Flux européens

Thank you Alison Frankel at Reuters for bringing to my attention Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch. An immigration case which triggered a delightfully written judgment by Gorsuch CJ on the delegation of power to agencies. In particular the founding fathers’ intention, against the background of separation of powers,  with agencies room for statutory interpretation.

Both Ms Frankel’s article and judge Gorsuch’s pieces do much more justice to the debate than I can do in a blog post so I will leave readers first of all to read both. Judge Gorsuch, referring to precedent (Chevron in particular), notes

‘There’s an elephant in the room with us today. We have studiously attempted to work our way around it and even left it unremarked. But the fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.’

Ms Frankel notes that Chevron directed courts defer to executive-branch agencies in the interpretation of ambiguous statutes. Justice Gorsuch reviews what exactly was intended by Chevron and points to the difficulty in excessive deferring to agencies’ interpretation of statutes.

I would summarise his views as ‘Congress meant trias, not quattuor politica.’

My knowledge of US civil procedure does not stretch to understanding what impact Gorsuch CJ’s views have on current US administrative /public law. Anyone out there who can tell me please do. At any rate, the judgment is great material for comparative constitutional law classes, the CJEU’s ECB (C-270/12) case being an obvious port of call.

Geert.

In C-195/15 Mulhaupt, the question referred reads 

Does the term ‘right in rem’ in Article 5(1) of (…) Regulation (…) 1346/2000 (…) on insolvency proceedings include a national rule such as that contained in Paragraph 12 of the Grundsteuergesetz (Law on real property tax, ‘GrStG’) in conjunction with the first sentence of Paragraph 77(2) of the Abgabenordnung (Tax Code, ‘AO’), pursuant to which real property tax debts are by operation of law a public charge on real property and the property owner must accept enforcement against the property in that respect?

Applicant is the trustee in bankruptcy of Société civile immobilière Senior Home, a French registered company. Gemeinde Wedemark is forcing the sale of rel estate belonging to Senior home, linked to arrays in real estate tax. It is suggested by the referring court that the qualification under German law, of real property tax (also known as ‘stamp duties’ or ‘estate taxes’), owed to public authorities, as rights in rem, mean that the forced sale of the site at issue, as a result of Article 5(1) of Regulation 1346/2000, is covered by German law and is therefore not subject to French law, which in the case at issue is the lex concursus of the insolvency proceedings that have been opened. Regulation 1346/2000 in the meantime has been replaced by Regulation 2015/848 however the provisions at issue have not materially changed.

Szpunar AG Opined end May (other than a Tweet I have kept schtum about the Opinion so far, for exam reasons).The Opinion is as yet not available in English.

In terms of applicable law, Article 4 of the Regulation is the general rule: unless otherwise stated by the Regulation, the law of the State of the opening of proceedings is applicable.

The general rule of Article 4 inevitably had to be softened for quite a number of instances. As noted in the introduction, insolvency proceedings involve a wide array of interests. The expediency, efficiency and effectiveness craved inter alia by recital 2 (old; now 3) of the Regulation, has led in particular to the automatic extension of all the effects of the application of the lex concursus by the courts in the State of opening of the proceedings. That could not be done without there being exceptions to the general rule:

In certain cases, the Regulation excludes some rights over assets located abroad from the effects of the insolvency proceedings (as in Articles 5, 6 and 7). In other cases, it ensures that certain effects of the insolvency proceedings are governed not by the law of the State of the opening, but by the law of another State, defined in the abstract by Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 and 15. In such cases, the effects to be given to the proceedings opened in other States are the same effects attributed to a domestic proceedings of equivalent nature (liquidation, composition, or reorganization proceedings) by the law of the State concerned. Of particular note are precisely Article 5 on third parties’ rights in rem, but also Article 10 on employment contracts, and Article 13 on ‘detrimental acts’.

The precise demarcation of rights in rem hovers between the classic interpretative rule of EU private international law, namely the principle of autonomous interpretation, and the lack of a European Ius Commune on what rights in rem are. The Advocate General completes his already extensive analysis in Lutz, with a combined reference to the recitals of the Regulation, and the Virgós/Schmit Report.

In particular, Article 5(2) does serve as something of a straightjacket, leading to the conclusion that rights in rem require restrictive interpretation: once the first hurdle of qualification using national law (of the rei sitae) is passed, the right also needs to  meet with the fundamentals of what the Virgos-Schmit report defines as rights in rem (at 41-45 of the Opinion): these are (at 103 of the Report): a right in rem basically has two characteristics

(a)its direct and immediate relationship with the asset it covers, which remains linked to its satisfaction, without depending on the asset belonging to a person’s estate or on the relationship between the holder of the right in rem and another person;

(b)the absolute nature of the allocation of the right to the holder. This means that the person who holds a right in rem can enforce it against anyone who breaches or harms his right without his assent (e.g. such rights are typically protected by actions to recover); that the right can resist the alienation of the asset to a third party (it can be claimed erga omnes, with the restrictions characteristic of the protection of the bona fide purchaser); and that the right can thus resist individual enforcement by third parties and in collective insolvency proceedings (by its separation or individual satisfaction).

The Virgos-Schmit report in this respect cross-refers to the 1968 Brussels Convention however it is noteworthy that the CJEU, in defining rights in rem under the now Brussels I recast Regulation, does not in turn refer to the Virgos-Schmit report.

In conclusion therefore the AG suggests that the right at issue is indeed a right in rem under Article 5. Finally, that it benefits a public authority (the inland revenue) rather than a private individual or legal person, does not impact upon that qualification: Szpunar AG correctly highlights that the public character of the creditor is not a determining criteria in either the recitals of the Regulation or the Virgos-Schmit report.

A prima facie straightforward question met by complete analysis of the AG which in passing solves more issues than those raised by the referring court: this Opinion may well become an important part of authoritative sources in applying the Insolvency Regulation..

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.7.1 ).

 

By Decision (EU) 2016/1366 of 10 August 2016, the European Commission confirmed the participation of Estonia in the enhanced cooperation that led to Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 on the law applicable to divorce and legal separation (Rome III).

The Rome III Regulation will apply to Estonia from 11 February 2018. Its rules will only apply in Estonia to legal proceedings instituted and to choice-of-law agreements concluded as from the latter date. However, effect shall also be given in Estonia to an agreement on the choice of the applicable law concluded before 11 February 2018, provided that it complies with Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation.

Seventeen Member States, including Estonia, are bound by the Rome III Regulation. Fourteen Member States have been taken part in this enhanced cooperation since the beginning (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia), and three more have joined in subsequently: Lithuania, under Decision (EU) 2012/714, Greece, under Decision (EU) 2014/39, and now Estonia.

I have included Article 15 of the Brussels IIa or IIbis Regulation, 2201/2003, in full below. It allows a court to relinquish a case to another court, if that is in the best interest of the child. I once referred to it in an exam, asking students to discuss Zwiefka MEP’s proposal at the time to introduce an Article 15-type exception in what is now the Brussels I Recast Regulation. Those discussions in the meantime have led in particular to Articles 33-34 of the Recast, on lis alibi pendens with courts in third States and the potential for EU courts to relinquish their jurisdiction.

The question I asked students was how they would rate Article 15 (which incidentally does not require the case to be pending in the alternative court to which the case is being deferred) against classic forum non conveniens provisions. The point being that the former puts courts very much in a straightjacket, which the CJEU was bound to have to untangle. That is exactly what is at stake in C-428/15 Child and Family Agency v JD in which Wathelet AG opined Mid June.

Agne Limante has full listing of the AG’s arguments in CJEL,  I should like to add that the Irish courts were particularly concerned with forum shopping: at 22:

In that regard, it (the referring court, GAvC) considers that the settling in Ireland of United Kingdom nationals who wish to conceal their children from the competent child protection authorities must not be encouraged and, more broadly, that opportunities for forum shopping must not be created or tolerated. However, it asks to what extent such considerations may be taken into account in the implementation of Article 15 of Regulation No 2201/2003.

Interesting case and ditto Opinion.

Geert.

Article 15

Transfer to a court better placed to hear the case

1. By way of exception, the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter may, if they consider that a court of another Member State, with which the child has a particular connection, would be better placed to hear the case, or a specific part thereof, and where this is in the best interests of the child:

(a) stay the case or the part thereof in question and invite the parties to introduce a request before the court of that other Member State in accordance with paragraph 4; or

(b) request a court of another Member State to assume jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 5.

2. Paragraph 1 shall apply:

(a) upon application from a party; or

(b) of the court’s own motion; or

(c) upon application from a court of another Member State with which the child has a particular connection, in accordance with paragraph 3.

A transfer made of the court’s own motion or by application of a court of another Member State must be accepted by at least one of the parties.

3. The child shall be considered to have a particular connection to a Member State as mentioned in paragraph 1, if that Member State:

(a) has become the habitual residence of the child after the court referred to in paragraph 1 was seised; or

(b) is the former habitual residence of the child; or

(c) is the place of the child’s nationality; or

(d) is the habitual residence of a holder of parental responsibility; or

(e) is the place where property of the child is located and the case concerns measures for the protection of the child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of this property.

4. The court of the Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter shall set a time limit by which the courts of that other Member State shall be seised in accordance with paragraph 1.

If the courts are not seised by that time, the court which has been seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14.

5. The courts of that other Member State may, where due to the specific circumstances of the case, this is in the best interests of the child, accept jurisdiction within six weeks of their seisure in accordance with paragraph 1(a) or 1(b). In this case, the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction. Otherwise, the court first seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14.

6. The courts shall cooperate for the purposes of this Article, either directly or through the central authorities designated pursuant to Article 53.

Most of the political attention to the panel’s award on the South East China Sea issue has gone to the implications for Chinese sovereignty in the area. That is in itself neither surprising nor problematic. It is worth highlighting however that 2 out of 6 of the Panel’s conclusions, as listed by Herbert Smith Freehills, relate to environmental protection:

1. failed to protect and preserve the marine environment by tolerating and actively supporting Chinese fishermen in the harvesting of endangered species and the use of harmful fishing methods that damaged the fragile coral reef ecosystem in the South China Sea;
2. inflicted severe harm on the marine environment by constructing artificial islands and engaging in extensive land reclamation at seven reefs in the Spratly Islands;

If one includes a third one, ‘interfered with the traditional fishing activities of Philippine fishermen at Scarborough Shoal;’ as being part of the principle of sustainable development, then half of the Chinese infringements relate to environmental protection in the wide sense. These findings highlight how closely linked environmental protection is to natural resources and to territory generally, and how environmental protection has come of age and is now part of core debates in public international law. Sadly also, of course, how in their search for scarce resources plenty of nations continue to trample freely on values which the 1992 Rio Declaration already found to essentially be part of customary international law.

A Monash student of mine is writing on the Panel report from the environmental angle and I shall share as and when that analysis is available.

Geert.

JZ
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
L’État membre ayant émis un mandat d’arrêt européen est tenu d’examiner, aux fins de déduction de la période de détention subie dans l’État membre d’exécution, si les mesures prises à l’égard de la personne concernée dans ce dernier État emportent un effet privatif de liberté

Tomana e.a. / Conseil et Commission
Relations extérieures
La Cour confirme les mesures restrictives imposées à M. Johannes Tomana, procureur général du Zimbabwe, et à 120 autres personnes et sociétés établies dans ce pays

Si terrà a Torino, il 14 e 15 ottobre 2016, il secondo incontro organizzato nell’ambito del progetto European Civil Procedure for Lawyers: Promoting Training to Improve the Effectiveness of Transnational Justice (segnalato in questo post).

L’incontro, stavolta, avrà ad oggetto il regolamento (UE) n. 655/2014 istitutivo dell’ordinanza europea di sequestro conservativo su conti bancari (OESC).

Si tratta, come il precedente, di un tirocinio formativo a partecipazione attiva con presentazione, discussione e risoluzione di casi concreti. La prima giornata sarà dedicata ai provvedimenti cautelari italiani e l’OESC, nonché alla richiesta di informazioni del creditore sui conti correnti bancari del debitore, mentre il secondo giorno si parlerà di esecuzione e dei rimedi possibili avverso l’OESC.

Interverranno Elena D’Alessandro (Univ. Torino), Silvana Dalla Bontà (Univ. Trento), Paolo Lombardi e Carlo Pavesio (entrambi avvocati del Foro di Torino).

La partecipazione al seminario è gratuita. Le iscrizioni sono già aperte e devono essere richieste tramite e-mail all’indirizzo info@europeancivilprocedureforlawyers.eu non oltre il 1° ottobre 2016.

Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili qui.

È apparso sulla Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea del 26 luglio 2016 il regolamento (UE) 2016/1191 del 6 luglio 2016 che promuove la libera circolazione dei cittadini semplificando i requisiti per la presentazione di alcuni documenti pubblici nell’Unione europea.

Il nuovo strumento è stato adottato sulla base dell’art. 21, par. 2, del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione europea, che consente al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio di adottare disposizioni intese a facilitare l’esercizio del diritto dei cittadini dell’Unione di circolare e soggiornare nel territorio degli Stati membri, adottando le misure necessarie a questo scopo, “salvo che i trattati non abbiano previsto poteri di azione a tal fine”.

Per la materia trattata — le condizioni alle quali è possibile invocare di fronte alle autorità di uno Stato membro gli atti pubblici formati in un diverso Stato membro — il regolamento integra, nei fatti, la più ampia cornice del diritto internazionale privato dell’Unione europea, sviluppatosi sulla base dell’art. 81 del Trattato relativo alla cooperazione giudiziaria in materia civile.

In sostanza, il regolamento dà vita ad un sistema di esenzione dei documenti pubblici dalla legalizzazione o formalità analoghe e di semplificazione di altre formalità.

Il regolamento riguarda soltanto l’autenticità dei documenti pubblici. Gli Stati membri continueranno dunque ad applicare le norme nazionali sul riconoscimento del contenuto e degli effetti dei documenti pubblici provenienti da un altro paese dell’Unione.

I documenti pubblici destinati a beneficiare del nuovo regime sono appena quelli indicati all’art. 2 del regolamento. Fra questi, le certificazioni di nascita, di esistenza in vita, di decesso, gli atti dello stato civile relativi al matrimonio, al divorzio, alla filiazione, e i certificati del casellario giudiziale.

In sintesi, per effetto della nuova misura — che sarà applicabile nella sua interezza solo a decorrere dal 16 febbraio 2019 — i documenti pubblici rilasciati in uno Stato membro dell’Unione dovranno essere accettati come autentici in un altro Stato membro senza necessità di legalizzazione. Inoltre, verrà meno l’obbligo di fornire in tutti i casi una copia autenticata e una traduzione asseverata dei documenti pubblici, potendo essere utilizzato un modulo standard multilingue da presentare come ausilio alla traduzione, allegato al documento pubblico per evitare l’obbligo di traduzione.

Quanto ai rapporti fra le nuove norme e la Convenzione dell’Aja del 5 ottobre 1961 sull’apostille, il regolamento si preoccupa di chiarire, innanzitutto, che il regime europeo non pregiudica “la facoltà delle persone di continuare a beneficiare, se lo desiderano, di altri sistemi di esenzione dei documenti pubblici dalla legalizzazione o da formalità analoghe applicabili tra Stati membri”, aggiungendo, in particolare, che il nuovo regolamento costituisce “uno strumento separato e autonomo rispetto alla convenzione sull’apostille” (considerando n. 4). Pertanto, “anche se non dovrebbe essere possibile per le autorità degli Stati membri di richiedere un’apostille quando una persona presenta loro un documento pubblico cui si applica il presente regolamento e sia rilasciato in un altro Stato membro”, il regolamento non impedisce agli Stati membri di apporre un’apostille se una persona scelga di farne richiesta (considerando n. 5).

Ai sensi dell’art. 19, il regolamento, in effetti, “non pregiudica l’applicazione delle convenzioni internazionali di cui uno o più Stati membri sono parte al momento dell’adozione del regolamento stesso e che riguardano materie disciplinate dallo stesso”, salvo prevalere, “per le materie rientranti nel suo ambito di applicazione e nella misura in esso prevista”, sulle altre disposizioni contenute negli accordi o intese bilaterali o multilaterali conclusi dagli Stati membri “nelle relazioni fra gli Stati membri che ne sono parte”.

Lo stesso art. 19, al par. 4, innovando l’approccio sin qui prevalentemente seguito dall’Unione sul terreno delle relazioni esterne (anche alla luce del parere 1/13 della Corte di Giustizia, del 14 ottobre 2014), stabilisce che il regolamento “non impedisce agli Stati membri di negoziare, concludere, aderire a, modificare o applicare accordi e intese internazionali con paesi terzi riguardanti atti di legalizzazione o formalità analoghe per documenti pubblici su materie oggetto del presente regolamento e rilasciati dalle autorità degli Stati membri o di paesi terzi al fine di essere utilizzati nelle relazioni tra gli Stati membri e i paesi terzi interessati”, né impedisce agli Stati membri di “decidere in merito all’accettazione dell’adesione di nuove parti contraenti a tali accordi e intese a cui uno o più Stati membri aderiscono o possono decidere di aderire”.

Here’s the recipe for Lungowe v Vedanta at the High Court.

Obtain one lb of C-291/02 Owusu: European authority: forum non conveniens has no place in the Brussels jurisdictional regime; particularly now in Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast for as Coulson J points out at 57 in his judgment in Lungowe, Articles 33-34 of the Recast Regulation do foresee consideration in the event of parallel proceedings outside of the EU.

Mix with one lb of Chandler v Cape : English authority: parent companies may in circumstances be held liable for the actions of their foreign subsidiaries; referred to with approval by the Dutch Courts in Shell.

Have Zambian claimants in a case of environmental pollution employ Article 4 to establish jurisdiction against a holding company established in England. The company is a holding company for a diverse group of base metal and mining companies, including the second defendant, Konkola.

The fact that Vedanta are domiciled in the United Kingdom is, evidently, one of the principal reasons why they have been pursued in these proceedings (see Coulson J’s acknowledgment of same at 76). This is a manifestation of forum shopping which the CJEU has certainly encouraged. Moreover, as Coulson J suggests at 77-78, claimants also wish to pursue Vedanta because they are seen as the real architects of the environmental pollution in this part of Zambia. The argument is that, since it is Vedanta who are making millions of pounds out of the mine, it is Vedanta who should be called to account. On balance, the use of Vedanta as an anchor defendant can hardly be seen as a malicious ‘device’ or an abuse of the anchor defendant mechanism.

On that issue of abuse, reference is made by the High Court to Freeport and to CDC at the CJEU. There is no suggestion of course that either are direct precedent for the anchor defendant mechanism in residual national private international law. (Which is the case here: for the Brussels Recast joinder mechanism in Article 7 most certainly does not apply to defendants domiciled outside of the EU). It is telling therefore that the Court does refer to them here. (And inevitably raises the question whether English Court will continue to do so after Brexit).

Both 20 Essex Street and RPC have further discussion. All in all an uplifting day in the English Courts for corporal social responsibility campaigners.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Headings 8.3.1.1., 8.3.2

In C-196/15 Granarolo, extensive reference is made to Brogsitter, in which the CJEU held that the fact that one contracting party brings a civil liability claim against the other is not sufficient to consider that the claim concerns ‘matters relating to a contract’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast. That is the case only where the conduct complained of may be considered a breach of contract, which may be established by taking into account the purpose of the contract, which will in principle be the case only where the interpretation of the contract which links the defendant to the applicant is indispensable to establish the lawful or, on the contrary, unlawful nature of the conduct complained of against the former by the latter. 

Kokott AG Opined that there was no such contractual relationship in the case at hand: see my review of the Opinion. The Court held last week and was less categorical. It suggests a contractual relationship between the parties (which did not have a framework agreement in place: rather a long series of one-off contracts) should not be excluded: the long-standing business relationship which existed between the parties is characterised by the existence of obligations tacitly agreed between them, so that a relationship existed between them that can be classified as contractual (at 25).

What follows can be considered a CJEU addition to the rather byzantine double negative C-26/91 Handte formula: ‘matters relating to a contract is not to be understood as covering a situation in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one party towards another’. In Granarolo at 26 the Court notes

The existence of a tacit relationship of that kind cannot, however, be presumed and must, therefore, be demonstrated. Furthermore, that demonstration must be based on a body of consistent evidence, which may include in particular the existence of a long-standing business relationship, the good faith between the parties, the regularity of the transactions and their development over time expressed in terms of quantity and value, any agreements as to prices charged and/or discounts granted, and the correspondence exchanged.

These criteria obviously are quite specific to the question at hand yet it is the first time the Court, carefully, ventures to give indications of some kind of a European ius commune on the existence of ‘a contract’.

Whether any such contract then is a contract for the sale of goods or one for services, is not a call the Court wishes to make. It lists the various criteria it has hitherto deployed, with extensive reference in particular to C-9/12 Corman-Collins, and leaves the decision up to the national court.

Make a mental note of Granarolo. It may turn out to have been quite pivotal. Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2, Heading 2.2.11.2.9

Maschek
Libre circulation des personnes
Lorsqu’il met lui-même fin à sa relation de travail, un travailleur a droit à une indemnité financière s’il n’a pas pu épuiser tout ou partie de son droit au congé annuel payé

Kotnik e.a.
Aide d'État
La communication de la Commission concernant les aides au secteur bancaire est valide

Tele2 Sverige
Rapprochement des législations
Selon l’avocat général Saugmandsgaard Øe, une obligation générale de conservation de données imposée par un État membre aux fournisseurs de services de communications électroniques peut être compatible avec le droit de l’Union

Il 30 giugno 2016, la Commissione europea ha presentato la proposta di revisione del regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 relativo alla competenza, al riconoscimento e all’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e in materia di responsabilità genitoriale (“Bruxelles II bis”). La proposta, accompagnata da un comunicato stampa e da una scheda che ne delinea i caratteri principali, interviene dopo una lunga fase di studio (l’agenda dei lavori e l’esito degli incontri del gruppo di esperti a tal fine designato possono essere consultati a questo indirizzo), nell’ambito della quale è stata prodotta, in particolare, una valutazione d’impatto che ha evidenziato le criticità della disciplina esistente, soprattutto con riguardo alla sottrazione internazionale dei minori.

La Commissione suggerisce di rifondere l’attuale regime in un regolamento nuovo, che manterrebbe sostanzialmente invariate le disposizioni in tema di divorzio, separazione personale e annullamento del matrimonio, introducendo, viceversa, una serie di novità sul terreno dei procedimenti in tema di responsabilità genitoriale e di sottrazione.

Il testo risultante dalla prospettata rifusione tiene conto dei molti gli strumenti normativi adottati dall’Unione europea nel campo del diritto internazionale privato della famiglia dopo l’elaborazione del regolamento Bruxelles II bis (in particolare, i regolamenti relativi alle obbligazioni alimentari, alla legge applicabile a separazione e divorzio, nonché, recentemente, ai regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi e agli effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate), oltre che della pronunce rese dalla Corte di giustizia per interpretare il regolamento.

In generale, nella prospettiva della Commissione, il futuro regolamento dovrebbe: snellire i procedimenti relativi alla responsabilità genitoriale; rafforzare la tutela e la promozione dei diritti fondamentali, in armonia col principio del superiore interesse del minore garantito dall’art. 24, par. 1, della Carta sui diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea e dall’art. 12 della Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti del fanciullo; rafforzare il ruolo della Rete giudiziaria europea in materia civile e commerciale; chiarire e consolidare le funzioni delle Autorità centrali designate da ciascuno Stato membro per garantire lo spedito ritorno del minore in caso di illecito trasferimento o mancato rientro.

Tra le novità prefigurate dalla proposta si segnalano le seguenti.

1. È istituita una procedura autonoma per il collocamento dei minori a carattere transnazionale. A tal fine, è stabilito un termine di otto settimane per lo Stato membro investito della richiesta di collocamento. La proposta introduce requisiti uniformi per i documenti necessari per il collocamento del minore, tra cui un obbligo di traduzione nella lingua dello Stato membro richiesto: l’autorità richiedente deve presentare una relazione sul minore e precisare i motivi sottesi alla richiesta di collocamento.

2. Viene introdotta una disposizione ai sensi della quale, al minore capace di discernimento (“who is capable of forming his or her own views”), deve essere data la possibilità “reale ed effettiva” di esprimere liberamente le proprie opinioni durante il procedimento che lo interessa (art. 20). L’art. 22 dispone che ciascuno Stato membro concentri dinanzi ad un numero limitato di tribunali la competenza per le richieste di ritorno (e che comunichi alla Commissione tali tribunali); avverso una decisione che disponga il ritorno del minore ovvero che lo neghi, sarà ammesso un solo grado di appello (art. 23, par. 4).

3. Si prevede l’abolizione della procedura di exequatur per tutte le decisioni concernenti la responsabilità genitoriale (art. 30 e seguenti). Il canale di circolazione preferenziale che il regolamento Bruxelles II bis accorda oggi alle sole decisioni relative al diritto di visita e a certe decisioni sul ritorno del minore sarà dunque esteso anche alle decisioni per cui, come quelle concernenti l’affidamento, il regolamento richiede ancora una dichiarazione di esecutività. L’abolizione dell’exequatur è accompagnata da tutele procedurali volte a garantire il diritto del convenuto ad un ricorso effettivo e ad un giudice imparziale sancito nell’art. 47 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali (articoli 40-42).

La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne s’associe à l’hommage rendu aux victimes de l’attentat du 14 juillet à Nice

The CJEU has confirmed the views of Szpunar AG in C-222/15 Hőszig /Hoszig, without (much as expected) entertaining the lex fori prorogati rule of the Brussels I Recast.

Can choice of court made in underlying documentation in the context of a tender, for which Hőszig entered a winning bid, be considered valid under Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation (now: Article 25 Brussels I Recast)? Yes, the Court said, with explicit reference to the AG. Crucial point in the consideration is whether per Case 24/76 Colzani an explicit reference to the choice has been made, reference which can be controlled by a party applying normal diligence and where it is established that the general conditions containing the jurisdiction clause was actually communicated to the other contracting party (at 40 in Hoszig). This was so in the case at issue. The court points out that Article 23 (and now Article 25) includes mostly formal requirements (expression of consent, see the references in my posting on the AG’s Opinion) and only one substantial requirement (choice of court needs to relate to an identified legal relationship between the parties). The remainder of discussion on the substantive requirements with respect to the choice of court agreement, is subject to the lex causae of that separate choice of court agreement (exactly why the current Regulation now includes the lex fori prorogati rule; Szpunar AG’s discussion of this clause however was not required to settle the issue and therefore the Court does not look into it).

‘(T)he Paris Courts [have exclusive and final jurisdiction]’ is sufficient for the CJEU to determine the choice of court with precision: it is perfectly acceptable that it will subsequently be French civil procedure laws that will determine precisely which court will have jurisdiction.

A sensible judgment following clear Opinion of the Advocate General, together further completing the choice of court provisions of Brussels I.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9 Heading 2.2.9.4. Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.2 .

 

 

Promoimpresa
Liberté d'établissement
Le droit de l’Union s’oppose à ce que les concessions pour l’exercice des activités touristico-récréatives dans le domaine maritime et lacustre soient prorogées de manière automatique en l’absence de toute procédure de sélection des candidats potentiels

Allemagne / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal de l’UE annule la décision de la Commission ordonnant à l’Allemagne de récupérer auprès de Deutsche Post une partie des subventions relatives aux retraites des anciens fonctionnaires postaux

Dal 16 al 27 agosto 2016 si svolgerà a Urbino il 58ème Séminaire de Droit Comparé et Européen, organizzato dal Centro di studi giuridici europei dell’Università di Urbino “Carlo Bo” in collaborazione con l’Istituto svizzero di diritto comparato.

Nell’ambito dell’iniziativa si succederanno lezioni e conferenze su temi di diritto comparato ed europeo, diritto del commercio internazionale e diritto internazionale privato.

Quest’anno il seminario ospiterà, fra le altre, le lezioni di François Mailhé (Univ. Panthéon-Assas, Paris II) su Les accords d’élection de for, vieilles questions et nouveaux territoires, di Tuto Rossi (Univ. Fribourg) sugli Sviluppi recenti delle garanzie bancarie nel commercio internazionale, di Chris Thomale (Univ. Heidelberg) dal titolo A la recherche d’une coordination des compétences universelles civiles entre l’Union européenne et les Etats tiers, di Luigi Mari (Univ. Urbino “Carlo Bo”) su Il diritto internazionale privato sammarinese; di Paolo Morozzo Della Rocca (Univ. Urbino “Carlo Bo”) su Mariage et nationalité, e di Ilaria Pretelli (Istituto svizzero di diritto comparato) su Language, law and judicial training ou bien Les relations tripartites en droit international privé.

Le iscrizioni sono aperte sino al 30 luglio 2016. Occorre, a tal fine, inviare la domanda di partecipazione, compilata e sottoscritta, a edoardo.rossi@uniurb.it.

Maggiori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo. Il flyer dell’iniziativa è consultabile qui.