Flux européens

Szpunar AG’s Opinion in C-135/15 Hellenic Republic v Grigorios Nikiforidis has travelled half the world with me in my briefcase. Time to tackle the blog queue…

As I had reported earlier, the Bundesarbeitsgericht has given the CJEU an opportunity to provide much needed clarity on the application of Rome I to continuing (employment) contracts, and on the Regulation (or as the case may be, the Rome convention)’s provisions on overriding mandatory law.

The Opinion (not available in English) first of all clarifies the temporal scope of Rome I. Article 28 Rome I provides that it applies to contracts concluded ‘as from 17 December 2009’ (this is the corrected format; initially Article 28 read ‘after’). When exactly a contract is ‘concluded’ needs to be determined in accordance with the putative lex causae as identified by the Regulation (an extension of Article 10(1), suggested by most if not all of relevant scholarship). What, however, about ‘continuing’ contracts’: those concluded before the temporal scope of the Regulation, continuing after, however renewed, renegotiated, amended…: do these continue to be covered by the Rome convention ad infinitum, or is there a cut-off point at which these continuing contracts become newly concluded?

I had suggested in my earlier posting that one’s intuitive assumption may be to prefer autonomous interpretation of the concept ‘concluded’. That, after all, is the standard approach of the Court. However I argued that in the current state of (lack of) harmonisation of contractual law, it is more likely that the Court will prefer an Article 10(1) type solution. Szpunar AG is of the same opinion. He first of all points out (at 33) that secondary EU  law need not necessarily include verbatim transitionary measures. In the absence of a specific regime, the general rule is that the new provisions immediately apply to future effects of situations that arose under the old regime. Rome I’s transitory regime therefore, with its reference to date of ‘conclusion’  is an exception to that general principle. Can that moment of conclusion be autonomously defined? Szpunar AG shares my intuition (at 35 ff): along the lines of Article 10’s regime (the van Munchausen or the ‘bootstrap’ principle) the lex causae has to determine the moment of conclusion. For long-term contracts, this will inevitably lead to uncertainty (at 49). Yet that does not take away the soundness of the rule.

 

Next up is the application of Article 9’s provision on overriding mandatory provisions. This is the first time the CJEU will rule on that Article (Unamar was held under the Rome Convention). The Regulation quite deliberately limited the room for manoeuvre for the court seized to apply overriding mandatory law other than that of the forum: only such laws of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract ‘have to be performed’ can come into calling. That place is likely to be Germany in the case at issue (the Regulation does not define ‘place of performance’ under Article 9(3)) – however the AG suggests differently: there are a variety of reasons to assume that Greece, too, can be that place (at 95).

Szpunar AG first of all, in his very first para, remarks that scholarly attention to ‘lois de police’ far exceeds its featuring in practice. He also notes that von Savigny himself discussed ordre public (at 68 with references) and succinctly discusses the difference between the two (at 69-70). He repeats (at 78) that scholarly attention to overriding mandatory law has been excessive. He then rejects the suggestion that Article 9(3) needs to be applied restrictively to such a degree that its application becomes pretty much near-impossible. Importantly, he rejects in the process (a la Kainz) a strict parallel between ‘performance’ in Article 9(3) Rome I and Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast, and suggest that while the latter needs strict interpretation in line with the overall interpretative rules of that Regulation, there is no such need for Article 9(3) (at 92).

I wonder whether the Court will still hold before the recess (professor Szpunar Opined in April: I did flag there is a queue of cases waiting to be reviewed…

Geert.

Kossowski
DFON
Un suspect peut de nouveau être poursuivi dans un État Schengen lorsque les poursuites antérieures dans un autre État Schengen ont été clôturées sans instruction approfondie

The Max Planck Institute Luxembourg, heading an international consortium, is undertaking a study, funded by the European Commission, aiming to assess the impact of domestic laws of civil procedure of the 28 Member States on mutual trust and the free circulation of judgements, as well as on the enforcement of consumer rights derived from EU law.

As a part of this project, a public consultation has been launched for gathering data and opinions among stakeholders.

Direct access to the two online questionnaires, which mirror the two separate strands of the study, are currently available (in six languages) here.

The Institute encourages consumers, lawyers, judges, academics, consumer protection associations, business/trade associations, dispute resolution facilitators, and those working in other legal professions to respond to both questionnaires.

For those wishing to offer further insights on any of the topics covered by the study, it will be possible to leave the contact details at the end of the survey so as to be contacted for an interview.

Portugal Telecom / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal de l’UE confirme l’illégalité de la clause de non-concurrence entre Portugal Telecom et Telefónica dans le cadre de l’acquisition de l’opérateur mobile brésilien Vivo par Telefónica

Portugal Telecom / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal de l’UE confirme l’illégalité de la clause de non-concurrence entre Portugal Telecom et Telefónica dans le cadre de l’acquisition de l’opérateur mobile brésilien Vivo par Telefónica

In un’ordinanza del 21 aprile 2016, il Tribunale di Milano ha individuato il parametro fattuale a cui ancorare la sussistenza della giurisdizione rispetto ad una domanda di sequestro conservativo di crediti presso terzi.

La vicenda alla base della pronucia puó essere riassunta come segue.

Il creditore procedente, sulla base di una sentenza della High Court of Justice inglese, dichiarata esecutiva in Italia in base al regolamento n. 44/2001 (Bruxelles I), chiedeva al giudice italiano il sequestro conservativo di un credito vantato dalla propria parte debitrice nei confronti di un terzo, residente a Montecarlo ma domiciliato a Milano.

In ragione della parrallela pendenza di un procedimento di opposizione avverso l’ordinanza di exequatur, instaurato dal debitore, l’attività esecutiva espletabile sulla base del titolo estero era infatti limitata ai soli provvedimenti di carattere conservativo (art. 47, par. 3, del Regolamento Bruxelles I).  Similmente, l’attuale art. 44 par.1, lett. a), del regolamento n. 1215/2012 (Bruxelles I bis) prevede che, in pendenza di una domanda di diniego dell’esecuzione, l’autorità dello Stato Membro a cui è richiesta l’esecuzione possa, su istanza di parte, “limitare il procedimento di esecuzione ai provvedimenti cautelari”.

Nel caso in esame, la richiesta di sequestro riguardava, in particolare, le somme dovute dal terzo (promissario acquirente) alla parte debitrice nel procedimento in esame (promittente venditore) sulla base di un contratto preliminare di compravendita di immobili, e le somme già versate dal terzo sulla base del contratto medesimo.

Il Tribunale milanese, rilevata innanzitutto la necessità di verificare la sussistenza della giurisdizione italiana rispetto alla domanda di sequestro conservativo, individua la norma di riferimento nell’art. 22 del citato regolamento n. 44/2001 (corrispondente all’attuale art. 24, par. 5, del regolamento Bruxelles I bis). Questo prevede, “in materia di esecuzione delle decisioni”, la competenza esclusiva dei “giudici dello Stato Membro nel cui territorio ha luogo l’esecuzione”.

Alla luce del carattere esclusivo di tale capo di giurisdizione, il giudice procedente ritiene di escludere, nel caso di specie, la rilevanza di una qualsivoglia accettazione tacita di giurisdizione desumibile dal fatto che il terzo sia comparso in udienza senza nulla eccepire sul punto.

Al contrario, secondo il giudice, la verifica circa la sussistenza della giurisdizione italiana deve ispirarsi ad una lettura teleologicamente orientata della suddetta regola di giurisdizione, che tenga conto della necessità di concretizzare il principio di prossimità rispetto una fattispecie, come quella in esame, in cui l’oggetto dell’attività esecutiva richiesta – il credito – presenta una natura immateriale che ne rende difficile la localizzazione.

Su queste basi, il Tribunale ritiene di disattendere la ricostruzione proposta dalle Sezioni unite della Corte di cassazione nella sentenza 5 Novembre 1981 n. 5827, con cui si ancorava la giurisdizione in materia di esecuzione delle decisioni al luogo in cui è sorta o deve essere adempiuta l’obbligazione. Parimenti inadeguato è parso al giudice il suggerimento della dottrina di localizzare l’attività esecutiva da espletare presso il terzo al luogo ove questi si trova, essendo egli il vero soggetto passivo dell’esecuzione.

Secondo l’ordinanza qui segnalata, nessuna di queste soluzioni è in grado garantire in misura sufficiente il rispetto di quei principi – in particolare, prossimità ed efficiente amministrazione della giustizia sotto il profilo istruttorio – che, per consolidata giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia, devono guidare l’interprete nella localizzazione della fattispecie ai fini delle regole uniformi di giurisdizione stabilite dal Regolamento Bruxelles I. La sussistenza della giurisdizione può semmai essere affermata soltanto sulla base di una complessiva valutazione del rapporto dal quale il credito da sequestrare deriva. In particolare, la presenza di un promissario acquirente e di un promittente venditore, entrambi domiciliati in Italia, che concludono – a Milano – un contratto preliminare avente ad oggetto immobili siti in Italia consente, nel caso specifico, di ritenere che il rapporto tra debitore e terzo sia sottoposto alla giurisdizione del giudice italiano.

Quanto alle difese allegate dall’asserito debitore, l’eccezione di prescrizione del diritto vantato dal creditore sequestrante, avanzata in sede di opposizione alla dichiarazione di esecutività e riproposta davanti al giudice adito con la domanda di sequestro, è ritenuta da quest’ultimo non proponibile nel procedimento in esame, ma solo, eventualmente, nel successivo procedimento esecutivo vero e proprio. Tale eccezione, nota il giudice, è tuttavia di dubbia ammissibilità anche in sede di opposizione all’exequatur, posto che essa non figura tra la lista (esaustiva) dei motivi per cui il giudice può, ai sensi dell’art. 45 del regolamento Bruxelles I, revocare l’exequatur.

Commission / Portugal
Droit institutionnel
Pour avoir tardé à mettre en œuvre la directive sur le traitement des eaux urbaines résiduaires, le Portugal est condamné à une somme forfaitaire de 3 millions d’euros et à une astreinte de 8 000 euros par jour de retard

Commission / Portugal
Droit institutionnel
Pour avoir tardé à mettre en œuvre la directive sur le traitement des eaux urbaines résiduaires, le Portugal est condamné à une somme forfaitaire de 3 millions d’euros et à une astreinte de 8 000 euros par jour de retard

New Valmar
Libre circulation des personnes
L’obligation d’établir des factures transfrontalières exclusivement dans une langue spécifique, sous peine de nullité, enfreint le droit de l’Union

New Valmar
Libre circulation des personnes
L’obligation d’établir des factures transfrontalières exclusivement dans une langue spécifique, sous peine de nullité, enfreint le droit de l’Union

As previously announced and reminded on this blog, on 6t and 7 April 2017 the University of Bonn will host a conference on the topic Politics and Private International Law (?).

The conference aims to discuss the different aspects of the interaction between conflict of law rules and the reaching of substantive goals, highlighting as well its advantages and disadvantages.

The proposals for conference papers (of not more than 1.000 words in German language and without any reference to the authorship) should be submitted to nachwuchs-ipr(at)institut-familienrecht.de until 30 June 2016, 12 am CET.

Further information can be found here.

As I had feared /as was to be expected, the CJEU did not follow Szpunar AG’s lead in formally letting go of Case 21/76 Bier‘s Erfolgort /Handlungsort distinction, even if it did accept the AG’s rejection in the case at issue, of the mere presence of a bank account triggering jurisdiction for tort under (now) Article 7(2) Brussels I Recast.

Kolassa upheld jurisdiction in favour of the courts for the place of domicile of the applicant by virtue of where the damage occurred, if that damage materialises directly in the applicant’s bank account held with a bank established within the area of jurisdiction of those courts. The case was distinguished however, for in that case there where ‘circumstances contributing to attributing jurisdiction to those courts.’ In general, the Court held, ‘purely financial damage which occurs directly in the applicant’s bank account cannot, in itself, be qualified as a ‘relevant connecting factor’‘ (at 38) . ‘ It is only where the other circumstances specific to the case also contribute to attributing jurisdiction to the courts for the place where a purely financial damage occurred, that such damage could, justifiably, entitle the applicant to bring the proceedings before the courts for that place.‘ (at 39).

The Court at 38 flags a rather interesting and relevant argument for dismissing pure presence of  a bank account as a determining connecting factor: a company such as Universal Music may have had the choice of several bank accounts from which to pay the settlement amount, so that the place where that account is situated does not necessarily constitute a reliable connecting factor. What the Court is essentially saying is that in such circumstance the applicant can manipulate jurisdiction and hence shop for a forum: which is not part of the jurisdictional rule for tort.

Crucially of course we are left having to ponder what exactly ‘other circumstances’ than location of bank account may imply.

Geert.

 

(Handbook of) European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Headings 2.2.11.2, 2.2.11.2.7

A study on the Cross-border placement of children in the European Union, commissioned by the EU Parliament, has just been published. It has been drawn up by Laura Carpaneto (Univ. Genova), and is available here.

[Abstract] – This study … explores the range and nature of problems linked to the cross-border placement of children and to the application of article 56 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. Based on an analysis of the practice in 12 Member States and European case law, it identifies a number of shortcomings in the current legislative framework. Looking ahead to the recast of Brussels IIa, the study sets out recommendations to remedy some of the weaknesses, such as clarifying the respective tasks of the Member States involved in cross-border placement cases and facilitating the recognition and enforcement of cross-border placement orders.

Universal Music International Holding
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La matérialisation d’un dommage purement financier dans un État membre ne justifie pas en soi la compétence des juges de cet État

Universal Music International Holding
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La matérialisation d’un dommage purement financier dans un État membre ne justifie pas en soi la compétence des juges de cet État

Universal Music International Holding
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La matérialisation d’un dommage purement financier dans un État membre ne justifie pas en soi la compétence des juges de cet État

Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken
Liberté d'établissement
Selon l’avocat général Szpunar, le prêt d’un livre numérique est comparable au prêt d’un livre traditionnel

Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken
Liberté d'établissement
Selon l’avocat général Szpunar, le prêt d’un livre numérique est comparable au prêt d’un livre traditionnel

Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken
Liberté d'établissement
Selon l’avocat général Szpunar, le prêt d’un livre numérique est comparable au prêt d’un livre traditionnel

Alfonso-Luis Calvo Caravaca, Javier Carrascosa González, Derecho Internacional Privado, 16a ed., Editorial Comares, 2016, vol. I, ISBN: 9788490454060, pp. 992, 39,50 euro, e vol. II, ISBN: 9788490454121, pp. 1512, 42 euro.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – La décimosexta edición de este «Derecho internacional privado, volumen I» persigue ofrecer al lector un material de estudio del Derecho internacional privado convenientemente actualizado, sistemático y comprensible. Esta nueva edición se presenta con un doble objetivo. Por una parte, servir como texto para el estudio, en el ámbito universitario, de un DIPr. enteramente orientado a la práctica, y por otra parte, operar como instrumento de ayuda en la aplicación del Derecho internacional privado por los profesionales del Derecho.

I sommari dei volumi I e II possono essere consultati, rispettivamente, qui e qui.

Maggiori informazioni sono reperibili a questi indirizzi: volume I e volume II.