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Alexander DJ Critchley has added an enriching installment to Hart’s renowned Studies in Private International Law Series entitled “The Application of Foreign Law in the British and German Courts”.

The author has extensive experience as solicitor in Scots law with a specialisation in family law. His book is the publication of a doctoral thesis completed with distinction at the university of Tübingen (Germany). The blurb reads as follows:

This book explores the application of foreign law in civil proceedings in the British and German courts. It focuses on how domestic procedural law impacts on the application of choice of law rules in domestic courts. It engages with questions involved in the investigation and determination of foreign law as they affect the law of England and Wales, Scotland, and Germany. Although the relevant jurisdictions are the focus, the comparative analysis extends to explore examples from other jurisdictions, including relevant international and European conventions. Ambitious in scope, it expertly tracks the development of the law and looks at possible future reforms.

Please check out Hart’s banner at the top of this page for special discounts for CoL readers.

This post was contributed by Fabienne Jault-Seseke, who is Professor at University Paris Saclay (UVSQ), and a member of GEDIP.

I reported here on the French judgment which questioned the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) on res judicata. Two months later, in a Recamier case, the French Court of cassation referred again to the ECJ on res judicata as reported by François Mailhé here.

AG Pikamäe delivered his opinion on 16 February 2023 in the first case C-567/21, BNP Paribas. As a reminder, the case relates to an action for payment of various sums, brought in France against a French company by one of its former employees in connection with his dismissal. Previously, he had initiated proceedings in London, his last place of work, and had obtained a judgment ordering the company to pay him compensation for unfair dismissal. In the first instance, a French labour court declared the claims relating to his dismissal inadmissible, because of the res judicata effect of the English judgment. On appeal, the judgment was overturned: the Court of Appeal considered that the various claims for compensation had not been examined by the English court.

The first question referred to the ECJ concerns the obligation to concentrate claims provided for by both legal system at stake.  The second and third questions are related to the notions of cause and subject-matter of the action. In this case, the question is whether an action for unfair dismissal in the United Kingdom has the same cause of action and the same subject-matter as an action for dismissal without real and serious cause in French law or an action for payment of bonuses or premiums provided for in the employment contract, as these actions are based on the same contractual relationship between the parties.  The answers depend on the respective role of Union law and national laws to determine res judicata. Res judicata is not mentioned in the Brussels I Regulation. So the Advocate General first looks at the relationship between res judicata and recognition. Not surprisingly, he states that res judicata is one of the facets of recognition.

AG Pikamäe focuses on two issues, that of the scope of res judicata and that of the consequences for the court of another Member State hearing a related case.

In a first step, regarding the scope of res judicata and the impact of an national rule of concentration of claims, AG Pikamäe refers to the Jenard Report and the Hoffman judgment (145/86) to justify appliying the doctrine of “extension of effects”, leaving it to the law of the Member State of origin to determine the effects of the judgment invoked in a second Member State (para 46). Therefore, no independent interpretation of the res judicata is given. The Gothaer judgment that might have led to the opposite conclusion. is here irrelevant. It is specific and only apply to jurisdictional decisions.

Thus the law of the United Kingdom must be “taken into account” (applied would have been more precise) for the purpose of determining the authority and effectiveness of the judgment given by the British court (para 52).

But the obligation to concentrate claims does not affect the authority and effectiveness of the judgment (para 53). For AG Pikamäe the rule of “abuse of process”, which is the source of this obligation is not related to res judicata: it is only a means to sanction abuses (para 55). Here it seems that in a somewhat confusing way AG Pikamäe is not interpreting EU law but English law. He refers also to the scheme of Regulation 44/2001 and considers that taking into account, at the stage of the recognition of a decision, a national rule on the concentration of claims could jeopardise the subsequent implementation of the specific rules on jurisdiction in matters relating to individual contracts of employment and of the provisions governing lis pendens and related actions (para 60).  The reasoning does not really convince even in matters of employment contracts where the rules of jurisdiction ensure the protection of the worker. Indeed, one could consider that the protective effect is exhausted with the first proceeding initiated by the worker against his employer. In other words, the employee only has the option of choosing between the place of work and the employer’s home once.

AG Pikamäe goes very far in questioning procedural autonomy when he states that the application of the provisions of Regulation 44/2001 cannot depend on the content of the procedural rules of a Member State (para 62). It does not matter, he adds, that the two Member States concerned have the same rule (para 63). He concludes that a domestic procedural rule on concentration of claims is not an effective criterion for determining the authority attached to a decision given in a Member State. In short, the concentration of claims rule has no consequences for the recognition of decisions. This statement may be surprising. It is up to the law of the country from which the decision originates to specify the extent of res judicata, but the rule on the concentration of claims that it contains is not applied. Thus, while new claims could not have been made in the State of origin, they can be made in another State. Such an attitude is likely to fuel forum shopping and sharpen procedural strategies. In any case the aim of procedural economy is clearly not a priority.

In a second step, the opinion focuses on the concepts of cause and subject-matter. The French Cour de cassation had asked the Court of Justice whether a claim for unfair dismissal in the UK has the same cause of action and the same subject-matter as a claim for dismissal without real and serious cause under French law. It also wondered whether a claim for unfair dismissal in the UK has the same cause of action and the same subject-matter as claim for payment of bonuses or premiums provided for in the employment contract, since these actions are based on the same contractual relationship.

The answer to these questions presupposes a precise comparison of the provisions of English labour law with those of French labour law, which is beyond the role of the Court (para 71) but
AG Pikamäe suggests that the Court reformulates the questions referred to it in this way : for the purposes of Articles 33 and 36 of Regulation No 44/2001, do actions based on the same employment contract and relating to obligations arising out of the performance of that contract and to obligations arising out of its termination have the same cause of action and the same subject-matter?

As expected, a parallel between the conditions of lis pendens and those of res judicata is made. AG Pikamäe notes that “the rules on lis pendens and recognition have the common purpose of contributing to the full authority of the judgment given in the Member State of origin, which must not be called into question by a judgment given by a court in another Member State” (para 80). Consequently, he suggests transposing the criterion of identity of parties, cause and subject-matter applicable to lis pendens to res judicata (para 90). As for lis pendens, the terms cause and subject-matter must be regarded as independent.

Building on Gubisch Maschinenfabrik (144/86), Tatry (C‑406/92), and Merck (C‑231/16), AG Pikamäe considers that the claims brought before the Employment Tribunal and those brought before the French Courts, based on the same contractual relationship, are based on the same cause of action.

As regards the ‘subject matter’, the case is more complicated. The Court has stated on different occasions that this means the end the action has in view, that the concept is to be interpreted broadly and cannot be restricted so as to mean two claims which are formally identical and that account must be taken in that regard of the applicants’ respective claims in each of the sets of proceedings. AG Pikamäe distinguishes then between claims relating to the termination of the employment contract and its financial consequences and those relating to the performance of the employment contract (claims for payment of sums due for the performance of work). They have not the same subject-matter (para 106). Nevertheless, the “second” court hearing claims for payment of remuneration in respect of the performance of an employment contract should take into account the possible implications of the original decision. An example is given, the case of the determination, in accordance with the law of the State of origin, by the initial decision of the date of termination of the employment contract, which would be likely to have an impact on the end of the period during which remuneration is due.

AG Pikamäe focuses on the distinction between issues relating to the end of the contract and those relating to the performance of the contract. He considers then that a claim for unfair dismissal in the UK has not the same subject-matter that a claim for payment of sums due for the performance of work. In doing so, it leaves part of the question unanswered. Has a claim for unfair dismissal in the UK the same subject-matter as a claim for dismissal without real and serious cause under French law? A positive answer is only suggested. It is to be hoped that the ECJ will be clearer. The worker is sometimes encouraged to pick and choose among the different laws that may be applied to the employment relationship. The effect would be multiplied if he were also allowed to multiply the proceedings in different countries.

The first view of the second issue of ICLQ  for 2023 contains a private international law article that was published online just recently:

S Matos, Arbitration Agreements and the Winding-Up Process: Reconciling Competing Values

Courts in a number of jurisdictions have attempted to resolve the relationship between winding-up proceedings and arbitration clauses, but a unified approach is yet to appear. A fundamental disagreement exists between courts which believe that the approach of insolvency law should be applied, and those which prefer to prioritise arbitration law. This article argues that a more principled solution emerges if the problem is understood as one of competing values in which the process of characterisation can offer guidance. This would allow both a more principled approach in individual cases, and a more coherent dialogue between courts which take different approaches to the issue.

The first issue of the Journal du droit international for 2023 was released. It contains one article and several case notes relating to private international law issues.

In her article, Valérie Pironon (University of Nantes) discusses the issue of international competence in private litigation in the field of anti-competitive practices (L’adaptation des règles de compétence juridictionnelle issues du règlement Bruxelles I bis aux actions en réparation des préjudices causés par une pratique anticoncurrentielle).

The English abstract reads:

Private litigation in the field of anti-competitive practices often has a cross-border dimension justifying the application of private international law mechanisms. Where the dispute is integrated into the European Union, the rules of jurisdiction are those of Brussels I bis Regulation. The implementation of this general regulation in such a specific field of law is often problematic. It seems that the interpretation given by the Court of justice when asked is aimed at encouraging the development of these actions. However, this motivation does not result clearly from the judgments. After considering the hypothesis of a hidden adaptation of the rules of jurisdiction to the material competition stakes at issue, the article questions the prospect of a more transparent adaptation. 

The table of contents of the issue can be accessed here.

This week the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) published the Practical Guide – Access to Justice for International Tourists and Visitors. The HCCH news item is available here.

As indicated in the Guide, this document “is intended to assist international tourists and visitors to foreign countries seeking access to justice for disputes arising from their tourism experience by providing information on online dispute resolution mechanisms that may be available and HCCH legal instruments that may be relevant in a given case.”

There are a few aspects of the Guide that are worthy of note:

First, the definitions of a visitor and a tourist are interesting.

A “visitor” is considered to mean “a traveller taking a trip to a main destination outside their usual environment, for less than a year, for any main purpose (business, leisure, or other personal purpose) other than to be employed by a resident entity in the country or place visited.”

A “tourist”: “A visitor (domestic, inbound, or outbound) is classified as a “tourist” if their trip includes an overnight stay.”

These definitions are taken from the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).

Secondly, Part I of this Guide provides a list of online dispute resolution platforms, although some are not specific to international tourists and visitors. Among the governmental initiatives are: EU Online Dispute Resolution Platform (European Commission), Concilianet de PROFECO (Mexico) and Consumidor.gov.br (Brazil). Among the private initiatives are: Airbnb Online Resolution Centre and Endispute.

Thirdly, Part II of this Guide sets out examples of common claims made by tourists and visitors such as lost baggage, cruise cancelled due to weather, and damage to property at hotel. These examples are merely indicative and of course do not constitute legal advice.

All in all it makes an interesting read and its layout is more easily readable on different devices. Nevertheless, it does make me wonder how much this document would actually help tourists and visitors in times of trouble.

On 8 March 2023, the latest edition of the cycle of seminars – entirely in English – on cross-border civil and commercial litigation will begin, as part of the European project Jean Monnet Module on Multilevel, Multiparty and Multisector Cross-Border Litigation in Europe, organized by the Department of Italian and Supranational Public Law of the University of Milan.

This year’s edition will focus on the following three topics:

– Binding effects and res iudicata in a multilevel dimension (seminars on 8-9-15-16-17-22-23 March 2023);

– Collective redress and group litigation (seminars on 29 March-12-13-19-20-26-27-28 April 2023);

– Main procedural issues of climate litigation (seminars on 3-4-10-11-17-18 May 2023).

The seminars (currently being accredited by the Milan Bar Council) can be followed both face-to-face and remotely, on the MS Teams platform.

All information on the program and how to register may be found here.

Marco Biasi (Università degli Studi di Milano) has published Decent Work and the Virtual Dimension: Reflections about the Regulation of Work in the Metaverse in Lavoro Diritti Europa 2023/1. The article (written in Italian) deals with conflict-of-laws and substantive law issues of working in the virtual world.
What is the Metaverse?

The metaverse is more than the eponymous project of Facebook, which has recently rebranded itself as “Meta”. The term was first mentioned in 1992 in the novel “Snow Crash” by Neal Stephenson, and describes a virtual space in which participants are fully immersed and can interact with each other almost as in real life. In essence, the metaverse is thus a special type of computer programme which allows people to interact in digital space. To do so, they need equipment, in particular a virtual reality headset and controllers, which are readily available today at a relatively affordable price. Nowadays, a multitude of projects exist aiming to create such a metaverse. Well-known projects in this field are Decentraland and The Sandbox, and of course the ”Metaverse” developed by Meta.

In the metaverse, various forms of activity can be performed, such as office work, reunions, sales meetings, education – under an employment agreement. As such, disputes between employers and employees will soon emerge, and with them, the question which law applies to work performed. The problem of connecting a metaverse to the labour law of a particular nation state is as obvious as it is baffling.

In the European Union, according to Article 8 Rome I Regulation, the country from which or in which the work is habitually performed is of particular importance for determining the law applicable to a contract of employment, irrespective of whether there is a choice of law. Although Article 8(1) Rome I Regulation follows the principle of party autonomy by allowing the parties to choose the applicable law, this choice is limited by the mandatory rules of the country in or from which the work is habitually carried out.
At first sight, both connecting factors seem to lead nowhere given that the work is performed in the virtual space. But Marco Biasi rightly distinguishes the situation of metaverse workers from that of posted workers and pulls us down to a more realistic view point: an employee who sits in their home in country X with a headset and a controller in fact performs their work in this country, and nowhere else.

This seems to settle the question, yet it would provide very strong incentives for metaverse employers to pick and choose employees living in countries with the lowest labour law standards possible. One way of avoiding this problem could be to assume a closer connection between the contract and the country of establishment of the employer under Art 8(4) Rome I. Marco Biasi suggests, however, another solution: if the employees themselves were to bring a claim in the country of domicile or seat of the employer, the courts there could apply the provisions of their national labour law as overriding mandatory rules (Art 9 Rome I Regulation).

The (possibly) too lenient rules of the place of habitual residence of the worker could thus be overcome and fairness between employer and employee could be re-established. In this way, a nucleus of essential workers protections could be preserved, e.g. the maximum working hours, the minimum wage, and health and safety rules.

There are, however, two problems with this suggestion: First, the employee would have to make the effort of bringing a suit in the country of the employer, which will often be fraught with difficulties such as distance, language, and costs. Second, the suggestion presupposes that mandatory labour law rules could be applied via Article 9 Rome I, even though Article 8 Rome I seems to conclusively determine their application. While many authors indeed are of this view, it is in no way the subject of consensus.

Marco Biasi assumes that, in any event, the protection of the employee will be incomplete and differ from country to country. Therefore, he suggests introducing international rules (such as a convention) on the rights of metaverse employees. Some problems will be hard to solve, though; trade negotiations on behalf of a class of workers scattered around the planet will be particularly challenging. There remain, therefore, enough problems to think about even after this first in-depth study of labour law in the metaverse.

Conventions & Instruments

On 1 February 2023, the 1980 Child Abduction Convention entered into force for Botswana. The Convention currently has 103 Contracting Parties. More information is available here.

On 17 February 2023, Azerbaijan deposited its instrument of accession to the 1965 Service and 2007 Child Support Conventions. The 1965 Service Convention, which now has 80 Contracting Parties, will enter into force for Azerbaijan on 1 September 2023, subject to the Article 28 procedure. As for the 2007 Child Support Convention, with the accession of Azerbaijan 46 States and the European Union are now bound by it. It will enter into force for Azerbaijan on 28 February 2024. More information is available here.

Meetings & Events

On 7 and 8 February 2023, the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH co-organised the Regional Conference “The HCCH and the relevance of its work for Southern Africa”, together with Finland and South Africa, with the participation of Namibia and Tanzania, as well as other Southern African Development Community States, and hosted by the University of Pretoria (South Africa). More information is available here.

From 13 to 15 February 2023, the International Transfer of Maintenance Funds Experts’ Group met for the fourth time. Pursuant to its mandate, the Experts’ Group continued its work discussing good practices in relation to the cross-border transfer of maintenance payments, with a view to identifying solutions that are cost-effective, transparent, prompt, efficient and accessible. More information is available here.

From 13 to 17 February 2023, the Working Group on Matters Related to Jurisdiction in Transnational Civil or Commercial Litigation met for the fourth time. Pursuant to its mandate, the Working Group made further progress on the development of draft provisions for a possible future instrument on parallel litigation in civil or commercial matters. More information is available here.

Upcoming Events

Registrations are open for the conference “The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: Cornerstones – Prospects – Outlook”, which will be held in person on 9-10 June 2023 at the University of Bonn in Germany. More information is available here.

Vacancies

Applications are now open for three- to six-month legal internships for the period from July to December 2023. The deadline for the submission of applications is 31 March 2023 (18:00 CEST). More information is available here.

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

Thank you Gilles Cuniberti for flagging and discussing the French Supreme Court’s judgment in JE and B v Barclay Pharmaceuticals [cross-referral to the English judgment makes this Barclay Pharmaceuticals v Mekni]. Much of this post is already included in prof Cuniberti’s posts.

The core of the case concerns the enforcement of an English judgment [Barclay Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Antoine Mekni and others, [2018] 6 WLUK 461] which, in assisting Barclay Pharmaceuticals with enforcement of an earlier established £8.7 million debt (since accrued with costs etc to about £12 million), had declaratorily held that a large number of bank accounts and other entities which for the most part purport to belong to parties other than Mr Mekni, are in truth owned by him. Mr Mekni did not appear in the English declaratory relief proceedings hence did not there object to jurisdiction.

The relevant issue in the French proceedings for the purposes of the blog, is first of all Article 24(3) Brussels Ia’s exclusive jurisdiction for ‘proceedings which have as their object the validity of entries in public registers’. As Gilles had earlier discussed, here the Supreme Court [5-6] held that an English judgment determining ownership in shares held in public registers, does not engage ‘the validity of entries in public registers’, for said exclusive jurisdiction, it holds, only extends to the formal validity of such entry, not to the ownership of the assets related to the entry.

As Gilles notes, it was possible for the SC succinctly to deal with the A24(3) argument for under the applicable French law relating to the type of corporation involved, whose shares were the object of the proceedings, the only impact of the (non-obligatory) registration was to create limited third party effect; registration has no bearing on the existence, validity and ownership of the shares. Professor Cuniberti justifiably signals that a distinction between substantive and formal validity may not always be easily made.

The second issue of note to the blog, is the issue of service. A43(1) BIa prescribes that

Where enforcement is sought of a judgment given in another Member State, the certificate issued pursuant to Article 53 shall be served on the person against whom the enforcement is sought prior to the first enforcement measure. The certificate shall be accompanied by the judgment, if not already served on that person.

Recital 32 adds

In order to inform the person against whom enforcement is sought of the enforcement of a judgment given in another Member State, the certificate established under this Regulation, if necessary accompanied by the judgment, should be served on that person in reasonable time before the first enforcement measure. In this context, the first enforcement measure should mean the first enforcement measure after such service

In the case at issue, service happened at 2:55 PM and enforcement at 3 PM. Does that leave a ‘reasonable time’? I share Gilles’ frustration that the SC [3] merely replied that French CPR does not require the SC to engage with grounds of appeal that are manifestly unarguable

En application de l’article 1014, alinéa 2, du code de procédure civile, il n’y a pas lieu de statuer par une décision spécialement motivée sur ces griefs qui ne sont manifestement pas de nature à entraîner la cassation.

The take-away from this is that the SC in the circumstances did not see a clear infringement of A43 juncto A53 BIa. That does of course leave a lot of speculation as to when the timing of service might lead to enforcement issues – crucial too, I would suggest, in case of provisional measures.

Geert.

On 9 March 2023, the Court will deliver the judgment in C-177/22, Wurth Automotive. The Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria) referred the following (extremely case-specific) questions on the interpretation of the Brussels I bis Regulation and the consumers’ heads of jurisdiction:

1. Does the assessment of whether the applicant is a consumer within the meaning of Articles 17 and 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 depend on

a) whether the applicant pursued the activity of a graphic and web designer declared by her in the proceedings only as an employed person or, at least in part, also in the context of a freelance activity at the time of concluding the contract of sale and immediately thereafter and

b) the purpose for which the applicant acquired the vehicle, that is to say solely for the purpose of satisfying her own needs in terms of private consumption or also in connection with a current or future trade or professional activity or purpose?

2. Would the applicant no longer be able to rely on her status as a consumer if she had resold the passenger car in August 2019, and would any profit made in the process be relevant?

3. Must the applicant be considered not to be a consumer merely because she signed a standard contract of sale prepared by the defendant, the printed form of which designated the buyer as a ‘company’ and contained the text ‘business-to-business/no return, no warranty/delivery only after receipt of money’ under the heading ‘special agreements’ in a smaller font, without objecting to this and referring to the fact that she was a consumer?

4. Must the applicant accept responsibility for the conduct of her partner, who acted as a car dealer in arranging the purchase, from which the defendant could have concluded that the applicant was a trader?

5. Is it to the detriment of the applicant in the assessment of whether she is a consumer if the court of first instance was unable to determine why the written contract of sale differed from the preceding offer by the applicant’s partner in terms of the designation of the buyer or what was discussed in that regard during the telephone calls between the applicant’s partner and one of the defendant’s salespeople?

6. Is it relevant to the applicant’s status as a consumer if the applicant’s partner telephoned the defendant several weeks after taking delivery of the vehicle to enquire whether it was possible to state the VAT on the invoice?

The case has been allocated to a chamber of three judges (L.S. Rossi, J.C. Bonichot, O. Spineanu-Matei as reporting judge). No opinion was requested.

All remaining PIL-related events will take place on Thursday 23 March. A hearing is scheduled on case C-90/22, Gjensidige, also regarding the Brussels I bis Regulation, this time in relation to the CMR (Convention on the contract for the international carriage of goods by road, Geneva, 19 May 1956). The main proceedings concern a claim for compensation of loss on the basis of subrogation. In cassation, the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Lithuania) is asking the Court of Justice:

1. Can Article 71 of Regulation No 1215/2012, having regard to Articles 25, 29 and 31 and recitals 21 and 22 thereof, be interpreted as permitting the application of Article 31 of the CMR Convention also in cases where a dispute falling within the scope of both those legal instruments is the subject of an agreement conferring jurisdiction?
2. Having regard to the legislature’s intention to strengthen the protection of agreements conferring jurisdiction in the European Union, can Article 45(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation No 1215/2012 be interpreted more broadly, as covering not only Section 6 of Chapter II of that regulation but also Section 7 thereof?
3. After assessment of the specific features of the situation and the resulting legal consequences, can the term ‘public policy’ used in Regulation No 1215/2012 be interpreted as covering the ground for deciding not to recognise a judgment of another Member State where the application of a specialised convention, such as the CMR Convention, creates a legal situation in which both the agreement conferring jurisdiction and the agreement on the applicable law are not observed in the same case?

The deciding chamber is composed of judges A. Arabadjiev, P.G. Xuereb, T. von Danwitz, A. Kumin (as reporting judge), and I. Ziemele. On the occasion of the hearing, AG N. Emiliou will indicate the date he will publish his opinion.

The same day the Court will publish the opinions on cases C-590/21, Charles Taylor Adjusting, and C-832/21, Beverage City Polska, both by AG J. Richard de la Tour; C-21/22 OP, by AG M. Campos Sánchez-Bordona; and C-87/22, TT (Déplacement illicite de l’enfant), by AG P. Pikamäe.

In C-590/21, Charles Taylor Adjusting (on which I already reported here) the Court has been asked whether injunctions of a court capable of hindering  the continuation of proceedings pending before the jurisdiction of another State, in particular by awarding compensation to cover the costs of the defendants before that jurisdiction, are contrary to the public policy of the European Union in the sense of Article 34(1) of Regulation  44/2001. The referring court – the Greek Areios Pagos- is asking :

(I)      Is the expression ‘manifestly contrary to public policy’ in the EU and, by extension, to domestic public policy, which constitutes a ground for non-recognition and non-enforcement pursuant to point 1 of Article 34 and Article 45(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, to be understood as meaning that it extends beyond explicit anti-suit injunctions prohibiting the commencement and continuation of proceedings before a court of another Member State to judgments or orders delivered by courts of Member States where: (i) they impede or prevent the claimant in obtaining judicial protection by the court of another Member State or from continuing proceedings already commenced before it; and (ii) is that form of interference in the jurisdiction of a court of another Member State to adjudicate a dispute of which it has already been seised, and which it has admitted, compatible with public policy in the EU? In particular, is it contrary to public policy in the EU within the meaning of point 1 of Article 34 and Article 45(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, to recognise and/or declare enforceable a judgment or order of a court of a Member State awarding provisional damages to claimants seeking recognition and a declaration of enforceability in respect of the costs and expenses incurred by them in bringing an action or continuing proceedings before the court of another Member State, where the reasons given are that: (a) it follows from an examination of that action that the case is covered by a settlement duly established and ratified by the court of the Member State delivering the judgment (or order); and (b) the court of the other Member State seised in a fresh action by the party against which the judgment or order was delivered lacks jurisdiction by virtue of a clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction?

(II)    If the first question is answered in the negative, is point 1 of Article 34 of Regulation No 44/2001, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union, to be understood as constituting a ground for non-recognition and non-enforcement in Greece of the judgment and orders delivered by a court of another Member State (the United Kingdom), as described under (I) above, where they are directly and manifestly contrary to national public policy in accordance with fundamental social and legal perceptions which prevail in Greece and the fundamental provisions of Greek law that lie at the very heart of the right to judicial protection (Articles 8 and 20 of the Greek Constitution, Article 33 of the Greek Civil Code and the principle of protection of that right that underpins the entire system of Greek procedural law, as laid down in Articles 176, 173(1) to (3), 185, 205 and 191 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure cited in paragraph 6 of the statement of reasons) and Article 6(1) of the [European Convention on Human Rights], such that, in that case, it is permissible to disapply the principle of EU law on the free movement of judgments, and is the non-recognition resulting  therefrom compatible with the views that assimilate and promote the European perspective?

The case has been assigned to a chamber of five judges (K. Jürimäe, M. Safjan, N. Piçarra, M. Gavalec, N. Jääskinen reporting).

C-832/21, Beverage City Polska (hearing last January was announced here) concerns the interpretation of Article 8(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, in particular the condition of a close relationship (‘so closely connected’) required for the purposes of applying the head of international judicial jurisdiction in a situation which, potentially, could amount to “forum shopping”. The request has been referred by the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Germany), in proceedings brought by the proprietor of a number of EU trade marks including: an application for injunction throughout the territory of the Union, and an application (limited to acts in Germany) for information, the disclosure of accounts and a declaration of liability for damages. They are both directed against a German company and a Polish company as well as against two natural persons, in a personal capacity and as managers of these companies. The question referred reads:

Are claims ‘so closely connected’ that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to prevent irreconcilable judgments, within the meaning of Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, where, in infringement proceedings for infringement of an EU trade mark, the connection consists in the fact that the defendant domiciled in a Member State (here, Poland) supplied the goods which infringe an EU trade mark to a defendant domiciled in another Member State (here, Germany) whose legal representative, against whom infringement proceedings have also been brought, is the anchor defendant, if the parties are connected to each other only through the mere supply relationship beyond which there is no legal or factual connection?

Judges E. Regan, D. Gratsias, I. Jarukaitis, Z. Csehi and M. Ilešič (reporting) will decide on the requested interpretation.

C-21/22, OP (Choix du droit d’un État tiers pour la succession), is a request from the Sąd Okręgowy w Opolu (Poland), on appeal lodged against the refusal by a notary practising in Poland to draw up a notarial will on behalf on an Ukrainian national; the will would contain a clause stipulating that the law applicable to all matters relating to the succession and modification of the legal order of succession would be Ukrainian law. The questions referred require the interpretation of the Succession Regulation and the ascertainment of its relationship to bilateral conventions between Member States and third States:

1. Must Article 22 [of Regulation No 650/2012] be interpreted as meaning that a person who is not a citizen of the European Union is entitled to choose the law of his or her native country as the law governing all matters relating to succession?
2. Must Article 75, in conjunction with Article 22, of Regulation No 650/2012 be interpreted as meaning that, in the case where a bilateral agreement between a Member State and a third country does not govern the choice of law applicable to a case involving succession but indicates the law applicable to that case involving succession, a national of that third country residing in a Member State bound by that bilateral agreement may make a choice of law?

Judges K. Jürimäe, M. Safjan, N.J. Piçarra,  M. Gavalec and N. Jääskinen (reporting) will decide on the matter.

Finally, in C-87/22, TT (Déplacement illicite de l’enfant), the Landesgericht Korneuburg (Austria) is asking about the scope of Article 15 of Regulation 2201/2003 (Brussels II bis), the conditions of application of that article and its relationship with Article 10 of that regulation.

1. Must Article 15 of [the Brussels II bis Regulation], be interpreted as meaning that the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter, if they consider that a court of another Member State, with which the child has a particular connection, would be better placed to hear the case, or a specific part thereof, may request such a court to assume jurisdiction even in the case where that other Member State has become the place of habitual residence of the child following wrongful removal?
2. If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Must Article 15 of [the Brussels II bis Regulation], be interpreted as meaning that the criteria for the transfer of jurisdiction that are set out in that article are regulated exhaustively, without the need to consider further criteria in the light of proceedings initiated under Article 8(f) of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction?

The request has been attributed to judges C. Lycourgos, K. Lenaerts, J.C. Bonichot, O. Spineanu-Matei, and L.S. Rossi (reporting).

Reviewing Sanctions in Arbitration: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Private International Law Analysis

by Naimeh Masumy, [nmasumy@gmail.com]

The growing role of arbitration as a peaceful means for resolving investment, commercial and inter-state disputes is now impacted by an increasing number of sanction regimes borne out of the recent geopolitical conflicts.  Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many regulators across various jurisdictions sought to move towards greater coordination of sanction implementation and enforcement efforts. The recent tranche of sanctions has sparked a debate on the appropriate standards of review that arbitral tribunals ought to apply when dealing with disputes involving sanctions.

In this short note, we look at the case of Sofregaz v. NGSC, which provides a sobering exposition of the challenges faced by the adjudicative bodies when assessing the legality of unilateral Extra-territorial sanctions under international law.  This case concerns the annulment of an arbitral award rendered in Paris 2018 in favor of NGSC, pursuant to the Rules of Arbitration of the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC Rules). In 2018, the ICC tribunal found against Sofregaz and awarded NGCS an amount of over USD 2.4 million for an unpaid invoice and down payment drawn by Sofregaz under certain guarantees. Sofregaz applied to set aside the award before the Paris Court of Appeal.  It sought an annulment application based on NGSC’s exposure to US secondary sanction. Sofregaz argued, inter alia, that the tribunal had failed to carry out its mandate and had not considered the impact of sanctions against Iran on the performance of the contract. In Sofregaz’s view, this resulted in an award contrary to French international public policy in that it gave effect to a contract that could not be performed without breaching the designated sanctions. The Court of Appeal dismissed the annulment application brought by the Sofregaz, using private international law analysis to dismiss the legality of U.S. sanctions.

This note will highlight why invoking such a private international law analysis when determining the validity and the scope of applicable sanctions will undermine international arbitration. Then, it will show that such an analysis is inconsistent with the overriding objectives of international arbitration – arguably, the creation of an autonomous dispute resolution system for the effective and expeditious resolution of disputes in a delocalized fashion.

The Relevance of Private International Law Analysis to Arbitration

Private international law provides a judicial tool for courts to address the distinction between forum law and foreign law and promotes a smooth functioning of the international legal regime by mitigating jurisdictional conflicts, especially in a legal relationship involving several applicable laws.  Courts weigh private and public policy concerns of the forum law and foreign law when determining whether to apply the laws of a foreign jurisdiction over the forum law.

Many scholars have strongly advocated the use of private international law analysis in international arbitration. The benefits of such analysis are particularly clear when arbitrators are faced with potentially conflicting laws, similar to the case of Sofregaz v. NGCS. where the tribunal was confronted with three different sets of laws: Iranian law governing the contract, French law as the law applicable at the seat of arbitration, and the U.S. law governing the sanctions regime, albeit extraterritorially imposed, which materially impacted on the performance of a contract. The tribunal did not consider the impact of US sanctions, and rendered an award in favor of NGSC due to the wrongful termination of a contract for the conversion of a gas field.

 In such instances, private international law can operate as a mechanism of localization that permits tribunals to adjudicate in cases involving several legal orders by taking into account important considerations such as overriding mandatory rules at the seat of the arbitral tribunal.

Arbitrators are generally empowered to apply the law deemed “appropriate” or “applicable” in the absence of a governing law clause. Notably, Article 22(3) of the 2020 LCIA Rules also authorizes arbitrators, when determining the lex contractus, to apply the rules of law they deem appropriate. Such approaches can provide objective yardsticks for tribunals exercising their discretion to select the appropriate law. Having objective criteria aids predictability and efficiency and ensures tribunals do not act outside their designated mandates.

This is of particular significance as the uncertainty over the governing law may negatively affect the parties’ due process rights and may lead to the award being issued arbitrarily. Such concern was echoed in the Sofregaz application to set aside the award in 2019, in which it was claimed that the tribunal failed to take into account the impact of U.S. economic sanctions. Thus, that award recognition would be contrary to international public policy (“l’ordre public international”).

The court dismissed the claim observing that the Tribunal did not violate international public policy in failing to consider the impact of U.S. economic sanctions. To this end, the French court defined international public policy as “the body of rules and value whose violation the French legal order cannot tolerate, even in the international context.” In its reasoning, the court heavily endorsed French conflict-of-laws rules to determine the contour of mandatory rules. This approach means that if a tribunal relies on objective criteria to take into account essential regulations of the forum such as domestic and international mandatory law, the final award may remain immune from potential challenges.  In other words, private international law analysis may be a desirable straight jacket to ensure that tribunals comply with regulatory provisions of the forum. As such, it may enable courts to establish trust in arbitration and refrain from inquiring into the merits of final awards.

Conflict of Rules Analysis: Undermining the Delocalization Theory

The delocalization theory of arbitration is a part of the much broader, which posits that international arbitration ought to be completely detached from the procedural and substantive law of the place of arbitration or the seat, or lex loci arbitri, and from national law in general. According to this theory, arbitration is a private activity, which can be considered favorably or unfavorably, but certainly does not need to be empowered by any state ex ante. While this theory found a firm grounding under the French law of international arbitration, in reality, this theory usually carries little weight, especially in enforcing an award that has been challenged. The theory of delocalization begins to wane, as the legal system of the forum country will be the primary source relevant to ascertaining the legal relationship of the final award and the mandatory provisions of the lex fori.

In addition, the New York Convention muddies the waters by making reference to domestic public policy in article V (2) (b) as a ground for non-recognition or enforcement of an award., Based on the literal reading of the Convention, the law of the seat of arbitration usually delineates. Thus, to contextualize international arbitration through the prism of absolute delocalization, a system wholly emancipated from the forum law will pose practical challenges.

The above is of relevance to the role of sanctions for arbitral awards. Private international law is predicated on the notion that the world is divided into nation states and national legal orders. This approach dramatically contrasts with what international arbitration delocalisation theory arguably has long sought: to free arbitration from national orders. According to this view, examining the validity and scope of sanctions through the prism of private international law analysis forces the arbitrator to draw upon domestic law. This, in turn, contravenes the main tenet of delocalization theory, which confirms that arbitration has no forum. Further, the arc of modern arbitration laws arguably negates the relevance of private international law analysis. Modern arbitration laws are mostly substantive laws, and the notions embedded in arbitration are substantially transnational rather than international, which undermines the viability of the private international law analysis.

Private International Law Analysis: A False Aura of Objectivity

Despite the widespread view that private international law provides a roadmap towards a more predictable and objective outcome for disputes involving sanctions, such framework is prone to inconsistent and divergent results. Private international law provides a basis of jurisdiction to apply foreign law when several laws may concurrently apply to the dispute. In doing so, private international law approaches balance competing interests according to notions such as reciprocity, expectation of courtesy and comity. The exact contours of these notions have remained imprecise, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in the case of Hilton v. Guyot. Courts often draw upon their ideology and values explicitly and implicitly to ascertain comity. Such assessment will inadvertently lead to adjudicators interposing ad hoc political judgments about foreign relations, opening a door for arbitrators to endorse parochial domestic policies to ascertain the legal orders involving international components. This is evident in the French Court’s reasoning, in which the court heldthat “[t]he unilateral sanctions taken by U.S. authorities against Iran cannot be regarded as the expression of an international consensus, since the French authorities dispute the extraterritorial reach of these sanctions”. This assessment was drawn by balancing the interests of French national policies, which denotes that relying on political considerations rather than legitimate international considerations concerning the legality of sanctions will open the door for domestic idiosyncratic views and interpretations, which in turn, will bar this concept to be applied hegemonically across different jurisdictions.

If the governing law of sanctions is determined by private international law, it may pose conceptual difficulties. Sanctions are international instruments hinging on the notion of sovereign equality. The underpinning principle of sovereign equality of states is deeply embedded in one of the main tenants of international law. Any actions impinging on that principle would therefore need to involve considerations of public policy. Public international law must impose limits to the scope and validity of sanctions and to governing law. To this end, using private international law approaches to ascertain the validity of sanctions will negate the character (or nature) of sanctions as a public international law instrument transcending national boundaries

Conclusion

This post has called into question the viability of a private international law analysis in reviewing the scope of the application of sanctions. It has contended that a private international law analysis borrows its genesis from the domestic law of the forum (state). Private international law analysis needs to have sufficient normative weight to scrutinize or inquire into the substance of sanction regimes. Further, invoking private international law principles does not preclude arbitrators from engaging in subjective assessments to examine the applicability of a sanctions regime. By abandoning a private international law analysis, the interpretation and enforceability of sanctions will become more anachronistic and predictable.

The Centre for Private International Law is organising an online research seminar on Beyond the Civil – Common Law Divide: Islamic Shari’a Principles in Shari’a Based International Arbitration Disputes on 14 March 2023, 14:00 – 15:30 UK time.

With the global growth in the Islamic finance industry, the conclusion of Islamic finance transactions, and the offering of Islamic finance products in non-Islamic states across the globe, intricate legal questions and applicable law issues have become exceedingly pertinent. It is in this context that the speaker, Prof Dr Mohamed Abdel Wahab, proposes to tackle the interplay between Islamic Shari’a principles and the applicable norms governing Shari’a-based contracts and disputes.

See event details and registration information.

On 3 May 2023, a conference entitled L’estensione dei titoli giurisdizionali del Regolamento Bruxelles Ibis ai convenuti non domiciliate nell’UE will be held at Palazzo Capris, Via Santa Maria 1 in Turin, Italy.

The conference will focus on the possibility of an extension of the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation to non EU-defendants. The topic has also been covered by the 3rd project of the EAPIL Young Research Network and the forthcoming book condensing the results of that project will in fact be presented during the conference.

The conference will be held – for the most part – in Italian.

All are welcome to attend the conference in person. Remote attendance is also possible: the link can be requested at ennio.piovesani@unito.it.

The full programme is available here.

Nikitas Hatzimihail (University of Cyprus) has published on SSRN an article titled Private International Law Matters involving Non-Recognized States: The View from Cyprus.

The abstract reads as follows:

This essay examines how private-law matters involving non-recognised States and territories under de facto administration from the post-Soviet space are dealt with in Cyprus – a jurisdiction of interest, whose approach is influenced by the existence of a Turkish-controlled de facto administration in its north. The chapter proposes a distinction between cases concerning the establishment of forum jurisdiction over a private party, cases which potentially involve the application of law, or legal actions, in or regarding, the contested space and cases in which the forum may be seen as called to acknowledge, explicitly or implicitly, the political entity itself. The article advocates an approach of principled pragmatism, which takes into account both the legitimate private interests and the political repercussions of any legal decision.

The article is to be published in Alexander Trunk et al (eds.), Legal Position of Non-Recognized States in the Post-Soviet Space under International Trade Law, Private International Law and International Civil Procedure, Springer Science: 2022.

A conference of the same title as the above-mentioned volume was organized in July 2018 in Bordesholm and Kiel. The programme and some of presentations may be downloaded from the website of the conference.

The 2023 special issue of the open-access journal Papers di diritto europeo collects the proceedings of the conference organized in the framework of the “Identities on the move. Documents cross borders – DxB” project (see this post).

Opened by a foreword by Maria Caterina Baruffi and Laura Calafà, the issue features the following papers.

Małgorzata Balwicka-Szczyrba, Anna Sylwestrzak and Dominik Damian Mielewczyk, Transcription of foreign civil status documents of children of same-sex parents in Polish law

In the Polish legal system marriage is a formal union of a man and a woman. Due to a different definition of marriage in some foreign legislations doubts arise as to the transcription of foreign civil status records in which spouses or same-sex parents are registered. Entry in the Polish register has far-reaching consequences, both public law and private law. Civil status records constitute the sole evidence of the events contained therein, and their incompatibility may be proven in court proceedings and sometimes by administrative action. Civil status records are intrinsically linked to personal and family law, and any refusal to transcribe them will have consequences in terms of the legal situation of the person concerned.
The study analyses the positions of jurisprudence and doctrine relating to the problem under examination. It was found that on the basis of applications for the transcription of birth certificates of children of same-sex parents, two disputable positions have developed in the jurisprudence. Public administration bodies and administrative courts generally refuse the transcription. However, 2018 marked a break in the previous line of rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court, which allowed for such a possibility. However, the reasoning raised in the justification of the court’s decision attracted widespread criticism, which resulted in the lack of consolidation of this view.
The research carried out into the problem of the transcription of foreign civil status documents of children of same-sex parents under Polish law has shown that the Polish legal system is not adapted to the transcription of foreign civil status documents of children of same-sex parents.
In conclusion, it should be stated that in view of the noticeable conflict between the fundamental principles of the Polish legal system (including the public order clause) and the rights of the child (including personal rights), the lack of the possibility of making transcriptions of foreign civil status documents of children of same-sex parents unduly violates the principle of the welfare of the child. In particular, it results in a far-reaching diminution of the rights of the child, i.a. due to the impossibility of obtaining an identity card. This state of affairs requires urgent intervention either through a change in the direction of interpretation of the existing provisions of the Act on Civil Status Records, or through amendments to this Act.

Matteo Caldironi, The circulation of the child’s legal status in Italy: open issues

The essay aims to deepen the theme of the circulation of the legal status of minors, with reference to those conceived using ART (artificial reproductive technologies). It will focus on the prejudice to the rights of minors and the downgrading of their status caused by the lack of homogeneous recognition of the phenomena of social parenthood in EU countries. The analysis will start with two pronouncements of the Italian Constitutional Court (nos. 32 and 33 of 2021) that have dealt with the recognition of the parental relationship with the intentional parents in two cases of ART carried out abroad, where the practices are prohibited in our country. The first case involved the practice of heterologous fertilization carried out by a female couple and the second involved surrogacy. Among the many issues addressed, it is particularly interesting that it was found impossible to recognize the foreign provision of the filiation relationship due to the existence of public order obstacles presented by the criminal prohibition of surrogacy in Italy. However, also due to the lack of other adequate instruments of recognition under domestic law, the Court finds a void of protection that, even if «intolerable», must be resolved by the national legislator. In other words, the Constitutional judge notes that the «best interest of the child» cannot be automatically prejudiced by the other interests at stake, but the most appropriate balance is left to the exercise of legislative discretion.
It will then be shown how an attempt has been made at a European level to respond to the same problems. In its recent judgment (14 December 2021) the Court of Justice ruled that Member States (MS) are required to recognize the filiation relationship with both parents (even if the parental relationship with the intended parent is not recognized by the MS) at least to allow the child to exercise, together with each of their two parents, their right to free movement. On the other hand, both parents must have a document authorizing them to travel with that child. Indeed, while it is true that the status of persons falls within the competence of the MS, they are free to provide or not, in their national law, for same-sex marriage and social parenthood. However, in exercising this competence, each Member State must respect Union law and the provisions of the Treaty relating to freedom of movement and residence for citizens of the Union, recognizing, to this end, the status of persons established in another Member State in accordance with the law of that State.
In conclusion, the paper will show how Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 can eventually hypothesize an alternative instrument such as common European civil status framework to recognize a «unique» legal status that thus best protects the best interest of the child in a broader context.

Cristina Campiglio, «Recognition» of civil status records in the aftermath of Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 on public documents: a new functional identity for EU citizens

Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 sets the objective of ensuring the free movement of persons through the free circulation of public documents establishing «facts» standing for legally defined and relevant situations (name, marriage, parenthood, etc.). As the aim of this Regulation «is not to change the substantive law of the Member States», the interpreter is confronted with notions whose meaning is liable to vary from State to State. The lack of harmonization of the notions of «marriage» and «parenthood», in particular, re-proposes the characterization problems already encountered with regard to the EU Citizens’ Free Movement Directive 2004/38/EC, which includes spouses and direct descendants among the family members, although without providing a definition. Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 is expressly not intended to apply «to the recognition in a Member State of legal effects relating to the content of public documents issued by the authorities of another Member State» (Art. 2(4)). In other words, the document certifying the existence of a marriage or parenthood guarantees the spouse or parent/child of an EU citizen free movement to another Member State, regardless of whether the marriage or parenthood at issue may be recognised in that State. In line with the Regulation,in the 2018 Coman judgmentthe Court of Justice – applying the principle of mutual recognition – stated that, in the name of the right to free movement, a Member State cannot refuse the EU citizen’s same-sex spouse a right of residence on the ground that the law of that Member State does not provide for marriage between persons of the same sex. Given the limited effects of the recognition of this marriage, the Court has found no evidence of an attack on national identity (Art. 4(2) TEU) and consequently of a threat to public order of the Member State concerned. The same conclusion has been reached by the Court of Justice in the 2021 Pancharevo case, regarding a child born through medically assisted procreation. Birth certificates drawn up in a Member State shall be recognized by the other Member States as part of the exercise of the rights under Art. 21 TFEU. On the contrary, there is no obligation for other Member States to recognize that filiation relationship for other purposes, since respect for national identity (and public policy) may be invoked in this regard. In summary, the recognition of personal status appears now to be heading towards a double track: with no control for the sole purpose of enabling such persons to exercise the rights they enjoy under EU law, and still subject to the traditional limit of public policy for the purpose of exercising the rights conferred under national law. As a consequence, the same person may be considered married or parent for the purposes of circulation within the EU, while unmarried or not parent for civil purposes. Beyond practical utility, the compatibility of such a split personal identity – one merely functional to circulation, while the other one to its full extent – with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights principles may be called into question.

Mădălina Cocoșatu and Claudia Elena Marinică, Case law of the European Court of Justice on free movement of persons and public documents: focus on Romania

Free movement of persons in the European Union, a foundation of European Union citizenship which implies an increase in the movement and cross-border nature of public documents, is a topic that has become part of the discussions in the European Union and in the member states in recent years, that are known for their commitment to help regulate a regional order regarding the mobility of citizens in an area without borders. It was therefore not at all surprising that Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 on the promotion of free movement of citizens was adopted and entered into force by simplifying the requirements for the presentation of certain public documents in the EU, as a facilitator and accelerator factor for enforcing cross-border free movement, so that now, five years after its adoption, its effects are increasingly visible.
The purpose of this article is to encourage the analysis and reflection at the level of the European Union and at national level (in Romania) on a series of challenges determined by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which seeks to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as all other legislative acts in force. Such an approach cannot be taken out of the context of public and private international law applicable in this field and of treaties, conventions or agreements to which Member States are a part of, in particular the Convention concerning the abolishing of the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents, signed in The Hague on 5 October 1961 (Apostille Convention) regarding public documents and their authenticity but it should only be regarded as a supplement.
The article will focus on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union related to the scope of Regulation (EU) 2016/1191, in cases concerning citizenship and a number of family law issues that have a direct impact on public documents and the free movement of persons, without bringing prejudice to the national identity or public policy of the Member States. The analysis mainly concerns the different legislative regulations of the Member States and how to use their common points that should follow the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/1191, for the most efficient free movement of persons and public documents in order to ensure the predictability of EU freedoms in cases with a cross-border impact. The conclusions drawn from this analysis emphasize the need for collaboration between theoretical and practical aspects, taking into account the considerable impact on the authenticity, recognition and legal security of these documents that are meant to create the facilitation of free movement in the European Union, while respecting EU law and the material law of the Member States.

Ester di Napoli, Giacomo Biagioni, Ornella Feraci, Renzo Calvigioni e Paolo Pasqualis, La circolazione dello status dei minori attraverso le «frontiere» d’Europa: intersezioni tra diritto dell’Unione e diritto internazionale privato alla luce della sentenza Pancharevo

The paper moves from the judgment issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Pancharevo case to reflect on the repercussions, in the context of the intra-EU circulation of the status of children created abroad, on the level of substantive European Union Law, and of Private International Law, as well as in the practical perspective of those professionals, such as the registrar and notary, are closely engaged with the recognition of personal and family status, and its respective implications, in the requested Member State.

Marco Gerbaudo, Public documents on the move in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: uniformisation or free circulation?

The maintenance of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), introduced with the Amsterdam Treaty, is one of the main challenges of EU legislation on freedom of movement and external migration. An impressive body of legislation has been adopted to «achieve», «create», «maintain» and «develop» such an area. In 2016, Regulation 2016/1191 was added to the group. The simplification of the requirements for presenting certain public documents is indeed purposed to ease free movement and, consequently, maintain the AFSJ.
The circulation of public documents is an important issue also in the other pillar of the Area: external migration. Contrary to freedom of movement, migration from third countries is neither free nor communitarised, as Member States retain a great degree of discretion in regulating migration flows. At the same time, once entered the AFSJ, third-country nationals are entitled to a certain degree of intra-EU mobility. To better control and facilitate such mobility, the format of migration-related public documents, such as residence permits and visas, has been uniformised across the EU. These legal acts are expressively purposed to «establish progressively» an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
This paper aims to compare administrative cooperation on public documents in the field of free movement, on one side, and external migration and intra-EU mobility, on the other. Through the analysis of primary sources, Regulation 2016/1191 will be compared with Regulation 1030/2002 (uniform format for residence permits) and Regulation 1683/95 (uniform format for visas). Differences and similarities between uniform formats and multilingual standard forms will be assessed. Also, the respective provisions on anti-fraud and data collection on IT databases will be analysed.
The free circulation of public documents is an often overlooked yet critical component of the AFSJ. It is thanks to these practicalities that values such as freedom of movement and common policies as migration become (or not) a reality. Many elements of Regulation 2016/1191 are an advancement if compared to the provisions governing the uniformisation of visas and residence permits. However, if compared to the uniformisation process of migration-related documents, free circulation of EU public documents still maintains several flaws and imperfections.
KEYWORDS: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; civil status records; visa; residence permit; uniformisation; free circulation.

Marion Ho-Dac, Elsa Bernard, Susanne Lilian Gössl, Martina Melcher and Nicolas Nord, Reassessing Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 on public documents in the light of EU citizenship

The contribution aims to analyse the effects of cross-border circulation of public documents under EU law (i.e. mere circulation of the instrumentum, exclusive to any recognition of the negotium), following a twofold approach based on legal methodology (i.e. EU free movement law and private international law techniques) and legal policy (i.e. EU integration and functionalism).
The starting point of the analysis is the current contradiction/tension within the EU legal order between, on the one hand, the need to ensure the permanence of the personal status of individuals and families (such as family name, parentage or marital status) on the basis of EU citizenship (Arts. 18 to 21 TFEU) and, on the other hand, the limited scope and effects of the legal instruments in force in EU law, i.e. Regulation 2016/1191 on public documents, complemented by international conventions in force within all or some Member States, such as the HCCH Apostille Convention of 1961 and ICCS Convention (No 16).
In this context, the article proposes to explain this contradiction, to assess it and finally to submit legal ways to overcome it, while considering the restraints of political feasibility. It provides for a cross-cutting analysis of the (above-mentioned) legal frameworks, complemented by relevant case law of the CJEU, of the ECtHR and of national courts of the Member States, under this specific perspective.

Fabienne Jault-Seseke, Right to identity and undocumented migrants

In various cases, migrants have no documents or no valid documents. Their right to identity is therefore threatened. There are various solutions to combat this risk. On the one hand, the improvement of civil status services in countries of origin, namely through digitalization or biometric techniques, is to be explored. On the other, reconstitution of civil identity in transit and host countries should also be considered.

Eva Kaseva, The scope of Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 in the light of Bulgarian domestic law

This paper is focused on the Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 – Public Documents Regulation. In particular, it concerns the general characteristic of the Regulation, the conditions to be met in order to apply the Regulation, and its scope of application. The analysis addresses specifically the documents that can be issued in the Republic of Bulgaria under its domestic law to certify the facts included in the scope of Regulation under Art. 2(1)(a)-(m). It is indicated which national act settles each document and clarified which are the requirements to be issued.

Francesca Maoli, Civil status and circulation of public documents in EU and worldwide: the need for a European common framework for third countries

While the EU fosters and protects the right of free movement of its citizens, it is necessarily concerned by the reception of third-country nationals. Migration issues are among the EU competences in the area of freedom, security and justice. In both scenarios – i.e. intra-EU movements and immigration from outside the EU – there is a need to ensure the continuity of personal and family status: this represents a condition of effectiveness, as concerns the enjoyment of rights. With specific reference to third country nationals, the implementation of the European migration rules requires the resolution of civil status issues for which there is no common approach so far. However, the simplifications introduced by the EU Regulation 2016/1191 do not work for documents from third countries. The EU rules coexist with the fragmented (yet, in some cases, more advanced) regime contained in international conventions. However, this does not mean that the EU cannot have uniform rules to deal with such documents (compare with foreign judgments and the ratification of the 2019 Hague Convention). Common rules for public documents on civil status would reinforce the coherence of the EU migration law.
The need for a common legal framework is the focus of the present paper, which highlights the opportunity for the EU to act in synergy with the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the International Commission on Civil Status.

Guillermo Palao, Challenges to the codification of cross-border dimension of the digitalization of civil status records and registers

The increase of internationalisation and digitalisation are two essential elements deeply affecting the current activity of civil status registers. The incorporation of new technological tools in the management of civil status registers has proved to be highly beneficial, affecting also to their international dimension and the cross-border circulation of civil status records. As a result, an intense codification effort has taken place at the national, regional and international levels over the last few years, to promote the digitisation and the international circulation of civil status documents. The global challenges faced by this matter call for the need of supra-national responses, although the high level of complexity deriving from the plurality of codification venues and applicable legal sources, as well as the limited and fragmentary nature of the normative solutions contained in such instruments. Three are the main international codification venues whose normative results should be analysed from the perspective of the digitisation and the internationalisation of the activity of civil status registers: the HCCH, the ICCS/ CIEC and the EU. In this respect, despite of the undeniable efforts made in the different codification centres, it is advisable to reconsider the current model, with the aim of taking full advantage of the opportunities offered by ICTs and reducing the legal obstacles that the current situation generates in the international mobility of persons. Therefore, this would require, a deepening of dialogue and constructive cooperation between the different institutions involved in this area and to take advantage of the strengths offered by the various codification initiatives.
KEYWORDS: Civil status registers; digital civil status records; cross-border circulation of public documents; private international law; Hague Conference on Private International Law; International Commission on Civil Status; European Union.

Stefania Pia Perrino, «If you are a parent in one country, you are a parent in every country»: is it true for social parenthood?

Parenthood is the legal relationship between a child and the child’s parents and recently EU citizens are establishing this relationship through consent or intended parent agreements, without any genetic link. The new concept is known in case law as social parenthood and can be traced in different scenarios: same sex couples’ adoption; artificial reproduction; surrogacy; post mortem fertilization.
The paper will investigate if the lack of a common notion of social parenthood can constitute an obstacle for the free movement of citizens and analyze the recent case Pancharevo of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Marco Poli, Quo vadis mater? Motherhood, freedom of movement, and the circulation of documents

Building on the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgment on the case C-490/20, V.M.A. v. Stolichna obshtina, rayon Pancharevo, this paper considers the circulation of birth certificates under Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 investigating its effects on the legal notion of motherhood.
Developing reproductive technology and social changes impacted differently on the EU Member States’ national law on parentage and motherhood. In this sense, as seen in the aforementioned CJEU judgment, some legal scenarios, such as the Bulgarian one, recognise the legal effects of the sole biological tie between the child and their mother, clinging on to a monist notion of mother. Differently, other national laws opened up to a pluralist concept of motherhood: indeed, in addition to childbirth, intent gives rise to the legal status of mother. For example, under Spanish law, both the woman who delivered the baby and the female social parent are recognised the status of mother. In such a diverse lawscape, free movement and respect for human rights have made motherhood accessible to a wider group of people. What happens then when a monist legal system deals with a birth certificate issued for one of its citizens by another Member State recognizing intent-based motherhood? Answering this question will help us get closer to understanding quo vadis mater?.
In order to do so, this paper primarily explores whether the circulation of birth certificates implies circulation of status as well. As explicitly stated in Recital 18, the aim of Regulation 2016/1191 is not to change substantive law relating to parenthood. Furthermore, the same recital provides that the Regulation should not affect the recognition in one Member State of legal effects relating to the content of a public document issued in another Member State. Secondly, the paper aims at investigating to what extent, if any, the circulation of public documents under Regulation 2016/1191 makes a contribution to the shaping the legal notion of motherhood. Despite the EU Court of Justice’s use of gender-neutral language concerning parentage (i.e., parents, instead of mothers), this work aims at exploring the impact of legal developments concerning the circulation of birth certificates on motherhood.

Irena Ryšánková, Die Verordnung im Vergleich zu den Übereinkommen der CIEC und anderen relevanten internationalen Übereinkommen (z.B. Haager Apostille-Übereinkommen (1961))

The present article gives a brief overview of how cross-border movement of public documents is regulated in different instruments of International and European Civil Procedure. After explaining the role of legalisation, it then focuses on the Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 and compares its dispositions with the 1961 Hague Convention, the Convention of 25 May 1987 abolishing the legalisation of documents in the Member States of the European Union and some relevant conventions of the ICCS.

Brody Warren and Nicole Sims, The changing nature of trust: the Apostille Convention, digital public documents, and the chain of authentication

The Convention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents (Apostille Convention) was developed in response to an increasing number of public documents circulating around the world and forged a new path in the authentication of foreign public documents. At its core, the Convention established a simplified mechanism by which contracting parties could trust that the documents they were receiving were authentic. The essence of this solution was the Apostille certificate and the authorities designated as competent for its issuance.
More recently, the European Union (EU) has attempted to further simplify the circulation of public documents between its member states, most notably through Regulation (EU) 2016/1191. While the Regulation relies on the inherent trust between EU Member States to better the approach used by the Convention, its goal is the same: to abolish the authentication requirements for presenting public documents abroad.
Over sixty years on from the adoption of the Apostille Convention, public documents are increasingly executed in digital rather than paper form. This rapidly evolving technological landscape inspired the establishment of the electronic Apostille Programme (e-APP), to promote and encourage the digitalisation of the Apostille process. In comparison, the Regulation has not needed any special programme or initiative to operate in a digital context, as it was developed with the realities of digital public documents in mind.
As the digital transition intensifies, both the Convention and the Regulation face similar challenges in overcoming the hesitation of authorities and individuals with respect to digital public documents. However, as governments and citizens become more comfortable with the technology, and more importantly the security underlying it, the Regulation may be able to reach its full potential and the issuance of Apostilles under the Convention may become entirely unnecessary.
Against this background, this paper considers how the pursuit of trust in the authentication process has shaped the development of the Apostille Convention. The authors also consider the EU Regulation, as it follows in the footsteps of an instrument 50 years its senior. With the digital environment in mind, the paper concludes that technology will eventually enable ultimate trust in the authentication of public documents.

Soriano v Forensic News LLC & Ors [2023] EWCA Civ 223 deals with the discipline an English court should hand out to defendants trying to use foreign proceedings and their discovery rules, to assist them in the defence of a claim (here a libel claim) in England and Wales. (Defendants’ attempt at dismissing jurisdiction had earlier failed).

In a joint and fairly succinct opinion, Voss MR, Carr LJ and Warby LJ dismiss the contention that the defendants should be served with an anti-suit injunction (also refused at first instance by Murray J a mere 20 days back; this was a most swift appeal) to restrain them from continuing US proceedings. These had been initiated in the District Court for the Southern District of New York (the DCSDNY) on 6 December 2022. Defendants seek an order there requiring HSBC USA to produce two very broad categories of banking documents relating to Mr Soriano’s companies. Defendants here, claimants in the US, rely in 28 USC §1782 (a so-called 1782 application) allowing a US court to provide assistance to an applicant in gathering evidence in support of legal proceedings in a foreign court. It provides that: “[t]he district court … may order [a person] to … produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign … tribunal”, and “[t]he order may be made … upon the application of any interested person”.

The Court of Appeal relied like the judge on the grounds per South Carolina Insurance Co v. Assurantie Maatschappij “De Zeven Provincien” NV [1987] 1 AC 24 to find that defendants were not guilty  of “conduct which [was] oppressive or vexatious or which [interfered] with the due process of the court” in seeking the US order.

In essence, the Court supports the lawful exercise of evidence gathering and does not easily decide that use of foreign proceeding for same be considered oppressive.

Geert.

Discovery forum shopping
Important, lightning fast unsuccessful appeal on approach to defendants using foreign courts to gather evidence to support their defence to litigation in E&W
No abuse found

Soriano v Forensic News & Ors [2023] EWCA Civ 223https://t.co/gq9nmzmf2H

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 1, 2023

The fourth issue of 2022 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:

Christian Kohler, Honorary Professor at the University of Saarland, Private International Law Aspects of the European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on SLAPPs (‘Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation’)

The Commission’s proposal for a Directive on SLAPPs (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) aims at protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public debates from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings with cross-border implications. Inter alia, it protects SLAPP defendants against judgments from third countries that would have been considered manifestly unfounded or abusive if they had been brought before the courts or tribunals of the Member State where recognition or enforcement is sought, and allows SLAPP defendants to seek compensation of the damages and the costs of the third country-proceedings before the courts of the Member State of his or her domicile. This article examines the conflicts rules in question and discusses the broader private international law context of the proposed Directive, in particular the rules of jurisdiction and the mosaic approach of the CJEU for the interpretation of Article 7(2) of Regulation Brussels Ia. In order to limit the forum shopping potential of the present rules on jurisdiction and applicable law in defamation cases, an intervention by the EU legislature should be envisaged.

Pietro Franzina, Professor at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Il contenzioso civile transnazionale sulla corporate accountability (Cross-Border Civil Litigation on Corporate Accountability) [in Italian]

Civil proceedings are brought with increasing frequency against corporations for allegedly failing to prevent or mitigate the adverse impact of their activity on the protection of human rights and the environment. Most of these proceedings are initiated by non-governmental organisations whose activity consists in safeguarding or promoting the collective interests at issue, or otherwise benefit from support provided by such organisations. A cross-border element is almost invariably present in these proceedings, as they often involve persons from different countries and/or relate to facts which occurred in different States. Litigation in matters of corporate accountability is, distinctively, strategic in nature. The aim pursued by those bringing the claim does not consist, or at least does not only or primarily consist, in achieving the practical result that the proceedings in question are meant, as such, to provide, such as compensation for the prejudice suffered. Rather, the goal is to induce a change in the business model or industrial approach of the defendant (and, possibly, of other corporations in the same field or with similar characteristics) and increase the sustainability of their corporate activity at large. The paper gives an account of the factors that determine the impact of the described proceedings, that is, the ability of those proceedings to effectively prompt the pursued change. The analysis focuses, specifically, on the factors associated with the rules of private international law, chiefly the rules that enable the claimant to sue the defendant before the courts of one State instead of another. The purpose of the article is not to examine the latter rules in detail (actually, they vary to a large extent from one State to another), but to assess the strategic opportunities, in the sense explained above, that the rules in question may offer to the claimant, depending on their structure and mode of operation.

The following review and comments are also featured:

Lenka Válková, Researcher at the University of Milan, The Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the Recognition of Parenthood and Other Legislative Trends Affecting Legal Parenthood

The developments in science and changing family patterns have given rise to many problems, including those of non-recognition of parenthood, which affects mostly children of same-gender parents and children in cases of surrogacy. The basic drivers of the current difficulties in recognising parenthood lie in the differences of the national rules on the establishment and recognition of parenthood and the lack of the uniform conflict rules and rules on recognition of judgments in the area of parenthood. Despite the copious case law of CJEU and ECtHR, which plays a crucial role in allowing flexibility in law with regard to parenthood, there is still no legal instrument which provides for a clear framework seeking to outline a consistent and systematic approach in this area. In 2021 and 2022, three important legislative actions have been taken. The Parenthood Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions has been published on 7 December 2022. At the same time, the Final Report of the Experts Group on the Parentage/Surrogacy Project of the HCCH has been issued on 30 November 2022. Moreover, the Report on Review of the Implementation of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock has been prepared in November 2021 as a preliminary step to a possible future update of the substantive law provisions of the Convention. All regulatory initiatives are addressed in this article, with a special focus on the Parenthood Proposal. In particular, this article offers a first appraisal of the Parenthood Proposal in light of other two legislative efforts and examines whether the works on international level may eliminate the need for an action concerning recognition of parenthood at EU level.

Stefano Dominelli, Researcher at the University of Genoa, Emoji and Choice of Court Agreements: A Legal Appraisal of Evolutions in Language Methods through the Prism of Article 25 Brussels Ia Regulation

Starting from the consideration that emoji and the alike are becoming increasingly common in computer-based communication, this article transposes current debates in material law surrounding emoji and their aptitude to express intent into the field of choice of court agreement through the prism of Art 25 Brussels Ia Regulation. The aim of this article is to develop some hypotheses and methods for the assessment of emoji in the conclusion of choice of court agreements.

Michele Grassi, Research fellow at the University of Milan, Revocazione della sentenza civile per contrasto con la Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali (Revocation of a Civil Judgment for Conflict with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) [in Italian]

This article comments on the recent reform of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, with a specific focus on the introduction of the possibility to seek revocation of a civil judgment conflicting with a decision of the ECtHR. The possibility to re-open proceedings in breach of the ECHR was not contemplated by the previous rules applicable to the matter, and the Italian Constitutional Court had excluded that the obligation of Contracting States to conform to the judgments of the ECtHR could imply the need to review national res judicata in civil or administrative law matters. Against this background, this article examines the new mechanism of review of national decisions introduced by the recent reform, pointing out that such mechanism has been designed to apply in limited circumstances and that, consistently with the reparatory perspective adopted by the Italian Constitutional Court, it gives little to no consideration to the obligation of cessation of international wrongful acts consisting in violations of human rights protected by ECHR.

This issue also features an account by Silvia Favalli, Researcher at the University of Milan, Bellini c. Italia: Il Comitato ONU sui diritti delle persone con disabilità si pronuncia sulla situazione dei caregiver familiari in Italia (Bellini v. Italy: The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on the Situation of Family Caregivers in Italy) [in Italian].

Finally, this issue features the following book review by Francesca C. Villata, Professor at the University of Milan: Louise MERRETT, Employment Contracts in Private International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2nd ed., 2022) pp. XXXII-329.

The wide (even if not absolute: see Handbook 2.162 ff) catchment area of Article 24(1) Brussels Ia in the specific context of tenancies is contested, so much so that when the Brussels I Regulation was being revised, the Commission proposed to widen the existing, narrow exception for short-time holiday lets, to rental agreements concerning tenancies of premises for professional use. However it was not followed by Council or Parliament.

Despite this established application of A24(1), the appeal judges in X v Y  ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2023:306 (seriously why the need for anonymity) question its applicability to a claim in rent arrears with the rental agreement concluded by the tenant so as to let the rooms professionally. Parties have agreed choice of court and law for The Netherlands, despite the property being located in Austria (the judge tries to keep even that from public eyes yet it is given away in 3.10). The judges 3.10 mistakenly nota bene assume that non-exlusively expressed choice of court, is indeed non-exclusive (A25 BIa says otherwise).  The judge equally wrongly suggests that a claim for arrears without claims viz for instance enjoyment of the property, obligations vis-a-vis the neighbours etc., is not caught by A24(1).

Should anyone think CJEU C-73/77 Sanders v Van der Putte comes to the rescue, they are wrong. I know the CJEU itself sloppily summarised that  case [13] in C-280/90 Hacker as meaning that A24(1) ‘did not apply to a contract which concerned the operation of a business’. In reality, in Sanders the CJEU concluded that A24(1) was not engaged due to the claim relating to the lease by lessor to lessee of a usufruct on a retail business, with lessor itself renting the property from a third party (that was not involved in the proceedings): that claim simply did not relate to a ‘tenancy’ between parties.

The Dutch courts clearly do not have jurisdiction and whichever party in the Dutch proceedings has an interest in that being confirmed, should say so.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.174 ff.

First instance Amsterdam postponing decision on A24(1) BIa 'tenancy' jurisdiction
Landlord domiciled in NL, tenants in DE, house in AT
Claim for late rent and related penalties
Court minded to uphold choice of court for NL courtshttps://t.co/iGRAYzz3Cw

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 14, 2023

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:

(These abstracts can also be found at the IPRax-website under the following link: https://www.iprax.de/en/contents/)

H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner: Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2022: Bewegung im internationalen Familienrecht

This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters from January 2022 until December 2022. It presents newly adopted legal instruments and summarizes current projects that are making their way through the EU legislative process. It also refers to the laws enacted at the national level in Germany as a result of new European instruments. Furthermore, the authors look at areas of law where the EU has made use of its external competence. They discuss both important decisions and pending cases before the CJEU as well as important decisions from German courts pertaining to the subject matter of the article. In addition, the article also looks at current projects and the latest developments at the Hague Conference of Private International Law.

N. Elsner/H. Deters: Of party requested service by post and courts as transmitting agencies under the EU Service Regulation

On 1 July 2022, the EU Regulation on the Service of Documents No. 1784/20 (Recast) (EU Service Regulation) took effect and changed the law on service by postal services in cross-border proceedings. This calls for a revisiting of the divergent opinions and ways of interpretation of service by postal services according to Art. 14 EU Service Regulation 2007 and its relation to Art. 15 EU Service Regulation 2007. Against this background, this article discusses a decision of the Higher Regional Court Frankfurt (OLG Frankfurt) holding that service by postal services pursuant to Art. 14 EU Service Regulation 2007 is in principle only open to a court when effecting service in cross-border proceedings. A party shall effect service according to Art. 15 EU Service Regulation 2007 by contacting directly the foreign authorities designated to effect service in the other member state.

Firstly, the reasoning of the court and the opinions in legal scholarship on the admissibility of service by postal services effected by parties are assessed critically. Subsequently, the authors propose a different application of Art. 14 and 15 EU Service Regulation 2007 in Germany. It will be argued that the OLG Frankfurt was indeed correct in stating that service by postal services must be effected through a transmitting agency according to Art. 2 EU Service Regulation 2007. Under German law, only courts are considered transmitting agencies. However, this does not preclude parties from effecting this type of service. When parties are required to effect service themselves under German law, they may send the documents to the court, inform the court of the address of the other party and apply for service in accordance with Art. 14 EU Service Regulation 2007. The court then acts as a mere transmitting agency on behalf of the party, and thus, in its administrative capacity.

S. Schwemmer: Direct tort claims of the creditors of an insolvent company against the foreign grandparent company

In its ruling of 10 March 2022 (Case C-498/20 – ZK ./. BMA Nederland), the ECJ had to deal with a so-called Peeters/Gatzen-claim under Dutch law brought by the insolvency administrator. The court had already ruled in an earlier judgement that these claims fall under the Brussels I Regulation (recast). So the main question was now where the harmful event occurred within the meaning of Art. 7 para. 2 of the Regulation. The ECJ opts for the seat of the insolvent company, basing its analysis on the differentiation between primary damage and consequential damage. The same analysis is also used to determine the applicable law under the Rome II Regulation. In this context, however, the ECJ examines more closely the specific breach of duty of care to determine whether the claim falls under the scope of the Rome II Regulation or under the rules of international company law.

A. Kronenberg: Disapproved overriding mandatory provisions and factual impossibility

Two years after the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht, OLG) of Frankfurt am Main, the OLG Munich also had to rule on a lawsuit filed by an Israeli against Kuwait Airways. The plaintiff had demanded to be flown from Munich to Sri Lanka with a stopover in Kuwait City in accordance with the contract the parties had concluded. The OLG Munich dismissed the claim with regard to a Kuwaiti Israel boycott law, which, although inapplicable, according to the court had the effect that it was factually impossible for the defendant airline to transport Israeli nationals with a stopover in Kuwait. The ruling shows that in cases of substantive law level consideration of disapproved foreign overriding mandatory provisions the legally required result can be undesirable. However, this result depends on the circumstances of the individual case as well as on certain prerequisites that must be observed when taking into consideration overriding mandatory provisions. The article sets out these prerequisites and shows why the OLG Munich probably should have ordered the defendant to perform its obligation. It also explains why, in cases in which factual impossibility indeed exists, the result of the dismissal of the action most likely cannot be changed even by enacting a blocking statute.

C. Thomale/C. Lukas: The pseudo-foreign British one man-LLC

The Higher Regional Court of Munich has decided that a Bristish one man-LLC, which has its real seat in Germany, under German conflict of laws and substantive rules lacks legal personality altogether. This case note analyzes this decision’s implications for the conflict of company laws, notably for the interpretation of the TCA and application of the so-called “modified real seat theory”.

M. Brinkmann: Discharge in England and subsequent declaratory judgement against debtor in Germany – Binding effects of judgement trump recognition of prior bankruptcy proceedings

The Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf (OLG Düsseldorf) had to decide upon an action for the payment of damages based on a declaratory judgement. The declaratory judgement had established the defendant’s liability and was, at the time, not challenged by the defendant. In his defense against the action for payment the defendant now tries to invoke a discharge, which he had already obtained in insolvency proceedings in the UK in March 2012, i.e. prior to the declaratory judgement.

The OLG argued that under the applicable EIR, the English insolvency proceedings were, in principle, subject to automatic recognition. Under Art. 17 EIR 2002, these proceedings produce the same effects in all Member States. The OLG Düsseldorf nevertheless precluded the defendant from invoking the discharge. As the English bankruptcy proceedings were concluded before the action for the declaratory judgement was initiated, the defendant should have invoked the discharge already in the proceedings that led to the declaratory judgement in March 2013.

The OLG correctly found that the declaratory judgement was procedurally binding between the parties and hence barred the defendant from invoking the discharge in subsequent proceedings.

M. Andrae: Modification or suspension of enforcement of a decision under Article 12 of the Hague Child Abduction Convention?

The article discusses which procedural options exist if, after a final decision pursuant to 12 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, circumstances arise which would justify the refusal of an application for the return of the child. A procedure to change the decision is only permissible if the international jurisdiction of the German courts exists. For child abduction from EU Member States, this is determined in principle according to Art. 9 of the Regulation (EU) n 1111/2019 and for child abduction from other Contracting States of The Hague Protection of Children Convention according to Art. 7 of the Convention. As long as jurisdiction thereafter lies with the courts of the state in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention keep, the German courts are limited to ordering the temporary stay of enforcement.

J. Oster: Facebook dislikes: The taming of a data giant through private international data protection law

Just as the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) suffers from a deficit concerning both its public and its private enforcement. Among other things, this deficit is owed to the fact that European data protection law still raises many questions regarding jurisdiction and the applicable law. In its interlocutory judgment that will be discussed in this article, the Rechtbank Amsterdam established its jurisdiction and declared the GDPR as well as Dutch data protection and tort law applicable to a lawsuit by the Dutch Data Protection Foundation for alleged violations of rules of data protection and unfair competition. This article agrees with the Rechtbank’s findings, but it also draws attention to weaknesses in its reasoning and to unresolved questions of European private international data protection law.

The new edition of the Commentary on the Brussels I bis Regulation, edited by Ulrich Magnus and the late Peter Mankowski, part of the European Commentaries on Private International Law series published by Otto Schmidt, has recently been released.

The list of authors includes Alfonso Luis Calvo Caravaca, Javier Carrascosa González, Gilles Cuniberti, Carlos Esplugues Mota, Richard G. Fentiman, Stephanie Francq, Thomas Garber, Mizuki Hashiguchi, Helmut Heiss, Xandra Ellen Kramer, Luís Pedro Rocha de Lima Pinheiro, Ulrich Magnus, Peter Mankowski, Louise Merrett, Horatia Muir Watt, Sarada Nateshan, Guillermo Palao Moreno, Ilaria Queirolo, Pippa Rogerson, Didimi Sturua, Paul Vlas and Patrick Wautelet.

See here for further information.