Earlier this month (9 January 2024), the Republic of Cabo Verde acceded to the Hague Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, which will enter into force for it on 12 January 2025 [Note: this is not our reading of Article 60 of the Convention]. With the accession of Cabo Verde, 49 States and the European Union will be bound by the 2007 Child Support Convention.
Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=955
I have frequently reported in the use of English restructuring and law, including Plans and Schemes of Arrangement, and the forum and applicable law shopping strategies for same. Readers will find the tag ‘restructuring’ or ‘scheme of arrangement’ useful.
My post on Apcoa summarises many of the issues and cross-refers to many other postings. The same post in a later update reports on Codere, which has become standard reference, and to AGPS Bondco Plc, Re, where the Court’s jurisdiction was unsuccessfully challenged on the basis that the Issuer Substitution was ineffective or invalid as a matter of German law.
That latter judgment has now been successfully appealed in Strategic Value Capital Solutions Master Fund LP & Ors v AGPS BondCo PLC (Re AGPS BondCo PLC) [2024] EWCA Civ 24. The Court of Appeal held that the first instance judge had unjustifiably departed from the paru passi distribution of assets principle in sanctioning the cross-class cram down.
Of note for the blog however is Lord Justice Snowden’s obiter reference to the jurisdiction [29] ff as follows:
(emphasis added)
The point is clearly made obiter, seeing as the issue was not appealed (although it is being litigated in Germany, which evidently will raise interesting further issues); and of course it is possible that Snowden LJ simply mentions the issue for it was litigated at first instance. Yet often if that is the case, the Court of Appeal simply keeps schtum about it. Therefore just possibly it may be hinting that the often applied arguendo approach to jurisdiction for Schemes and Plans (“arguments put forward are not barmy and they are not really opposed by any party therefore we accept jurisdiction”) may not work at least across the board in restructuring cases.
An obiter hint of note.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 5.35 ff.
Interesting, successful appeal against sanction of cross-class cram down
Held unjustified departure from pari passu distribution
Re jurisdiction [34] obiter Snowden LJ neither confirming nor rejecting technique of issuer substitution by EN corporation to justify E&W jurisdiction
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 24, 2024
The Court of Justice delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑531/22 (Getin Noble Bank S.A.), where it has, once more, defended the right of the national judge to, ex officio, examine the potential unfairness of a clause in a contract concluded by a consumer (Directive 93/13).
The decision is available in all EU languages, albeit not in English. Here is the French version:
“1) L’article 6, paragraphe 1, et l’article 7, paragraphe 1, de la directive 93/13/CEE du Conseil, du 5 avril 1993, concernant les clauses abusives dans les contrats conclus avec les consommateurs, doivent être interprétés en ce sens que : ils s’opposent à une réglementation nationale prévoyant qu’une juridiction nationale ne peut procéder d’office à un examen du caractère éventuellement abusif des clauses figurant dans un contrat et en tirer les conséquences, lorsqu’elle contrôle une procédure d’exécution forcée fondée sur une décision prononçant une injonction de payer définitive revêtue de l’autorité de la chose jugée :
– si cette réglementation ne prévoit pas un tel examen au stade de la délivrance de l’injonction de payer ou
– lorsqu’un tel examen est prévu uniquement au stade de l’opposition formée contre l’injonction de payer concernée, s’il existe un risque non négligeable que le consommateur concerné ne forme pas l’opposition requise soit en raison du délai particulièrement court prévu à cette fin, soit eu égard aux frais qu’une action en justice entraînerait par rapport au montant de la dette contestée, soit parce que la réglementation nationale ne prévoit pas l’obligation que soient communiquées à ce consommateur toutes les informations nécessaires pour lui permettre de déterminer l’étendue de ses droits.
2) L’article 3, paragraphe 1, l’article 6, paragraphe 1, l’article 7, paragraphe 1, et l’article 8 de la directive 93/13 doivent être interprétés en ce sens que : ils ne s’opposent pas à une jurisprudence nationale selon laquelle l’inscription d’une clause d’un contrat au registre national des clauses illicites a pour effet que cette clause soit considérée comme étant abusive dans toute procédure impliquant un consommateur, y compris à l’égard d’un autre professionnel que celui à l’encontre duquel la procédure d’inscription de ladite clause à ce registre national avait été engagée et lorsque la même clause ne présente pas un libellé identique à celui enregistré, mais revêt la même portée et produit les mêmes effets sur le consommateur concerné ».
I am much annoyed one has to refer to cases like these yet again as X v Y (see also here, also on Article 22 Rome II). I understand the need for anonymisation in this particular case, ECLI:NL:PHR:2023:1114, which concerns the liability of a Dutch mother, guardian of a (young) adult son with mild autism and ADHD and a number of mental health challenges, who stabbed and otherwise attacked a Russian (immaterial to the attack) boy living in Germany but holidaying with his family in Crete. Yet some kind of acronym might be helpful.
At any rate, the interest of this tragic case for the blog lies in Advocate General Vlas discussing Rome II particularly the evidence and procedure carve-out as qualified by Article 22 Rome II’s inclusion of the burden of proof in the lex causae:
Article 22 Rome II
Burden of proof
1. The law governing a non-contractual obligation under this Regulation shall apply to the extent that, in matters of non-contractual obligations, it contains rules which raise presumptions of law or determine the burden of proof.
2. Acts intended to have legal effect may be proved by any mode of proof recognised by the law of the forum or by any of the laws referred to in Article 21 under which that act is formally valid, provided that such mode of proof can be administered by the forum.
Parties agree Greek law is the lex causae. Dutch law applies procedurally as the lex fori, with the A22 Rome II caveat. (3.25) the AG cites the relevant burden of proof issue in the Greek Civil Code: Article 923:
“Whoever has the supervision of a person under age or of a person placed under judicial assistance is liable for the damage that such persons unlawfully cause to a third party, unless he proves that he has exercised properly the duty of supervision or that the damage could not have been avoided. (…)”. (…)’
(3.26) the AG summarises the implications of A22 as follows (translated by me, and omitting his references (ia to prof Peters, Magnus/Mankowski/Queirolo, Kramer, and Bart-Jan van het Kaar)
In brief, it follows from A22(1) Rome II that the lex causae applies to the burden of proof. A22 concerns substantive issues of the law of evidence, such as the distribution of the burden of proof. It does not concern issues relating to the formal elements of the burden of proof, such as admissibility and the appreciation of evidence. These issues are subject (see A10:3 Dutch Civil Code) to Dutch law as the lex fori.
A relevant consideration, one will have to wait and see whether the Supreme Court itself will engage with the A22 issue, which is only a small part of the appeal.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed 2024, 4.79 ff.
X v Y (parental responsibility). Vlas AG (of the Supreme Court of The Netherlands) ia on the evidence and procedure carve-out and Article 22 Rome II.https://t.co/OGt1m04LPx
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 17, 2024
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