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On 24 February 2023, the Dutch Supreme court has ruled in the case Willemen Infra v Jura, ECLI:NL:HR:2023:313. The ruling clarifies the scope of the Dutch courts’ duty to apply the CISG (UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980) ex officio on appeal. The Dutch appellate courts shall not review of their own motion whether the first instance court had to apply the CISG to the dispute, if the question of governing law was not the subject of parties’ objections on appeal and thus got “beyond the parties’ dispute”.

Facts

The facts of this case related to a sale of gutters by a Dutch seller to a Belgian buyer. The gutters were to be used for the renovation of a runway at Zaventem airport. According to the seller’s general terms and conditions, the disputes were to be resolved before a Dutch court on the basis of Dutch law.

After the start of performance, the buyer had reasons to assume that that the seller was unable to timely supply the products of the required quality. The buyer refused to take all the purchased gutters.

Proceedings

The seller disagreed and claimed damages for the loss of profit caused by the breach of contract. In the proceedings, the buyer submitted a counterclaim, invoking partial avoidance of contract and, alternatively, nullity of contract due to vitiation of consent. The buyer submitted namely that it had concluded the contract based on misrepresentation relating to the products’ quality (the certificates which the products should have) and the delivery time.

The seller relied on both the CISG and Dutch law in its written submissions, including the statement the choice for Dutch law in the general terms and conditions should be interpreted as excluding the application of the CISG. During the oral hearing, both parties referred to Dutch law only (see on this the Conclusion of the Advocate General, at [3.4]). The first instance court ruled as follows in relation to applicable law: ‘According to the [seller], the contract is governed by Dutch law. (…) ‘The court contends that [the buyer] also relies on Dutch law in its arguments, and thus follows [the seller’s] reasoning. The court follows the parties in this and shall apply Dutch law.” (the formulation is quoted in Willemen Infra v Jura at [4.3.1], compare to Advisory Council’s Opinion nr 16). The court has then applied the Dutch civil code, not the CISG, to the dispute.

The seller appealed against the decision, but not against the applicable law. Nevertheless, the appellate court considered of its own motion, whether the contract was governed by the CISG. It ruled that the contract fell under the CISG’s scope; the Convention was directly applicable on the basis of article 1(1)(a) CISG, as both Belgium and the Netherlands are Contracting States to CISG. Furthermore, the parties to the dispute have not explicitly excluded the CISG’s application based on article 6. The appellate court has applied the CISG to the contractual claim, and Dutch law – to the claim relating to the vitiation of consent, as this matter falls outside the Convention’s scope. The buyer has labelled the application of the CISG ‘surprising’, because no claim in appeal targeted applicable law.

In cassation, the Dutch Supreme has ruled that applicable law was indeed “beyond the parties’ dispute” on appeal. Therefore, the appellate court was thus neither free to determine applicable law anew nor free apply CISG of its own motion (Willemen Infra v Jura at [2.1.2]- [3.1.6]).

CISG and procedural ordre public?

The ruling is logical from the point of view of civil procedure. Appellate review follows up on – and is limited by – the points invoked on appeal. Issues “beyond the parties’ dispute” are not reviewed, unless these issues fall under the rules of procedural ordre public, which the appellate courts must apply of their own motion. While there is no unanimously accepted definition of the Dutch procedural ordre public, the cassation claim explicitly suggested that ‘the CISG is not of ordre public’ (see Conclusion of the Advocate General, at [3.3.]). Whereas this element of the cassation claim has been satisfied, neither the Advocate General nor the Court have engaged with the discussion whether procedural ordre public does not cover the direct application (or applicability) of the Convention’s uniform substantive sales law, even if it would be confined to establishing whether the parties have opted-out the CISG based on its article 6.

On 13 April 2023, the University Paris Dauphine will host a conference on State Immunity from Enforcement (L’immunité d’exécution de l’Etat).

The conference will be divided in four parts. The first will discuss the interaction of the various sources of the immunity from enforcement. The second will discuss the influence of human rights and arbitration. The third part will be a round table offering comparative insights from England, Italy and Canada. Finally, the fourth part will discuss the scope of the immunity, with a panel composed of academics and a second panel composed of judges and practitioners.

Speakers will include Philippe Thery, Catherine Kessedjian, Louis Perreau Perreau-Saussine, Juliette Morel-Maroger, Sophie Lemaire, Arnaud De Nanteuil, Louis d’Avout, Duncan Fairgrieve, David Pavot, Mathias Audit, Jérôme Chacornac, Helene Tissandier, Etienne Farnoux, Renaud Salomon, Jérôme Ortscheidt, Guillaume Tapie,  Victor Grandaubert, Francoise Moneger, Gilles Cuniberti, Fabrizio Marrella and Jacques Alexandre Genet.

The full programme of the conference can be found here.

The conference will be held in the context of the 150th anniversary of the International Law Association.

Participation is free, but registration is compulsory.

As the Matrimonial Property Regimes Regulation and the Property Regimes of Registered Partnerships have celebrated their fourth anniversary of application recently (namely on 27 January 2023), it might be a good occasion to mention three publications devoted to them, all available in open access.

All three books are the product of the EU-funded project EU-Fam Pro.

The first book, edited by L. Ruggeri, A. Limantė and N. Pogorelčnik Vogrinc, is titled The EU Regulations on Matrimonial Property and Property of Registered Partnerships, and was published by Intersentia in 2022.

The book may be downloaded from the website of the publisher. Translations of the book into Lithuanian, Italian, Spanish, Slovenian and Croatian may be downloaded from the website of the project.

As the editors explain

This book presents an in-depth analysis of these instruments, revealing the substance of the provisions in the regulations and exploring their practical implications in EU family law by discussing questions that are closely related to matrimonial and partnership property regimes. The contributors also cover the relevant CJEU case law and, where available, the national case law of the EU countries. Case studies are used to interrogate the potentialities of these new instruments.

The second book was authored by L. Ruggeri and M.J. Cazorla González, and comes under the title Cross-Border Couples Property Regimes in Action Before Courts. Understanding the EU Regulations 1103 and 1104/2016 in Practice. It was published by Dykinson in 2022.

The book may be downloaded from the website of the publisher.

As stated in the foreword:

This book has the prime purpose of analysing practice through European and national case law from the entry into force of the Twin Regulations, adding hypothetical cases (…)

The objective of all the authors in this volume is to facilitate understanding of and the application of the Twin Regulations. For this purpose, the editors have divided the content into two parts.

In the first, several authors analyse general questions such as the determination of the habitual residence of cross-border partners (…), and four EU Court of Justice judgments (…). The second part considers the application of the Twin Regulations in some Member States, presenting the case law and case studies from selected countries participating in the enhanced cooperation.

Finally, the third book was edited by L. Ruggeri and R. Garetto and is titled European Family Property Relations Article by Article. Commentary on EU Regulations 1103 and 1104/2016. It was published in 2021 by Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane.

The book may be downloaded from the website of the publisher.

The blurb informs that:

This Commentary would offer a path to know and better understand article-by-article the two Regulations.

A team of law experts, among them lawyers, notaries and scholars, analyses through a synoptic view the text of each article of each Regulation. The authors focus on the new provisions as well as on the existing case law by the European Court of Justice and courts of the Member States

Singapore’s Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act 1921 (‘RECJA’) is based on the UK Administration of Justice Act 1920 and its Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 1959 (‘REFJA’) is based on the UK Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. In 2019, the government amended the REFJA in significant ways (previously detailed here), expanding its scope to include the registration of judgments from non-superior courts of gazetted countries, judicial settlements, non-money judgments and interlocutory judgments. At the same time, the RECJA was repealed from a date to be determined by the government.

That date has now (very nearly) arrived. The RECJA will be repealed on 1 March 2023. When the REFJA was amended in 2019, the intention at that time was to transfer over the countries gazetted under the RECJA gradually to the newly amended REFJA, with negotiations conducted on a country-by-country basis to determine what reciprocal arrangements would be suitable in each case. Only HK SAR has ever been gazetted under the REFJA. On 1 March 2023, it will be joined by Brunei Darussalam, Australia, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (see here). These countries were previously gazetted under the RECJA. An omission is the Windward Islands, which does not appear in the new list. The list now also includes all the States of India; previously the State of Jammu and Kashmir were excluded under the RECJA.

Of particular note, however, is that the terms of the reciprocal arrangements generally remain the same as under the RECJA. Only money judgments rendered by the superior courts of the gazetted countries which are final and conclusive between the parties can be registered under the REFJA. Clearly, the full promise of the REFJA – with its potential for a wider range of foreign judgments to be registered under its scope – will have to be realised another day.

The latest issue of the RabelsZ (Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht) has been published. As always, it contains a number of insightful articles, this time also many in English language. Here are the authors, titles and abstracts:

Holger Fleischer, Große Debatten im Gesellschaftsrecht: Fiktionstheorie versus Theorie der realen Verbandspersönlichkeit im internationalen Diskurs (Great Debates in Company Law: The International Discourse on Fiction Theory versus Real Entity Theory)

This article opens a new line of research on great debates in domestic and foreign company law. It uses as a touchstone the classical debate on the nature of legal personhood, which was moribund for a time but has recently experienced an unexpected renaissance. The article traces the scholarly fate of fiction theory and real entity theory over time and across jurisdictions. It describes the origins of both theories, explores the processes of their reception in foreign legal systems, and through selected case studies illustrates the areas in which both courts and doctrine to this day have continued to draw on their body of arguments.

Sabine Corneloup, Migrants in Transit or Under Temporary Protection – How Can Private International Law Deal with Provisional Presence?

An increasing number of migrants are provisionally present in the territory of a State other than their State of origin, be it because they are granted temporary protection until they can return to their country of origin or because migration policies– notably externalization measures– prevent them from accessing the territory of their State of destination. As a result, many migrants are stuck for months, if not years, in transit countries at the external borders of Europe before being able to resume their migratory route. Their provisional presence, which initially was meant to remain transitional and short-term, often becomes indefinite. In the meantime, life goes on: children are born, couples marry and divorce, parental child abductions take place, etc. How can private international law deal with these situations? The 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, which requires that the personal status of refugees be governed by the law of domicile or residence, does not provide an answer to all difficulties. The paper aims to explore PIL connecting factors, such as nationality, habitual residence, and mere presence, and assess their appropriateness for migrants on the move or under temporary protection.

Hannes Wais, Digitale Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzungen und anwendbares Recht (Digital Infringement of Personality Rights and the Applicable Law)

Under art. 4 para. 1 Rome II Regulation, the law applicable to torts is the law of the state in which the damage occurred. With respect to the violation of personality rights, however, art. 40 para. 1 EGBGB points to the law of the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred (sent. 1) or, should the victim so decide, the place where the damage occurred (sent. 2). This essay demonstrates that this approach entails an element of unequal treatment and is inconsistent with German substantive law, which tends to favour the tortfeasor over the victim in personality rights cases. These findings give reason to subject the German conflict-of-law rules regarding the infringement of personality rights (which almost exclusively take place online) to an expansive review. The article first discusses the exclusion of personality rights infringements in art. 1 para. 2 lit. g Rome II Regulation and the dormant reform initiative, followed by an analysis of the shortcomings of the solution laid down in art. 40 para. 1 EGBGB. Alternative approaches are subsequently discussed before concluding with a proposal de lege ferenda.

Zheng Sophia TANG, Smart Courts in Cross-Border Litigation

Smart courts use modern technology to improve the efficiency of trials, enabling the parties to access court proceedings from a distance. This advantage is particularly important in cross-border litigation, which is characterised by the cost and inconvenience for at least one party to take part in proceedings abroad. However, although technology can significantly improve procedural efficiency, legal obstacles make efficiency impossible to achieve. This article uses service of proceedings, collecting evidence and virtual hearing as examples to show how the current law, especially the old-fashioned concept of sovereignty, hampers the functioning of technology. In the age of technology, it is necessary to reconceptualise sovereignty. This article argues that private autonomy may be utilised to reshape sovereignty in cross-border litigation procedures and reconcile the conflict between sovereignty and technology.

The table of contents in German is available here.

Written by Georgia Antonopoulou (Birmingham Law School) & Xandra Kramer (Erasmus University/Utrecht University; research funded by an NWO Vici grant, www.euciviljustice.eu).

We are grateful to Nicolas Kyriakides (University of Nicosia) for providing us with very useful information.

The Novel Commercial Court and Admiralty Court in Cyprus

New courts geared to dealing with international commercial disputes have been established in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, as has also been reported in earlier blogposts in particular on Europe (see, among others, here and here). They have various distinctive features such as the focus on cross-border commercial disputes and the use of the English language as the language of court proceedings. It seems that Cyprus will soon be joining other European countries that have established such courts in recent years, including France, the Netherlands, and Germany.

In May 2022, the House of Representatives in Cyprus passed Law 69(I)/2022 on the Establishment and Operation of the Commercial Court and Admiralty Court. The law creates two new specialised courts, namely the Commercial Court and Admiralty Court, focusing on commercial and maritime law disputes respectively. The courts were planned to open their doors on 1 January 2023. However, the Supreme Court of Cyprus, which is responsible for administrative matters, requested an extension and the courts are expected to be operational in July 2023 (see here).

According to the preamble to this Law, the establishment of these specialised courts aims at expediting the resolution of disputes and improving the efficiency of the administration of justice. In addition, the Courts’ establishment is expected to enhance the competitiveness of Cyprus, attract foreign investment, and contribute to its overall economic development. Similar arguments have been put forward in other European countries, notably in the Netherlands (Kramer & Antonopoulou 2022).

The Cypriot Commercial Court shall have jurisdiction to determine at first instance any type of commercial dispute, provided that the amount in dispute or the value of the dispute exceeds 2,000,000 Euros. The law defines commercial disputes broadly and offers an indicative list of such disputes for which the court has jurisdiction. The Commercial Court shall also have jurisdiction over competition law disputes, intellectual property law disputes, and arbitration related matters irrespective of the value of the dispute. The Commercial Court shall have territorial jurisdiction over disputes that have arisen, in part or wholly in Cyprus, as well as over defendants residing in Cyprus. In cross-border disputes parties can agree on the court’s jurisdiction in a choice of court agreement. Typically, the Brussels I-bis Regulation would apply to determine the validity of such clause. At the request of at least one party and in the interest of justice, the court shall accept procedural documents in English and shall conduct hearings and publish judgements in English. The Commercial Court will consist of five judges drawn from the Cypriot judiciary based on their expertise in commercial law disputes and practices and their English language skills.

A Genuine International Commercial Court for Cyprus?

While the definition of an international commercial court is open to interpretation and there are different types of international commercial courts (Bookman 2020; Dimitropoulos 2022), the Commercial Court’s specialised focus on high-value commercial disputes as well as the option to litigate in English suggest that Cyprus has just added itself to the growing number of countries that have established an international commercial court in recent years (see also Kramer & Sorabji 2019). This possibility of English-language court proceedings is a key feature of these new courts. However, the degree to which this is possible differs per country. The Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC) uses English throughout the proceedings apart from cassation at the Supreme Court. Due to the lack of a relevant constitutional provision, the use of the English language in NCC court proceedings was made possible by including a new provision in the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. By contrast, the German Chambers for International Commercial Disputes and the Paris International Chambers limit the use of English in court to documentary evidence or oral submissions and on the basis of a lenient interpretation of existing rules. Cyprus is the first country in Europe that amended its constitution with a view to permitting the use of the English language in court proceedings. The new Article 4(3)(b) provides that the Commercial Court and the Admiralty Court as well as the higher courts ruling on appeals may allow the use of English in court including oral and written submissions, documentary evidence, witness statements and the pronouncement of judgements or orders. In addition, unlike other international commercial courts established as chambers or divisions within existing courts the Commercial Court in Cyprus is structured as a self-standing court. Its jurisdiction is not exclusively limited to cross-border disputes but extends to domestic disputes with territorial links to Cyprus. The court’s focus on both cross-border and domestic disputes might be explained by the objective to accelerate trials and increase the efficiency of public court proceedings especially with regard to disputes related to the financial crisis and its aftermath.

The Reasons for Creating the Cypriot Commercial Court

The establishment of international commercial courts in Europe and in Asia has been thus far mainly driven by access to justice and economic considerations. International commercial courts aim at improving commercial dispute resolution by offering litigating parties specialised, faster, and therefore better court proceedings. It has been also underpinned by the aim of improving the business climate, attracting foreign investment, and creating litigation business.

In line with these considerations, Law 68(I)/2022 reiterates the benefits of a specialised commercial court both for the Cypriot civil justice system and the economy. Despite these similarities between the reasons driving the worldwide proliferation of international commercial courts and the establishment of a commercial court in Cyprus, the Cypriot context is slightly different. The financial crisis suggests that the Cypriot international commercial court is also part of a broader array of measures aimed at meeting the particular dispute resolution demands following the crisis (see also Mouttotos 2020). The establishment of the Commercial Court in Cyprus therefore indicates that international commercial courts might no longer be seen as a luxury available to the few countries willing and able to participate in a global competition of courts, but also as an essential measure for countries aiming to recover from a financial crisis. Yet, whether specialised courts bring about direct economic benefits or if they only indirectly benefit national economies by signalling to foreign investors a well-functioning justice system remains open to debate (among others Farber 2002; Coyle 2012).

 

The American Society of International Law (ASIL) is looking for a Director of Programmes (responsible for the oversight of the Society’s Programs Department, including major conferences, educational programming, substantive Interest Group activities, international organization engagement, and international law career training) and a Director of Finance and Administration (leading all aspects of the Society’s financial and human resources operations and oversees its general administrative operations, in partnership with the Executive Director).

More information is available on their Career opportunities page.

This post to flag my analysis of SAS Saloni France v SAS Nexity Logement, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, 19ème chambre, 14 December 2022, over at Lexis Nexis arbitration. It is a rare application by a French court of first
instance, of the fairly recently introduced theory of unforeseeability (imprévision) in the context of the price spike in energy costs, transport and packaging as a result particularly of the Russian war in Ukraine.

Geert.

 

 

 

 

Harris ea v Environment Agency [2022] EWHC 2606 (Admin) I fear is another case I let slip on the blog. It is a judgment which discusses to right to an effective remedy following the earlier finding in Harris & Anor v Environment Agency [2022] EWHC 2264 (Admin) that the Agency’s allowing water extraction in three Sites of Special Scientific Interest was in breach of retained EU law, namely Article 6(2) Habitats Directive (measures designed to prevent the deterioration of habitats and species) and of the equally retained EU law precautionary principle.

The issue at stake in current case is the appropriate remedy, a classic challenge in judicial review cases in instances where the authorities have been found in breach of an obligation of effort rather than one of result. Those of us involved in climate litigation will appreciate the difficulty.

The Agency suggests the finding that there was a breach is enough of a remedy. Claimants disagree, seeking an order in the nature of [2018] EWHC 315 (Admin) which the Agency says must be distinguished on the grounds that the regulatory requirements relevant to that order, they argue, is more prescriptive.

Johnson J holds [7] that ‘the claimants have not just a presumptive common law right to a remedy, but also a statutory right’, given Article 19(1) TEU’s right to an effective remedy. A mandatory order that the Environment Agency must formulate a plan is issued [10], a plan which must be produced within 8 weeks [13]; that deadline has passed at the time of posting], disclose that plan to claimants [17] and with the precise formulation of the order [26] being

“The defendant shall, by 4pm on 7 December 2022, provide to the claimants details of the measures it intends to take to comply with its duties under Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive (“Art 6(2)”) in respect of The Broads Special Area of Conservation. The details shall include an indication as to the time by which the defendant intends to have completed those measures. It shall also include, so far as practicable, the scientific and technical basis for the defendant’s assessment of the measures that are necessary to comply with Art 6(2).”

More on the nature of the kind of orders judges may give to authorities is currently discussed in a wide range of environmental law, including climate law litigation. It is an interesting application of the nature of judicial review and trias politica..

Geert.

Monash University, Law 5478 Strategic and Public Interest Litigation.

Remedy under common law when public authority has been found to have acted illegally
A6(2) EU Habitats law, water extraction
Agency ordered to produce plan & its legal, science basis, within 8 weeks

Harris ea v Environment Agency [2022] EWHC 2606 (Admin)https://t.co/6OKSKh7caJ pic.twitter.com/SKjEnpnQF0

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 19, 2022

A bit of a late follow-up to a 1 November Tweet but hey ho, I have been a tad busy and it is nevertheless good to still have the post up.

East-West Logistics Llp v Melars Group Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 1419 is a good reminder of the importance of ascertainability by third parties for determination of a corporation’s Centre of Main Interests – COMI. The appeal against Miles J’s finding in [2021] EWHC 1523 (Ch) was rejected and Malta as place of COMI confirmed.

The Company was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands -BVI and entered into a charterparty with the Petitioner in December 2011 for a shipment to Turkmenistan. The address of the Company in the charterparty was stated to be in the BVI. The charterparty contained a clause providing for disputes to be resolved by arbitration in London under English law. Following a disputed shipment, the Petitioner tried to but failed to launch LCIA arbitration (the tribunal holding it did not have jurisdiction), followed by successful proceedings in BVI resulting in a judgment in default against the company, which the latter later managed to have set aside. Without notifying the Petitioner, the Company had in the meantime moved its place of incorporation, and hence its registered office, to Malta.

On 19 July 2016 the Petitioner then presented a winding up petition in London based upon its BVI judgment debt. The Petition alleged that COMI of the Company was in the UK, citing pro UK as COMI [11] (prima facie rather flimsily) that i) the six commercial contracts concluded by the Company of which the Petitioner was aware (including its own charterparty) were in the English language, were governed by English law and had arbitration clauses providing for arbitration in London; and ii) the Company participated in the LCIA arbitration in London and was represented by a London firm (or firms) of solicitors. Against Malta as COMI, it suggested i) the Company did not actually have an office there, its registered office address being that of a Cypriot law firm providing company administration services; ii) the Company did not have any employees or conduct any business in Malta; iii) the Company’s sole director was a nominee who was a Swiss national, resident in South Africa; and iv) the Company’s sole shareholder and principals were Russian.

Baister J made a winding-up order, citing [20] the forum shopping background and the corporation not much being involved in physical, rather virtual trade, deciding ‘ by a narrow margin and with misgivings, that on balance the greater use of English law for contracts, the greater use of London as a seat of arbitration, the actual recourse to or forced involvement in legal proceedings here and the consequential use of English lawyers makes the UK, on the balance of probabilities, the main centre of those interests. The company’s affairs seem to have been conducted in this country more than in Switzerland [SW plays a role because of a Swiss national, GAVC],  certainly as far as contractual and litigation interests were concerned, although it is, I accept, hard to be precise.”

That judgment was overruled on appeal, with Miles J concluding ‘that Judge Baister had erred in principle in three ways in his approach to the determination of the Company’s COMI. The first was in relation to the importance of the presumption in Article 3(1), the second was in relation to the concept of ascertainability, and the third was in failing to distinguish between matters of administration of the company’s interests and matters going to the operation of its business.’

Upon further appeal, Lewison LJ agreed with Miles J. [46] ‘lack of evidence that the debtor actually carries out any activities at the place of its registered office does not allow the court to ignore or disregard the legal presumption under Article 3(1).’

He is right! [47] ‘The court must be alert to detect fraudulent or abusive forum shopping by purported changes of COMI by a debtor’ however ‘the question in such cases is whether the move of COMI is real or illusory. It is not whether the move of the debtor’s registered office is real or illusory.’

[63] “the court should not invent a hypothetical “typical” third party creditor with “average” or “normal” characteristics, and form a view on what might (or might not) have been apparent to that creditor in the course of a notional dealing by him with the company. Neither the EU Regulation nor the jurisprudence of the CJEU refer to the concept of a “typical” creditor, but refer instead, and more generically, to “creditors” or “third parties”.”

[80] “none of the factors relied upon by the Petitioner were, individually or collectively, sufficient to establish that the Company actually conducted the administration of its interests on a regular basis in England (or any other particular location) so as to displace the presumption in favour of Malta under Article 3(1).”

One’s intuition in a case like this may be not to have much sympathy for a corporation engaging in COMI /seat forum shopping. However that intuition is not reflected in the Regulation’s presumptive treatment of incorporation as COMI.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 5.6.1.

Centre of main interests determination under EU #Insolvency Regulation 2015/848
Unsuccessful appeal against confirmation of COMI as Malta, not E&W
Discussion of 'third party ascertainability'

East-West Logistics Llp v Melars Group Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 1419https://t.co/CZhTRhtybC

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 1, 2022

This is the and final part of a post collectively written by Marion Ho-Dac and Matthias Lehmann. Part one is found here.

The previous post has underlined the DSA’s indifference to PIL. In this post, we will take the example of “illegal content” to illustrate the need for a conflict-of-laws approach.

DSA Regulation of Illegal Content and Conflicts of Laws

The DSA obliges intermediaries to inform the authorities of any effect given to their orders regarding illegal content “on the basis of the applicable Union law or national law in compliance with Union law” (Article 9(1) DSA). This formulation echoes the very definition of illegal content described as “any information … that is not in compliance with Union law or the law of any Member State which is in compliance with Union law” (Article 3 (h) DSA). The Act avoids the – quite arduous – problem how the applicable law shall be identified.  And, more broadly, it demonstrates its indifference to the mere distinction between public and private law issues, by stating that the characterisation of the illegality of the said contents, at the origin of the orders, is based on the applicable law regardless of “the precise nature or subject matter … of the law in question” (Recital 12 in fine DSA).

The same pattern reoccurs with regard to the intermediaries’ obligation to inform the authorities about individual recipients of their services (Article 10(1) DSA). The DSA simply assumes that orders requiring such information will be issued “on the basis of the applicable Union law or national law in compliance with Union law”, without detailing which national law actually is governing.

At the bottom of this method is the assumption that Union law or the national law will identify itself as applicable. Thereby, legal unilateralism is not only embraced, but also reinforced because orders based on unilateralist Union law or national law are strengthened. There are little limits the Act poses on national authorities, except that the territorial scope of their orders must be in compliance with Union law, including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and – “where relevant” – general principles of international law and the principle of proportionality (see Article 9(2)(b) DSA). Interestingly, Recital 36 makes the (exceptional) extraterritoriality of the orders mainly conditional upon the EU legal basis of the illegality of the content, or requires “the interests of international comity” to be taken into account.

The problem with such unilateralism “set in stone” is that it does not overcome conflicts of laws, but exacerbates them. The law of the Member State having the strictest rules with the widest scope of application will be given preference over those who take a more liberal, balanced or nuanced approach.

Additionally, this ‘regulatory competition’ effectively suspends the country-of-origin principle laid down in Article 3(1) e-commerce Directive, which gives exclusive competence to the Member State in which the service provider addressed is established (see Recital 38 DSA). The orders regarding illegal content can be issued by the authorities of any Member State. This can be justified by Article 3(4), though, which provides a public policy exception.

The DSA’s Reason for Indifference to PIL

The reason why this road was taken is, quite obviously, the difficulties to overcome the entrenched divergences between national laws with overlapping scope. For this reason, the EU legislator decided to pass over this problem and place its rules on a different level. Conflicts of laws will be managed, not solved. This is in line with the “procedure over substance” philosophy of the Act, which has been criticised by others.

True, the illegality of internet content is often patently obvious, making the search for the applicable law a redundant exercise. Child pornography, hate speech, details of crimes or private photos do not justify long legal analysis. The DSA calls this “manifestly illegal content” and allows particularly strict measures in their regard, such as the suspension of services to their senders (Article 23(1) DSA). Still, the issue of legality or illegality may not always be so obvious, for instance when it comes to copyright infringements, the offering of accommodation services or the sale of live animals (examples taken from Recital 12), which is regulated quite differently in the Member States, not to speak of betting and gaming or the clash between privacy rights and free speech/freedom of the press that is resolved differently in different countries.

The Limits of Conflicts of Laws

In these instances, and in many others, it would have been preferable to have clear-cut rules that allow to identify the applicable rules. However, and from a more operational perspective, common substantive rules, rather than bilateral conflict-of-laws rules, should have been adopted where Union law is silent on what is illegal content. This would help to preserve individual freedom and to avoid contradicting orders between different Member States. In the absence of a political agreement between Member States on this question, the DSA opts instead for cooperation between regulators, especially the “Digital Services Coordinators” of the various Member State. However, without any clear guidance on whose laws governs, they may lack the means to solve these disputes in a matter that is legally certain, foreseeable and compatible with fundamental rights.

Moreover, the European digital environment will remain fragmented and there may be a risk that “illegal content havens” emerge (in the same way as tax havens in corporate matters). On the one hand, it can be expected that non-EU-based online platforms will choose a legal representative established in a Member State (Article 13 DSA) that is liberal in matters such as freedom of expression and privacy issues. On the other hand, one can imagine these platforms to strategically and systematically invoke their European “law of origin” (i.e. that of the Member State of establishment of their legal representative) in application of the internal market clause of the e-commerce Directive in the event of a civil liability action brought against them. Eventually, it will be for the national court of the Member States to navigate within this regulatory maze, with the sole help of the CJEU.

We guess national judges would rather favour their own law. Indeed, the law of the forum has several reasons to apply here, i.e. as the law governing the illegality of the content, the law of the place where the damages occurred and, more broadly, the law of the place of “use” of the content. This will reinforce the unilateralist tendencies that characterises the whole Act.

The first issue of Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly for 2023 was just published today. It contains the following articles, case notes and book review on private international law:

S Matos, “Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Escalating Dispute Resolution Agreements”

M Phua and M Chan, “The Law Governing whether an Arbitration Agreement binds a Non-party”

Lord Hodge, “The Rule of Law, the Courts and the British Economy”

Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Vos MR, “The Economic Value of English Law in Relation to DLT and Digital Assets” 

Adrian Briggs KC, Life and Cases: Manuscript of an Autobiography. Frederick Alexander Mann, edited by Wolfgang Ernst. V&R unipress; Bonn University Press (2021) xvi and 230pp. plus 1 p. Bibliography. Hardback £36.99.

A couple of weeks ago, I had the pleasure of speaking about the scope of application of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA), which together have been labelled the ‘European constitution for the internet’, at an event at the University of Strasbourg, organized by Etienne Farnoux and Delphine Porcheron. The preprint of my paper, forthcoming at Dalloz IP/IT, can be found on SSRN.

Disappointingly, both instruments only describe their territorial scope of application through a unilateral conflicts rule (following a strict ‘marketplace’ approach; see Art. 2(1) DSA and Art. 1(2) DMA), but neither of them contains any wider conflicts provision. This is despite the many problems of private international law that it raises, e.g. when referring to ‘illegal’ content in Art. 16 DSA, which unavoidably requires a look at the applicable law(s) in order to establish this illegality. I have tried to illustrate some of these problems in the paper linked above and Marion Ho-Dac & Matthias Lehmann have also mentioned some more over at the EAPIL Blog.

Unfortunately, though, this reliance on unilateral conflicts rules that merely define the scope of application of a given instrument but otherwise defer to the general instruments of private international law seems to have become the norm for instruments regulating digital technology. It can be found, most famously, in Art. 3 of the GDPR, but also in Art. 1(2) of the P2B Regulation, Art. 3(1) of the proposed ePrivacy Regulation, and in Art. 1(2) of the proposed Data Act. Instruments that have taken the form of directive (such as the DSM Copyright Directive) even rely entirely on the general instruments of private international law to coordinate the different national implementations.

These general instruments, however, are notoriously ill-equipped to deal with the many cross-border problems raised by digital technology, usually resulting in large overlaps between national laws. These overlaps risk to undermine the regulatory aims of the instrument in question, as the example of the DSM Copyright Directive aptly demonstrates: With some of the most controversial questions having ultimately been delegated to national law, there is a palpable risk of many of the compromises that have been found at the national level to be undermined by the concurrent application of other national laws pursuant to Art. 8 I Rome II.

The over-reliance on general instruments of PIL despite their well-established limitations also feels like a step back from the e-Commerce Directive, which at least made a valiant attempt to reduce the number of national laws, although arguably not at the level of the conflict of laws (see CJEU, eDate, paras. 64–67). The balance struck by, and underlying rationale of, the e-Commerce Directive can certainly be discussed – indeed, given its importance for the EU’s ambition of creating a ‘Digital Single Market’, it should be. The drafting of the DSA/DMA package would arguably have provided the perfect opportunity for this discussion.

The author of this post is Uglješa Grušić, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Laws of the University College London.

As reported on this blog on 13 February 2023, the EAPIL Working Group on the Reform of the Brussels I bis Regulation has issued a preliminary position paper formulating proposals for reforming the Regulation. This is an important document, which gives the members of EAPIL and the readers of this blog a lot of food for thought.

The preliminary position paper, however, does not propose any reform to the Regulation’s rules of jurisdiction in employment matters. I believe that these rules are defective in several respects and that the EAPIL Working Group and, ultimately, the EU legislator should take note of these defects and amend the Regulation accordingly. Here, I want to outline these defects, formulate my proposal for reforming the Regulation in this respect and consider whether my proposal is consistent with those advanced in the preliminary position paper.

Five Defects

The rules of jurisdiction in employment matters of Brussels I bis suffer from five weaknesses that undermine the proclaimed goal of these rules, namely the goal of the protection of employees as weaker parties.

As is well-known, Recital 18 provides that ‘In relation to … employment contracts, the weaker party should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules.’ Paradoxically, two changes that Brussels I bis introduced in 2012 with the aim of advancing the goal of employee protection are, in some circumstances, less favourable to the interests of employees than the general rules.

Article 20(2) extends the concept of the domicile of the employer, which now covers employers not domiciled within the EU pursuant to Article 63, but which have a branch, agency or other establishment in the EU in relation to disputes arising out of the operations of the establishment. This rule may disfavour claimant employees because, when it applies, national jurisdictional rules, which may be more favourable to employees than the jurisdictional rules of Brussels I bis, do not.

While, pursuant to Article 6(1), persons domiciled outside the EU can, generally speaking, be sued in the Member State courts under national jurisdictional rules, Article 21 provides that employers domiciled outside the EU can only be sued in the courts for the habitual place of work or, absent a habitual place of work, in the courts for the engaging place of business if the habitual place of work/engaging place of business is located in the EU. The CJEU has confirmed, in Case C-604/20 ROI Land Investments Ltd v FD, that such employers cannot be sued in the Member State courts under national jurisdictional rules. This makes little sense from the perspective of employee protection because it puts claimant employees in a significant jurisdictional disadvantage in comparison to claimants in general.

The third and fourth defects are related to the use of the connecting factor of the engaging place of business in Article 21(1)(b)(ii). The rule of jurisdiction based on this connecting factor is not only practically useless, but also leads to considerable legal uncertainty and unforeseeability and undermines the goals of employee protection and proximity. I have presented my objections to this rule of jurisdiction in terms of legal uncertainty, unforeseeability, employee protection and proximity elsewhere, and I will not rehearse those arguments again. Here, I want to focus on the practical uselessness of this rule of jurisdiction.

The rule of jurisdiction based on the connecting factor of the engaging place of business is only applicable if there is no habitual place of work (Article 21(1)(b)(i)). The CJEU has interpreted the connecting factor of the habitual place of work very broadly in its case law on this point that covers so many different kinds of transnational employment relationships (ie itinerant commercial representatives (here and here), workers working offshore, posted workers (hereand here), lorry drivers, seamen, aircrew and agency workers). In fact, the CJEU has interpreted this connecting factor so broadly that there is very little, if any, room left for the connecting factor of the engaging place of business. This means that there is little reason to keep the jurisdictional rule based on the connecting factor of the engaging place of business. This is even more true if Advocate General Øe was correct to find in Case C-804/19 BU v Markt24 GmbH that ‘the forum established in Article 7(5) of the Brussels Ia Regulation is, in principle, the same as that for the “business which engaged the employee”, within the meaning of Article 21(1)(b)(ii) of that regulation’ ([90], fn 68) and to suggest that Article 7(5) applied even if the establishment in question no longer existed at the moment of commencement of proceedings ([93]).

The CJEU held in Case 32/88 Six Constructions Ltd v Humbert that, if the habitual place of work is outside the EU, the jurisdictional rule based on the connecting factor of the engaging place of business is inapplicable. Article 21, therefore, fails to offer any favourable treatment to employees engaged in the EU to habitually work outside the EU. If my proposal to abolish the jurisdictional rule based on the connecting factor of the engaging place of business is not accepted, then at least the relationship between Article 21(1)(b)(i) and Article 21(1)(b)(ii), as interpreted in Six Constructions, should be reformed.

The fifth defect concerns the use of arbitration agreements contained in individual employment contracts. It is unclear if such arbitration agreements should only be enforced under the same or similar conditions that apply to jurisdiction agreements. This problem arises because, on the one hand, arbitration is expressly excluded from the subject-matter scope of Brussels I bis (Article 1(2)(d)), but, on the other hand, arbitration agreements, if effective, deprive employees of the regulation’s jurisdictional protection. There is evidence that digital platforms are taking advantage of this legal uncertainty and inserting arbitration agreements in contracts with their workers (see, for example, Aslam v Uber BV in the English employment tribunal at [35]).

Proposal for Reform

My proposal for reforming the rules of jurisdiction in employment matters of Brussels I bis contains three elements.

First, the international scope of application of these rules should be reconsidered. The goal of employee protection would be better satisfied if the rule extending the concept of the employer’s domicile applied without prejudice to the right of claimant employees to rely on national jurisdictional rules against employers not domiciled within the EU pursuant to Article 63, even if they have an establishment in the EU. Similarly, the availability of the courts for the habitual place of work or, absent a habitual place of work, of the courts for the engaging place of business should not prejudice the right of claimant employees to sue employers domiciled outside the EU under national jurisdictional rules.

Second, the rule of jurisdiction based on the connecting factor of the engaging place of business should be reformed in one of the following two ways. The considerations of effectiveness, legal certainty, foreseeability, employee protection and proximity speak in favour of abolishing this jurisdictional rule. If this were to happen, a new rule could be introduced instead of it, which, by analogy with the jurisdictional rule over contracts for the provision of services (Art 7(1)(b) second indent, as interpreted in cases like Case C-204/08 Rehder v Air Baltic Corporation), would, absent a habitual place of work, give jurisdiction to the courts for each place where some significant work was carried out.

Alternatively, if the abolition of the rule of jurisdiction based on the connecting factor of the engaging place of business is consider too radical, the goal of employee protection would be better satisfied if this rule were available in two situations: where there is not a habitual place of work at all or where the habitual place of work is outside the EU.

Third, a recital should be introduced that would clarify that arbitration agreements cannot undermine the jurisdictional protection provided to employees.

Consistency with the Preliminary Position Paper

The preliminary position paper contains two relevant proposals.

Proposal 11 is that the EU lawmaker should extend Article 7(1) and 7(5) of Brussels I bis to defendants domiciled in third states. The proposal, however, does not clarify whether the application of Article 7(1) and 7(5) to defendants domiciled in third states would lead to a disapplication of national jurisdictional rules. I believe that the drafters of the preliminary position paper should clarify whether they perceive this inevitable consequence of their proposal (see Case C-604/20 ROI Land Investments Ltd v FD) as a welcome development. But even if they do, the objective of employee protection would still point towards the extension of the concept of the employer’s domicile and of the extension of the rules based on the connecting factors of the habitual place of work and the engaging place of business without prejudice to the right of claimant employees to rely on national jurisdictional rules.

Another proposal is that the rules of jurisdiction for consumer contracts should cover tort claims. The UK Supreme Court had asked the CJEU in Case C-603/17 Bosworth and Hurley v Arcadia Petroleum Limited whether a claim not arising directly out of an employment contract or the applicable employment legislation, but in relation to the employment contract (ie a claim in fraud or conspiracy), triggered the application of the protective jurisdictional rules. Advocate General Øe adopted a wide definition of the concept of ‘matters relating to individual contracts of employment’. Since the CJEU found in Bosworth that there was no relationship of subordination, it did not deal with this question asked by the UKSC. If the EU legislator accepts the preliminary position paper’s proposal, it should further be clarified that the concept of ‘matters relating to individual contracts of employment’ is of equally wide scope.

Finally, my proposal for reforming the international scope of application of the rules of jurisdiction in employment matters and the effect of arbitration agreements contained in individual employment contracts can be extended to contracts involving other weaker parties contracts and, therefore, considered in any reform proposal of the rules of jurisdiction for weaker parties of Brussels I bis.

This post was collectively written by Marion Ho-Dac and Matthias Lehmann. It consists of two parts. Part two will be published on 24 February 2023.

The Digital Services Act (DSA) is a landmark legislation in many respects, also regarding its volume (102 pages in the O.J., no less than 156 Recitals). It will force online platforms such as Youtube, Google or Amazon to be more responsible for the contents posted on them. It has been adopted on 19 October 2022 and will (mainly) be applicable from 17 February 2024 (Article 93(2) DSA). Inter alia, it partially amends the e-commerce Directive (Art. 89 DSA) but preserves its famous “internal market clause”.

The DSA’s Indifference to PIL

The DSA states that it applies “without prejudice to Union rules on private international law” (Recital 10 DSA). However, the text deals with the provision of “intermediary services” within the broader concept of “information society services” (i.e. digital services). These virtually always raise cross-border private-law issues (cf. also Recital 2 DSA). A basic example is a legal action by a user in the EU to request the removal of (allegedly) defamatory online content. The question of the competent court will be resolved by the Brussels I bis Regulation – but what about the applicable law?

The DSA does not resolve such conflicts of laws, but pretends they do not exist. Time and time again, it refers to the “applicable national law”, without giving any indication how this law is to be determined. The Act flies in a high legal stratosphere, hovering over any differences between Member State and other national laws.

Yet, there are instances in which conflicts of laws play a role when applying the DSA (as in all EU regulations dealing with private law issues). The first will be studied in this post and concerns the determination of the applicability of the DSA. The second instance is where the DSA makes reference to a national legal system, for instance with regard to illegal content. This will be the subject of another post.

DSA Scope of Application

In the global digital ecosystem, the application of the DSA, as a uniform body of rules, requires that EU law as such is applicable. This is far from obvious since the vast majority of online platforms are based outside the EU. The DSA’s scope of application focuses on the recipients of the intermediary service – their establishment or location in the EU – “irrespective of where the providers […] have their place of establishment” (Article 2(1) DSA). The recipients are those who simply “use” intermediary services, “in particular for the purposes of seeking information or making it accessible” (Article 3(b) DSA).

The provision on the scope of the DSA presupposes that the providers are “offering” their services to recipients in the EU. Characterising the offering to users in a given territory is a well-known difficulty in private international law. But here the issue is more sensitive than e.g. in Article 17(1)(c) Brussels I bis Regulation as it relates to the scope of the DSA’s regulatory regime.

If the text stopped there, the DSA would have a “global vocation”. Such an approach, which could be described as a kind of “maximalist European unilateralism”, is however unpalatable. It would have large extraterritorial effects, create tensions with third countries and, in practice, would probably be unworkable given the limited capacities of European market supervision.

But the DSA is much more cautious and imposes a “substantial connection” with the EU (Article 3(e) DSA). This is de jure the case when the provider of intermediary services is established in the Union. Otherwise, the text requires that either the provider has a “significant number of recipients of the service” in the EU, or that it “targets” recipients in the EU. The first criterion is based on the economic and societal weight of the foreign operator, the latter on its behaviour. Ultimately, these criteria attenuate the European unilateralist approach and thus make it acceptable on a global scale.

Impact on Conflicts of Laws

The applicability of the DSA has consequences for conflicts of laws in case of international private disputes that fall within its scope. The national law of a third State which would be designated as applicable will be set aside in favour of its provisions, which qualify as overriding mandatory rules. Though the text is silent on this, the DSA certainly is regarded as crucial by the EU for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation (cf Article 9(1) Rome I). The DSA thus belongs to the European public policy, which is part of the public policy of the Member States.

Although many of its provisions are of a procedural nature, others may have an incidence on the level of substantive law, for instance tort law. This is in particular the case for those rules that concern liability. They operate in a double-edged sword by excluding liability but only under certain conditions. Where these conditions are not fulfilled, the “free pass” on liability under EU law is suspended.

To illustrate, Art 6 DSA exempts hosting services from liability for the hosted content, but only under certain conditions. One of them is that the provider, upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of illegal content, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to it (Article 6(1)(b) DSA). In other words, where the hosting provider does not act expeditiously, the way to liability under the applicable law is open.

Although the rule does not impose liability itself, the underlying policy is that the EU will not countenance hosting service providers that do not honour their duties to remove illegal content expeditiously. This could be interpreted as an overriding mandatory rule, which supersedes foreign rules that give a free pass to all hosting service providers. Of course, this interpretation still needs to be tested in court.

on: ‘JUSTIFYING CONCURRENT CLAIMS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW‘.

Written by Sagi Peari and Marcus Teo, the article analyses whether claimants can choose between contract and tort claims arising on the same facts with different jurisdictional and/or choice-of-law consequences. While domestic legal systems generally recognise a concurrent liability,  commentators object that its extension to private international law would be unprincipled and would threaten the field’s values. This, however, contrasts with the position in common law and under EU Regulations, where concurrent claims are generally recognised with only narrow limits. This article justifies concurrent claims in private international law, arguing that the same premises supporting concurrent liability in domestic law exist in private international law and that no field-unique concerns foreclose it.

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on Thursday 23 February 2023 at 14:30 (Mexico City time – CST), 21:30 (CET time). The topic of the webinar is the Right to Child Support within the international framework – Mexico and the United States of America and will be presented by Claudia Sierra Martínez of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) (in Spanish).

By way of context, please note that Mexico is not yet a party to the 2007 HCCH Child Support Convention but the United States is. On the other hand, Mexico is a party to the Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations and the United Nations Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance but the United States is not. Faced with this conundrum and given the great number of Child Support cases between these two countries, other solutions have been made available (think for example of US domestic law / bilateral practices).

The details of the webinar are:

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87996362538?pwd=QjNuZThqNUpTVHQ3cFZaZ1BXZ0YzQT09

Meeting ID: 879 9636 2538

Password: AMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX

Family disputes constitute the majority of cases of cross-border nature. The free movement of people within the European judicial space and the integration of third-country nationals has created a considerable number of multinational family structures, that give rise to a significant number of legal disputes, leading to complex conflict of law issues. It is no coincidence that in the area of family disputes one could identify the most extended number of EU legislative initiatives, from Regulation 1347/2000 (Brussels II Regulation) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children of both spouses, followed by the “successors”, i.e., Regulation No 2201/2003 (Brussels IIa Regulation) and Regulation 2019/1111 (Brussels IIb Regulation), Regulation 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, Regulation 1259/2010 (Rome III Regulation) on the applicable law to divorce and legal separation, as well as and Regulations 2016/1103 and 2016/1104 on international jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes and, registered partners, respectively, covering the maximum scope of personal or property family disputes. It is also notable that, as concluded after examining the data kindly brought to our attention by the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance Department of Publications, out of one hundred court judgments related to international law issued in the year 2022 by the above mentioned Court, approximately 70% of them concerned family disputes in a broader sense, either within the EU, or related to third countries, demonstrating the importance of the matter in practice.

Cross-border family disputes are the Focus of the current issue and were examined in an online conference of Lex and Forum (8.12.2022), under the Presidency of the Supreme Court Judge, Ms. Evdoxia Kiouptsidou-Stratoudaki. The topics of the conference concern the international jurisdiction on matrimonial and child custody disputes according to Regulation No 2019/1111, by Ioannis Delikostopoulos, Professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Athens; the practical problems of the application of the Regulations for family disputes and parental custody disputes, by Ms. Aikaterini Karaindrou, Judge at the First Instance Court; the agreements on the exercise of parental care according to Regulation No 2019/1111 and their relationship with Greek law, by Aikaterini Fundedaki, Professor at the Law Faculty of the University of Thessaloniki; Law No 4800/2021 and the harmonization of the Greek legal provisions with international law, by Ioannis Valmantonis, Judge at the Court of Appeal, and the new Hague Convention for the protection of adults, by Dr. Vasileios Sarigiannidis, Head of the Private International Law Department at the Hellenic Ministry of Justice.

The present issue also contains case comments on the CJEU judgment, 15.11.2022, Senatsverwaltung/TB, on the recognition of dissolution of marriage from another member state, by Dr. Apostolos Anthimos; the CJEU judgments, 15.11 .2021, ??/FA and 10.2.2022, OE/VY, on the concept of habitual residence and, respectively, the importance of the length of residence of the claimant in a member state for the establishment of international jurisdiction under the Brussels IIa/b Regulation, by Paris Arvanitakis, Professor at the University of Thessaloniki, and . Stefania Kapaktsi, Judge at the Court of First Instance; the Greek Supreme Court judgment No 30/2021 on the declaration of enforceability of a foreign decision on the distribution of the spouses’ common property, by Dr. Apostolos Anthimos; the Greek Supreme Court cases No 48/2021 and 54/2021 on international child abduction, by Ioannis Valmantonis, Judge at the Court of Appeal; the judgment of the Thessaloniki First Instance Court No 1285/2022, on the temporary regulation of contact rights according to the Brussels IIb Regulation and the 1996 HAGUE Convention, by Professor Delikostopoulos, and the German Supreme Court judgment dated from 29.9. 2021, on the non-opposition to public order of a marriage performed by a proxy, with a note by Dr. Anthimos. The jurisprudence section also contains the CJEU decisions, 22.4.2022, Volvo/RM, regarding the temporal scope of the Directive No 2014/104 and their incorporation into substantive or procedural EU law, accompanied by the Opinion of the Advocate General, Mr. Athanassios Rantos, with a case comment by Dr. Stefanos Karameros, PhD, and the Court of First Instance case No 13535/2019, on the possibility of implicit prorogation of jurisdiction in case of provisional measures in the Brussels Ia Regulation, despite a contrary agreement, with a case comment by Ioanna Pissina, PhD Candidate.

The issue is completed with the Praefatio by Vassilios Christianos, Emeritus Professor at University of Athens, and former Director of the Center of International and European Economic Law, regarding the contribution of the comparative method to EU procedural law; the expert opinion by Dimitrios Tsikrikas, Professor at the Athens Faculty of Law, on the scope of application of choice-of-court agreements in bond loans and interest rate contracts; and finally, the analysis of practical issues on the recognition of foreign divorce decrees, focusing on the difficulties of the applicants to prove the finality of the foreign decision (L&F Praxis), by Dr. Anthimos.

[editorial prepared by Professor Paris Arvanitakis, scientific director of Lex & Forum]

In a judgment of 11 January 2023, the French supreme court for private and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) ruled that enforcement measures can be validly carried out 5 minutes after the certificate provided for in Article 53 of the Brussels I bis Regulation was served on the judgment debtor.

I have already reported on this judgment which also addressed the issue of the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction in Article 24(3).

Background

The case was primarily concerned with the enforcement of an English money judgment rendered in 2012 and thus subject to the Brussels I Regulation. However, the English court delivered an order in 2018 which ruled that the shares owned by the wife of the judgment debtor in a French company were only held fictitiously by the wife, and that they should be considered as actually owned by the debtor, her husband. The 2018 English order was subject to the Brussels I bis Regulation.

The judgment creditor initiated enforcement proceedings in France over the shares on the basis of both the 2012 judgment and the 2018 order.

Requirements for Enforcing the English Decisions in France

There was no issue that the 2012 judgment was enforceable in France: the creditor had obtained a declaration of enforceability from the competent French authority, pursuant to the Brussels I Regulation shortly after obtaining the judgment.

However, in order to enforce the 2018 order, it was necessary to obtain an Article 53 certificate from the court of origin, and serve it on the debtor “before the first enforcement measure”, pursuant to Article 43(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

Article 43 does not say how long in advance the certificate should be served on the debtor, but Recital 32 explains that service should be effected “in a reasonable time” before the first enforcement measure.

In that case, the creditor served the certificate on the debtor at 2:55 pm. Then, it carried out the attachment of the shares at 3 pm.

The debtor applied for the attachment to be lifted on a number of grounds, including that the attachment had not been carried out in a reasonable time after service of the certificate.

Judgment

The argument was not formulated very clearly at the early stages of the proceedings. The court of appeal only underscored that service of the certificate was the only requirement for enforcing the 2018 order, and that service had been made at 2:55 pm, before the attachment.

In contrast, the argument was perfectly formulated in the appeal before the Supreme Court, with a direct reference to Recital 32 and to the claim that 5 minutes was not a reasonable time.

The Cour de cassation dismissed the appeal and thus validated the attachment.

Unfortunately, while it did answer the argument on the jurisdiction of the English Court, it did not give any reason to dismiss the argument on the time of service of the Article 53 certificate, except that it was manifestly wrong. It held:

Sur les premier et deuxième moyens et sur le troisième moyen, pris en seconde branche, ci-après annexés

En application de l’article 1014, alinéa 2, du code de procédure civile, il n’y a pas lieu de statuer par une décision spécialement motivée sur ces griefs qui ne sont manifestement pas de nature à entraîner la cassation.

And that’s it !

The French Cour de cassation has long been famous for delivering cryptic decisions, offering reasons in a couple of sentences. In recent years, however, the Court has realised that it had to make efforts and give more reasons in order to improve the accessibility of its judgments and of the law generally. The Court entered into a new era of motivation enrichie (enriched reasons), or motivation développée.

Well, so much for motivation enrichie and developpée.

We are back to the days of guessing what the court meant. What we know, however, is that the challenge against the enforcement measure has now been finally dismissed, and that the argument that the certificated was served 5 minutes before the enforcement measure was rejected, and that it was considered “manifestly” wrong.

Assessment

The requirement that the art 53 certificate was introduced in 2012. While the European lawmaker was completing its project of abolishing all intermediate measures to enforce foreign judgments within the EU (initiated in Tampere in 1999), it reintroduced one with Art. 43(1): the requirement only applies to the enforcement foreign jugdments, and is thus an additional delay and cost for the creditor. Just as good old exequatur.

The goal is to offer an additional protection to the debtor by informing him of the intention of the creditor to initiate enforcement proceedings in another Member State. But one wonders why the debtor should receive any additional protection. By definition, he was ordered to pay the monies by an enforceable judgment, which means that he could not convince the foreign court. He still does not want to pay, which forces the creditor to initiate enforcement proceedings. Finally, the debtor may be taking step to dispose of his assets, which is exactly what the debtor had done in this case, by transferring his assets to his wife. This all begs the question of why EU law should afford him any additional protection. Have we not reached the stage where the right to enforcement of the creditor should simply prevail?

It is therefore submitted that this judgment of the Cour de cassation is excellent, and that Article 43(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation should be abolished, as the EAPIL Working Group on the Reform of the Brussels I bis Regulation will hopefully propose.

Distinguishing Enforceability and Enforcement of Judgments

If we leave aside policy and get back to law, there are several grounds which could be put forward to justify the outcome of this judgment.

Let’s first insist that the measures carried out over the shares at 3 pm were enforcement measures, aiming at transferring their ownership to the creditor. They were not protective measures, to which Article 43(1) does not apply (see Article 43(3)). Unfortunately, the judgment mentions at the beginning that the measure was a “saisie conservatoire“. This is simply a mistake (!), and art. 43(3) was never raised at any point of the proceedings.

The best rationale for the outcome of the judgment is that the proceedings were concerned with the validity of the French enforcement measure over the shares. As the CJEU has repeatedly held, however, the Brussels I bis Regulation only governs the conditions at which foreign judgments become enforceable in other Member States, but does not govern enforcement per se. The validity of French enforcement measures is only governed by French law. The requirement that the Article 53 certificate be served could not, therefore, impact the validity of an enforcement measure. It could only limit the enforceability of the foreign judgment. But there is no indication in the Brussels I bis Regulation that service of the certificate is a requirement for extending the enforceability of judgments in other Member States.

Finally, one wonders whether it was necessary to enforce the 2018 English order in the first place. The money judgment was the 2012 judgment. The 2018 order did not really need to be enforced. It only declared who the owner of the relevant assets was. Arguably, it would have been enough to recognise the 2018 order. And for that purpose, Article 43(1) does not require service of the Article 53 certificate.

The editors of the European Yearbook of International Economic Law (EYIEL) welcome abstracts from scholars and practitioners at all stages of their career for the EYIEL 2023. This year’s focus section will be on European and International (Public) Procurement and Competition Law. Next to this, in Part II the EYIEL will consider Current Challenges, Developments and Events in European and International Economic Law.

For the General Section, abstracts shall address topics which are currently of relevance in the context of European and International Economic Law. Similarly, reviews of case-law or practices and developments in the context of international organisations are encouraged. For the Focus Section, abstracts may cover any topic relating to (public) procurement and competition law in the field of European and international economic law, though preference is given to topics focusing on the international perspective.

Abstracts should not exceed 500 words. Abstracts together with a short bionote may be submitted until 28 February 2023 via e-mail to eyiel@leuphana.de.

For all the relevant information, see here.