Flux européens

The 23rd International Conference of Europeanists, organised by the Council for European Studies at Columbia University (CES), will be devoted to the topic Resilient Europe?, and will take place in Philadelphia from 14 to 16 April 2016.

One of the panels is titled Do we trust in ‘mutual trust’? Current challenges to mutual recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as a benchmark for Europe’s resilience. 

[Summary] – The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) encompasses crucial policy areas for European integration. Mutual recognition is the driving engine for the EU action in these fields and a cornerstone of the AFSJ. Yet, it is also a complex principle. Since mutual recognition does not produce common substantive rules, it would seem to be less problematic than other methods of integration (e.g. approximation or harmonisation) in terms of interference with the Member States’ legal orders. In reality, mutual recognition presupposes a certain degree of openness to and tolerance of the diversity characterizing each national legal system. In fact, its root is mutual trust between the Member States. “Resilience” is not a recurrent notion in legal studies on mutual recognition. Nevertheless, the academic debate, the case law of European and national courts, but also dramatic events such as the migrants crisis, have pointed to different challenges – legal, political and societal – that surround the application of mutual recognition in the AFSJ matters. These challenges affect the trust between the Member States, and the trust of the Member States and individuals towards the Union. In this sense, the capacity to react constructively to such challenges is a proxy to test Europe’s resilience. Accordingly, the five presentations within this panel provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of current shortcomings of mutual recognition in the AFSJ. Their common purpose is to provoke a constructive discussion on possible solutions to improve the principle’s functioning and its contribution to European integration.

The panel will be articulated in the following speeches: Mutual Recognition As a Governance Strategy for Civil Justice, Eva Storskrubb (Univ. Uppsala); Mutual Recognition in Civil Matters: An Appraisal Between (partial) Achievements and New Challenges, Ornella Feraci (Univ. Florence); Mutual Recognition in Criminal Justice: Towards Order and Method?, Maria Bergstrom (Univ. Uppsala); Mutual Trust As a Stumbling Block to the Accession of the EU to the Echr?, Nicole Lazzerini (Univ. Parma). The session will be chaired by Nicolò Nisi (Univ. Bocconi, Milan) and discussed by Ester di Napoli (Univ. Magna Graecia of Catanzaro).

The full programme of the conference can be downloaded here. For more information see here.

Aranyosi
Justice et Affaires intérieures
L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen doit être reportée s’il existe un risque réel de traitement inhumain ou dégradant en raison des conditions de détention de la personne concernée dans l’État membre d’émission du mandat

Le Tribunal de l’Union européenne se prépare à l’arrivée de nouveaux membres

In Winkler v Shamoon [2016] EWHC 2017 Ch Mr Justice Henry Carr broadly follows Mrs Justice Susan Carr in Sabbagh v Khoury (which I have reviewed earlier) on the interpretation of the ‘wills and succession’ exception in the Brussels I Recast (and the Lugano convention). [The Justices themselves, incidentally, are neither related nor married, I understand]. In so doing, Sir Henry follows Dame Susan’s approach vis-a-vis the exclusions in the Brussels I Recast.

Ms Alexandra Shamoon accepts that she is domiciled in the UK for the purposes of the Brussels Regulation.  However, she applies for an order on essentially the same basis as that set out above, contending, in particular, that the claim relates to succession and therefore falls outside the scope of the Brussels Regulation. Brick Court have summary of the case and hopefully do not mind me borrowing their heads-up of the facts:

the case concerns the estate of the late Israeli businessman, Sami Shamoon.  Mr Shamoon owned and controlled the Yakhin Hakal Group of Israeli companies and was known in his lifetime as one of the wealthiest men in Israel.  The claim was brought by Mr Peretz Winkler, formerly the Chief Financial Officer and manager of Yakhin Hakal, against Mrs Angela Shamoon and Ms Alexandra Shamoon, the widow and daughter respectively of Mr Shamoon and the residuary legatees under his will.  In his claim Mr Winkler alleged that prior to his death Mr Shamoon had orally promised to transfer to him certain shares worth tens of millions of dollars.  On the basis of the alleged promise Mr Winkler claimed declarations against Angela and Alexandra Shamoon as to his entitlement to the shares (which they are due to receive under Mr Shamoon’s will).  Angela and Alexandra challenged the jurisdiction of the English Court to hear the claim on the basis that it was a matter relating to “succession” within article 1(2)(a) of the Brussels Regulation and therefore fell outside its scope (and that England was not the natural or appropriate forum for the dispute).

If the claim does fall within the scope of the Regulation, jurisdiction is quite easily established on the basis of the defendant’s domicile – albeit with contestation of such domicile in the UK by Mr Shamoon’s widow and daughter.

Carr J held that the claim was one relating to succession and therefore fell outside of the Brussels I Recast (at 53 ff). While I may concur in the resulting conclusion, I do not believe the route taken is the right one. Sir Henry follows Mrs Justice Carr’s approach in applying the excluded matters of the Brussels I Recast restrictively. I disagree. Exclusions are not the same as exceptions: Article 24’s exclusive rules of jurisdictions are an exception to the main rule of Article 4; hence they need to be applied restrictively. Article 1(2)’s exclusions on the other hand need to be applied solely within the limits as intended. Lead is also taken from Sabbagh v Koury with respect to the role of the EU’s Succession Regulation. Even if the UK is not party to that Regulation, both justices suggest it may still be relevant in particular in assisting with the Brussels I Recast ‘Succession’ exception. If the approach taken in Winkler v Shamoon is followed it leads to a dovetailing of the two Regulations’ respective scope of application. Not a conclusion I think which is necessarily uncontested.

The High Court concludes (at 72) ‘this claim is excluded from the Brussels Regulation and the Lugano II Regulation as its principal subject matter is “succession” within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a).  In particular, it is a claim whose object is “succession to the estate of a deceased person” which includes “all forms of transfer of assets, rights and obligations by reason of death”. It is a succession claim which concerns “sharing out of the estate”; and it is a claim within the definition of “succession as a whole” in Article 23 of the Succession Regulation, as a claim whose principal subject matter concerns  “the disposable part of the estate, the reserved shares and other restrictions on the disposal of property upon death”: Article 23(h); and an “obligation to …account for gifts, …when determining the shares of the different beneficiaries”: Article 23(i).

Intriguingly, of course, had the UK be bound by the Succession Regulation, and given the dovetailing which the judgment suggest, the next step after rejection of jurisdiction on the basis of the Brussels I Recast, would have been consideration of jurisdiction following the Succesion Regulation. It is ironic therefore to see the Regulation feature as a phantom piece of legislation. Now you see it, now you don’t.

Geert.

(Handbook EU Private international law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.2.10).

 

On 15 April 2016, the Faculty of Law of the University of Santiago de Compostela will host a conference on Security rights and the European Insolvency Regulation: From Conflicts of Laws towards Harmonization.

Speakers include Paul Beaumont (Univ. of Aberdeen), Francisco Garcimartín Alferez (Autonomous Univ. of Madrid), Anna Gardella (European Banking Authority), Wolf-Georg Ringe (Copenhagen Business School), Françoise Pérochon (Univ. of Montpellier) and Paul Omar (Nottingham Trent University).

The conference is part of the SREIR project, coordinated by Gerard McCormack, Reinhard Bork, Laura Carballo Piñeiro, Marta Carballo Fidalgo, Renato Mangano and Tibor Tajti.

The full programme is available here.

Attendance to the conference is free, but registration prior to 10th April is required.  For this, an e-mail with name and ID card must be sent to marta.carballo@usc.es or laura.carballo@usc.es.

In Brogsitter, the CJEU held that the fact that one contracting party brings a civil liability claim against the other is not sufficient to consider that the claim concerns ‘matters relating to a contract’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast. That is the case only where the conduct complained of may be considered a breach of contract, which may be established by taking into account the purpose of the contract, which will in principle be the case only where the interpretation of the contract which links the defendant to the applicant is indispensable to establish the lawful or, on the contrary, unlawful nature of the conduct complained of against the former by the latter. 

At the end of December, Kokott AG Opined in C-196/15 Granarolo (even now, early April, the English version was not yet available) effectively applying Brogsitter to the case at hand: an action for damages for the abrupt termination of an established business relationship for the supply of goods over several years to a retailer without a framework contract, nor an exclusivity agreement. Ms Kokott (at 17) points out that unlike Brogsitter, there is no forceful link with the contractual arrangements between parties which would be the foundation for jurisdiction on the basis of contractual (non) performance (which there would have been had there been a framework relation between the parties). Rather, the soure for a claim between the parties is a statutory provision (it is not specifically identified: however presumable it relates to unfair commercial practices) that existing business relations cannot be abruptly halted without due cause.

Article 7(2) therefore should determine jurisdiction (over and above Article 4).

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2, Heading 2.2.11.2.9

RPC and Sarah Shaul it seems, like me, are hoovering up database backlog – once again thank you to their excellent blog for alerting me to Banque Cantonale de Genève v Polevent. Other than the direct impact for the interpretation of Rome II‘s Article 10, and its relation with Article 4’s general rule, an important lesson from the case to me seems to be, yet again, the relevance of the articulation of claims, for the determination of jurisdiction.

Facs are as follows (at 2 ff). Claimant (“BCGE”) is a bank in Geneva. On 24 March 2104 a man calling himself Mr. Dumas telephoned BCGE and asked to speak to Yvan Nicolet of the accounting department. He was not in the office and so the call was taken by Jacqueline Konrad-Bertherin. Mr. Dumas asked her to send a confidential message to what he said was the private mail address of Eric Bourgeaux, the deputy CEO of BCGE. She did so and received a reply from someone claiming to be Mr. Bourgeaux instructing her to pay Euro 6,870,058 from BCGE to the Natwest Bank in London in favour of Polevent Limited. She did so. She believed she had been instructed to do so by Mr. Bourgeaux; but she had not been. The fraud was discovered and repayment was requested later that day.

Shortly before the fraud Natwest had been advised of a freezing order against Polevent in favour of an Italian company Enoi SpA (“Enoi”). The funds were therefore frozen in Polevent’s account with Natwest. BCGE has claimed damages from Polevent for deceit. BCGE accepts that that claim is governed by the law of Geneva. It has also advanced a claim against Polevent in restitution on the basis that the sum was paid by mistake. It claims that since Polevent must have realised that the sum was paid by mistake the conscience of Polevent was affected such that a constructive trust arises thereby providing BCGE with a proprietary claim in respect of the frozen funds. BCGE says that this proprietary claim is governed by English law.

Enoi is another creditor of Polevent. Enoi maintains that BCGE’s claim for restitution, in common with the claim is in deceit, is governed by the law of Geneva which does not recognise a proprietary claim. The resulting dispute is therefore between two creditors of Polevent. That company is in liquidation and has taken no part in this dispute.

 

The only preliminary issue which the High Court was asked to adjudicate on is worth repeating in full:

“On the basis of the facts as pleaded in the Amended Particulars of Claim and on the basis that the claim set out at paragraph 13 of the Amended particulars of Claim is governed by the law of Geneva, are the claims set out at paragraph 15 of the Amended particulars of Claim governed by English law or by the law of Geneva ? ”

One can appreciate why two different claims were formulated here.

For the claim in damages for deceit, BCGE accept Geneva law applies. The claim for restitution on the basis of unjust enrichment, however, is covered in its view by Article 10(3) Rome II: the law of the place in which the unjust enrichment took place, this being England, hence allowing for the existence of a constructive trust and priority in the pecking order following Polevent’s insolvency.

Enoi argue that the claim in restitution, like the claim in damages, is covered by the law of Geneva: at 9:

The submission of counsel for Enoi is that the law governing the claim in restitution is the law of Geneva by reason of Article 4(1) of Rome II. The claim arises out of the tort/delict of fraud and so the governing law is that of the place in which the damage occurred, namely, Geneva. Alternatively, the governing law is the law of Geneva pursuant to Article 10(1) on the grounds that the unjust enrichment concerns a relationship arising out of a tort/delict such that the governing law is that which governs that relationship, namely, the law of Geneva. In the further alternative the governing law is the law of Geneva pursuant to Article 10(4) on the grounds that the obligation arising out of the unjust enrichment is manifestly more closely connected with Geneva.

Both parties of course reverse engineer their governing law arguments: being aware of the attraction of one State’s laws over the other, counsel brief is to convince the court that the matter is characterised so that it leads to the warranted applicable law.

Enoi suggest that BCGE in reality have one claim only: one in fraud, a tort, it argues, from which the claim in unjust enrichment follows in a dependent fashion. Teare J disagrees (at 13). A claim in restitution need not be fault-based. It is a separate claim, to which Article 10’s regime applies (in the end leading to a finding of English law).

The judgment is in fact quite short. Its crucial implication to me would seem to be that BCGE has won the day by formulating two separate heads of action. Teare J acknowledges that his view may be an ‘unduly English law’ view, in other words, that he read the formulation of two claims at face value, as being two separate claims, because English law recognises non-fault based unjust enrichment. Regardless of the fact that other States, including European States, do so too, the obvious question is whether the EU’s qualification would be the same. The concept of unjust enrichment, like the concept of tort, necessarily needs to be an ‘autonomous’ one. Yet without much guidance in the preparatory works of Rome II on this concept, who can blame national law for filling in the blanks?

Geert.

(Handbook EU Private International Law, 2nd ed 2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.7).

Thomas Bauermann, Der Anknüpfungsgegenstand im europäischen Internationalen Lauterkeitsrecht, Mohr Siebeck, 2015, ISBN 9783161539084, pp. 332, Euro 69.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – For the first time, Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation contains uniform European provisions on the private international law of unfair competition. This poses particular problems since there are huge differences in EU member states’ understanding of unfair competition law. Against this background, Thomas Bauermann examines the autonomous European concept of unfair competition and its characteristics.

Maggiori informazioni disponibili a questo indirizzo.

Il 14 e il 15 aprile 2016 si terrà il decimo seminario internazionale di diritto internazionale privato della Universidad Complutense di Madrid.

Si parlerà degli sviluppi del diritto internazionale privato spagnolo, delle recenti codificazioni nazionali del diritto internazionale privato e del diritto internazionale privato dell’Unione europea.

Interverranno, fra gli altri, Miguel Virgós Soriano (Univ. Autónoma de Madrid), Bertrand Ancel (Univ. Paris II-Assas), Alegría Borrás (Univ. Barcellona), Jürgen Basedow (Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law), Christian Heinze (Univ. Leibniz, Hannover), Elena D’Alessandro (Univ. Torino), Roberto Baratta (Univ. Macerata) e Thalia Kruger (Univ. Antwerpen).

Il programma completo ed ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.

Steadman Jean, Sprague Steven, Common Law Contract Law. A Practical Guide for the Civil Law Lawyer, Wolters Kluwer, 2015, pp. 896, ISBN 9788821751547, Euro 81.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Il testo costituisce una guida pratica alla disciplina dei contratti nell’ambito del sistema common law e si rivolge a tutti gli operatori del settore legale che, per loro origine e formazione, fanno riferimento al sistema del diritto civile e si occupano di operazioni, transazioni e contratti regolati dal diritto inglese o americano qualunque sia l’oggetto del contratto o la nazionalità delle parti. Vengono analizzati gli istituti fondamentali del sistema common law in Inghilterra, Galles e Stati Uniti d’America, evidenziandone i tratti comuni e fornendo una dettagliata spiegazione delle principali differenze esistenti tra i due sistemi giuridici. Numerosi esempi consentono al lettore di meglio comprendere come la prassi contrattualistica trovi reale applicazione nella quotidiana pratica legale. Ogni capitolo è corredato da specifiche note esplicative. Sono presenti un dettagliato glossario e una checklist delle principali tipologie contrattuali.

Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

I have reported before on various schemes of arrangement which the English Courts gave the go-ahead even when they concerned non-English companies (I should flag that in two of those, Apcoa and Van Gansewinkel, I acted as expert). Thank you Arie van Hoe for bringing Indah Kiat to my attention some weeks ago.

Indah Kiat is a Dutch BV seeking an order convening a single meeting of its scheme creditors to consider and if thought fit approve a scheme of arrangement pursuant to Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006. The application is strenuously opposed by one of the Scheme Creditors, APP Investment Opportunity LLC (“APPIO”), which contests the jurisdiction of the court to entertain or sanction the Scheme. Such opposition is different from the other schemes which I mention in my previous postings.

In the first instance, APPIO simply seeks an adjournment of the Scheme Company’s application on the grounds that inadequate notice has been given to Scheme Creditors. However, it also raises a significant number of other issues concerning the adequacy of the evidence and disclosure by the Scheme Company, together with questions concerning the procedure and scope of the court’s jurisdiction to sanction creditor schemes for foreign companies in relation to debts governed by foreign law.

The Scheme Company is a special purpose vehicle which was incorporated for financing purposes in the Netherlands. It sought the COMI way to enable English courts to obtain jurisdiction over the scheme. English jurisdiction, required to carry out the Scheme, usually rests on either one of two legs: COMI, or making English law the governing law of the underlying credit agreements (if necessary by changing that governing law en route).

The COMI route to jurisdiction in many ways defies the proverbial impossibility of having one’s cake and eating it. For the establishment of a company’s centre of main interests, the courts and practice tend to refer to the EU’s Insolvency Regulation. Yet that schemes of arrangement do not fall under the Insolvency Regulation is a crucial part of the forum shopping involved in attracting restructuring advice to the English legal market. This is especially so for the aforementioned second route to jurisdiction (a change in governing law). however it is also true for the first form. Snowden J refers to that at para 85-86 of his judgment.

Indah Kiat has effected its change of COMI (rebutting the presumption of COMI being at its registered seat) by notifying its creditors via a number of clearing houses for the Notes concerned. APPIO contest that this notification sufficed for change in COMI. There are not enough relevant facts in the judgment to consider this objection thoroughly, however APPIO’s misgivings would not seem entirely implausible.

Snowden J notes that whilst protesting the jurisdiction, in the first instance APPIO simply seeks an adjournment of the convening hearing on the grounds that inadequate notice has been given of it to Scheme Creditors. It contends that given the complex nature of the Scheme and the factual background, there is no justification for an urgent hearing of the application. The Court agreed and the convening hearing (different from the sanction hearing, which follows later) was adjourned until 3 March. Snowden J further gave extensive argument obiter as to why the Scheme’s information was insufficient in the form as it stood at the hearing.

He then revisits (82 ff) the jurisdictional issue, which I have already signalled above: what role exactly COMI should play, how the Brussels I recast intervenes, what the impact is of likely recognition of the sanction (if any) in Indonesia, The Netherlands, and the US; and what if any role the relevant US judgments in the case should play: there will be plenty of points for discussion at the convening and sanction hearing. (I mentioned above that the convening hearing was scheduled around 3 March; I have not heard from the case since however if anyone has, please do let me know).

I do not think Indah Kiat has made the jurisdictional hurdle higher for Schemes of Arrangement involving foreign companies. Rather, the fierce opposition of an important creditor has brought jurisdictional issues into sharper perspective than had been the case before.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, Chapter 5, Heading 5.4.2).

 

 

 

Kohärenz im Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht der Europäischen Union, a cura di Jan von Hein e Giesela Rühl, Mohr Siebeck, 2016, pp. XVII+389, ISBN 9783161533501, Euro 79.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Since adopting the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the European Union has enacted a large number of regulations in the field of Private International Law and International Civil Procedure. Resultant reconciliation and coordination problems were the subject of a 2014 conference in Freiburg im Breisgau. The findings presented here shed light on incoherences, describe the requirements for a more coherent regulation and discuss perspectives for a future European codification in the field of Private International Law.

L’indice ed un estratto del volume sono disponibili qui. Ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.

Il fascicolo di gennaio 2016 della rivista La Ley: Unión Europea contiene alcuni contributi su temi internazionalprivatistici.

In particolare, Angel Espiniella Menéndez è autore di uno scritto, dedicato al regolamento 2015/2421, che modifica il regolamento n. 861/2007, sulle controversie di modesta entità, intitolato La reforma de los procesos europeos monitorio y de escasa cuantía.

Appaiono altresì un commento di Santiago Álvarez Gonzáles alla sentenza pronunciata dalla Corte di giustizia il 19 novembre 2015 nella causa C-455/15, PPU, intitolato Traslado ilícito de menores, competencia judicial internacional y orden público, e un commento di María Jesús Elvira Benayas alla sentenza Corte di giustizia del 16 settembre 2015 nella causa C-519/13, Alpha Bank, intitolata El uso de los formularios (en la notificación internacional conforme al Reglamento 1393/2007) y la tutela judicial efectiva.

L’indice completo della rivista è disponibile qui.

Statistiques judiciaires 2015 : de nouveaux records de productivité et d’affaires introduites pour la Cour de justice de l’UE

Karl-May-Verlag / OHMI - Constantin Film Produktion (WINNETOU)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Le Tribunal accueille le recours de la maison d’édition Karl-May contre la décision de l’Office des marques de l’Union annulant la marque communautaire WINNETOU

In Vizcaya v Picard, the Privy Council considered the issue of consent to a choice of court clause in the event no such choice has been made verbatim. It was alleged that choice of court had been made implicitly but clearly by reference to an applicable law agreement in the underlying contract. RPC have a review of the case on their blog and I am grateful to them for bringing it to my attention.

The case is a fall-out of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme, carried out through Mr Madoff’s company Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”), a New York corporation. After Madoff’s fraud came to light in 2008, Irving Picard (“the trustee”) was appointed as trustee in BLMIS’s liquidation in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (“the New York BankruptcyCourt”). The trustee commenced proceedings under the anti-avoidance provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code against investors who had been repaid before the fraud was discovered, including the appellant, Vizcaya Partners Limited (“Vizcaya”), a BVI (British Virgin Islands) company which carried on business as an investment fund, and which invested about US$328m with BLMIS between January 2002 and December 2008, but was repaid US$180m before the fraud was discovered.

The Appeal before the Privy Council concerns primarily the content and scope of the rule in common law that a foreign default judgment is enforceable against a judgment debtor who has made a prior submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign court (as distinct from a submission by appearance in the proceedings).  Brussels I or the Recast was not applicable to the case. In that Regulation (Article 25), the expression of consent with choice of court must take one of thee forms: essentially: written (or oral but confirmed by written agreement); in accordance with lex mercatoria; or in accordance with established business practice simply between the parties.

The question in the case at issue is whether the agreement to submit must be express, or can also be implied or inferred. The Privy Council settled the uncertainty which would seem to have existed for some time in the common law, in favour of an answer in the affirmative. Consent to jurisdiction can be implied. What needs to be shown though is real ‘agreement’, or ‘consent’ (in European private international law with respect to the similar discussion re choice of law (Rome I) I would say the test is one of ‘clearly established’), quod non in casu. Choice of law (here: in favour of New York law) can be a factor but not a solely determinant one. Moreover, choice of court viz one’s business transactions does not imply automatic extension to insolvency proceedings.

Crucial precedent, it would seem. Geert.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9

Johannes Schilling, Das Internationale Privatrecht der Transportverträge, Mohr Siebeck, 2016, pp. XXXV+468, ISBN 9783161542534, € 79,00

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Das internationale Transportrecht ist durch eine unübersichtliche Anzahl von materiellen Einheitsrechtsakten gekennzeichnet. Während im Gütertransport die völkerrechtlichen Konventionen, wie die CMR oder das MÜ, zum Tragen kommen, werden bei der Personenbeförderung in erster Linie die europäischen Fahrgastrechteverordnungen relevant. Mittlerweile ist auch das für Beförderungsverträge maßgebliche Kollisionsrecht auf europäischer Ebene vereinheitlicht, und zwar in Art. 5 Rom I-VO. Angesichts dessen geht Johannes Schilling der Frage nach, welches Recht auf internationale Beförderungsverträge Anwendung findet. Im Fokus stehen dabei sowohl die Auslegung als auch das praktische Anwendungsfeld des neuen europäischen IPR für Beförderungsverträge. Darüber hinaus wird das supranationale Kollisionsrecht zu dem internationalen Einheitsrecht der Güter- und Personenbeförderung ins Verhältnis gesetzt.

Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili qui.

Mirza
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice ASIL
Le règlement Dublin III permet aux États membres d’envoyer un demandeur de protection internationale vers un pays tiers sûr, indépendamment qu’il s’agisse de l’État membre responsable du traitement de la demande ou d’un autre État membre

Ruijssenaars et Jansen
Transport
Les autorités nationales exercent une surveillance de caractère général afin de garantir les droits des passagers aériens, mais ne sont pas tenues d’agir suite à des plaintes individuelles

Mc Fadden
SERV
Selon l’avocat général Szpunar, l’exploitant d’un magasin, d’un bar ou d’un hôtel qui propose gratuitement au public un réseau Wi-Fi n’est pas responsable des violations de droits d’auteur commises par un utilisateur