Flux européens

Vervloet e.a.
Liberté d'établissement
L’avocat général Kokott estime que la garantie accordée par la Belgique aux sociétés coopératives financières ARCO enfreint le droit de l’Union

Vervloet e.a.
Liberté d'établissement
L’avocat général Kokott estime que la garantie accordée par la Belgique aux sociétés coopératives financières ARCO enfreint le droit de l’Union

Clayton P. Gillette, Advanced Introduction to International Sales Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, ISBN 9781784711870, pp. 160, GBP 58,50.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Providing a concise overview of the basic doctrines underlying the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Clayton Gillette explores their ambiguities and thus considers the extent to which uniform international commercial law is possible, as well as appraising the extent to which the doctrines in the UN Convention reflect those that commercial parties would prefer. With its compelling combination of doctrine and theory, this book makes an ideal companion for students and legal scholars alike.

Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

On 24 June 2016, the University of Lincoln will host the conference titled Private and Public International Law: Strengthening Connections”.

As the final event of a two-year research project led by academics in Edinburgh and Lincoln, the conference aims at exploring the connections existing between Private and Public International Law across a wide range of interdisciplinary topics.

Subjects covered include jurisdiction, State immunity, corporate social responsibility, arbitration, and trade in medical services.

The full program of the conference is available here.

Further information can be found here.

In C-222/15 Hőszig Advocate General Szpunar opined using the sensible route, on the application of Article 23 of Regulation 44/2001 . His excursus though on Article 25 of the Brussels I Recast and the new lex fori prorogati rule is the part of his judgment which I read with most interest.

First things first: can choice of court made in underlying documentation in the context of a tender, for which Hőszig entered a winning bid, be considered valid under Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation (now: Article 25 Brussels I Recast). Pursuant to Clause 23.1 of these ‘general conditions of purchase’, headed ‘applicable law and settlement of disputes’, ‘[t]he Order shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with French law. The application of the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods dated April 11, 1980 is excluded. Any dispute arising out of or in connection with the validity, construction, performance or termination of the Order, which the parties are unable to settle amicably shall be finally and exclusively settled by the courts of Paris, including in the case of a summary procedure, injunctions or conservatory measure.’

Hőszig tried to sue instead in what it considered to be the place of performance of the contract, per Article 5(1) (now 7(1) in the Recast). Its torpedo of the choice of court included in the general conditions of purchase, was based on recourse to Article 10(2) Rome I, which holds that the putative law of the contract does not apply to consider a party’s consent if it would not be reasonable to do so. In such case the law of the habitual residence of said party applies. Here this would lead to Hungarian law rather than French law and Hungarian law, it is argued, would not accept such incorporation of general terms and conditions. Szpunar AG however simply refers to the fact that choice of court agreements are excluded from the Rome I Regulation. Recourse to Article 10(2) is barred by that exclusion.

What needs to be considered under Article 23 Brussels I is whether parties have reached consensus, ‘clearly and precisely demonstrated’, the AG suggests. This wording is typically associated with choice of law under Rome I however I would support its use in the context of the Brussels I (and Recast) Regulation, too, for that is what the Court’s case-law on the Article amounts to. Applying Case 24/76 Colzani mutatis mutandis, and taking into account that express reference to the general terms and conditions in documents exchanged between the parties prior to the tender being awarded, the AG concludes that agreement had been reached.

Now, is the expression ‘courts of Paris’ sufficiently precise? Szpunar AG suggests it is and I would concur, albeit that the last word on  that is probably not yet said. The Advocate General refers to Capotorti AG in Case 23/78 Meeth, who had advised that a clause worded such as here, refers by implication to the system of rules of territorial jurisdiction (typically on the basis of a combination of value and subject-matter) to determine precisely at which court proceedings must be instituted. The Court itself did not at all elaborate in the eventual judgment. Szpunar AG suggests it must have taken Capororti’s suggestion for granted. Therefore (at 44 of the Opinion) it is French procedural law which governs the question of precisely which Paris court is competent.

This leaves open the question, though (which I understand is not sub judice here) whether parties can employ choice of court to trump national rules of civil procedure. What if they agree that the courts of say province X in Member State A are preferable to settle the issue, e.g. because of perceived know-how, even if national civil procedure would ordinarily assign the case to province Y? Not an issue which to my knowledge has been settled by EU case-law.

By way of sign-off, the Advocate General then reviews whether the new text, Regulation 1215/2012, has in any way altered or added to the discussion on choice of court agreements. Readers will be aware (via this blog or the Handbook or otherwise) that the new Regulation refers to the lex fori prorogati to determine the validity of the choice of court agreement:  ‘[i]f the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that Member State’ (emphasis added by Szpunar AG).

Under Brussels I, various options were defended. Szpunar AG refers to Slynn AG having defended lex fori prorogati in Case 150/80 Elefanten Schuh,  and Szpunar AH himself suggest (at 47 in fine) lex fori additi under the Brussels I Regulation (44/2001).

The AG is most certainly correct in my view that the lex fori prorogati is not meant to cover all aspects of the validity of the agreement. In my Handbook I distinguish between the expression of consent (harmonised by Article 25), and the formation of consent (not touched upon by Brussels I and now subject to the lex fori prorogati). He then suggests that the insertion of lex fori prorogati was meant to align the Brussels I (Recast) with the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, to which the EU have now acceded. I do not recall any such reference in the travaux preparatoires of Regulation 1215/2012 – however it has been a while since I consulted them extensively and the AG presumably has.

The Court of course will be much more succinct than its AG.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9Heading 2.2.9.4. Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.2 .

 

 

Achbita
Principes du droit communautaire
Selon l’avocat général Kokott, l’interdiction de porter un foulard en entreprise peut être licite

Achbita
Principes du droit communautaire
Selon l’avocat général Kokott, l’interdiction de porter un foulard en entreprise peut être licite

The title exaggerates. However the CJEU will have an opportunity in C-136/16 SMD v Banco Santander to hold how ‘international’ a case has to be to trigger application of the European private international law Regulations. In both Owusu and Lindner the Court suggested a flexible approach to the ‘international’ character of a case (hence to the Regulations being easily engaged). The case referred is reminiscent of Banco Santander Totta at the High Court. In that case, however, jurisdiction was not contested and analysis focused on the reach of Article 3(3) Rome I (relating to ‘purely domestic contracts’).

I have copy/pasted the questions referred below. No doubt the CJEU will not entertain them all.

Crucial questions, are: is choice of court ex the country enough for the  case to be considered ‘international’; if it is, can forum non conveniens-type considerations lead to the (national) Court seized ignoring choice of court; if it is not, what other international elements need to be present and does choice of law play a role in this assessment.

Exciting. Once private international law engaged, literally the whole world opens up to contracting parties. If it is not, one is stuck with national law.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.2.1

 

In a dispute between two national undertakings of a Member State concerning agreements, does the fact that such agreements contain clauses conferring jurisdiction to another Member State constitute a sufficient international element to give rise to the application of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 1 and Regulation No 1215/2012 to determine international jurisdiction, or must there be other international elements?

May application of the jurisdiction agreement be waived where the choice of the courts of a Member State other than that of the nationality of the parties causes serious inconvenience for one of those parties and the other party has no good reason to justify such choice?

In the event that it is held that other international elements are necessary in addition to the jurisdiction agreement:

Do the swap agreements concluded between [Sociedade Metropolitana de Desenvolvimento, S.A.] (‘SMD’) and Banco Santander Totta have sufficient international elements to give rise to the application of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 and Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 in order to determine which courts have international jurisdiction to settle disputes relating to them where:

(a)    Those entities are nationals of a Member State, Portugal, that concluded two swap agreements in Portugal consisting of an ISDA Master Agreement and two confirmations, negotiated by the Autonomous Region of Madeira on behalf of SMD;

(b)    In that negotiation, the Autonomous Region of Madeira, assisted by Banco BPI, S.A., and by a law firm, invited more than one international bank to submit proposals, one of those invited banks being JP Morgan;

(c)    Banco Santander Totta is wholly owned by Banco Santander, with domicile in Spain;

(d)    Banco Santander Totta acted in its capacity as an international bank with subsidiaries in various Member States and under the single brand Santander;

(e)    Banco Santander Totta was considered in the ISDA Master Agreement as a Multibranch Party, able to make and receive payments in any transaction through its subsidiaries in London or Luxemburg;

(f)    Under the terms of the ISDA Master Agreement concluded, the parties may, in certain cases, transfer their rights and obligations to other representative offices or subsidiaries;

(g)    The parties to the swap agreements specified that English law was applicable and concluded jurisdiction agreements that confer exclusive jurisdiction on the English courts;

(h)    The agreements were drafted in English and the terminology and concepts used are Anglo-Saxon;

(i)    The swap agreements were concluded with the objective of covering the risk of variation in the interest rates of two financing agreements, both drafted in English and concluded with foreign entities (one based in the Netherlands and the other in Italy), and in one of the financing agreements it is provided that borrowers’ payments must be made to the HSBC Bank Plc account in London, on dates defined by reference to the London time zone and subject to English law and the English courts;

(j)    Banco Santander Totta acted as an intermediary of the international market, having concluded hedging agreements in the context of the international market?

 

Virginia Pardo Iranzo, Competencia, Reconocimiento y Ejecución de Resoluciones Extranjeras en la Unión Europea, Tirant lo Blanch, 2016, pp. 351, ISBN: 9788491193005, Euro 34,90.

[Dal sito dell’editore] Hace apenas un año entró en vigor el Reglamento 1215/2012, sobre competencia, reconocimiento y ejecución de resoluciones extranjeras en la Unión Europea. El mismo, además de fijar los criterios para la determinación de la competencia judicial internacional tiene la virtud de eliminar el exequatur como trámite previo a la ejecución de títulos extranjeros. El presente libro analiza el citado reglamento y lo hace desde una perspectiva práctica, dando respuestas a las dudas interpretativas que su articulado está planteando. Junto con este instrumento, de carácter general, se analizan entre otros la reciente orden europea de retención de cuentas (Reglamento 655/2014) o el problemático Reglamento 4/2009, relativo a la obligación de alimentos, cuyo ámbito de aplicación es específico.

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Régimes matrimoniaux de participation aux acquêts et autres mécanismes participatifs entre époux en Europe, a cura di Elena Lauroba Lacasa e Maria Esperança Ginebra Molins, LGDJ, 2016, pp. 296, ISBN: 9782365170581, Euro 28,00.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – L’adoption par l’Allemagne et la France d’un régime matrimonial commun de participation aux acquêts, dont il a été pris acte lors du douzième conseil des ministres franco-allemand le 4 février 2010, donne tout son intérêt à l’étude comparative et approfondie de cette situation. Ce livre regroupe ainsi les contributions présentées lors du colloque qui s’est tenu les 7 et 8 novembre 2013 à la Faculté de Droit de Barcelone. Le défi était de présenter une cartographie comparatiste des différents régimes économiques matrimoniaux de participation aux acquêts, ainsi que d’identifier les mécanismes adoptés par des systèmes ayant fait le choix de consacrer un régime de séparation de biens – exemple pris de la Catalogne – non sans faciliter une communication participative des gains des époux. C’était aussi l’occasion d’étudier d’autres initiatives européennes et formules participatives, parmi lesquelles les options ouvertes aux couples de fait.

 Ulteriori informazioni sul volume sono disponibili qui.

France / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal annule la décision de la Commission qui qualifie d’aide d’État la garantie implicite illimitée accordée par l’État français à l’Institut français du pétrole

France / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal annule la décision de la Commission qui qualifie d’aide d’État la garantie implicite illimitée accordée par l’État français à l’Institut français du pétrole

France / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal annule la décision de la Commission qui qualifie d’aide d’État la garantie implicite illimitée accordée par l’État français à l’Institut français du pétrole

Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods, a cura di Ingeborg Schwenzer, Oxford University Press, 2016, ISBN 9780198723264, pp. 1728, GBP 265.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Now in force in over 80 countries, the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is one of the most successful and wide-reaching attempts to unify legal instruments for international commerce. As global sales transactions increase, the CISG’s range of influence in international practice has significantly expanded, potentially governing 80% of world trade. In addition to the growing case law, the volume of case law reporting and scholarly writing on the Convention and its provisions and problems has increased dramatically. The Convention also continues to influence legislators on the international as well as the domestic level. This is the fourth edition in English of the Commentary on the United Nations (UN) Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG). Since the publication of the first edition in 1998, the book has become an invaluable source for the comprehension and discussion of the Convention, frequently cited by legal writers, tribunals, and courts all over the world. Thoroughly revised to reflect the growth and complexity of case law relating to the Convention, the book also considers new developments in the field of the CISG, particularly the accession of Brazil to the Convention. It also assesses all relevant scholarly writing on the CISG since 2009, with a special emphasis on the opinions issued by the CISG Advisory Council that are being considered as persuasive authority by courts and tribunals across the globe.

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Simba Toys / EUIPO
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
L’avocat général Szpunar propose à la Cour d’annuler l’enregistrement de la forme du Rubik’s cube en tant que marque de l’Union

Simba Toys / EUIPO
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
L’avocat général Szpunar propose à la Cour d’annuler l’enregistrement de la forme du Rubik’s cube en tant que marque de l’Union

Simba Toys / EUIPO
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
L’avocat général Szpunar propose à la Cour d’annuler l’enregistrement de la forme du Rubik’s cube en tant que marque de l’Union

Geert Van Calster, European Private International Law, 2a ed., Hart Publishing, 2016, ISBN 9781849466721, pp. 576, GBP 32.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Usable both as a student textbook and as a general introduction for legal professionals, European Private International Law is designed to reflect the reality of legal practice throughout the EU. This second edition provides a thorough, up-to-date overview of core European private international law, in particular the Brussels I, Rome I and Rome II Regulations (jurisdiction, applicable law for contracts and tort), while additional chapters deal with private international law and insolvency, freedom of establishment, corporate social responsibility and finally a review of two Regulations in the family law arena: Brussels II bis (matrimonial matters and parental responsibility) and the EU Succession Regulation.

Il sommario del volume può leggersi qui. Ulteriori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

The CJEU has in my view taken the sensible approach in C-366/13 Profit Investment Sim, on (among others) whether choice of court included in a bond prospectus, binds not just the original transactional parties but also the buyers of such bonds on the secondary markets or via intermediaries. (An issue which many of us pondered in Kolassa but which was not sub judice there).

Parties at issue were Commerzbank (formerly Dresdner), the bond issuer; Redi, financial intermediary licensed by the UK FSA and subscriber of all relevant bonds on the primary market; and Profit, an Italian company, who bought part of the bonds of Redi, on the secondary market. Dresdner’s prospectus contains choice of court in favour of the English courts.

First, on the issue of the jurisdiction clause. The referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 23(1)(a) and (c) of Regulation 44/2001 (both now part of Article 25) must be interpreted as meaning that a jurisdiction clause, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, satisfies the formal requirements laid down in Article 23(1)(a) [‘in writing or evidenced in writing’] where (i) it is contained in a prospectus produced by the bond issuer concerning the issue of bonds, (ii) it is enforceable against third parties who acquire those bonds through a financial intermediary and (iii), in the event that the first two parts of the second question are answered in the negative, it corresponds to a usage in the field of international trade or commerce for the purpose of Article 23(1)(c).

Choice of court in the prospectus and the impact on the primary market.

The Court first of all holds that the ‘formal requirement’ of (now Article 25 a (a) ”in writing or evidenced in writing’ for the issue of choice of court between Dresdner and Redi is only met (along the lines of Colzani Case 24/76) if the contract signed by the parties upon the issue of the bonds on the primary market expressly mentions the acceptance of the clause by Redi, or contains an express reference to the prospectus. The latter in particular is quite likely.

Choice of court in the prospectus and enforceability against third parties acquiring through a financial intermediary.

Next, the Court (at 30) holds that the same two alternatives apply for the relationship between Redi and Profit. Here the court refers to Refcomp and  distinguishes it, basically by pointing to the specific examples of bills of lading and choice of court in shareholders registries, cases in which the CJEU had previously accepted transferability of choice of court to third parties, in specific circumstances. (Please refer to both the Refcomp judgment and to current judgment (at 33 ff) for detail).

The Court consequently held (at 37) that choice of court contained in a prospectus produced by the bond issuer concerning the issue of bonds may be relied on against a third party who acquired those bonds from a financial intermediary if it is established, which it is for the referring court to verify, that (i) that clause is valid in the relationship between the issuer and the financial intermediary, (ii) the third party, by acquiring those bonds on the secondary market, succeeded to the financial intermediary’s rights and obligations attached to those bonds under the applicable national law, and (iii) the third party had the opportunity to acquaint himself with the prospectus containing that clause. (Emphasis added).

The emphasis I added is quite important: the CJEU does not hold that such succession is somehow part of an EU Ius Commune.

Finally, if the answer to the first two questions is negative, is there usage in international trade or commercial custom between the parties? 

This, the Court holds, has to be determined by the national court. The CJEU (at 48) recalls its earlier case-law in particular C-106/95 MSG:  actual or presumed awareness of a usage on the part of the parties may be made out, in particular, by showing either that the parties had previously had commercial or trade relations between themselves or with other parties operating in the sector in question, or that, in that sector, a particular course of conduct is sufficiently well known because it is generally and regularly followed when a particular type of contract is concluded, so that it may be regarded as being an established practice.

The Court does though give a few more practical things which the national court needs to look out for: at 49. In order to determine, in the main proceedings, whether the insertion into the prospectus of a jurisdiction clause constitutes a usage in the sector in which the parties operate, of which those parties were aware or ought to have been aware, the referring court must take into account, inter alia, the fact that that prospectus was approved in advance by the Irish Stock Exchange and made available to the public on the latter’s website, which does not seem to have been contested by Profit in the proceedings on the merits. In addition, the referring court must take account of the fact that it is undisputed that Profit is a company active in the field of financial investments as well as of any commercial relationships it may have had in the past with the other parties to the main proceedings. The national court must also verify whether the issue of bonds on the market is, in that sector, generally and regularly accompanied by a prospectus containing a jurisdiction clause and whether that practice is sufficiently well known to be regarded as ‘established’.

 

Lest one forgets, the Court’s judgment is also relevant for a more general query on the nature of (now) Article 7(1): must the action seeking the annulment of a contract and the restitution of the amounts paid on the basis of a document the nullity of which is established, be regarded as ‘matters relating to a contract’ (the existence of which plaintiff seeks to dispute)? Yes, it does: if only (at 54) to ensure that Article 7(1) cannot simply be torpedoed by one party claiming that there is no contract.

(The judgment also reviews the conditions of application of (now) Article 8(1), with respect to ‘irreconcilability’ of judgments).

This judgment is quite relevant in yet again the CJEU having to defer to national law on the issue of transferability (see the emphasis I added, above). The Court very clearly does not wish to overplay its hand in trying to force a European Ius Commune in private law, via the use of private international law.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.1; Heading 2.2.11.1.a; 2.2.9.3;.2.2.9.7; 2.2.12

 

 

Una sentenza del Tribunale di Bologna del 9 novembre 2015 tratta della legge applicabile alla donazione e alla ripetizione dell’indebito.

La controversia trae origine dall’erogazione di una somma di denaro da parte di una società con sede a Panama a favore di una persona fisica residente in Italia.

Nella prospettazione della società panamense, attrice in giudizio, tale somma avrebbe dovuto servire all’acquisto di un immobile sito in Italia per conto della stessa società, ma era stata trattenuta dal percipiente, senza titolo, ed utilizzata da questi per scopi personali; di qui la domanda di restituzione proposta al giudice italiano.

Il convenuto, per parte sua, contestava la fondatezza della pretesa attorea, affermando che la somma gli era stata versata in adempimento di un’obbligazione naturale, o comunque a titolo di donazione, rilevando che la dazione aveva per sfondo la lunga relazione sentimentale che lo aveva legato all’amministratrice della società panamense.

Ritenuta la propria giurisdizione e sollecitato il contraddittorio sulla questione della legge applicabile nelle forme dell’art. 101, comma 2°, del codice di procedura civile, il Tribunale di Bologna considera, dapprima, l’ipotesi che la fattispecie integri un caso di ripetizione dell’indebito e ritiene, a tal fine, di poter fare riferimento all’art. 61 della legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato, in tema di obbligazioni nascenti dalla legge, ricavandone l’applicabilità della legge italiana, quale “legge dello Stato in cui si è verificato il fatto da cui deriva l’obbligazione”.

La sentenza, per la verità, non prende espressamente posizione circa la possibile applicabilità ratione temporis del regolamento n. 864/2007 sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni extracontrattuali (c.d. Roma II), e in particolare del suo art. 10, relativo all’arricchimento senza causa. Si legge in motivazione, peraltro, che anche “a considerare la fattispecie come ‘illecito’, secondo la specifica nozione dell’articolo 2 [del regolamento c.d.Roma II], si avrebbe comunque applicazione del diritto italiano, essendosi la fattispecie conclusa con l’arrivo del bonifico” nella disponibilità del convenuto, in Italia.

Individuata in questo modo la legge ipoteticamente applicabile al pagamento di indebito, il Tribunale si interroga in ordine alla sussistenza o meno di un titolo che giustifichi il trasferimento della somma di denaro in grado di escludere il diritto alla restituzione dell’indebito. Viene innanzitutto osservato che la causa del pagamento non può consistere in un’obbligazione naturale — come avanzato dalla convenuta — atteso che “la imputazione della liberalità è in capo alla società attrice [che], per ovvie ragioni, non può avere avuto un rapporto sentimentale” e che, pertanto, “non è possibile che essa abbia avuto, nei confronti del [convenuto], obbligazioni naturali”.

Ritenendo, all’esito di questo riscontro, di non poter inquadrare la fattispecie nella categoria delle obbligazione naturale, il giudice passa ad analizzare la seconda ipotesi di qualificazione dedotta dalla convenuta, giungendo a scorgere nell’invio della somma di denaro una donazione.

Basandosi su questa qualificazione, il Tribunale bolognese identifica la norma di conflitto pertinente nell’art. 4, par. 2, del regolamento n. 593/2008 sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali (Roma I), pervenendo così alla conclusione che la legge applicabile al rapporto litigioso è la legge panamense, non essendo dubbio — si legge nella  motivazione — “che la prestazione caratteristica della donazione sia quella del donante, che è panamense”.

Appurato che la donazione debba essere assoggettata alla legge panamense, il giudice accerta che essa è valida ed efficace in conformità alle norme di tale ordinamento. Pertanto, ritenuto nel merito che l’erogazione della somma fosse al tempo sorretta dalla causa della donazione, viene escluso il carattere indebito del pagamento, con conseguente rigetto della domanda.

Si ringrazia per la segnalazione l’avv. Claudio Pezzi.