Flux européens

Gnandi
Justice et Affaires intérieures
Les États membres sont en droit d’adopter une décision de retour dès le rejet de la demande de protection internationale, à condition qu’ils suspendent la procédure de retour dans l’attente de l’issue du recours contre ce rejet

Le Pen / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
Le Tribunal de l’UE confirme la décision du Parlement européen de recouvrer auprès de l’eurodéputée Marine Le Pen près de 300 000 euros pour l’emploi d’une assistante parlementaire, au motif qu’elle n’a pas démontré l’effectivité du travail de cette assistante

Baumeister
MARI
Toutes les informations figurant dans le dossier d’une autorité de surveillance financière ne sont pas nécessairement confidentielles

Wahl AG advised late November in C-426/16 – see my post on his Opinion at the time and my previous posts on the issue. A European Regulation (1099/2009) provides for an unclear, and conditional, exemption from a requirement of stunning animals for religious slaughter.

The CJEU as readers will know practices judicial economy. On the face of it, the case only deals with the Flemish decision no longer to authorise, from 2015 onwards, the ritual (sic; why the EU institutions stubbornly refuse to name the practice by its proper name of religious slaughter is beyond me) slaughter of animals without stunning in temporary slaughterhouses in the that region during the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice (Eid al-Adha).

Readers best consult the text of the judgment for it is as concise as it is complete. As the Court points out at 56, the derogation authorised by Article 4(4) of Regulation 1099/2009 does not lay down any prohibition on the practice of religious slaughter in the EU but, on the contrary, gives expression to the positive commitment of the EU legislature to allow such slaughter of animals without prior stunning in order to ensure effective observance of the freedom of religion, in particular of practising Muslims during the Feast of Sacrifice.  That is a clear indication of the CJEU being against a total ban (or at the least giving expression to the reality of the EU legislator not approving of such a ban).

That technical framework, the CJEU holds, is not in itself of such a nature as to place a restriction on the right to freedom of religion of practising Muslims. Whether the specific circumstances in Flanders, including the investment needed to convert temporary spaces into licensed abattoirs, in effect hinder Muslims’ practice of their faith in forum externum (at 44), is neither here nor there for the argument under consideration, which is that Article 4(4) itself is incompatible with the Charter on Fundamental rights.

One issue nota bene which was not sub judice, is the incomprehensible discrimination between ‘culture’ (exempt as a whole from the Regulation), and religion (regulated). In short: if myself and a bunch of locals slaughter animals without stunning on a Flemish medieval square, citing local custom, the Regulation does not catch me. But if I do so because I am religiously motivated not to stun, the Regulation’s regime kicks in.

Finally, I introduced my students at American University Washington, College of Law this morning to Case C-497/17, Oeuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoirs. In this case (hearing at Kirchberg tomorrow) an NGO requests a certification body to stop certifying as ‘organic’, products obtained from religious slaughter, even though neither Council Regulation 834/2007 nor the Commission implementing Regulation 889/2008 on organic production and labelling of organic products with regard to organic production, labelling and control, mention stunned or unstunned slaughter. That case turns around scope of application, I would suggest, albeit that the shadow of the human rights implications hangs over it.

Geert.

 

 

日常的に法律事務所を利用しているような人は、ほとんどいないでしょう。それだけに、いざ何らかの法的問題を抱えたとき、法律事務所に赴く際は少し気が引けるかもしれません。敷居が高く感じる、まともに対応してくれるのだろうか、難しい話をされてしまいそう、そんな不安が頭をよぎるのではないでしょうか。

ですが、過度に気構える必要はありません。多くの法律事務所では、一般の利用者が訪れやすいよう間口を広く設けてくれています。各法律事務所のホームページを見たとき、法律に詳しくない人向けに分かりやすく相談の流れを開設している点からもその様子は窺えます。そもそも、一般国民の味方であってこその法律事務所なので、いかに相談のしやすさをアピールできるかという点に力が注がれているようにも感じられます。

近年特に力注がれている問題として、債務整理が挙げられます。日本国民の多くが借金を利用しているといわれる昨今、それにまつわるトラブルも少なくないのです。それに際し、債務整理のサポートをメインとする法律事務所も多く登場してきています。

債務整理をおこなうと、借金の負担の軽減に期待が持てます。ですが、借金問題や法律にあまり詳しくない人にとって、債務整理は分かりにくい存在でもあるかもしれません。今回は、法律事務所の魅力や債務整理について詳しく特集しました。借金問題の解決を目指している、そしてどのように解決すれば分からず悩んでいるといった人は、ぜひご参考ください。

Makhlouf / Conseil
Relations extérieures
La Cour de justice confirme le maintien du gel de fonds de Rami Makhlouf, cousin de Bachar al-Assad, pour la période 2016-2017

In re B.C.I Fins. Pty Ltd. (In Liquidation) (thank you Daniel Lowenthal for flagging) illustrates to and fro exercise, hopping between laws, and the use of choice of law rules to establish (or not) jurisdiction. This method is often called the ‘conflicts method’ or ‘looking over the fence’: to establish whether one has jurisdiction a judge has to qualify his /her district as a place of performance of an obligation, or the situs of a property, requires the identification of a lex causae for the underlying obligation, application of which will in turn determine the situs of the obligation, property etc.

As Daniel points out, Bankruptcy Code section 109(a), says that “only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States, or a municipality may be a debtor under this title.” Lane J considers the issue in Heading B and concludes that the Debtors’ Fiduciary Duty Claims against Andrew and Michael Binetter constitute property in the United States to satisfy Section 109(a).

There is no federal conflicts rule that pre-empts.  New York conflict of law rules therefore apply. New York’s “greatest interest test” pointed to Australian substantive law to determine the situs of the fiduciary duties claims: “[t]he Liquidators were appointed by an Australian court, and are governed by Australian law, and Andrew Binetter is an Australian citizen.  Perhaps even more importantly, the Fiduciary Duty Claims arose from acts committed in Australia and exist under Australian law, and any recovery will be distributed to foreign creditors through the Australian proceeding.’

Lane J then applies Australian substantive law eventually to hold on the situs of the fiduciary duty: considering the (competing) Australian law experts, he is most swayed by the point of view that under Australian law ‘not only debts, but also other choses in action, are for legal purposes localised and are situated where they are properly recoverable and are properly recoverable where the debtor resides.’ The Binetters reside in New York.

In summary: New York conflict of law rules look over the fence to locate the situs of a fiduciary debt to be in New York, consequently giving New york courts jurisdiction. A neat illustration of the conflicts method.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, Chapter 3, Heading

 

The title of this piece almost reads like an encyclical. C-250/17 Esprito Santo (in full: Virgílio Tarragó da Silveira Massa v Insolvente da Espírito Santo Financial GroupSA – readers will appreciate my suggestion of shortening), held last week, concerns the scope of Article 15 juncto 4(2)(f) of the EU’s Insolvency Regulation 1346/2000 (materially unchanged in Regulation 2015/848).

In many jurisdictions lawsuits pending are subject to vis attractiva concursus: all suits pending or not, relevant to the estate of the insolvent company are centralised within one and the same court. In the context of cross-border insolvency however this would deprive the courts and the law of the Member State other than the State of opening of proceedings, of hearing cq applying to, pending suits.

The Court has now held along the lines what is suggested in the Virgos-Schmit report: only enforcement actions are subject to Article 15. Lawsuits pending which merely aim to establish the merits of a claim without actually exercising it (in the judgment: ‘Substantive proceedings for the recognition of the existence of a debt’), remain subject to the ongoing proceedings in the other Member State.

The judgment evidently has more detail but this is the gist of it. Of note is that yet again, linguistic analysis assists the court in its reasoning.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5.

 

Scotch Whisky Association
Agriculture
La juridiction de renvoi doit vérifier si un consommateur a directement à l’esprit l’indication géographique enregistrée « Scotch Whisky » en présence d’un produit comparable portant la désignation « Glen » afin de déterminer l’existence d’une « évocation » interdite par le droit de l’Union

Louboutin et Christian Louboutin
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Une marque consistant en une couleur appliquée sur la semelle d’une chaussure ne relève pas de l’interdiction d’enregistrement des formes

Louboutin et Christian Louboutin
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Une marque consistant en une couleur appliquée sur la semelle d’une chaussure ne relève pas de l’interdiction d’enregistrement des formes

When I reported the first salvos in Goldhar v Haaretz I flagged that the follow-up to the case would provide for good comparative conflicts materials. I have summarised the facts in that original article. The Ontario Court of Appeal in majority dismissed Haaretz’ appeal in 2016, 2016 ONCA 515. In Haaretz.com v. Goldhar, 2018 SCC 28, the Canadian Supreme Court has now held in majority for a stay on forum non conveniens grounds. Both the lead opinion, the supporting opinions and the dissents include interesting arguments on forum non conveniens. Many of these, as Stephen Pitel notes, include analysis of the relevance of obstacles in enforcement proceedings.

If ever I were to get round to compiling that published reader on comparative conflicts, this case would certainly feature.

Have a good start to the working-week (lest is started yesterday in which case: bonne continuation).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.14.5.

Thank you  Elias Neocleous & Co  for reporting Andrew Burness v Saipem SpA, in which the Cypriot Supreme Court confirmed jurisdiction over claims related to Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (under UNCLOS), and rejected application of forum non conveniens. The claims followed an accident on board the vessel Saipem 1000 in the Cyprus EEZ.

The first issue is one under public international law, which I will leave to others. The second is an interesting application of forum non conveniens. Its application had been suggested for none of the parties are Cypriot nationals, neither were the witnesses, or any of the insurance and other companies involved. One assumes the card played was one of convenience, and costs. However the Supreme Court particularly emphasised that the accident had occurred in the process of prospection or exploitation of Cyprus’s natural resources: that makes the Cypriot courts particularly suited to hearing the case, despite the many foreign elements.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.14.5.`

Scotch Whisky Association
Agriculture
La juridiction de renvoi doit vérifier si un consommateur a directement à l’esprit l’indication géographique enregistrée « Scotch Whisky » en présence d’un produit comparable portant la désignation « Glen » afin de déterminer l’existence d’une « évocation » interdite par le droit de l’Union

Choices, choices. I will continue to follow the GDPR for jurisdictional purposes, including territorial scope. (And I have a paper coming up on conflict of laws issues in the private enforcement of same). But for much of the GDPR enforcement debate, I am handing over to others. Johannes Marosi, for instance, who reviews the CJEU judgment this week in Fansites, over at Verfassungsblog. I reviewed the AG’s Opinion here.

Judgment in Grand Chamber but with small room for cheering.

As Johannes’ post explains, there are many loose ends in the judgment, and little reference to the GDPR (technically correct but from a compliance point of view wanting). (As an aside: have a look at Merlin Gömann’s paper, in CMLREv, on the territorial scope of the GDPR).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.2.5.

 

 

[2017] EWHC 3012 (QB) Spring v MDO and Evengelisches Krankenhaus Bielefeld is unreported as far as I can tell (and I have checked repeatedly). Thank you Max Archer for flagging the case and for sending me copy of judgment a few months back. (I am still chipping away at that queue).

In 1997, Claimant was stationed in Germany with the British Army. The Claimant very seriously fractured his right leg and ankle whilst off duty in Germany (the off duty element evidently having an impact – on duty injuries arguably might not have been ‘civil and commercial’). He was then treated at the Second Defendant’s hospital under an established arrangement for the treatment of UK service personnel between the First (the Ministry of Defence) and Second Defendants (the German hospital). Various complications later led to amputation.

The Brussels I Recast Regulation applies for claimant did not introduce the claim against the second defendant until after its entry into force: 18 years in fact after the surgery. This was the result of medical reports not suggesting until after July 2015 that the German hospital’s treatment has been substandard. Rome II ratione temporis does not apply given the timing of the events (alleged wrongful treatment leading to damage).

Yoxall M held that Article 8(1)’s conditions for anchoring /joinder were fulfilled, because of the risk of irreconcilable judgments (at 35). Even if the claim against the First Defendant is a claim based on employer’s liability whereas the claim against the Hospital is based on clinical negligence. Should the proceedings be separate there is a risk of the English and German courts reaching irreconcilable judgments on causation of loss. At 35: ‘It would be expedient for the claims to be heard together – so that all the factual evidence and expert evidence is heard by one court. In this way the real risk of irreconcilable judgments can be avoided.’

With reference to precedent, Master Yoxall emphasised that ‘in considering Article 8(1) and irreconcilable judgments a broad common sense approach is justified rather than an over-sophisticated analysis’ (at 36).

Yoxal M is entirely correct when he states at 37 that Article 8(1) does not include a requirement that the action brought against the different defendants have identical legal bases. For decisions to be regarded as contradictory the divergence must arise in the context of the same situation of law and fact (reference is made to C-98/06 Freeport).

Next however the court considers as a preliminary issue, the limitation period applying between claimant and the German defendant and holds that the Hospital have an arguable case that the claim is statute barred in German law (German expert evidence on the issue being divided). The latter is the lex causae for the material dispute (on  the basis of English residual private international law), extending to limitation periods per Section 1(3) of the Foreign Limitations Period Act 1984 (nota bene partially as a result of the 1980 input by the Law Commission, and not entirely in line with traditional (or indeed US) interpretations of same). This ultmately sinks the joinder.

As a way forward for plaintiff, the Court suggests [2005] EWCA Civ 1436 Masri. In this case the Court of Appeal essentially held that joinder on the basis of Article 8(1) may proceed even if litigation against the England-based defendants are not the same proceedings, but rather take place in separate action. Masri has not been backed up as far as I know, by European precedent: Clarke MR held it on the basis of the spirit of C-189/87 Kalfelis, not its letter. Moreover, how the German limitation periods would then apply is not an obvious issue, either.

An interesting case and I am pleased Max signalled it.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12.1.

 

France / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
L’avocat général Wathelet propose à la Cour de n’annuler que l’acte par lequel le président du Parlement a constaté à Bruxelles et non à Strasbourg que le budget général de l’Union de 2017 était définitivement adopté

Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein
Rapprochement des législations
L’administrateur d’une page fan sur Facebook est conjointement responsable avec Facebook du traitement des données des visiteurs de sa page

Coman e.a.
Citoyenneté européenne
La notion de « conjoint », au sens des dispositions du droit de l’Union sur la liberté de séjour des citoyens de l’Union et des membres de leur famille, comprend les conjoints de même sexe

France / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
L’avocat général Wathelet propose à la Cour de n’annuler que l’acte par lequel le président du Parlement a constaté à Bruxelles et non à Strasbourg que le budget général de l’Union de 2017 était définitivement adopté