Flux européens

Depesme et Kerrou
Libre circulation des personnes
Selon l’avocat général Wathelet, un enfant au sein d’une famille recomposée peut être considéré comme l’enfant du beau-parent en matière d’avantage social transfrontalier

Pesce e.a.
Agriculture
La Commission peut obliger les États membres à enlever tous les végétaux susceptibles d’être infectés par la bactérie Xylella fastidiosa, même en l’absence de symptômes d’infection, lorsqu’ils se trouvent à proximité de végétaux déjà infectés par cette bactérie

Pesce e.a.
Agriculture
La Commission peut obliger les États membres à enlever tous les végétaux susceptibles d’être infectés par la bactérie Xylella fastidiosa, même en l’absence de symptômes d’infection, lorsqu’ils se trouvent à proximité de végétaux déjà infectés par cette bactérie

Pesce e.a.
Agriculture
La Commission peut obliger les États membres à enlever tous les végétaux susceptibles d’être infectés par la bactérie Xylella fastidiosa, même en l’absence de symptômes d’infection, lorsqu’ils se trouvent à proximité de végétaux déjà infectés par cette bactérie

EGEDA e.a.
Rapprochement des législations PROP
La directive sur le droit d’auteur s’oppose à ce que la compensation équitable destinée aux auteurs en cas de copie privée de leurs œuvres soit soumise à un système de financement budgétaire tel que celui institué en Espagne

EGEDA e.a.
Rapprochement des législations PROP
La directive sur le droit d’auteur s’oppose à ce que la compensation équitable destinée aux auteurs en cas de copie privée de leurs œuvres soit soumise à un système de financement budgétaire tel que celui institué en Espagne

EGEDA e.a.
Rapprochement des législations PROP
La directive sur le droit d’auteur s’oppose à ce que la compensation équitable destinée aux auteurs en cas de copie privée de leurs œuvres soit soumise à un système de financement budgétaire tel que celui institué en Espagne

Entrée en fonction de nouveaux juges au Tribunal

Entrée en fonction de nouveaux juges au Tribunal

In  AVOTIŅŠ v Latvia, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR at Strasbourg held late May that Article 6 ECHR (right to fair trial) was engaged but not infringed by the Latvian’s Supreme Court’s application of Article 34(2( Brussel I (now Article 45(1) b Brussels I Recast).

The Article reads ‘A judgment shall not be recognised: (…) 2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so;…

In the case at issue applicant sought refusal by the Latvian court of recognition of a Cypriot judgment issued against him. After review of the Regulation’s core pedigree of mutual recognition and mutual trust, burden of proof particularly exercised the Court: at 121:

‘The fact that the applicant relied on that Article (34(2), GAVC) without having challenged the judgment as required necessarily raised the question of the availability of that legal remedy in Cyprus in the circumstances of the present case. In such a situation the Senate was not entitled simply to criticise the applicant, as it did in its judgment of 31 January 2007, for not appealing against the judgment concerned, and to remain silent on the issue of the burden of proof with regard to the existence and availability of a remedy in the State of origin; Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, like Article 34(2) in fine of the Brussels I Regulation, required it to verify that this condition was satisfied, in the absence of which it could not refuse to examine the applicant’s complaint. The Court considers that the determination of the burden of proof, which, as the European Commission stressed (see paragraph 92 above), is not governed by European Union law, was therefore decisive in the present case. Hence, that point should have been examined in adversarial proceedings leading to reasoned findings. However, the Supreme Court tacitly presumed either that the burden of proof lay with the defendant or that such a remedy had in fact been available to the applicant. This approach, which reflects a literal and automatic application of Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation, could in theory lead to a finding that the protection afforded was manifestly deficient such that the presumption of equivalent protection of the rights of the defence guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 is rebutted. Nevertheless, in the specific circumstances of the present application the Court does not consider this to be the case, although this shortcoming is regrettable.’

Those ‘specific circumstances’ include in particular the applicant’s professional background: at 124:

‘the applicant, who was an investment consultant, should have been aware of the legal consequences of the acknowledgment of debt deed which he had signed. That deed was governed by Cypriot law, concerned a sum of money borrowed by the applicant from a Cypriot company and contained a clause conferring jurisdiction on the Cypriot courts. Accordingly, the applicant should have ensured that he was familiar with the manner in which possible proceedings would be conducted before the Cypriot courts (…). Having omitted to obtain information on the subject he contributed to a large extent, as a result of his inaction and lack of diligence, to bringing about the situation of which he complained before the Court and which he could have prevented so as to avoid incurring any damage’. 

I am not convinced by the Court’s view on the burden of proof ad on the national court’s duty to assess the law in the State of origin sua sponte. Judges Lemmens and Briede, jointly concurring but for different reasons as the court, in my view have the better argument where they say

‘If the applicant wanted to argue that no remedy had in fact been available to him in Cyprus, in our opinion it would have been for him to raise this issue explicitly before the Supreme Court. We question whether he could expect the Supreme Court to raise that issue of its own motion. And we definitely consider that he cannot complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the lack of an explicit response to an argument that was not explicitly made.’

The end result is the same at the ECtHR. For future application of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation however it makes a big difference.

Geert.

 

 

Affum
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La « directive retour » s’oppose à ce qu’un ressortissant d’un pays non UE puisse, avant d’être soumis à la procédure de retour, être mis en prison au seul motif de son entrée irrégulière sur le territoire d’un État membre via une frontière intérieure de l’espace Schengen

Affum
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La « directive retour » s’oppose à ce qu’un ressortissant d’un pays non UE puisse, avant d’être soumis à la procédure de retour, être mis en prison au seul motif de son entrée irrégulière sur le territoire d’un État membre via une frontière intérieure de l’espace Schengen

I contratti internazionali di agenzia e distribuzione dall’Europa all’Oriente è il titolo dell’incontro in programma il 23 giugno 2016 a Vicenza, promosso dalla locale sezione dell’Associazione Italiana Giovani Avvocati (AIGA) con il patrocinio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Vicenza.

L’incontro vedrà il susseguirsi di interventi in tema di liquidazione dell’indennità di fine rapporto nei contratti internazionali di agenzia e distribuzione nella giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia (Silvia Petruzzino, Foro di Lugano), di agenzia e distribuzione in Vietnam e in Iran (Federico Vasoli, Foro di Milano) e di distribuzione e commercio elettronico in Cina (Roberto Luzi Crivellini, Foro di Verona).

Maggiori informazioni sull’incontro e sulle modalità d’iscrizione sono consultabili sulla locandina, qui disponibile.

Does Article 21 TEU on EU citisenship, facilitate one’s acquiring names bearing the tokens of nobility, acquired in one Member State (here: the flexible ‘deed poll’ regime available to citisens of the United Kingdom), for subsequent use in another Member State less keen on such (token or real) titles? In Case C-438/14 Bogendorff the CJEU held that it does not.

Applicant at issue had acquired UK nationality over and above German nationality (which he held by birth). Subsequent adoption but especially vanity had led to a change in first name and surname by deed poll, a very flexible name change regime available to UK citisens. German authorities however refused to recognise the name change upon the occasion of registration of applicant’s daughter, citing public order considerations in particular Germany’s long-standing objection against aristocratic titles, real or vanity, so as to emphasise equality before the law.  The court’s approach on free movement and names in my view has taken a better turn since Vardyn, Case C-391/09, where it left its insistence that only copy /paste recognition of names by authorities in other Member States can safeguard citisens free movement rights.

In the case of aristocratic titles, however, the court has always recognised in particular Austria’s and Germany’s right to extend domestic policies to incoming citisens, on the basis of public policy considerations. Current case differs from Sayn-Wittgenstein, C‑208/09. The latter concerned Austrian law, which has a strict prohibition on the use and transmission of titles of nobility. Under German law by contrast all privileges and inequalities connected with birth or position have been abolished in Germany. Titles of nobility which were actually borne when the Weimar Constitution entered into force may continue as elements of a name and may be transmitted as a fact of personal status. The creation of new titles of nobility and the grant of such titles are prohibited.

Hence for Germany to refuse to recognise such titles where they have been accidentally obtained abroad (by birth, marriage or adoption) would run counter EU citisenhip. By contrast, it would run counter to the intention of the German legislature for German nationals, using the law of another Member State, to adopt afresh abolished titles of nobility. Systematic recognition of changes of name such as that at issue in the main proceedings could lead to that result.

Name dropping undoubtedly will continue. Name shopping has been halted.

Geert.

 

Con un decreto depositato il 17 maggio 2016, il Tribunale per i minorenni di Bologna si è pronunciato sul riconoscimento di una sentenza di adozione emessa negli Stati Uniti con la quale era stata disposta l’adozione piena di una minore, cittadina americana, in favore della moglie della madre biologica.

Nel novembre del 2014, lo stesso Tribunale aveva sollevato una questione di legittimità costituzionale degli articoli 35 e 36 della legge 4 maggio 1983, n. 184, in materia di adozione, nella parte in cui non consentono al giudice di valutare, nel caso concreto, se risponda all’interesse del minore adottato all’estero il riconoscimento della sentenza straniera che abbia pronunciato la sua adozione da parte del coniuge del genitore, a prescindere dal fatto che il matrimonio abbia prodotto effetti in Italia (in proposito si veda questo post).

La Corte costituzionale, con sentenza n. 76 del 7 aprile 2016, aveva dichiarato inammissibile la questione. I giudici costituzionali hanno preso le mosse dalla ricostruzione dell’art. 41 della legge 31 maggio 1995 n. 218, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato, che prevede due diversi procedimenti per il riconoscimento di provvedimenti stranieri in materia di adozione. Accanto al riconoscimento “automatico” contemplato attraverso il richiamo agli articoli 64, 65 e 66 della stessa legge, la norma stabilisce, al secondo comma, che “restano ferme le disposizioni delle leggi speciali in materia di adozione dei minori”, ossia gli articoli 35 e 36 della legge 184/1983.  Secondo la Corte “l’applicazione della legislazione speciale in materia di riconoscimento della sentenza di adozione internazionale di minori – che richiede un previo vaglio giudiziale, ad opera del Tribunale per i minorenni – non può che escludere il contemporaneo rinvio alle disposizioni ordinarie sul riconoscimento ‘automatico’ dei provvedimenti stranieri”.

In virtù di tali rilievi, il Tribunale per i minorenni di Bologna – escludendo l’applicabilità della procedura di riconoscimento di cui all’art. 36, comma 4, della legge n. 184/1983 (che estende il controllo giudiziale del minore ad una particolare ipotesi di adozione di minori stranieri in stato di abbandono da parte di cittadini italiani), poiché al momento dell’adozione tanto la ricorrente quanto la minore erano cittadine americane – ha considerato che il provvedimento straniero dovesse essere sottoposto a riconoscimento automatico mediante trascrizione a cura dell’ufficiale di stato civile. Il Tribunale, evidenziando tuttavia che la Consulta ha disatteso il rilievo in merito alla cittadinanza (anche) italiana della ricorrente al momento della domanda, ha escluso la propria potestas decidendi non sussistendo i presupposti di cui all’art. 41, comma 2, della legge n. 218/95 per derogare alla competenza della Corte d’appello con riguardo al riconoscimento di provvedimenti stranieri e, di conseguenza, ha dichiarato l’inammissibilità della domanda.

Affinché la ricorrente possa poi “conseguire il risultato sperato”, il Tribunale ha infine suggerito di trarre spunto da un caso analogo a quello di specie e giunto dinanzi alla Corte d’appello di Milano (la decisione è consultabile qui).

Si ringrazia l’avv. Claudio Pezzi per la segnalazione.

Institute of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society has recently come to my attention thanks to Juliett Hatchett over at Baker: her analysis is spot on and I am happy to refer to it. She summarises the case as the district court confirming that perpetrating and funding piracy and unsafe navigation are within the scope of ATS jurisdiction, but holding that there is no enforceable international norm against whaling or financing terrorism.

The case is not easy to find however Sea Shepherd tend to link to court documents in their updates on the litigation.

I flag the case mainly to bring it to readers’ attention that CSR litigation can be done proactively: one need not wait for alleged violations of relevant legal standards to seek to seize a court. Exactly a point I assessed in the context of vulture fund litigation, end of May. (And in forthcoming paper).

Geert.

 

Moreda-Riviere Trefilerías / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal rejette les recours des quatre sociétés espagnoles ayant participé à l’entente sur le marché européen de l’acier de précontrainte

Moreda-Riviere Trefilerías / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal rejette les recours des quatre sociétés espagnoles ayant participé à l’entente sur le marché européen de l’acier de précontrainte

Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff
Principes du droit communautaire
Un nom contenant plusieurs éléments nobiliaires et librement choisi par un Allemand dans un autre État membre dont il possède également la nationalité ne doit pas nécessairement être reconnu en Allemagne

Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff
Principes du droit communautaire
Un nom contenant plusieurs éléments nobiliaires et librement choisi par un Allemand dans un autre État membre dont il possède également la nationalité ne doit pas nécessairement être reconnu en Allemagne