https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/144.pdf
I reviewed [2018] EWHC 3506 (QB) Kalma v African Minerals et al in an earlier post. It essentially entails vicarious liability of UK-incorporated companies (jurisdiction firmly settled therefore) for human rights abuses committed by Sierra Leone police (SLP), who ensured security at the defendants’ mine. All claims were held to have failed and the Court of Appeal in [2020] EWCA Civ 144 has confirmed same on 17 February (a little before the important SCC ruling in Nevsun).
The High Court’s discussion of the factual involvement of the companies with SLP activities, required to establish vicarious liability, as I noted at the time has echoes of the discussion on the level of oversight required for mother companies to be held liable for subsidiaries’ actions (such as e.g, in Apartheid, Shell (in The Netherlands) or of course in Vedanta). (The case otherwise does not raise the kind of jurisdictional or applicable law issues readers often find on this blog).
Of most relevance for the corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues are the grounds of appeal concerning the alleged duty of care owed, discussed at 110 ff: appellants say that the judge wrongly approached this case as a case of “pure omissions” and that, instead, he should have considered the existence of the duty by reference to first principles and, in particular, the three elements identified in Caparo v Dickman, namely foreseeability, proximity and whether or not such a duty was fair, just and reasonable (Ground 3). The appellants also have an alternative case that, if this was a case of pure omissions, the judge should have found that it was one of the recognised exceptions to the rule, namely that it involved the creation of the danger by the respondents themselves (Ground 4). Core factual consideration in all this are the money, vehicles and accommodation provided to the SLP, which the judge had found was common in Sierra Leone.
Coulson LJ reiterated with the judge that the duty of care tenet was one of omission: failure to protect the claimants (the respondents, arguendo, having failed to protect the claimants from the harm caused by the SLP). Extensive analysis of Turner J’s judgment at the High Court found no reason to reach a different conclusion than his.
Geert.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Heading 8.3.
A short post to flag the French Conseil d’Etat’s final ruling in which on 7 February it held that organisms obtained via in-vitro mutagenesis techniques should be subject to GMO regulation and that consequently as EurActiv summarise the French authorities must update regulation to include such crops within six months, which includes identifying the agricultural plant varieties which have been obtained by these techniques and subjecting them to the assessments applicable to GMOs.
The ruling follows the CJEU’s mutagenesis finding in C-528/16, reviewed at the time on Steve Peers’ blog here and subsequently by KJ Garnett in RECIEL here. The ruling put agro-bio industry narrators in a spin but in essence is an utterly logical consequence of EU law.
Geert.
I have reported earlier on the issues which yesterday led to the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court 2020 SCC 5 Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, in which the Supreme Court was asked whether there should be a new tort of breach of international law, and whether the “act of state” doctrine prevents adjudication in the case at issue. The case does not have jurisdictional issues to consider so I shall leave the substantive public international law analysis (not my core area) to others: Dr Ekaterina Aristova’s Twitter feed referenced below should give readers plenty of pointers, as does (which came out just as I was finalising this post) Stephen Pitel’s analysis here.
The case does raise the kinds of questions upon which the US Supreme Court (Kiobel; Jesner) refused to be drawn, particularly issues of corporate culpability under public international law. Again, this is not my area of core expertise and my thoughts here are merely that.
Three Eritrean workers claim that they were indefinitely conscripted through Eritrea’s military service into a forced labour regime where they were required to work at a mine in Eritrea. They claim they were subjected to violent, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The mine is owned by a Canadian company, Nevsun Resources Ltd. The Eritrean workers started proceedings in British Columbia against Nevsun and sought damages for breaches of customary international law prohibitions against forced labour, slavery, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and crimes against humanity. They also sought damages for breaches of domestic torts including conversion, battery, unlawful confinement, conspiracy and negligence.
Nevsun brought a motion to strike the pleadings on the basis of the ‘act of state’ doctrine, which precludes domestic courts from assessing the sovereign acts of a foreign government. Nevsun also took the position that the claims based on customary international law should be struck because they have no reasonable prospect of success.
The act of state doctrine is “a rule of domestic law which holds the national court incompetent to adjudicate upon the lawfulness of the sovereign acts of a foreign state” (R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.), at p. 269) (Lord Millett). The doctrine exists in Australian and English common law (with plenty of discussion) but is not part of Canadian common law. At 30 Abella J for the majority explains the connections and differences with the doctrine of state immunity.
The motion was dismissed by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in majority has now agreed, arguing (ia at 44-45)
The act of state doctrine and its underlying principles as developed in Canadian jurisprudence are not a bar to the Eritrean workers’ claims. The act of state doctrine has played no role in Canadian law and is not part of Canadian common law. Whereas English jurisprudence has reaffirmed and reconstructed the act of state doctrine, Canadian law has developed its own approach to addressing the twin principles underlying the doctrine: conflict of laws and judicial restraint. Both principles have developed separately in Canadian jurisprudence rather than as elements of an all‑encompassing act of state doctrine. As such, in Canada, the principles underlying the act of state doctrine have been completely subsumed within this jurisprudence. Canadian courts determine questions dealing with the enforcement of foreign laws according to ordinary private international law principles which generally call for deference, but allow for judicial discretion to decline to enforce foreign laws where such laws are contrary to public policy, including respect for public international law.
Nor has Nevsun satisfied the test for striking the pleadings dealing with customary international law. Namely it has not established that it is “plain and obvious” that the customary international law claims have no reasonable likelihood of success.
Of note is at 50 the insistence with reference to authority that ‘deference accorded by comity to foreign legal systems “ends where clear violations of international law and fundamental human rights begin” ‘, and the majority’s opinion’s references to the stale nature of the established concept that public international law exists for and between States only.
Clearly the case is not home and dry for the lower courts will now have to address the substantive issues and may still hold for Nevsun. Moreover claimant’s case is based on parts of international law traditionally considered ius cogens – of less use in other corporate social responsibility cases involving environmental issues or more ‘modern’ social rights other than the hard core ius cogens category. Hence in my initial view the precedent value of the case may not be as wide as one might hope. However the clear rejection of the act of state attempt is significant.
Of interest finally is also the judgment at 75 and at 109 citing Philippe Sands’ (KU Leuven doctor honoris causa) formidable East West Street in support.
Geert.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Heading 8.3.
WOW! Supreme Court of Canada released decision in Nevsun case, the case will move forward, victory for claimants! Majority opinion: it is arguable that the breaches of customary international law, or jus cogens, relied on by the victims may apply to corporations https://t.co/L527vA7tEq
— Ekaterina Aristova (@EkatAristova) February 28, 2020
The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑25/19 (Corporis sp. z o.o. v Gefion Insurance A/S), which is in particular about the Service Regulation (recital 8):
« Article 152(1) of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II), read in conjunction with Article 151 of that directive and recital 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 […] must be interpreted as meaning that the appointment by a non-life insurance undertaking of a representative in the host Member State also includes the authorisation for that representative to receive a document initiating court proceedings for damages in respect of a road traffic accident”.
Reminder: Recital 8 of Regulation No 1393/2007 states that ‘This Regulation should not apply to service of a document on the party’s authorised representative in the Member State where the proceedings are taking place regardless of the place of residence of that party.’
Source: here
AG Bobek delivered today his opinion in case C‑41/19 (FX v GZ, represented by her mother), which is about the Maintenance Regulation:
“Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 […] and, in particular, Article 41(1) thereof, should be interpreted as meaning that the courts of the Member State where the enforcement of a maintenance decision given in another Member State is sought have jurisdiction to adjudicate on an application opposing enforcement, in so far as it is intrinsically connected with enforcement proceedings, it does not seek the modification or review of the maintenance decision, and it is based on grounds that could not have been raised before the court that issued the maintenance decision. Those conditions appear to be fulfilled by the application of opposition to enforcement based on the discharge of the debt at issue in the present case, which is nonetheless ultimately for the referring court to verify”.
Source: here
The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑803/18 (AAS « Balta » v UAB « Grifs AG »). It is not available in English, albeit you can read it in nearly all languages of the EU (by accessing the link infra and selecting the language of your choice). Here is the French version:
« L’article 15, point 5, et l’article 16, point 5, du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 […] doivent être interprétés en ce sens que la clause attributive de juridiction prévue dans un contrat d’assurance couvrant un « grand risque », au sens de cette dernière disposition, conclu par le preneur d’assurance et l’assureur, ne peut être opposée à la personne assurée par ce contrat, qui n’est pas un professionnel du secteur des assurances, qui n’a pas consenti à cette clause et qui est domicilié dans un État membre autre que celui du domicile du preneur d’assurance et de l’assureur ».
Source : here
The judgment (in first instance; expect appeal) dismissing jurisdiction in Ismail Ziada v Benjamin Gantz is out in Dutch here and in English here. Gilles Cuniberti has reviewed the immunity issues here. I shall focus on the consideration of forum necessitatis, and can so do very briefly for the court does, too.
In essence the judgment on this point means that civil procedure rules on forum necessitatis do not set aside sovereign immunity based on public international law, and that the ECtHR judgment in Naït-Liman does not alter that finding. In that case, the ECtHR nudged States to consider a forum necessitatis rule:
‘“Nonetheless, given the dynamic nature of this area, the Court does not rule out the possibility of developments in the future. Accordingly, and although it concludes that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 in the present case, the Court invites the States Parties to the Convention to take account in their legal orders of any developments facilitating effective implementation of the right to compensation for acts of torture, while assessing carefully any claim of this nature so as to identify, where appropriate, the elements which would oblige their courts to assume jurisdiction to examine it.”
In Ismail Ziada v Benjamin Gantz the Court simply remarked that ECtHR authority on the issue all concerns immunity of international organisations not, as here, State sovereign immunity, in which consequently (in the court’s view) forum necessitatis does not have a role to play.
Geert.
In [2020] UKUT 0001 (TCC) Devon Waste Management, Biffa and Veolia v Inland Revenue, the tax and chancery chamber of the Upper Tribunal discussed the classification of ‘fluff’ as waste. The fluff at issue is not the type one may find in one’s pockets (or, dare I say, belly button). Rather, the “black bag” waste material that is disposed of at landfill sites and used by operators as a geomembrane liner and geotextile protection layer.
As Constantine Christofi at RPC reports, (see also UKUT at 22) the first tier tribunal – FTT had earlier found that that the use made of the material disposed of was only an indicator of whether there was an intention to discard the material, and that use was not conclusive in determining whether it was discarded. In the view of the FTT, the use of such material as a protective layer was not sufficient to negate an intention to discard it as it was destined for landfill in any event and because there was no physical difference between that material and the other general waste disposed of at the landfill sites. The FTT therefore held that the disposal of the waste was a taxable disposal by way of landfill: not everything that could be characterised as “use” was sufficient to negate an intention to discard.
The FTT had (UKUT does not at all) considered EU law precedent. UKUT relied on English authority and overturned the FTT’s finding on the basis of the FTT having fallen into the “once waste, always waste” trap (at 74). In deciding like this, UKUT itself in my view may have fallen into the alternative ‘once someone’s waste not that of another’ trap. At 52: ‘An owner of material does not discard it, within the meaning of the statutory provisions, if he keeps and uses it for his own purposes’. Making use of materials for the site operator’s purposes connected with regulatory compliance, when they are deposited in the cell, is use that is necessarily inconsistent with an intention to discard the materials.
This arguably is the kind of single criterion test which when it comes to (EU and UK) waste law has been rejected.
Geert.
Thank you Huib Berendschot for alerting me to a CJEU judgment which had escaped me. In C-678/18 Procureur Generaal bij de Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Re: Spin Master Ltd) at issue is Regulation 6/2002 on Community designs.
The Regulation provides among others (Article 81) that Community design courts (as appointed in the individual jurisdictions) have exclusive jurisdiction for infringement actions. At issue was whether Member States may extend the exclusivity to provisional measures (Article 90). The Netherlands had done so, however as Huib explains more extensively, the CJEU has now given speed at the level of provisional measures, priority over specialisation: at 41: ‘ whilst the pursuit of that objective of uniform interpretation is entirely justified in the case of court proceedings the substance of which concerns infringement or invalidity actions, the EU legislature also pointed out, in recital 29 of Regulation No 6/2002, that the exercise of the rights conferred by a design must be enforced in an efficient manner throughout the territory of the European Union. The EU legislature was therefore able to ensure that, in the case of requests for provisional measures, including protective measures, concerning infringement or invalidity, the requirements of proximity and efficiency should prevail over the objective of specialisation.’
A most interesting judgment.
Geert.
Theme by Danetsoft and Danang Probo Sayekti inspired by Maksimer