Flux européens

The Belgian Council of State, chamber of legislation (in the title I call it a ‘parliamentary watchdog: for that is what it is. By issuing prior opinions on the legality of legislative initiative it guards against illegal Statute) has opined that a private members bill banning unstunned slaughter, does not pass the ECHR test.

A European Regulation (1099/2009) provides for an unclear, and conditional,  exemption for religious (regularly rather offendingly called ‘ritual’) slaughter. Practised in particular by the Jewish (Shechita; leading to ‘kosher’ meat) and Muslim (Zabihah; with halal meat) faith, a core aspect of the practice is that animals are not stunned prior to slaughter. The science on the effect of stunned or unstunned slaugther is  unequivocal, and most certainly neither stunned nor unstunned slaughter, when carried out incorrectly (well documented in the case of stunned slaughter) does not aid the welfare of the animal.

Religious slaughter falls squarely within the European Convention of Human Rights Article 9’s freedom of religious expression. Hence the Council of State summarily (its conciseness is rather attractive) reviews the ECtHR’s case-law and concludes that the proposed ban would be both unconstitutional and clearly against the provisions of the ECHR. On the EU Regulation front, I believe the EU rules are more problematic than the Opinion suggests (I have analysis on it forthcoming) however on the ECHR side of things, the Opinion could not be more correct. An outright ban on unstunned slaughter in the name of animal welfare or otherwise would offend freedom of religious expression to such a degree that it simply must not pass.

Geert.

Genentech
Concurrence
Le bénéficiaire d’une licence de brevet doit payer la redevance convenue même s’il ne contrefait pas la technologie brevetée

Tommy Hilfiger Licensing e.a.
Rapprochement des législations
L’exploitant d’une place de marché physique peut se voir contraint de faire cesser les infractions commises par les marchands en matière de marque

Engagement solennel devant la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne de nouveaux membres de la Cour des comptes européenne

For the facts of the case, and the reasoning of the AG in C-559/14 Meroni, I refer to my earlier posting. At the end of May (I am indeed still hoovering up the queue) the Court held very much alongside Kokott AG’s Opinion, I shall therefore not repeat its reasoning here. The CJEU does insist that if third parties rights are directly affected with the intensity as in the case at issue, that third person must be entitled to assert his rights before the court of origin (which English courts provide for), lest one runs the risk of the injunction being refused recognition under ordre public. As I had feared, the Court does not address the AG’s concern whether Mareva orders actually constitute a ‘judgment’ for the purposes of the Regulation.

Post Brexit, this considerable attraction of English courts in interlocutory proceedings might become a lot less real. (Like many of us, I am working on a short review of Brexit consequences for European private international law).

Geert.

(Handbook of) European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, 2.2.16.1.1, 2.2.16.1.4

Future Enterprises / EUIPO - McDonald's International Property (MACCOFFEE)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Selon le Tribunal de l’UE, la renommée des marques de McDonald’s permet de faire échec à l’enregistrement, pour les produits alimentaires ou les boissons, de marques combinant le préfixe « Mac » ou « Mc » avec le nom d’un produit alimentaire ou d’une boisson

È in programma per i giorni 30 settembre e 1° ottobre 2016 a San Ginesio (MC) la sesta edizione dell’Incontro dei dottorandi di ricerca di diritto internazionale.

L’evento, promosso dalla Società Italiana di Diritto Internazionale e di diritto dell’Unione europea in collaborazione con il Centro Internazionale Studi Gentiliani, offre ai dottorandi di ricerca in diritto internazionale, diritto internazionale privato e diritto dell’Unione europea iscritti al secondo anno la possibilità di presentare i risultati parziali delle proprie indagini e di promuovere il dibattito sui temi affrontati.

I dottorandi interessati possono inviare la propria candidatura compilando questo modulo ed inviandolo all’indirizzo mail info@sidi-isil.it entro il 20 luglio 2016.

Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili qui.

On 20 April 2016, AG Szpunar delivered his Opinion in the case C-135/15, Hellenic Republic v Nikiforidis. The case concerns the temporal scope of application of Regulation (EC) 593/2008 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome I), and the interpretation of Article 9(3) of the same Regulation, concerning the overriding mandatory provisions of third countries.

The referring court, the German Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Court for Labour Matters), was seised by Mr Nikiforidis, a teacher in a public school that was managed and run, in Germany, by the Hellenic Republic. Mr Nikiforidis’ claim concerned the salary due to him from 2010 to 2012. The amount of the salary had been unilaterally reduced by the employer under one of the austerity packages adopted by the Greek legislature in connection with the country’s sovereign debt crisis. This led Mr Nikiforidis to sue the Greek Ministry of Education, seeking the payment of the sums withheld.

The Bundesarbeitsgericht found that the Hellenic Republic could not avail itself of State immunity, since the duties performed by a public school teacher are not so closely connected to its sovereign or governmental activities as to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts of any other State. The Federal Court further held it possessed jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 18(1) and 19(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussel I).

As to the applicable law, the Bundesarbeitsgericht observed that the contract should be deemed to be governed by German law, although it failed to specify the provisions on which this finding was grounded. It conceded, however, that the Greek statutes mentioned above could be regarded as overriding mandatory provisions of a third country, insofar as their respect is, quite indisputably, crucial for safeguarding the public interests of the Hellenic Republic, namely its economic organisation.

The first question submitted to the ECJ precisely concerns the legal basis upon which ‘effect may be given’ to provisions of this kind. As it is, the approach taken by the Rome I Regulation in respect of overriding mandatory provisions of third countries is somewhat stricter than the one adopted under the Rome Convention of 19 June 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations.

While Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention provides that ‘effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of [any] country with which the situation has a close connection’, Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation sets forth, for these purposes, two requirements. The rules in question, in fact: (i) must belong to ‘the law of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed’; (ii) may be taken into consideration for the purposes of Article 9(3) only insofar as the effect of their application consists in rendering the performance of the contract ‘unlawful’.

It is also worth remembering that the Republic of Germany has entered into a reservation to Article 7(1) of the 1980 Rome Convention, which, according to the EU Commission, translates into the impossibility, for German courts, of giving effect, by any means, to overriding mandatory provisions of third countries when that instrument applies rations temporis (cfr. para 99 of the Opinion).

Pursuant to its Article 28, the Rome I Regulation  applies to ‘contracts concluded after 17 December 2009’. As far as continuing contracts are concerned, this rule evidently determines a considerable extension of the temporal emprise of the regime set forth by the Rome Convention, insofar as it will still apply to durable contractual relationships constituted before that date.  According to  AG Szpunar, anyway,  the intrinsic characteristics of the contract concerned have no bearings in the interpretation and application of Article 28, which therefore applies also to continuing contracts (para 51).

As the relevant point in time for the conclusion of the contract, the Advocate General suggests that it shall be determined according to  the provisions of the putatively applicable lex causae. The Rome I Regulation accordingly applies, ratione temporis, provided that, under the (substantive) law which would govern the case were that Regulation applicable, the contract is regarded as concluded after 17 December 2009 (para 40). The shaping, to these purposes, of an autonomous solution of EU law is, in fact, deemed impractical (para 41).

The putatively applicable lex causae  shall also determine whether any subsequent modification occurred to the contractual relationship is of such a kind and extent as to be regarded as conclusion of a new contract.

The second question submitted to the Court of Justice presupposes the ascertained applicability, ratione temporis, of the Rome I Regulation. The seised court asks whether ‘effect may be given’ under its domestic law  (namely article 241(2) BGB)  to overriding mandatory provisions of a third countries. This on the assumption that the pre-conditions for the triggering of Article 9(3) are not satisfied, being Germany – and not Greece –  the place of performance of the obligations arising out of the contract at stake.

In the Advocate General’s view, nonetheless, Article 9(3) might still apply to the case under examination. The pre-requirements set forth by that provision should not, he contends, be narrowly understood, because a strict reading would run counter  the very rationale underlying the “taking into consideration” of overriding mandatory provisions of a third country (para 87). On the other hand, a more lenient understanding of the concepts therein employed would favour more equitable solutions in the specific case and prevent forum shopping malus (paras 88-89).

In particular, the identification of the ‘place of performance of the obligations arising out of the contract’ should not follow, under Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation, the same reasoning postulated by Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation. Under the former provision, that concept should rather be understood as encompassing not only the place in which the obligation in question has to be materially executed, but also any other place featuring a significant connection with either the legal order or the sovereign powers of the concerned third-country (para 93).

Hence, the fact that the Hellenic Republic contributes, with its budget, to the funding of the (public) service provided by the school in which Mr Nikiforidis is employed may be an argument for finding that the obligations arising out of the contract of employment are to be performed, to a certain extent, also in Greece.

The third preliminary question submitted to the ECJ concerned the role of the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU in the (indirect) application of overriding mandatory provisions of another Member State. According to the Advocate General, said principle has no bearing in the application of the substantive law appointed by the instruments of private international law. Specifically, it could not, as such, compel the seised court to apply the overriding mandatory provisions of another Member State, not even when these latter are meant to implement a measure decided by the EU itself. This circumstance might, nonetheless, be taken into account to the purposes of the assessment required to the court under the final line of Article 9(3).

Szpunar AG’s Opinion in C-135/15 Hellenic Republic v Grigorios Nikiforidis has travelled half the world with me in my briefcase. Time to tackle the blog queue…

As I had reported earlier, the Bundesarbeitsgericht has given the CJEU an opportunity to provide much needed clarity on the application of Rome I to continuing (employment) contracts, and on the Regulation (or as the case may be, the Rome convention)’s provisions on overriding mandatory law.

The Opinion (not available in English) first of all clarifies the temporal scope of Rome I. Article 28 Rome I provides that it applies to contracts concluded ‘as from 17 December 2009’ (this is the corrected format; initially Article 28 read ‘after’). When exactly a contract is ‘concluded’ needs to be determined in accordance with the putative lex causae as identified by the Regulation (an extension of Article 10(1), suggested by most if not all of relevant scholarship). What, however, about ‘continuing’ contracts’: those concluded before the temporal scope of the Regulation, continuing after, however renewed, renegotiated, amended…: do these continue to be covered by the Rome convention ad infinitum, or is there a cut-off point at which these continuing contracts become newly concluded?

I had suggested in my earlier posting that one’s intuitive assumption may be to prefer autonomous interpretation of the concept ‘concluded’. That, after all, is the standard approach of the Court. However I argued that in the current state of (lack of) harmonisation of contractual law, it is more likely that the Court will prefer an Article 10(1) type solution. Szpunar AG is of the same opinion. He first of all points out (at 33) that secondary EU  law need not necessarily include verbatim transitionary measures. In the absence of a specific regime, the general rule is that the new provisions immediately apply to future effects of situations that arose under the old regime. Rome I’s transitory regime therefore, with its reference to date of ‘conclusion’  is an exception to that general principle. Can that moment of conclusion be autonomously defined? Szpunar AG shares my intuition (at 35 ff): along the lines of Article 10’s regime (the van Munchausen or the ‘bootstrap’ principle) the lex causae has to determine the moment of conclusion. For long-term contracts, this will inevitably lead to uncertainty (at 49). Yet that does not take away the soundness of the rule.

 

Next up is the application of Article 9’s provision on overriding mandatory provisions. This is the first time the CJEU will rule on that Article (Unamar was held under the Rome Convention). The Regulation quite deliberately limited the room for manoeuvre for the court seized to apply overriding mandatory law other than that of the forum: only such laws of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract ‘have to be performed’ can come into calling. That place is likely to be Germany in the case at issue (the Regulation does not define ‘place of performance’ under Article 9(3)) – however the AG suggests differently: there are a variety of reasons to assume that Greece, too, can be that place (at 95).

Szpunar AG first of all, in his very first para, remarks that scholarly attention to ‘lois de police’ far exceeds its featuring in practice. He also notes that von Savigny himself discussed ordre public (at 68 with references) and succinctly discusses the difference between the two (at 69-70). He repeats (at 78) that scholarly attention to overriding mandatory law has been excessive. He then rejects the suggestion that Article 9(3) needs to be applied restrictively to such a degree that its application becomes pretty much near-impossible. Importantly, he rejects in the process (a la Kainz) a strict parallel between ‘performance’ in Article 9(3) Rome I and Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast, and suggest that while the latter needs strict interpretation in line with the overall interpretative rules of that Regulation, there is no such need for Article 9(3) (at 92).

I wonder whether the Court will still hold before the recess (professor Szpunar Opined in April: I did flag there is a queue of cases waiting to be reviewed…

Geert.

Kossowski
DFON
Un suspect peut de nouveau être poursuivi dans un État Schengen lorsque les poursuites antérieures dans un autre État Schengen ont été clôturées sans instruction approfondie

The Max Planck Institute Luxembourg, heading an international consortium, is undertaking a study, funded by the European Commission, aiming to assess the impact of domestic laws of civil procedure of the 28 Member States on mutual trust and the free circulation of judgements, as well as on the enforcement of consumer rights derived from EU law.

As a part of this project, a public consultation has been launched for gathering data and opinions among stakeholders.

Direct access to the two online questionnaires, which mirror the two separate strands of the study, are currently available (in six languages) here.

The Institute encourages consumers, lawyers, judges, academics, consumer protection associations, business/trade associations, dispute resolution facilitators, and those working in other legal professions to respond to both questionnaires.

For those wishing to offer further insights on any of the topics covered by the study, it will be possible to leave the contact details at the end of the survey so as to be contacted for an interview.

Portugal Telecom / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal de l’UE confirme l’illégalité de la clause de non-concurrence entre Portugal Telecom et Telefónica dans le cadre de l’acquisition de l’opérateur mobile brésilien Vivo par Telefónica

Portugal Telecom / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal de l’UE confirme l’illégalité de la clause de non-concurrence entre Portugal Telecom et Telefónica dans le cadre de l’acquisition de l’opérateur mobile brésilien Vivo par Telefónica

In un’ordinanza del 21 aprile 2016, il Tribunale di Milano ha individuato il parametro fattuale a cui ancorare la sussistenza della giurisdizione rispetto ad una domanda di sequestro conservativo di crediti presso terzi.

La vicenda alla base della pronucia puó essere riassunta come segue.

Il creditore procedente, sulla base di una sentenza della High Court of Justice inglese, dichiarata esecutiva in Italia in base al regolamento n. 44/2001 (Bruxelles I), chiedeva al giudice italiano il sequestro conservativo di un credito vantato dalla propria parte debitrice nei confronti di un terzo, residente a Montecarlo ma domiciliato a Milano.

In ragione della parrallela pendenza di un procedimento di opposizione avverso l’ordinanza di exequatur, instaurato dal debitore, l’attività esecutiva espletabile sulla base del titolo estero era infatti limitata ai soli provvedimenti di carattere conservativo (art. 47, par. 3, del Regolamento Bruxelles I).  Similmente, l’attuale art. 44 par.1, lett. a), del regolamento n. 1215/2012 (Bruxelles I bis) prevede che, in pendenza di una domanda di diniego dell’esecuzione, l’autorità dello Stato Membro a cui è richiesta l’esecuzione possa, su istanza di parte, “limitare il procedimento di esecuzione ai provvedimenti cautelari”.

Nel caso in esame, la richiesta di sequestro riguardava, in particolare, le somme dovute dal terzo (promissario acquirente) alla parte debitrice nel procedimento in esame (promittente venditore) sulla base di un contratto preliminare di compravendita di immobili, e le somme già versate dal terzo sulla base del contratto medesimo.

Il Tribunale milanese, rilevata innanzitutto la necessità di verificare la sussistenza della giurisdizione italiana rispetto alla domanda di sequestro conservativo, individua la norma di riferimento nell’art. 22 del citato regolamento n. 44/2001 (corrispondente all’attuale art. 24, par. 5, del regolamento Bruxelles I bis). Questo prevede, “in materia di esecuzione delle decisioni”, la competenza esclusiva dei “giudici dello Stato Membro nel cui territorio ha luogo l’esecuzione”.

Alla luce del carattere esclusivo di tale capo di giurisdizione, il giudice procedente ritiene di escludere, nel caso di specie, la rilevanza di una qualsivoglia accettazione tacita di giurisdizione desumibile dal fatto che il terzo sia comparso in udienza senza nulla eccepire sul punto.

Al contrario, secondo il giudice, la verifica circa la sussistenza della giurisdizione italiana deve ispirarsi ad una lettura teleologicamente orientata della suddetta regola di giurisdizione, che tenga conto della necessità di concretizzare il principio di prossimità rispetto una fattispecie, come quella in esame, in cui l’oggetto dell’attività esecutiva richiesta – il credito – presenta una natura immateriale che ne rende difficile la localizzazione.

Su queste basi, il Tribunale ritiene di disattendere la ricostruzione proposta dalle Sezioni unite della Corte di cassazione nella sentenza 5 Novembre 1981 n. 5827, con cui si ancorava la giurisdizione in materia di esecuzione delle decisioni al luogo in cui è sorta o deve essere adempiuta l’obbligazione. Parimenti inadeguato è parso al giudice il suggerimento della dottrina di localizzare l’attività esecutiva da espletare presso il terzo al luogo ove questi si trova, essendo egli il vero soggetto passivo dell’esecuzione.

Secondo l’ordinanza qui segnalata, nessuna di queste soluzioni è in grado garantire in misura sufficiente il rispetto di quei principi – in particolare, prossimità ed efficiente amministrazione della giustizia sotto il profilo istruttorio – che, per consolidata giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia, devono guidare l’interprete nella localizzazione della fattispecie ai fini delle regole uniformi di giurisdizione stabilite dal Regolamento Bruxelles I. La sussistenza della giurisdizione può semmai essere affermata soltanto sulla base di una complessiva valutazione del rapporto dal quale il credito da sequestrare deriva. In particolare, la presenza di un promissario acquirente e di un promittente venditore, entrambi domiciliati in Italia, che concludono – a Milano – un contratto preliminare avente ad oggetto immobili siti in Italia consente, nel caso specifico, di ritenere che il rapporto tra debitore e terzo sia sottoposto alla giurisdizione del giudice italiano.

Quanto alle difese allegate dall’asserito debitore, l’eccezione di prescrizione del diritto vantato dal creditore sequestrante, avanzata in sede di opposizione alla dichiarazione di esecutività e riproposta davanti al giudice adito con la domanda di sequestro, è ritenuta da quest’ultimo non proponibile nel procedimento in esame, ma solo, eventualmente, nel successivo procedimento esecutivo vero e proprio. Tale eccezione, nota il giudice, è tuttavia di dubbia ammissibilità anche in sede di opposizione all’exequatur, posto che essa non figura tra la lista (esaustiva) dei motivi per cui il giudice può, ai sensi dell’art. 45 del regolamento Bruxelles I, revocare l’exequatur.

Commission / Portugal
Droit institutionnel
Pour avoir tardé à mettre en œuvre la directive sur le traitement des eaux urbaines résiduaires, le Portugal est condamné à une somme forfaitaire de 3 millions d’euros et à une astreinte de 8 000 euros par jour de retard

Commission / Portugal
Droit institutionnel
Pour avoir tardé à mettre en œuvre la directive sur le traitement des eaux urbaines résiduaires, le Portugal est condamné à une somme forfaitaire de 3 millions d’euros et à une astreinte de 8 000 euros par jour de retard

New Valmar
Libre circulation des personnes
L’obligation d’établir des factures transfrontalières exclusivement dans une langue spécifique, sous peine de nullité, enfreint le droit de l’Union

New Valmar
Libre circulation des personnes
L’obligation d’établir des factures transfrontalières exclusivement dans une langue spécifique, sous peine de nullité, enfreint le droit de l’Union

As previously announced and reminded on this blog, on 6t and 7 April 2017 the University of Bonn will host a conference on the topic Politics and Private International Law (?).

The conference aims to discuss the different aspects of the interaction between conflict of law rules and the reaching of substantive goals, highlighting as well its advantages and disadvantages.

The proposals for conference papers (of not more than 1.000 words in German language and without any reference to the authorship) should be submitted to nachwuchs-ipr(at)institut-familienrecht.de until 30 June 2016, 12 am CET.

Further information can be found here.

As I had feared /as was to be expected, the CJEU did not follow Szpunar AG’s lead in formally letting go of Case 21/76 Bier‘s Erfolgort /Handlungsort distinction, even if it did accept the AG’s rejection in the case at issue, of the mere presence of a bank account triggering jurisdiction for tort under (now) Article 7(2) Brussels I Recast.

Kolassa upheld jurisdiction in favour of the courts for the place of domicile of the applicant by virtue of where the damage occurred, if that damage materialises directly in the applicant’s bank account held with a bank established within the area of jurisdiction of those courts. The case was distinguished however, for in that case there where ‘circumstances contributing to attributing jurisdiction to those courts.’ In general, the Court held, ‘purely financial damage which occurs directly in the applicant’s bank account cannot, in itself, be qualified as a ‘relevant connecting factor’‘ (at 38) . ‘ It is only where the other circumstances specific to the case also contribute to attributing jurisdiction to the courts for the place where a purely financial damage occurred, that such damage could, justifiably, entitle the applicant to bring the proceedings before the courts for that place.‘ (at 39).

The Court at 38 flags a rather interesting and relevant argument for dismissing pure presence of  a bank account as a determining connecting factor: a company such as Universal Music may have had the choice of several bank accounts from which to pay the settlement amount, so that the place where that account is situated does not necessarily constitute a reliable connecting factor. What the Court is essentially saying is that in such circumstance the applicant can manipulate jurisdiction and hence shop for a forum: which is not part of the jurisdictional rule for tort.

Crucially of course we are left having to ponder what exactly ‘other circumstances’ than location of bank account may imply.

Geert.

 

(Handbook of) European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Headings 2.2.11.2, 2.2.11.2.7