Flux européens

Constantin Film Produktion / EUIPO
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Selon l’avocat général Bobek, la décision de l’EUIPO rejetant la demande d’enregistrement de la marque Fack Ju Göhte doit être annulée

Puigdemont i Casamajó et Comín i Oliveres / Parlement

Craeynest e.a.
Environnement et consommateurs
Les juridictions nationales sont compétentes pour contrôler le choix de l’emplacement des stations de mesure de la qualité de l’air et prendre, à l’égard de l’autorité nationale concernée, toute mesure nécessaire

Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême)
Droit institutionnel
Selon l’avocat général Tanchev, la chambre disciplinaire, nouvellement créée, de la Cour suprême polonaise ne satisfait pas aux exigences de l’indépendance judiciaire établies par le droit de l’Union

Hongrie / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal annule la décision de la Commission constatant l’incompatibilité de la taxe hongroise sur la publicité avec les règles de l’Union concernant les aides d’État

Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême)
Droit institutionnel
Selon l’avocat général Tanchev, la chambre disciplinaire, nouvellement créée, de la Cour suprême polonaise ne satisfait pas aux exigences de l’indépendance judiciaire établies par le droit de l’Union

In [2019] EWHC 1391 (QB) Percival v Moto Novu LLC Murray J considers the ins and outs of Article 38 Brussels Ia.

The dispute arose out of an aborted property transaction in Italy. Mr Teruzzi and Ms Puthod are husband and wife. La Fattoria was a “pass-through” company incorporated under Italian law and owned by Mr Teruzzi and Ms Puthod through which the property at the centre of the dispute was temporarily owned. It has since been dissolved.

By an Assignment of Rights of Judgment dated 28 March 2011 (but signed by the parties on 29 June 2011) and governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (“the 2011 Assignment”), Mr Teruzzi assigned to the respondent, Motu Novu LLC (“Motu Novu”), a Delaware limited liability company, all of his right, title and interest in the Tribunal Judgment and the CA Milan Judgment. There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the 2011 Assignment was also effective to transfer the right, title and interest of Ms Puthod and La Fattoria in those judgments or, if not, whether that fact is relevant to the effectiveness of the registration.

At 8: Title III (the recognition and enforcement Title) involves two stages: i) under Article 39 of the Regulation, a first stage involving only the applicant, who must be an “interested party” and who applies ex parte to the relevant “court or competent authority” listed in Annex II to the Regulation to obtain an order for registration of the foreign judgment in order to permit enforcement locally; and ii) under Article 43 of the Regulation, a second stage, inter partes, during which the respondent (the judgment debtor) has the opportunity to raise certain limited objections by lodging an “appeal” (under English CPR rules this would be an application to set aside the order).

Under Article 44 of the Regulation, the order made on appeal under Article 43 is subject to a single further appeal on a point of law.

At 11: The ex parte stage of the registration process is governed by Articles 38 to 42 of the Regulation. The inter partes stage is governed by Articles 43 to 47. The remainder of section 2 of chapter III of the Regulation, Articles 48 to 52, deals with miscellaneous points that do not arise in this case, other than in relation to Article 48 (undue delay).

The process is further described in detail in the judgment. This is most helpful. Unless one has done one of these oneself, in all Member States the actual procedure is often shrouded in various levels of fog.

Of longer term authority interest is the discussion of the mistake made at an earlier stage, to register all 3 Italian judgments even though under Italian law only one of them was actually enforceable. At 44 Murray J in my view justifiably excuses this error: there is nothing ‘in the Regulation, or otherwise, (that) limits an applicant’s registration of a foreign judgment to the proportion to which he is entitled. I have seen no authority for that proposition.’

What is also of note is the concept of ‘interested party’. At 45:

The term “interested party” is not defined in the Regulation, but a person who is the assignee of a named judgment creditor, even where there are other named judgment creditors, is clearly an interested party. It seems to me fundamentally incompatible with the deliberately limited and mechanical nature of the registration process under chapter III of the Regulation that the registering court or competent authority should be required to enquire into the nature and extent of an applicant’s interest in a judgment, beyond what is necessary to establish prima facie that the applicant is an interested party.

I believe this is right. That the proceedings leading to the Italian Judgment were served on the Original Claimants on 17 January 2011, pre-dating the 2011 Assignment by over two months has therefore become irrelevant (at 48).

Intricate detail of Title III is not often litigated. This judgment is noteworthy.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.

 

Craeynest e.a.
Environnement et consommateurs
Les juridictions nationales sont compétentes pour contrôler le choix de l’emplacement des stations de mesure de la qualité de l’air et prendre, à l’égard de l’autorité nationale concernée, toute mesure nécessaire

Craeynest e.a.
Environnement et consommateurs
Les juridictions nationales sont compétentes pour contrôler le choix de l’emplacement des stations de mesure de la qualité de l’air et prendre, à l’égard de l’autorité nationale concernée, toute mesure nécessaire

Not all of [2019] EWHC 1579 (Fam) RJ v Tigipko is easily understood. Detail is kept private and proceedings were conducted in camera for evident reasons. The case concerns an earlier order to return a child from the Ukraine, which was followed up by an unsuccessful appeal to the Ukrainian courts to recognise this order under the 1996 Hague convention. Application in England now is to beef up the return order.

What is of interest to the blog is the consideration of action against the maternal grandfather. From the little detail in the judgment one can infer that he is complicit in the parental kidnapping. What exactly is being asked from him is not made clear however it is not quite like an anti-suit but rather (at 21) ‘a mandatory injunction requiring a party to commence and act in a foreign suit in a certain way, which is an order.’ Here, at 20, Mostyn J would seem to be minded to apply CJEU C-159/02 Turner v Grovit to Hague Convention States.

That, I would suggest, is a bold move not supported by either authority or spirit of EU law. Full argument on it will be heard later.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.1.

In [2019] EWHC 960 (Ch) New Look Secured Issuer and New Look Ltd, Smith J at H applies the standing rules on jurisdiction over the scheme and other companies which I also signalled in Algeco and Apcoa (with further reference in the latter post). Against the scheme companies jurisdiction is straightforward: they are England incorporated.  Against the scheme creditors, English courts apply the jurisdictional test viz the Brussels I Recast (‘a’) Regulation arguendo: if it were to apply (which the English Courts have taken no definitive stance on), would an English court have jurisdiction? Yes, it is held: under Article 8 (anchor defendants). (Often Article 25 is used as argument, too).

At 48 Smith J signals the ‘intensity’ issue: ‘In some cases it has been suggested that it may not be enough to identify a single creditor domiciled in the United Kingdom, and that the court should consider whether the number and size of creditors in the UK are sufficiently large: see Re Van Gansewinkel Groep, [2015] EWHC 2151 (Ch) at [51]); Global Garden Products at [25]; Re Noble Group Ltd [2018] EWHC 3092 (Ch) at [114] to [116].’ Smith J is minded towards the first, more liberal approach: at 49. He refers to the liberal anchoring approach in competition cases, both stand-alone (think Media Saturn) and follow-on (think Posten /Bring v Volvo, with relevant links there).

At 51 he also discusses the ‘substantial effects’ test and classifies it under ‘jurisdiction’:

‘As well as showing a sufficient jurisdictional connection with England, it is also necessary to show that the Schemes, if approved, will be likely to have a substantial effect in any foreign jurisdictions involved in or engaged by the Schemes. This is because the court will generally not make any order which has no substantial effect and, before the court will sanction a scheme, it will need to be satisfied that the scheme will achieve its purpose: Sompo Japan Insurance Inc v Transfercom Ltd, [2007] EWHC 146 (Ch); Re Rodenstock GmbH, [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch) at [73]-[77]; Re Magyar Telecom BV, [2013] EWHC 3800 (Ch) at [16].’ 

This is not quite kosher I believe. If, even arguendo, jurisdiction is established under Brussels Ia, then no ‘substantial effects’ test must apply at the jurisdictional stage. Certainly not vis-a-vis the scheme companies. Against the scheme creditors, one may perhaps classify it is a means to test the ‘abuse’ prohibition in Article 8(1)’s anchor mechanism.

A useful reminder of the principles. And some doubt re the substantial effects test.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 5.

 

Commission / Pologne (Indépendance de la Cour suprême)
Principes du droit communautaire
Les dispositions de la législation polonaise relatives à l’abaissement de l’âge de départ à de la retraite des juges de la Cour suprême sont contraires au droit de l’Union

Commission / Pologne (Indépendance de la Cour suprême)
Principes du droit communautaire
Les dispositions de la législation polonaise relatives à l’abaissement de l’âge de départ à de la retraite des juges de la Cour suprême sont contraires au droit de l’Union

A late flag following my much earlier Tweet on [2019] EWHC 325 (Comm) Pipia v BGEO. Moulder J had to consider, as I put it in the tweet, a combination of conflict of laws and EU external relations law. Under CPR 25.12 security for costs must not be sought against parties covered by Brussels Ia or the Lugano Convention. The issue is whether the EU-Georgia association agreement is tantamount to those Conventions.

Article 21 headed “Legal cooperation” specifically refers to the Hague Convention and states that: “1. The Parties agree to develop judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters as regards the negotiation, ratification and implementation of multilateral conventions on civil judicial cooperation and, in particular, the conventions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in the field of international legal cooperation and litigation as well as the protection of children.” Article 21 merely refers to “developing judicial cooperation” as regards the ratification and implementation of the Hague Convention. The stated aims of the Association Agreement are set out in broad terms in Article 1. They include: “(f) to enhance cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice with the aim of reinforcing the rule of law and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”.

The Association Agreement does not therefore provide for the enforcement of judgments either on a bilateral basis or through the Hague Convention. At 10 Moulder J therefore does not accept that there is any basis on which the Association Agreement can be interpreted as falling within the express terms of CPR 25.13 (2)(a)(ii). (re: residence in BRU1a /Lugano State).

Neither in her view can the general non-discrimination requirement of the Agreement be read to have an impact on the issue.

Geert.

 

Nice combination of external relations law and PIL.
[2019] EWHC 325 (Comm) Pipia v BGEO.
CPR rules, security for costs. May not be sought against Brussels Ia or Lugano parties. Whether EU-Georgia association agreements qualifies as tantamount (answer: no)https://t.co/nfncju3jet

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 11, 2019

In [2019] EWHC 1359 (Comm) National Union of Mineworkers v Organisation Internationale de l’energie et des mines defendant is French-domiciled and represented by its chair, Arthur Scargill. That’s right, many of us whether Brits or not will remember him from the 1970s and 1980 mine strikes.

Of more immediate relevance for the blog is the discussion at 19 ff on jurisdiction and applicable law.

Defendant is an international body to which a number of trade unions are affiliated. Those unions operate in different countries but all represent workers engaged in the fields of mining and/or energy supply. The name the Defendant uses in English is the International Energy and Mineworkers’ Organisation (“the IEMO”) and it is the successor to the International Mineworkers’ Organisation (“the IMO”) following a merger in 1994.

The proceedings relate to the parties’ respective rights in relation to sums recovered by the Defendant from Mr. Roger Windsor in August 2012 after prolonged legal proceedings in the French Republic and in England. Those proceedings were undertaken in the name of the Defendant but funded in part by the Claimant. There is a shortfall between the sums recovered and the amounts of the principal debt and the legal costs of the proceedings. The parties are in dispute as to the distribution of the sums recovered from Mr. Windsor; as to which should bear any shortfall between the sums recovered and the costs incurred in the proceedings; and as to the amounts which each has paid by way of costs in those proceedings.

The underlying indebtedness which resulted in recovery being made against Mr. Windsor derived from a loan of £29,500 which the Claimant made to him in 1984. He was then the Claimant’s Chief Executive Officer and the loan was made by way of assistance with house purchase following the relocation of the Claimant’s headquarters from London to Sheffield in 1983. There was a repayment of that loan in November 1984 but it is common ground that to the extent that there was such a repayment it came from funds which had been lent to Mr. Windsor. In 1986 the right to recover payment from Mr. Windsor (either of the original loan or of the subsequent loan) was assigned to the IMO.

Claimant argues the courts of England and Wales have jurisdiction by reason of Articles 7(1) and 25(1)(b) Brussels Ia (by virtue of an agreement made in 1990), and that in any event defendant is to be treated as having accepted that the court has jurisdiction to try this matter (an Article 26 ‘prorogation’, ‘submission’ or ‘voluntary appearance’ in other words).

Eyre J at 24 agrees that submission has taken place: CPR rules (Pt11) provide the details the procedure to be followed by a defendant contesting jurisdiction. Defendant did make an application to the court within 14 days of filing the acknowledgement of service, as requested by CPR 11. However, it expressly accepted that the application was to be regarded as relating to the questions of limitation and of the effect of the Release Agreement. In its application it made extensive reference to Brussels Ia but did so in that context. In particular that material was put forward in support of the contention that the claim was statute-barred either by reference to the Limitation Act 1980 or by reference to the French limitation provisions. There was in other words no wider or more fundamental challenge to the court’s jurisdiction and the realisation probably in hindsight that jurisdiction may not be that straightforward, cannot impact on that original application.

Had there not been submission, interesting discussions could have ensued I suspect on the place of performance of the agreement (unless clear choice of court had been made), England as a forum contractus, and I for one shall be using the case in my classes as a good illustration of the ‘conflicts method’ (looking over the fence)

Attention then turns to the issue of applicable law for the time-barred argument: at 26: ‘Defendant also argued that the proceedings were to be regarded as subject to French law and in particular the French limitation provisions which impose a time limit of three years for claims. The Defendant made reference to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 and the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984. The contention was that French law was applicable because the judgments against Mr. Windsor were obtained in France and then registered in England and Wales. That argument was misconceived. Such an argument might have relevance if the issue were one of the enforcement of the judgments against Mr. Windsor though I make no finding on that question. The current proceedings are not concerned with the enforcement of the judgments against Mr. Windsor but with the distribution of the sums which have been received by the Defendant as a result of the litigation against Mr. Windsor. It follows that the provisions to which the Defendant made reference can have no relevance to the current proceedings. The Defendant made passing reference to the fact that it is domiciled in France but this was not the principal basis of the contention that French law was applicable and without more it would not cause the parties’ dealings to be governed by French law. In those circumstances the parties’ rights and liabilities are to be determined by reference to the law of England and Wales and any questions of limitation are governed by the Limitation Act 1980.‘

I am not privy to the submissions on applicable law, but I am assuming that there must have been some discussion of the impact of the 1980 Rome Convention. Not the Rome I Regulation which would not have applied ratione temporis. That Regulation like Rome II has not altogether straightforward provisions (as I have noted on other occasions) on procedure being covered by the lex contractus. Whether Eyre J classifies the limitation issue as being covered by English law per lex fori or alternatively as lex causae (lex contractus of the 1990 agreement) is not clear.

Back in the 80s I would have never dreamed of bumping into Mr Scargill again in the context of an interesting conflict of laws issue.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 1, Heading 1.3.1, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.7.

 

 

 

 

Línea Directa Aseguradora
Rapprochement des législations
Une situation dans laquelle un véhicule stationné dans un garage privé d’un immeuble depuis plus de 24 heures a pris feu, provoquant un incendie dont l’origine se trouve dans le circuit électrique du véhicule, et causé des dommages à cet immeuble relève de la notion de « circulation des véhicules » au sens de la directive sur l’assurance de responsabilité civile automobile

Línea Directa Aseguradora
Rapprochement des législations
Une situation dans laquelle un véhicule stationné dans un garage privé d’un immeuble depuis plus de 24 heures a pris feu, provoquant un incendie dont l’origine se trouve dans le circuit électrique du véhicule, et causé des dommages à cet immeuble relève de la notion de « circulation des véhicules » au sens de la directive sur l’assurance de responsabilité civile automobile

Ustariz Aróstegui
SOPO
Selon l’accord-cadre sur le travail à durée déterminée, les professeurs agents contractuels de droit public ont droit au même complément de rémunération pour grade que les professeurs fonctionnaires disposant de la même ancienneté si l’accomplissement d’une certaine période de service constitue la seule condition d’octroi de ce complément

Ustariz Aróstegui
SOPO
Selon l’accord-cadre sur le travail à durée déterminée, les professeurs agents contractuels de droit public ont droit au même complément de rémunération pour grade que les professeurs fonctionnaires disposant de la même ancienneté si l’accomplissement d’une certaine période de service constitue la seule condition d’octroi de ce complément

Commission / Pologne (Indépendance des juridictions de droit commun)
Principes du droit communautaire
L’avocat général Tanchev propose à la Cour de juger que les nouvelles règles polonaises concernant la retraite des juges sont contraires au droit de l’Union