Medellín is well-known worldwide for the transformative role that social urbanism has had in the past decades. This round-table, chaired by Ruiz Abou-Nigm, included a team of researchers from Medellín, who work in a collaborative project with the CCLAS (University of Edinburgh). Wilmar Castro Mere, Françoise Coupe de Restrepo, Ani Zapata Berrio and Carlos Velásquez shared their experiences of co-production of applied research on risk management in local communities. This was a truly insightful discussion bringing to life many of the issues that had been discussed in theory throughout the conference, particularly in relation to the role of different actors, norms, and communities in governance, as well as key considerations of social inclusion, capacity building, and the key role of cooperation between academia and the public and private sectors as well as civil society in the UN Agenda 2030.

The conference ended with a warm farewell from our fantastic local host, José Luis Marín Fuentes, who spared no efforts to make this conference a truly remarkable international event that provided much food for thought and opened new avenues for international collaboration in pursuance of the SDGs.

 

 

Written by Thalia Kruger (University of Antwerp) and Laura Carpaneto (University of Genoa)

On 1 June 2023 the European Law Institute (ELI) and the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law (SICL) held the third session of a conference on personal identity and status continuity. The focus of this third session was on names and gender in the conflict of laws. The programme included recent amendments to Swiss legislation, the portability and recognition of names, and new gender statuses in private international law.

The conference, including a screening of the film ‘The Danish Girl’ (Tom Hooper, 2015), illustrated the importance of gender and names as part of people’s identity, beyond the law. Names can be essential for people to identify with their religious group. In central and southern Africa, the use of names taken from people’s own language instead of English names has been part of the black consciousness movement. The film showed the struggle of a person to change her sex despite the absence of any legal framework. And yet, Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler (director of the SICL) and Martin Föhse (University of St Gallen) showed that the societal issues turn into legal ones. Sharon Shakargy (University of Jerusalem) explained that the law is important when individuals have to use identity cards, credit cards, licences, certificates and the like. The law struggles to provide the most appropriate solutions, respecting the rights of all involved and ensuring portability of gender and names.

When talking about rights, there is a blurring, or at least a lack of terminological clarity, between human rights and fundamental rights. The free movement of persons in the EU is also classified as a fundamental right. Giulia Rossolillo (University of Pavia) compared the approaches of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) with respect to the recognition and continuation of names. She showed that the solutions reached by the two courts can be quite different, as a result of their different approaches. The ECtHR uses the (human) right to the respect of private and family life protected by Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) while the CJEU uses the (fundamental) right to free movement of EU citizens. Moreover, the ECtHR is not so much concerned with the cross-border aspect, but focuses on the right to a person’s identity. The CJEU emphasises continuity of name in cross-border contexts. For instance, the facts in the ECtHR case Künsberg Sarre v. Austria and the CJEU case Sayn-Wittgenstein were quite similar, dealing with the Austrian prohibition on the use of noble titles. The ECtHR found that Austria, but allowing for a long time the use of the noble ‘von’ and then disallowing it, violated the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the ECHR. The CJEU, on the other hand, found the obstacle to the right to free movement in the EU to be justified.

Different approaches to rights can also result in conflicting rights, i.e. the society’s right to equality (no noble titles) versus the individuals’ rights to continuity of name. Other rights that come into play, include the LGBTIQ+ rights and rights of women (a gender logic, Ilaria Pretelli SICL), and the rights linked to the free market (economic logic), societal rights, and the right to self-determination and autonomy, such as the right to freely choose and change a name.

Johan Meeusen (University of Antwerp) considered the specific approach of the European Commission to matters of gender, drawing lessons from the Commission’s Parenthood Proposal, Com(2022) 695. The lessons are that the Commission uses PIL to pursue its political ambition to advance non discrimination and LGBTIQ rights in particular; is on a mission to achieve status continuity; invests in legal certainty and predictability; approaches status continuity first and foremost from a fundamental rights perspective; acts within the limits of the Union’s competence but tries to maximize its powers; ambitious with an eye for innovation…but within limits.

Anatol Dutta (Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich) explained the different waves of changes in gender legislation nationally. He indicated that private international law influences people’s status differently depending on whether it considers sex registration and sex change as substantive or procedural. This would determine whether the lex fori or lax causae is used. Even when agreeing on a classification as substantive law, different legal systems use different connecting factors. Nationality is often used, but sometimes the individual is given a choice between the law of the habitual residence and nationality. Yet, public policy can still play a role (bringing back the ideas of human rights, discussed earlier).

All in all, it is becoming increasingly clear that the idea that private international law is a neutral and merely technical field of law is nothing more than a fiction. Besides the different right and approaches at play, as discussed above, feminist approaches (set out by Mirela Zupan, University of Osijek) also influence connecting factors and recognition rules.

The latest issue of the IPRax (Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts) has been published. The table of contents is available here. The following abstracts have been kindly provided to us by the editor of the journal.

B. Heiderhoff, Care Proceedings under Brussels IIter – Mantras, Compromises and Hopes

Against the background of the considerable extension of the text of the regulation, the author asks whether this has also led to significant improvements. Concerning jurisdiction, the “best interests of the child” formula is used a lot, while the actual changes are rather limited and the necessary compromises have led to some questions of doubt. This also applies to the extended possibility of choice of court agreements, for which it is still unclear whether exclusive prorogation is possible beyond the cases named in Article 10 section 4 of the Brussels II ter Regulation. Concerning recognition and enforcement, the changes are more significant. The author shows that although it is good that more room has been created for the protection of the best interests of the child in the specific case, the changes bear the risk of prolonging the court proceedings. Only if the rules are interpreted with a sense of proportion the desired improvements can be achieved. All in all, there are many issues where one must hope for reasonable clarifications by the ECJ.

G. Ricciardi, The practical operation of the 2007 Hague Protocol on the law applicable to maintenance obligations

Almost two years late due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in May 2022 over 200 delegates representing Members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Contracting Parties of the Hague Conventions as well as Observers met for the First Meeting of the Special Commission to review the practical operation of the 2007 Child Support Convention and the 2007 Hague Protocol on Applicable Law. The author focuses on this latter instrument and analyses the difficulties encountered by the Member States in the practical operation of the Hague Protocol, more than ten years after it entered into force at the European Union level. Particular attention is given to the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Applicable Law Working Group, unanimously adopted by the Special Commission which, in light of the challenges encountered in the implementation of the Hague Protocol, provide guidance on the practical operation of this instrument.

R. Freitag, More Freedom of Choice in Private International Law on the Name of a Person!

Remarks on the Draft Bill of the German Ministry of Justice on a Reform of German Legislation on the Name of a Person. The German Ministry of Justice recently published a proposal for a profound reform of German substantive law on the name of a person, which is accompanied by an annex in the form of a separate draft bill aiming at modernizing the relevant conflict of law-rules. An adoption of this bill would bring about a fundamental and overdue liberalization of German law: Current legislation subjects the name to the law of its (most relevant) nationality and only allows for a choice of law by persons with multiple nationalities (they max designate the law of another of their nationalities). In contrast, the proposed rule will order the application of the law of the habitual residence and the law of the nationality will only be relevant if the person so chooses. The following remarks shall give an overview over the proposed rules and will provide an analysis of their positive aspects as well as of some shortcomings.

D. Coester-Waltjen, Non-Recognition of “Child Marriages” Concluded Abroad and Constitutional Standards

The Federal Supreme Court raised the question on the constitutionality of one provision of the new law concerning “child marriages” enacted by the German legislator in 2017. The respective rule invalidated marriages contracted validly according to the national law of the intended spouses if one of them was younger than 16 years of age (Art. 13 ss 3 no 1 EGBGB). The Federal Supreme Court requested a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on this issue in November 2018. It took the Federal Constitutional Court nearly five years to answer this question.
The court defines the structural elements principally necessary to attain the constitutional protection of Art. 6 ss 1 Basic Law. The court focuses on the free and independent will of the intended spouses as an indispensable structural element. The court doubts whether, in general, young persons below the age of 16 can form such a free and independent will regarding the formation of marriage. However, as there might be exceptionally mature persons, the protective shield of Art. 6 ss 1 Basic Law is affected (paragraphs 122 ff.) and their “marriage” falls under the protective umbrella of the constitution. At the same time, the requirement of a free and meaningful will to form a marriage complies with the structural elements of the constitutionally protected marriage. This opens the door for the court to examine whether the restriction on formation of marriage is legitimate and proportionate.
After elaborating on the legitimacy of the goal (especially prevention and proscription of child marriages worldwide) the court finds that the restriction on the right to marry is appropriate and necessary, because comparable effective other means are missing. However, as the German law does not provide for any consequence from the relationship formed lawfully under the respective law and being still a subsisting marital community, the rule is not proportionate. In addition, the court demurs that the law does not provide for transformation into a valid marriage after the time the minor attains majority and wants to stay in this relationship. In so far, Art. 13 ss 3 no 1 affects unconstitutionally Art. 6 ss 1 Basic Law. The rule therefore has to be reformed with regard to those appeals but will remain in force until the legislator remedies those defects, but not later than June 30, 2024.
Beside the constitutional issues, the reasoning of the court raises many questions on aspects of private international law. The following article focuses on the impact of this decision.

O.L. Knöfel, Discover Something New: Obtaining Evidence in Germany for Use in US Discovery Proceedings

The article reviews a decision of the Bavarian Higher Regional Court (101 VA 130/20), dealing with the question whether a letter rogatory for the purpose of obtaining evidence for pre-trial discovery proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware can be executed in Germany. The Court answered this question in the affirmative. The author analyses the background of the decision and discusses its consequences for the long-standing conflict of procedural laws (Justizkonflikt) between the United States and Germany. The article sheds some light on the newly fashioned sec. 14 of the German Law on the Hague Evidence Convention of 2022 (HBÜ Ausführungsgesetz), which requires a person to produce particular documents specified in the letter of request, which are in his or her possession, provided that such a request is compatible with the fundamental principles of German law and that the General Data Protection Regulation of 2018 (GDPR) is observed.

W. Wurmnest/C. Waterkotte, Provisional injunctions under unfair competition law

The Higher Regional Court of Hamburg addressed the delimitation between Art. 7(1) and (2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation after Wikingerhof v. Book ing.com and held that a dispute based on unfair competition law relating to the termination of an account for an online publishing platform is a contractual dispute under Art. 7(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. More importantly, the court considered the requirement of a “real connecting link” in the context of Art. 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The court ruled that in unfair competition law disputes of contractual nature the establishment of such a link must be based on the content of the measure sought, not merely its effects. The judgment shows that for decisions on provisional injunctions the contours of the “real connecting link” have still not been conclusively clarified.

I. Bach/M. Nißle, The role of the last joint habitual residence on post-marital maintenance obligations

For child maintenance proceedings where one of the parties is domiciled abroad, Article 5 of the EU Maintenance Regulation regulates the – international and local – jurisdiction based on the appearance of the defendant. According to its wording, the provision does not require the court to have previously informed the defendant of the possibility to contest the jurisdiction and the consequences of proceeding without contest – even if the defendant is the dependent minor child. Article 5 of the EU Maintenance Regulation thus not only dispenses with the protection of the structurally weaker party that is usually granted under procedural law by means of a judicial duty to inform (such as Article 26(2) Brussels Ibis Regulation), but is in contradiction even with the other provisions of the EU Maintenance Regulation, which are designed to achieve the greatest possible protection for the minor dependent child. This contradiction could already be resolved, at least to some extent, by a teleological interpretation of Article 5 of the EU Maintenance Regulation, according to which international jurisdiction cannot in any case be established by the appearance of the defendant without prior judicial reference. However, in view of the unambiguous wording of the provision and the lesser negative consequences for the minor of submitting to a local jurisdiction, Article 5 of the EU Maintenance Regulation should apply without restriction in the context of local jurisdiction. De lege ferenda, a positioning of the European legislator is still desirable at this point.

C. Krapfl, The end of US discovery pursuant to Section 1782 in support of international arbitration

The US Supreme Court held on 13 June 2022 that discovery in the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (a) – which authorizes a district court to order the production of evidence “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal” – only applies in cases where the tribunal is a governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative body. Therefore, applications under Section 1782 are not possible in support of a private international commercial arbitration, taking place for example under the Rules of the German Arbitration Institute (DIS). Section 1782 also is not applicable in support of an ad hoc arbitration initiated by an investor on the basis of a standing arbitration invitation in a bilateral investment treaty. This restrictive reading of Section 1782 is a welcome end to a long-standing circuit split among courts in the United States.

L. Hübner/M. Lieberknecht, The Okpabi case — Has Human Rights Litigation in England reached its Zenith

In its Okpabi decision, the UK Supreme Court continues the approach it developed in the Vedanta case regarding the liability of parent companies for human rights infringements committed by their subsidiaries. While the decision is formally a procedural one, its most striking passages address substantive tort law. According to Okpabi, parent companies are subject to a duty of care towards third parties if they factually control the subsidiary’s activities or publicly convey the impression that they do. While this decision reinforces the comparatively robust protection English tort law affords to victims of human rights violations perpetrated by corporate actors, the changes to the English law of jurisdiction in the wake of Brexit could make it substantially more challenging to bring human rights suits before English courts in the future.

Comment on CJEU case Rzecznik Praw Dziecka e.a., C-638/22 PPU, 16 February 2023)

Written by Tine Van Hof, post-doc researcher in Private International Law and Children’s Rights Law at the University of Antwerp, previously published on EU live

The Court of Justice of the EU has been criticised after some previous cases concerning international child abduction such as Povse and Aguirre Zarraga for prioritising the effectiveness of the EU private international law framework (i.e. the Brussels IIa Regulation, since replaced by Brussels IIb, and the principle of mutual trust) and using the children’s rights law framework (i.e. Article 24 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the principle of the child’s best interests) in a functional manner (see e.g. Silvia Bartolini and Ruth Lamont). In Rzecznik Praw Dziecka the Court takes both frameworks into account but does not prioritise one or the other, since the frameworks concur.

Rzecznik Praw Dziecka e.a. concerns Article 3881(1) of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, which introduced the possibility for three public entities (Public Prosecutor General, Commissioner for Children’s Rights and Ombudsman) to request the suspension of the enforcement of a final return decision in an international child abduction case. Such a request automatically results in the suspension of the enforcement of the return decision for at least two months. If the public entity concerned does not lodge an appeal on a point of law within those two months, the suspension ceases. Otherwise, the suspension is extended until the proceedings before the Supreme Court are concluded. The Court of Justice was asked to rule on the compatibility of this Article of the Polish CCP with Article 11(3) of the Brussels IIa Regulation and with Article 47 of the EU Charter.

Private international law and children’s rights law

As Advocate General Emilou emphasised in the Opinion on Rzecznik Praw Dziecka, (see also the comment by Weller) child abduction cases are very sensitive cases in which several interests are intertwined, but which should eventually revolve around the best interests of the child or children. In that regard, the Hague Child Abduction Convention, as complemented by Brussels IIa for intra-EU child abduction situations, sets up a system in which the prompt return of the child to the State of habitual residence is the principle. It is presumed that such a prompt return is in the children’s best interests in general (in abstracto). This presumption can be rebutted if one of the Child Abduction Convention’s exceptions applies. Next to these instruments, which form the private international law framework, the children’s rights law framework also imposes certain requirements. In particular, Article 24(2) of the EU Charter, which is based on Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, requires the child’s best interests (in abstracto and in concreto) to be a primary consideration in all actions relating to children. The Court of Justice analyses Article 3881(1) of the Polish CCP in light of both frameworks. The Court’s attentiveness towards private international law and children’s rights law is not new but should definitely be encouraged.

The private international law framework

The Court of Justice recalls that, for interpreting a provision of EU law, one should take into account that provision’s terms, its context and the objectives pursued by the legislation of which it forms part. To decide on the compatibility of the Polish legislation with Article 11(3) Brussels IIa, the Court of Justice thus analyses the terms of this provision, its context (which was said to consist of the Child Abduction Convention) and the objectives of Brussels IIa in general. Based on this analysis, the Court of Justice concludes that the courts of Member States are obliged to decide on the child’s return within a particularly short and strict timeframe (in principle, within six weeks of the date on which the matter was brought before it), using the most expeditious procedures provided for under national law and that the return of the child may only be refused in specific and exceptional cases (i.e. only when an exception provided for in the Child Abduction Convention applies).

The Court of Justice further clarifies that the requirement of speed in Article 11(3) of Brussels IIa does not only relate to the procedure for the issuing of a return order, but also to the enforcement of such an order. Otherwise, this provision would be deprived of its effectiveness.

In light of this analysis, the Court of Justice decides that Article 3881(1) of the Polish CCP is not compatible with Article 11(3) Brussels IIa. First, the minimum suspension period of two months already exceeds the period within which a return decision must be adopted according to Article 11(3) Brussels IIa. Second, under Article 3881(1) of the Polish CCP, the enforcement of a return order is suspended simply at the request of the authorities. These authorities are not required to give reasons for their request and the Court of Appeal is required to grant it without being able to exercise any judicial review. This is not compatible with the interpretation that Article 11(3) Brussels IIa should be given, namely that suspending the return of a child should only be possible in ‘specific and exceptional cases’.

The children’s rights law framework

After analysing the private international law framework, the Court of Justice addresses the children’s rights law framework. It mentions that Brussels IIa, by aiming at the prompt adoption and enforcement of a return decision, ensures respect for the rights of the child as set out in the EU Charter. The Court of Justice refers in particular to Article 24, which includes the obligation to take into account, respectively, the child’s best interests (para 2) and the need of the child to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents (para 3). To interpret these rights of the child enshrined in the EU Charter, the Court of Justice refers to the European Court of Human Rights, as required by Article 52(3) of the EU Charter. Particularly, the Court of Justice refers to Ferrari v. Romania (para 49), which reads as follows:

‘In matters pertaining to the reunification of children with their parents, the adequacy of a measure is also to be judged by the swiftness of its implementation. Such cases require urgent handling, as the passage of time can have irremediable consequences for the relations between the children and the parent who does not live with them.’

Unfortunately, the Court of Justice does not explicitly draw a conclusion from its analysis of the children’s rights law framework. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the Polish legislation is also incompatible with the requirements thereof. In particular, it is incompatible with both the collective and the individual interpretation of the child’s best interests.

On a collective level, Article 3881(1) of the Polish CCP is contrary to the children’s best interests since it does not take into account that international child abduction cases require ‘urgent handling, as the passage of time can have irremediable consequences for the relations between the children and the parent who does not live with them’ (as has also been acknowledged by the ECtHR as being in the best interests of children that have been abducted in general).

On an individual level, it is possible that an enforcement of the return decision is contrary to the child’s best interests and that a suspension thereof is desirable. However, Article 3881(1) of the Polish CPP is invaluable in that regard (see also Advocate General Emilou’s Opinion on Rzecznik Praw Dziecka, points 77-92). First, the Article exceeds what would be necessary to protect a child’s individual best interests. Indeed, under that Article, the authorities can request the suspension without any motivation and without any possibility for the courts to review whether the suspension would effectively be in the child’s best interests. More still, the provision is unnecessary to protect a child’s individual best interests. Indeed, a procedure already existed to suspend a return decision if the enforcement would be liable to cause harm to the child (Article 388 of the Polish CCP).

Conclusion

In this case, the private international law and the children’s rights law framework concurred, and both preclude the procedural rule foreseen in Article 3881(1) of the Polish CCP. The Court of Justice can thus not be criticised for prioritising the EU private international law framework in this case. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice could have been more explicit that the conclusion was reached not only based on the private international law framework but also on the children’s rights law framework.

Finally, the Brussels IIb Regulation, which replaced Brussels IIa as from 1 August 2022, made some amendments that better embed and protect the child’s best interests. It provides inter alia that Member States should consider limiting the number of appeals against a return decision (Recital 42) and that a return decision ‘may be declared provisionally enforceable, notwithstanding any appeal, where the return of the child before the decision on the appeal is required by the best interests of the child’ (Article 27(6)). While the Polish provision was thus already incompatible with the old Regulation, it would certainly not be compatible with the new one. To prevent future infringements, legislative reform of the Polish CCP seems inevitable.

 

Deyan Draguiev is the author of this monograph published in 2023 by Springer. He has kindly provided the following abstract.

The book proposes a holistic overview of interim measures and associated procedures in civil and commercial matters in international litigation and arbitration proceedings. It reexamines key features in this context and outlines novel findings on interim relief in the area of international dispute resolution. The book analyses the rules of EU law (EU law regulations such as the Regulation Brussels I bis and the rest of the Brussels regime) as the single system of cross-border jurisdictional rules, as well as the rules of international arbitration (both commercial and investment). In the process, it conducts a complete mapping of interim measures problems and explores the criteria for granting relief under national laws. For this purpose, it includes an extensive comparative law overview of many jurisdictions in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Americas, etc., to reveal common standards for granting interim relief.

In deeper depth, as follows, chapter after chapter.

Chapter one provides the wider framework for the analysis of interim relief procedures in cross-border civil and commercial disputes.
It sets out the underpinnings of the dispute resolution process from the standpoint of philosophy, sociology, psychology, and general legal theory by drawing references from fundamental social scientists and legal philosophers. It outlines the conceptual grounds for the existence of interim relief within the system of dispute resolution. Furthermore, after portraying the key background features upon which the study builds its foundations, chapter one also clarifies the terminology, which the study employs. This chapter puts forward the key points, which the entire study seeks to argue. More particularly, the position, which is argued, is that interim measures are not merely a procedural power of the dispute resolution authority or means to ensure the proper enforcement of the final ruling of the dispute, rather they have a wide-ranging function as a tool to manage and influence the pending dispute itself.

Chapter two focuses on the procedural rules for establishing jurisdiction to grant interim relief.
The first part deals with the so called “Brussels regime” or “system”, i.e. the variety of regulations which the European Union has established in the area of cross-border civil and commercial disputes. The backbone of the system is Regulation Brussels I bis – “Recast” (1215/2012), previously Regulation Brussels I (44/2001). The main features of interim relief in EU law stem from it and influence a number of other EU regulations. This chapter analyses the prerequisites for EU courts’ jurisdiction to provide interim relief, both as general grounds and as specific interim measures jurisdiction, with details about Art. 35 of Regulation Brussels I bis. This chapter also includes the regulations covering matrimonial matters (Regulation 2201/2003 and Regulation 2019/1111) and also Regulation 4/2009, Regulation 650/2012, Regulation 2016/1103, and Regulation 2016/1104. The European Account Preservation Order is not included.
The second part provides overview of the jurisdictional bases for interim relief in the area of international arbitration. It makes a brief overview of the general grounds for jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, and of the specific rules establishing jurisdiction to grant interim relief. This includes also a review of the rules of major arbitral institutions and domestic legislations, as well as analysis of the coordination, concurrence, even competition between state courts and arbitral tribunals in granting interim relief, with a proposed possible solution for this situation.

Chapter three analyses the procedural nature and characteristics of interim measures with strong focus on a comparative survey of most systems of law – in Europe, Asia, Africa, both Americas and Australia.
Based on this review of national law criteria for granting interim relief, the purpose is to outline several key benchmarks that are found within a wide-ranging list of legislations – proof of prima facie merit on the substance of the dispute, necessity, proportionality of measures, urgency as time factor, unilateral or bilateral nature of proceedings, etc. Furthermore, this part also provides an overview of various rules of arbitral institutions containing guidance on what measures may be granted under the respective rules. Chapter three looks into the procedural functioning of interim measures before state courts and arbitral tribunals, i.e. standards of proof, conduct of procedure, issuance of final award/decision/order, its form and content, etc. The chapter reviews the scope of interim measures and strives to provide in-depth list of the powers of dispute resolution bodies and the types of measures that are traditionally granted by courts and arbitral tribunals. The liability for damages if the measures are cancelled/revoked is reviewed, as well. Chapter three, finally, features an analysis of the typical measures that are provided in a selection of particularly common types of international disputes, including international sale of goods, international construction projects, intellectual property disputes, maritime and aviation disputes, anti-suit injunctions, etc. The argument in this section is that the characteristics of the underlying dispute are related to the nature of the measures that are typically awarded.

Chapter four seeks to outline the procedural mechanism for putting interim measures into effect.
This chapter provides review of the enforcement conditions, formalities and procedural steps under the regulations within the Brussels regime with focus on Regulation Brussels I bis. This chapter also contains an overview of one of the most challenging aspects of interim relief in international arbitration, i.e. its enforcement.
First, it covers a salient issue, which is widely discussed in legal theory and in arbitral case law, that is to what extent interim measures may be forced by an arbitral tribunal upon the parties to the arbitration case.
Second, this chapter analyses the important matter whether third parties non-signatories can be compelled by arbitral measures.
Third, the chapter reviews the procedural mechanisms contained in various national laws established to facilitate enforcement of interim relief by domestic legal procedures.
The chapter also deals with the liability for non-compliance with interim measures, including those granted in arbitral proceedings, providing overview of national laws and case law examples from different legal systems.

Chapter five compares the features of interim measures in private law disputes having international elements with the relief granted by international bodies established by public international law such as the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union and also the European Commission as an organ of an international organization (the EU).
The grounds for such comparison stem from the transnational characteristics of the disputes that arise both in private and in public international law. Focusing on these common international elements, Chapter five outlines the similarities to obtain interim relief under the auspices of the listed international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies in comparison to the conditions analysed under chapters two-four regarding civil and commercial cases. This chapter analyses this by providing review of the legal status and powers of these international adjudication bodies through the prism of the key benchmarks: jurisdiction, standards for assessment, procedure to obtain relief, and enforcement of measures. The comparison demonstrates significant similarities especially as to the criteria for granting relief and the potential issues with enforcement.

Chapter six provides assessment of the matter concerning interim relief and procedures in private law international disputes by drawing conclusions from the review and analysis under the previous chapters.
This chapter outlines the grounds to argue the two focal points of the entire study.
The first argument is that the proper understanding of interim relief is that it does not merely safeguard enforcement/compliance with the final decision on a dispute but that, if measures are placed in wider context, they should be seen as an instrument to manage not only the pending legal proceedings but also the entire ongoing conflict until its resolution.
The second argument is that the result of interim relief should be that no further aggravation of the dispute is allowed.
This chapter further employs the tools of the law & economics theory as to portray interim relief also as a wealth maximization lever. This chapter puts in comparison the effectiveness of the mechanism of granting and enforcement of relief before courts and before arbitral tribunals in order to propose what strategy parties are recommended to employ for better results. Finally, this chapter summarizes the types of interim measures and puts them in different categories.

Chapter seven is an attempt to look at the discussion in chapters one-six in a rearview mirror and provide a final overview placed in a wider context.
This study has purported from its outset to put the issue of interim relief against a broader, cross-jurisdictional and cross-sectoral background. It reflects the current global trends in business, private relations and disputes. This chapter reiterates the position of the author that the proper way to perceive interim measures is to view them not only as a creature of legal dispute resolution procedure but to understand interim relief as a means to ensure greater values such as reaching a meaningful end of the legal procedure, organizing the management of the underlying relationship between the parties, and providing an opportunity for restoration of the accord between them. If interim measures are seen through such a prism, their role and effectiveness appear to be ever important.

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) will be holding its annual XLVI Seminar entitled “Private International Law and the National Code of Civil Procedure. A critical analysis” (el Derecho Internacional Privado y el Código Nacional de Procedimientos Civiles. Un análisis crítico) from 8 to 10 November 2023. The venue of the seminar will be the Hotel Posada Señorial in Puebla, Mexico (and also online).

The main objective of this seminar will be to analyse the recently adopted Mexican National Code of Civil and Family Procedure (we previously posted about this development here), as well as the interrelationship between the new technologies and Private International Law.

Potential speakers are invited to submit a paper in Spanish, English or Portuguese by 31 August 2023. Papers must comply with the criteria established by AMEDIP and will be evaluated accordingly. Selected speakers will be required to give their presentations preferably in Spanish as there will be no interpretation services but some exceptions may be made by the organisers upon request for presentations in English and Portuguese.

There is a fee for participation both in person and online. For more information (incl. prices, hotel, venue etc.), click here.

McCarthy v Jones & Anor [2023] EWCA Civ 589 is an appeal from Jones & Anor v McCarthy [2022] EWHC 2186 (Ch) which I had not reported on the blog probably because I had not seen it (it happens to the best of us).

Jarman J in the first instance judgment summarised the facts [1 ff] as follows:

first claimant Mr Jones and the defendant Mr McCarthy orally agreed (the 2008 agreement) to exchange assets, whereby Mr McCarthy would obtain beneficial ownership of a yacht known as Biggest Buzz (the yacht) and registered in the British Virgin Islands (BVI), in exchange for Mr Jones acquiring a villa near Palma, Mallorca (the villa) and a mooring (the mooring) situated on mainland Spain. The yacht was registered in the name of the second claimant, a company owned and controlled by Mr Jones. The legal title to the villa was in the name of Mr McCarthy. The mooring was in the name of Mr McCarthy’s father. There was at the time, a substantial mortgage on the yacht and another on the villa. It was envisaged by Mr Jones and McCarthy at the time that after the swap the yacht and the villa would be sold to third parties. It is also not in dispute that part of the reason for the swap was to enable Mr Jones to buy a bigger boat.

In the autumn of 2008, Mr McCarthy sold the yacht to a third party for around £1 million, having had the use of it since the 2008 agreement was made. The second claimant had cleared the outstanding mortgage on the yacht. Mr McCarthy retained the proceeds of this sale, as was envisaged by the parties. The villa was not sold until 2016, at a price of €1.1 million. The proceeds of that sale were also retained by Mr McCarthy, which was something not envisaged at the time.

The primary remedy sought by the claimants is damages for breach of the 2008 agreement on the part of Mr McCarthy, to put them in the position they would have been in if Mr McCarthy had complied with his obligations thereunder by selling the villa at the direction of Mr Jones at its market value of €1.58 million or at least the value for which it was sold at €1.1million.

Alternatively, the claimants say that they are entitled to an account of profits and a constructive trust over the proceeds of sale of the villa, if this provides a more advantageous remedy to the claimants than that available in contract. Mr McCarthy was paid €150,000 by a Brian Proctor in December 2014 under an agreement between them which related to the villa and the mooring, and then bought it back for €950,000. Mr McCarthy then sold the villa to a third party in November 2016 for €1.1 million, so the wrongful proceeds of sale amount to €1.25 million.

The interest to the blog lies in the applicable law issues for the equitable relief. The first instance judge reported the procedural interest as follows [101]

It is not in dispute that matters of contract concerning the villa are governed by the law of England and Wales. Several weeks before the hearing was due to start, the claimants applied to amend their claims to include equitable remedies in respect of the villa. This gave Mr McCarthy little time to seek a report from an expert in Spanish law as to such remedies, as it was contended on his behalf, somewhat unusually, that despite the position regarding contractual remedies as set out above, any equitable remedies would be governed by Spanish law. This was not accepted by Mr Campbell, but he indicated that if the amendments were allowed, and if it was eventually determined that equitable remedies were governed by Spanish law, the claimants would rely solely on their claims in contract. This concession was referred to in the order made allowing the amendments, and repeated in Mr Campbell’s skeleton argument for the substantive hearing.

In other words claimant wanted to amend their claim so as to include equitable relief, a move which defendant opposed but was happy to forgive only if the judge held that that relief was subject to Spanish law, in contrast with the remainder of the claim which parties agreed was subject to English law as the lex contractus. Claimant OK-ed this route, committing to dropping the claim for equitable relief should the judge indeed find this was subject to Spanish law.

The judge duly [102] ff determined lex causae for equitable relief in the case and despite parties’ agreement that English law is the lex contractus, held it to indeed be Spanish law under the ‘most closely connected’ formula of the Rome Convention (the contract not being subject to the Rome I Regulation).

In so doing, he clearly (but without being specific about it) echoed the antediluvian (or is it?; authority and scholarship seem confused about the issue) distinction between rights, subject to the lex contractus, and remedies, subject to the lex fori – although it is odd to then subject those remedies to Spanish law. Unlike Rome I and Rome II, the Rome Convention does not have an Article specifying the ‘scope of the law applicable’, which includes in Rome I (A12(2) “within the limits of the powers conferred on the court by its procedural law, the consequences of a total or partial breach of obligations, including the assessment of damages in so far as it is governed by rules of law;”: itself of course courting controversy by referring to the limits of the lex fori’s procedural rules (see ia here for some of the discussions) and in Rome II Article 15(c) “the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy claimed”, each with the complication of the ‘evidence and procedure’ carve-out from the scope of application of the Regulation.

On appeal, the applicable law issue was not revisited, albeit Lewison LJ [3] notes viz an issue different than the remedies issue

It is common ground that the result of the 2008 agreement was that (looking at the matter through the eyes of the law of England and Wales) Mr Jones became entitled to the beneficial interest in the villa despite Mr McCarthy’s retention of the legal title. Whether the existence of such an interest would be recognised as a matter of Spanish law was not explored either at trial or on this appeal. We were asked (rather unsatisfactorily) to assume that the law of England and Wales applied. What was in issue at the trial was whether Mr Jones had ceased to be entitled to that beneficial interest; or was estopped from denying that he had. The judge found against Mr McCarthy on both issues; and, with the permission of Asplin LJ, Mr McCarthy appeals.

E&W authority does not usually make a fuss when parties are in agreement that a specific law applies to the claim, so why such concession here would be ‘unsatisfactory’ is not entirely clear to me.

I am not finding it easy to get my head round the issues here. Perhaps the hot European summer is getting to me.

Geert.

1/2 Appeal dismissed re beneficial interest in Spanish villa despite retention of legal title
Of interest: Lewison LJ:
Whether…would be recognised as matter of SP law was not explored..We were asked (rather unsatisfactorily) to assume that the law of England and Wales applied

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 25, 2023

Edward Elgar has just published a Research Handbook on International Child Abduction, edited by Marilyn Freeman and Nicola Taylor.

With a focus on the 1980 Hague Convention, this cutting-edge Research Handbook provides a holistic overview of the law on international child abduction from prevention, through voluntary agreements and Convention proceedings, to post-return and aftercare issues.

Discussing the repercussions of abduction from the perspectives of both abducted children and the therapeutic and family justice professionals engaged in their cases, chapters consider the contributions of the many professionals and key agencies involved in the field. Identifying the 1980 Hague Convention as the principal global instrument for dealing with child abduction, the Research Handbook traces its role, history, development and impact, alongside the mechanisms required for its effective use. Evaluating current trends, areas of concern in legal/judicial practice and various regional initiatives, it also considers alternatives to high-conflict court proceedings in international child abduction cases. The Convention’s strengths, successes, weaknesses and gaps are discussed, and the Research Handbook concludes by addressing how best to tackle the challenges in its future operation.

Interdisciplinary and accessible in approach, the contributions from renowned subject specialists will prove useful to students and scholars of human rights and family law, international law and the intersections between law and gender studies, politics and sociology. Its combination of research, policy and practice will be of value to legal practitioners working in family law alongside NGOs and central authorities active in the field.

Contributors include: Anna Claudia Alfieri, Sarah Calvert, Stephen Cullen, Jeffrey Edleson, Linda Elrod, Mary Fata, Sarah Cecilie Finkelstein Waters, Marilyn Freeman, Gérardine Goh Escolar, Diahann Gordon Harrison, Michael Gration, Mark Henaghan, Costanza Honorati, Ischtar Khalaf-Newsome, Clement Kong, Thalia Kruger, Suzanne Labadie, Sara Lembrechts, Nigel Lowe, Alistair MacDonald, Anil Malhotra, Ranjit Malhotra, Jeremy Morley, Yuko Nishitani, Christian Poland, Kelly Powers, Joëlle Schickel-Küng, Rhona Schuz, Henry Setright, Sudha Shetty, Ann Skelton, Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Victoria Stephens, Nicola Taylor, Mathew Thorpe.

More information here.

On 13 July 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in case C-87/22 that the court of a Member State where children were wrongfully removed by one of their parent can be requested to assume jurisdiction as a better place court than the court of their formal habitual residence, but that an application for return of the child suspends such decision.

Background

The case was concerned with the custody of two children born in 2012 from a couple of Slovak nationals in Slovakia. In 2014, the family moved to Austria, where the children went to daycare and then school for a few years. In 2017, however, the children started going to school in Slovakia, commuting daily from Austria. As the result, they spoke only limited German.

In 2020, the couple separated, and the mother took the children to Slovakia with her without the father’s consent.

The father sought an order for the return of the children under the 1980 Convention in Slovakia, and brought proceedings for custody of the children in Austria under the Brussels II bis Regulation.

The mother challenged the jurisdiction of the Austrian court on the ground that their habitual residence had been in Slovakia, where they went to school and were socially integrated. She won in first instance, but lost in appeal.

Transfer of the Case to the Place of Wrongful removal?

After loosing on jurisdiction, the mother then applied to the Austrian court for a transfer of the case to Slovakia as a better placed court under Article 15 of the Regulation.

She argued that Slovakian courts were better placed because multiple proceedings were pending in Slovakia (initiated by both parents), and extensive evidence was already available in these proceedings. The Austrian court granted the application in first instance, adding that because the children did not speak German, hearing them in Austrian proceedings would result in additional costs as interpreters would have to be involved.

The appeal court, however, saw a problem with the fact that the children had been wrongfully removed to Slovakia, and wondered whether this was a bar to resorting to Article 15. It referred the matter to the CJEU.

Judgment

The CJEU answers that the court of a Member State where a child was wrongfully removed could be transferred a case under Article 15 as a better placed court, but that an application for return of the child lodged with the competent authorities of the Member State of removal suspends any decision of transfer under Article 15.

This is a remarkable solution. As the judgement recalls, a major objective of the Regulation is to deter parents from removing wrongfully children to other Member States. This is why the return procedure exists, which should lead to a return of the child to the State where s/he was habitually resident. This is also why Article 10 of the Brussels II bis Regulation maintains the jurisdiction of the court of the old habitual residence of the child even if the removal results in a new habitual residence in another State (unless the parents have somehow consented to the removal).

Yet, the CJEU notes that, in practical terms, the court which might be considered as a better placed court under Article 15 will precisely be the court of the State where the child will have been wrongfully removed. Recall that, unlike doctrines such as forum non conveniens, the better placed court doctrine under the Brussels II Regulation is only available to transfer a case to a court which does not have jurisdiction under the Regulation.

The CJEU concludes, therefore, that Article 15 must be considered, in principle, to be available even for transfer to a court of the place of wrongful removal. The Court insists that given that one of the three prongs of the test to decide on a transfer is the best interests of the child, the decision should ultimately be “a balanced and reasonable assessment, in the best interests of the child, of all the interests involved, which must be based on objective considerations relating to the actual person of the child and his or her social environment”.

The CJEU then moves to the test for deciding a transfer under Article 15. It rules that the test remains the same in the context of a potential transfer to the court of the place of wrongful removal but that the existence of an application for return of the child suspends the decision for the six weeks time period for ruling on the application.

Assessment

The case was quite remarkable, in so far as the children were not well integrated, if at all, in the place of their habitual residence.

The judgement, however, addresses the issue from a general standpoint, and it is hard to avoid concluding that it might give additional hopes to parents that their strategy to abduct children might succeed, including in more common cases of child abduction from a country where they are socially integrated to another where they are not. The filing of an application for return of the child will, however, be an even more important move for the parent fighting against the removal and likely the transfer.

The important point that should be underlined, and which is an important safeguard, is that the decision will ultimately be made by the court of the original habitual residence. It is this court which will have to make the assessment of whether a transfer might be beneficial. The court of the place of wrongful removal may also request a transfer, but it will still have to be allowed by the court of the original habitual residence (see Article 13 of the Brussels II ter Regulation).

A collection of essays on the Hague Judgments Convention of 2 July 2019 has recently been published by Hart, in its Studies in Private International Law Series, under the title The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention – Cornerstones, Prospects, Outlook.

Edited by Matthias Weller, João Ribeiro-Bidaoui, Moritz Brinkmann and Nina Dethloff, the book has been presented and discussed at conference that wtook place at the University of Bonn on 9 and 10 June 2023.

This book analyses, comments and further develops on the most important instrument of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH): the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention. The HCCH Convention, the product of decades of work, will have a transformative effect on global judicial cooperation in civil matters. This book explores its ‘mechanics’, i.e. the legal cornerstones of the new Convention (Part I), its prospects in leading regions of the world (Part II), and offers an overview and comment on its outlook (Part III). Drawing on contributions from world-leading experts, this magisterial and ambitious work will become the reference work for law-makers, judges, lawyers and scholars in the field of private international law.

The contributors include Paul Beaumont, João Bidaoui-Ribeiro, Adeline Chong, Marcos Dotta Salgueiro, Beligh Elbalti, José Angelo Estrella-Faria, Pietro Franzina, Wolfgang Hau, Xandra Kramer, Cristina Mariottini, Chukwuma Okoli, Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Ilja Rumenov, Geneviève Saumier, Linda Silberman, Andreas Stein, Zheng Tang, Hans van Loon, Abubakri Yekini, Lenka Visoka, and Ning Zhao.

For more information, including the table of contents, see here.

On 26–28 October 2023, the University of Kiel will be hosting a conference on ‘EU Insolvency Law and Third Countries: Which Way(s) Forward?’. It is part of a research project coordinated by Professors Alexander Trunk (University of Kiel) and Jasnica Garasic (University of Zagreb), which is endorsed by UNCITRAL and supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. It is conducted in cooperation with representatives of the European Commission and the Hague Conference on Private International Law.

At the conference, the first results from the project will be presented and discussed with a larger professional and academic public. The conference will also include a Young Researchers Forum on the morning of 26 October.

The organizers have kindly shared the following documents with us:

• Conference Announcement (and Application Form)
• YRF Announcement (and Application Form)

Further information can also be found at the project website.

 

The third edition of Fabrizio Marrella’s textbook on international business law has recently published by Wolters Kluwers/Cedam.

The author (Vice-Rector and Chair of International Law at “Cà Foscari” University of Venice, Italy) has kindly provided the following summary for our readers:

After an historical introduction and a clear systematic analysis of key actors and sources of International Business Law, the book focuses on transnational contracts and commercial relationships of companies by deepening international sales (including the first applications of Incoterms ® 2020), contracts of international transport, insurance, commercial distribution, payments and bank guarantees. The leading methodology used by the Author is that of private international law and best operational practices.

The book also sets out the regulation of foreign direct investment in the light of the latest new regulatory and case-law developments. In the final part, the work examines, in one section, ADR mechanisms together with international arbitration and, in the final section, the most relevant international civil procedure rules for businesses.

The book can be found at the publisher’s website here.