Flux européens

On 19 November 2015 the ECJ rendered its judgment in P v Q (Case C-455/15), a case concerning the public policy exception contemplated in regulation No 2201/2003 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (Brussels IIa). Pursuant to Article 23(a) of the regulation, a judgment on parental responsibility rendered in a Member State may be denied recognition in another Member State if such recognition is “manifestly contrary to the public policy” of the latter State “taking into account the best interests of the child”.

The facts which gave rise to the referral concerned a divorced couple (P and Q), whose children lived in Sweden when the dispute arose.

In march 2014, Q, who had previously reported P for offences against herself and their two children (V and S), took her children to Lithuania.

In April 2014, P and Q brought proceedings against each other, in Sweden and Lithuania, requesting interim measures granting them custody of the children (actually, the custody of S, in the case of Q). Shortly after, the Lithuanian court granted Q the custody of S.

On October 2014 the Swedish court granted P sole custody of S, while in February 2015 the Lithuanian court ruled that S should live with Q, while P should pay maintenance for the children.

Before the Swedish court, P argued that the Lithuanian order of February 2015 was at variance with Swedish public policy and should, accordingly, be denied recognition. 

Asked by the Swedish court to clarify the interpretation of Article 23(a) of the regulation, the Court of Justice of the European Union observes in its judgment that the refusal to recognise a foreign judgement should be kept to the minimum required. It also noted that the public policy clause in Article 23(a) of the Brussels IIa regulation is not the same as the one in Article 34(1) of regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I), now Article 45(1)(a) of regulation No 1215/2012 (Brussels Ia) in that the former provision “requires that a decision to refuse recognition must take into account the best interests of the child”.

In the Court’s view, Article 23(a) of the Brussles IIa regulation should come into consideration  “only where, taking into account the best interests of the child, recognition of the judgment given in another Member State would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which recognition is sought, in that it would infringe a fundamental principle”.

That said, the Court is of the opinion that, in the case at issue, “the documents before the Court do not show the existence of such a rule of law, regarded as essential in the legal order of the Kingdom of Sweden, or of such a right, recognised as fundamental within that legal order, which would be infringed” if the Lithuanian judgment were recognised.

The refusal to recognise the Lithuanian provision, according to the Court, can neither be based on the fact that the Lithuanian court had allegedly declared its jurisdiction in breach of Article 15 of the regulation, which allows the court to transfer the case to another court if it believes the latter to be better placed to hear the case. Such impossibility is due to Article 24, which “prohibits any review of the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of origin, and even provides expressly that Article 23(a) of the regulation cannot be used to carry out such a review”.

Lastly, the Court focuses on the pursuable alternatives in order to contrast a wrongful removal or retention of the child in a Member State. In this respect, the Court points to Article 11 of the regulation, which lays specific provisions on the matter. In particular, Article 11(8)  provides for a special procedure “under which the possible problem of conflicting judgments in the matter may be resolved”.

Readers will have noticed that a substantial part of the blog relates to Conflict of Laws /private international law. Following the example of Steve Peers, I will from now on add tags to the conflicts postings to assist readers of the 2nd ed of my Handbook on European Private international law. These will relate to the closest level of headings relevant to the posting. (E.g. my upcoming post on Saugmandsgaard AG in re Amazon will be tagged ‘Chapter  2’ and ‘2.2.11.2’. One next week on yesterday’s Opinion of Kokott AG on Mareva injunctions will be tagged ‘Chapter 2’ and ‘2.2.16’).

I cannot promise I will shortly be able to update all past postings (there are a lot) in this way however all postings until December 2015 are in some way or another included in the 2016 ed.

Thank you, Steve, for the idea.

Geert.

In 2015, the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference decided that an Experts’ Group should be convened to explore the feasibility of advancing work on the private international law issues surrounding the status of children, including issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements (for further information on the Parentage / Surrogacy project, see here).

The Experts’ Group on Parentage / Surrogacy met from 15 to 18 February 2016 (the full report is available here). The discussion, based on a background note drawn up by the Permanent Bureau, revealed significant diversity in national approaches to parentage and surrogacy.

The Group noted that “the absence of uniform private international law rules or approaches with respect to the establishment and contestation of parentage can lead to conflicting legal statuses across borders and can create significant problems for children and families”, including limping parental statuses, uncertain identity of the child, immigration problems, uncertain nationality or statelessness of the child, abandonment including the lack of maintenance. “Common solutions”, the Group observed, “are needed to address these problems”.

In particular, as regards the status quo, the Group noted the following.

(a) Most States do not have specific private international law rules regarding assisted reproductive technologies and surrogacy agreements.

(b) Regarding jurisdiction, issues mostly arise in the context of legal parentage being established by or arising from birth registration, voluntary acknowledgment of legal parentage or judicial proceedings. The experts reported, however, that jurisdiction issues tend to arise not as a stand-alone topic, but rather in connection with recognition.

(c) Regarding applicable law, there is a split between those States whose private international law rules point to the application of the lex fori and those whose private international law rules may also lead to the application of foreign law.

(d) Regarding recognition, the Group acknowledged the diversity of approaches of States with respect to the recognition of foreign public documents such as birth certificates or voluntary acknowledgements of parentage, and noted that there is more congruity of practice with respect to the recognition of foreign judicial decisions.

Based on the foregoing, the Group determined that “definitive conclusions could not be reached at the meeting as to the feasibility of a possible work product in this area and its type or scope” and expressed the view that “work should continue” and that, at this stage, “consideration of the feasibility should focus primarily on recognition”. The Group therefore recommended to Council, whose next meeting is scheduled to take place on 15 to 17 March 2016 (see here the draft agenda), that the Group’s mandate be continued.

Sabrine Maya Bouyahia, La proximité en droit international privé de la famille, Harmattan, 2015, ISBN 9782343054643, pp. 618, Euro 51,30.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Parmi les méthodes proposées pour trancher les litiges présentant un élément d’extranéité, figure celle reposant sur le principe de proximité. L’étude porte sur deux systèmes de droit international privé de la famille différents (droit français et droit tunisien) pour mettre en exergue d’une part l’adaptation de cette méthode aux spécificités de chaque ordre étatique et d’autre part son adéquation avec tous les différents systèmes de droit.

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L’Associazione Italiana per l’Arbitrato ha indetto la settima edizione del premio “Eugenio Minoli”, per le migliori tre tesi di laurea in materia di arbitrato commerciale internazionale discusse nel periodo compreso tra il 1° giugno 2014 e il 30 marzo 2016.

Il termine per la presentazione delle domande scade il 31 maggio 2016.

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Stroumpoulis e.a.
SOPO
Les marins grecs résidant en Grèce et engagés par une société ayant son siège statutaire dans un État tiers et son siège effectif en Grèce bénéficient de la protection du droit de l’Union en cas d’insolvabilité de la société

Garcia-Nieto e.a.
Sécurité sociale des travailleurs migrants
La Cour de justice confirme que certaines prestations sociales peuvent être refusées aux ressortissants d’autres États membres pendant les trois premiers mois de leur séjour

Shoe Branding Europe / adidas
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
adidas peut s’opposer à l’enregistrement, comme marque communautaire, de bandes parallèles apposées sur la face latérale des chaussures de sport

Coca-Cola / OHMI (Forme d'une bouteille à contours sans cannelures)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Le Tribunal rejette le recours de Coca-Cola qui souhaitait faire enregistrer comme marque communautaire une bouteille à contours sans cannelures

In Case C-605/14, Komu v Komu, the CJEU stuck to its classic application of the rule of Article 22(1) Brussels I (now Article 24(1) Brussels Recast). This Article prescribes exclusive jurisdiction for (among others) proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property. Article 25 adds that where a court of a Member State is seised of a claim which is principally concerned with a matter over which the courts of another Member State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22, it shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction. (emphasis added).

Mr Pekka Komu, Ms Jelena Komu, Ms Ritva Komu, Ms Virpi Komu and Ms Hanna Ruotsalainen are domiciled in Finland and are co-owners of a house situated in Torrevieja (Spain), the first three each with a 25% share and the other two each with a 12.5% share. In addition, Ms Ritva Komu has a right of use, registered in the Spanish Land Register, over the shares held by Ms Virpi Komu and Ms Hanna Ruotsalainen.Wishing to realise the interests that they hold in both properties, and in the absence of agreement on the termination of the relationship of co-ownership, Ms Ritva Komu, Ms Virpi Komu and Ms Ruotsalainen brought an action before the District Court, South Savo, Finland for an order appointing a lawyer to sell the properties and fixing a minimum price for each of the properties. The courts obliged in first instance and queried the extent of Article 22’s rule in appeal.

Co-ownership and rights of use, one assumes, result from an inheritance.

The CJEU calls upon classic case-law, including most recently Weber. At 30 ff it recalls the ‘considerations of sound administration of justice which underlie the first paragraph of Article 22(1) …’ and ‘also support such exclusive jurisdiction in the case of an action intended to terminate the co-ownership of immovable property, as that in the main proceedings.’:

The transfer of the right of ownership in the properties at issue in the main proceedings will entail the taking into account of situations of fact and law relating to the linking factor as laid down in the first paragraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, namely the place where those properties are situated. The same applies, in particular, to the fact that the rights of ownership in the properties and the rights of use encumbering those rights are the subject of entries in the Spanish Land Register in accordance with Spanish law, the fact that rules governing the sale, by auction where appropriate, of those properties are those of the Member State in which they are situated, and the fact that, in the case of disagreement, the obtaining of evidence will be facilitated by proximity to the locus rei sitae. The Court has already held that disputes concerning rights in rem in immovable property, in particular, must generally be decided by applying the rules of the State in which the property is situated, and the disputes which frequently arise require checks, inquiries and expert assessments which have to be carried out there.

A sound finding given precedent. However I continue to think it questionable whether these reasons, solid as they may have been in 1968, make much sense in current society. It may be more comfortable to have the case heard in Spain for the reasons set out by the Court. But essential? Humankind can perform transcontinental robot-assisted remote telesurgery. But it cannot, it seems, consult the Spanish land registry from a court in Finland. I would suggest it is time to adapt Article 24 in a future amendment of the Regulation.

Geert.

Commission / Hongrie
SERV
Certains aspects des régimes de la carte de loisirs SZÉP et du titre repas Erzsébet, qui, en Hongrie, permettent aux employeurs d’octroyer à leurs salariés, dans des conditions fiscalement intéressantes, des avantages en nature, ne sont pas compatibles avec le droit de l’Union

Il principio dell’armonia delle decisioni civili e commerciali nello spazio giudiziario europeo, a cura di Giacomo Biagioni, Giappichelli, 2015, pp. XII+196, ISBN 9788892100282, Euro 24.

[Abstract] Muovendo dalla premessa che il riconoscimento reciproco e la libera circolazione dei provvedimenti giurisdizionali costituiscono obiettivi generali degli strumenti di cooperazione giudiziaria civile che possono essere adottati sulla base dell’art. 81 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione europea, il volume mira ad esaminare in quale misura e sotto quali profili la necessità di garantire il valore dell’armonia tra le decisioni in materia civile e commerciale venga in rilievo nell’interpretazione e nell’applicazione delle norme dell’Unione relative alla competenza giurisdizionale, al coordinamento delle azioni civili nello spazio e all’efficacia delle decisioni. L’indagine è condotta su due piani distinti: per un verso, essa attiene a profili di carattere più generale immanenti all’intero àmbito della cooperazione giudiziaria civile dell’Unione europea; per altro verso, essa si concentra sul sistema c.d. “Bruxelles I”, che ha costituito in passato e continua a costituire un laboratorio entro il quale vengono elaborate soluzioni, normative e giurisprudenziali, spesso destinate ad essere poi estese ad altri strumenti UE in materia di cooperazione giudiziaria civile. Questo metodo di indagine impone sia di tener conto delle molteplici innovazioni conseguenti all’adozione e all’entrata in vigore del regolamento UE n. 1215/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio; sia dei progressivi sviluppi della giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea, nella quale nel corso degli anni il principio di armonia delle decisioni, pur con talune inevitabili oscillazioni, si è venuto enucleando nelle sue caratteristiche di principio generale della cooperazione giudiziaria civile tra gli Stati membri.

Il volume raccoglie, fra gli altri, contributi di Giacomo Biagioni, Elena D’alessandro, Antonio Leandro, Paola Piroddi, Francesco Salerno e Chiara Tuo. Il sommario dell’opera può leggersi qui.

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È da poco uscito il fascicolo invernale dell’annata 2015 di Int’l Lis – Corriere trimestrale della litigation internazionale, diretto da Claudio Consolo.

Il fascicolo contiene una nota di Annalisa Ciampi alla sentenza Taricco della Corte di giustizia (8 settembre 2015, causa C-105/14), dal titolo Il caso Taricco impone la disapplicazione delle garanzie della prescrizione: un problema di rapporti fra diritto dell’UE e diritto nazionale e di tutela dei diritti fondamentali, non solo di diritto processuale internazionale.

Viene poi proposto un commento di Marco De Cristofaro a Cassazione, sez. I, 4 giugno 2015, n. 11564, intitolato Il private enforcement antitrust ed il ruolo centrale della disciplina processuale, di nuovo conio legislativo o di nuova concezione giurisprudenziale.

La sezione Antologia ospita la seconda parte di uno scritto di Neil Andrews sulle più recenti innovazioni del contract law inglese.

Chiudono il fascicolo il caso del trimestre di Luca Penasa, relativo al caso Gazprom, deciso dalla Corte di giustizia (13 maggio 2015, causa C-536/13), e la recensione di Albert Henke della seconda edizione del libro di Richard Fentiman dedicato alla International Commercial Litigation.

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A great example of internal forum shopping and the application of forum non conveniens in the Court of Appeal. (Just before Christmas. I am still hacking away at my end-of-year queue).

Claimants claim damages for personal injuries they alleged they sustained in accidents in Scotland as a result of the negligence and/or breach of statutory duty of the defendants. The claims were issued in the Northampton County Court. The registered offices of the defendants are situated in England and Wales. Both claimants are domiciled in Scotland. Liability has been admitted in the case of Cook, but denied in the case of McNeil.  Since the claims related to accidents in Scotland, the claims were allocated to Carlisle County Court, which is the court geographically closest to Scotland. The claims were struck out on forum non conveniens grounds, with Scotland being the appropriate forum.

The most important issue that arises on these appeals (and the reason why Tomlinson LJ gave permission for a second appeal) is whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens can apply in a purely domestic context where the competing jurisdictions are England and Scotland. Put simply, the question is: does the English court have the power in such a case to stay or strike out a claim on the ground that the natural and more appropriate forum is Scotland?

As Floyd MR notes (at 7) it is surprising that there was no authority on this point.

He correctly holds that the ‘international element’ required for the Brussels I regime to apply, as it did in Owusu and Maletic  (but also Lindner) is absent in the case at issue. There is nothing in the facts which renders the case international in the Brussels I (Recast) sense.  Relevant precedent which did have some calling was Kleinwort Benson, Case C-346/93, in which the CJEU refused to interpret the (then) Brussels Convention in a purely domestic UK situation, even if the internal UK rules were modelled on the Brussels regime.

Forum non conveniens could be applied. Though not under appeal, Floyd MR does suggest that in his view the claim in which liability was admitted (Cook), should not have been struck out but rather stayed under the relevant rules.

Geert.

La Corte di Giustizia è stata recentemente investita di un rinvio pregiudiziale volto a chiarire l’incidenza del diritto primario dell’Unione europea sulle norme che disciplinano, a livello nazionale, il riconoscimento della modifica di un cognome intervenuta sulla base delle regole di un diverso Stato membro (Causa C-541/15, Mircea Florian Freitag).

Il dubbio del giudice remittente concerne l’interpretazione degli articoli 18 e 21 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione. La prima di tali norme vieta, nel campo di applicazione dei trattati, “ogni discriminazione effettuata in base alla nazionalità”, mentre la seconda garantisce ad ogni cittadino dell’Unione “il diritto di circolare e di soggiornare liberamente nel territorio degli Stati membri”.

Il quesito — che dovrebbe consentire alla Corte di sviluppare gli orientamenti delineati (in un contesto non identico) nella sentenza Grunkin e Paul  del 2008 (C-353/06) — punta a sapere se le norme testé richiamate impongano alle autorità di uno Stato membro di “riconoscere la modifica del cognome di un cittadino di tale Stato se questi è nel contempo cittadino di un altro Stato membro e in tale Stato ha (ri-)acquisito, a seguito di una modifica del cognome non legata a una variazione dello stato di famiglia, il proprio cognome originario ricevuto alla nascita, benché l’acquisizione di tale cognome non sia avvenuta quando il cittadino aveva la residenza abituale nell’altro Stato membro e sia avvenuta dietro sua richiesta”.

Conseil / Bank Mellat
Relations extérieures
La Cour confirme l’annulation du gel de fonds édicté depuis 2010 contre la Bank Mellat

L’Università di Milano, assieme alla Fondazione Italiana del Notariato ed altri enti, organizza per il 4 marzo 2016 un convegno dal titolo Il diritto internazionale privato europeo delle successioni. Si tratta dell’evento conclusivo di una ricerca dedicata al regolamento n. 650/2012 sulle successioni mortis causa, co-finanziata dalla Commissione europea.

Il convegno si articolerà in quattro sessioni, dedicate rispettivamente all’ambito di applicazione del regolamento e alle nozioni di cui esso si serve, alle norme sui conflitti di leggi, a quelle sulla giurisdizione e il riconoscimento delle decisioni e all’impatto della disciplina uniforme sugli ordinamenti statali.

Interverranno, fra gli altri, Stefania Bariatti (Univ. Milano), Paul Beaumont (Univ. Aberdeen), Alegría Borrás (Univ. Barcellona), Roberta Clerici (Univ. Milano), Peter Kindler (Univ. Monaco), Luigi Fumagalli (Univ. Milano), Cyril Nourissat (Univ. Lyon), Ilaria Queirolo (Univ. Genova), Francesca Villata (Univ. Milano) e Ilaria Viarengo (Univ. Milano).

Il programma può leggersi qui.

La partecipazione – gratuita – richiede la registrazione al sito www.suxreg.eu.

The November 2015 draft ‘Judgments project’ of the Hague Conference on private international law, otherwise known as the draft convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to civil and commercial matters, is a very ambitious project which at the same time risks exposing some of the inherent weaknesses of the modus operandi of the Hague Conference. This is not the right forum for an exhaustive analysis. Rather, with input from other members (Elsemiek Apers in particular) at Leuven PIL institute, I would like to flag some areas of interest. Inevitably, an obvious point of reference is the European Union’s Brussels I (Recast) regime.

First, the text itself. The Working Group’s report, which accompanies the draft, explains the history and development of the text and the various options taken. No need to repeat it here. The approach of the Convention is the same ‘mission creep’ which the 1968 Brussels Convention had to resort to, to enhance the free movement of judgments between Member States. Given that the most widespread reason for refusal of recognition and enforcement (R&E), are accusations of excessive or inappropriate exercise of jurisdiction, one can only truly co-ordinate R&E if one also co-ordinates jurisdiction. The Hague Convention takes this route in Articles 5-6, (Exclusive) bases for recognition and enforcement. Following this co-ordination of jurisdictional rules, Article 7 then limits the ground upon which R&E may be refused.

Of note is that Article 4(2)’s ban on merits review (when assessing the possibility of recognition and enforcement), probably does not extend to judgments issued by default. The Article is not clear on what is meant exactly: the first para of Article 4(2) rules out ‘review of the merits’. The second para suggests ‘The court addressed shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction, unless the judgment was given by default.’ Not being bound by findings of fact does not necessarily entail a possibility for merits review, and the text can probably do with clarification at this point.

Article 5(e)’s special jurisdictional rule for contracts, has been clarified compared with earlier versions, however the text remains subject to plenty of room for debate.

Article 8’s room for refusing R&E when the exclusive jurisdictional rules of the Convention were infringed, or where matters excluded from the Convention were at issue, could in our view do with tidying up. It currently mingles scope for refusal of R&E as such, in the case of infringement of the exclusive jurisdictional rules, with discussion of excluded matters as ‘preliminary issues’ only – a clear reference to the EU’s experience with arbitration. Without editorial perfection, however, this article, in combination with Article 2’s excluded matters, risks similar and protracted debate as was /is the case under Brussels I (and the Recast).

Further, the modus operandi, and institutional consequences of the Convention. As indicated, an exhaustive review of the Convention is not possible here. That is due in large part to the extensive comments which one could address vis-a-vis each individual entry of the text. Rather like in the case of each individual provision of the Brussels regime. In the case of the latter, the CJEU is exercised on a very regular basis with the determination of the precise meaning of the heads of jurisdiction. In the Hague process, there is no such institution. One has to rely on the application of the Convention by the signatory States. At some point, one has to assess whether it is tenable not to have some kind of review process at The Hague, lest one risks the Convention being applied quite differently in the various signatory States. Coupled with the additional lawyer of complication were the EU to accede (which it is bound to; however would it really be progress to create additional layers of differentiation?), the CJEU itself might have difficulty accepting a body of judicial review, where the text to be reviewed borders so closely unto the Brussels regime.

Geert.

N.
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Le droit de l’Union permet le placement en rétention d’un demandeur d’asile lorsque la protection de la sécurité nationale ou de l’ordre public l’exige

Rendón Marín
Citoyenneté européenne
Selon l’avocat général Szpunar, un ressortissant non UE qui a la garde exclusive d’un citoyen mineur de l’UE ne saurait être expulsé d’un État membre ou se voir refuser un permis de séjour du seul fait de ses antécédents pénaux