Flux européens

Venerdì 8 aprile 2016, si terrà a Firenze un corso di aggiornamento su I titoli esecutivi ‘europei’: procedure a confronto, organizzato dal Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche dell’Università di Firenze, in collaborazione con la Fondazione per la Formazione Forense dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Firenze.

[Descrizione del corso] – Il corso si propone di fornire ai partecipanti gli strumenti teorici e pratici necessari ai fini di garantire una corretta ed agevole tutela del credito in Europa. L’Unione europea prevede la facoltà, in capo a società e individui, di ricorrere a strumenti di diritto internazionale privato e processuale volti a facilitare il recupero del credito all’interno degli Stati membri, consentendo, da una parte, di attribuire “carattere europeo” alle decisioni interne relative a crediti non contestati (regolamento (CE) n. 805/2004 istituivo di un titolo esecutivo europeo per i crediti non contestati) ed istituendo, dall’altra, veri e propri procedimenti europei per il recupero transfrontaliero del credito e per controversie di modesta entità (regolamenti (CE) nn. 1896/2006 e 861/2007). Tali regolamenti pongono questioni di coordinamento con altri strumenti dell’Unione, in particolare con il recente regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 (c.d. “Bruxelles I-bis”), che ha sostituito il regolamento n. 44/2001 (“Bruxelles I”), in un quadro frammentario e settoriale che richiede un’approfondita conoscenza del settore della cooperazione giudiziaria in materia civile promossa dall’Unione (articoli 67 e 81 del TFUE). La peculiarità che caratterizza tutte queste procedure di recupero del credito risiede nell’eliminazione della procedura di exequatur. Le decisioni emesse nel quadro di ciascuno dei suddetti regolamenti, infatti, circolano in Europa attraverso un canale preferenziale che, attraverso un efficace sistema di formulari reperibili on-line, semplifica, accelera e riduce i costi dei procedimenti: tali provvedimenti sono dunque eseguiti nello Stato membro richiesto alla stregua delle decisioni emesse dai giudici interni, senza necessità di alcun previo procedimento volto a dichiararne l’esecutività. Secondo la Relazione della Commissione europea, presentata al Parlamento europeo il 13 ottobre 2015, recante una statistica dell’applicazione, negli Stati membri, del regolamento (CE) n. 1896/2006 istitutivo di un procedimento europeo di ingiunzione di pagamento, l’Italia si colloca tra gli ultimi posti. Ciò, afferma la Commissione, è dovuto essenzialmente alla mancata consapevolezza, da parte degli operatori giuridici, dell’esistenza di tali meccanismi e del funzionamento delle rispettive procedure. Così, la mancata o errata conoscenza di strumenti concepiti per agevolare la circolazione delle decisioni – e, pertanto, per promuovere i rapporti transfrontalieri e la circolazione delle persone in Europa – pregiudicandone i rispettivi obiettivi, finisce col realizzare un risultato del tutto opposto, frustrando le aspettative dei creditori e le prospettive di futuri rapporti transnazionali. Inoltre, il 24 dicembre 2015 è stato pubblicato sulla Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea il regolamento (UE) 2015/2421 del 16 dicembre 2015, che ha apportato rilevanti modifiche ai regolamenti n. 861/2007 e n. 1896/2006. Il corso fornirà ai partecipanti le conoscenze necessarie alla “gestione” delle procedure di recupero del credito istituite dai regolamenti menzionati. All’illustrazione del quadro normativo esistente, sarà affiancata una metodologia didattica di carattere pratico, ricorrendo a tal fine all’esame della giurisprudenza dell’Unione ed interna, nonché all’illustrazione dei metodi di reperimento e compilazione dei moduli.

Interverranno come relatori Francesco Salerno (Univ. Ferrara), Olivia Lopes Pegna (Univ. Firenze), Elena D’Alessandro (Univ. Torino) ed Ester di Napoli (Univ. Magna Graecia Catanzaro).

Le domande dovranno essere inviate (compilando questo modulo) all’indirizzo perfezionamenti@adm.unifi.it entro il 1° aprile 2016.

Il programma completo del corso ed ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili qui e qui.

Mc Fadden
SERV
Selon l’avocat général Szpunar, l’exploitant d’un magasin, d’un bar ou d’un hôtel qui propose gratuitement au public un réseau Wi-Fi n’est pas responsable des violations de droits d’auteur commises par un utilisateur

Dextro Energy / Commission
Environnement et consommateurs
Le Tribunal confirme que plusieurs allégations de santé relatives au glucose ne peuvent pas être autorisées

The Body Shop International / OHMI - Spa Monopole (SPA WISDOM)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
The Body Shop ne peut pas enregistrer « SPA WISDOM » comme marque communautaire

Il fascicolo 2/2015 della rivista Contratto e Impresa / Europa ospita una serie di contributi dedicati all’introduzione del certificato successorio europeo, istituito dal regolamento n. 650/2012, dall’angolatura di alcune esperienze giuridiche nazionali.

Il certificato successorio, come si dice all’art. 63, par. 1, del predetto regolamento, “è destinato a essere utilizzato dagli eredi, dai legatari che vantano diritti diretti sulla successione e dagli esecutori testamentari o amministratori dell’eredità che, in un altro Stato membro, hanno necessità di far valere la loro qualità”. Il suo compito è, in sostanza, quello di agevolare l’esercizio delle prerogative spettanti ai soggetti sopra indicati in uno Stato membro diverso da quello in cui il certificato è stato rilasciato.

Questi gli scritti raccolti nel fascicolo: Paul Lagarde, Le certificat successoral européen dans l’ordre juridique français (p. 405 ss.); Heinrich Dörner, Il certificato successorio europeo da un punto di vista tedesco. Disposizioni attuative e questioni aperte (p. 424 ss.); Patrick Wautelet, Elise Goossens, Le certificat successoral européen – Perspective belge (p. 434 ss.); Francisco Lledo Yagüe, Arantzazu Vicandi Martínez, Il certificato successorio europeo e la sua applicazione in Spagna: l’ordinamento giuridico spagnolo è pronto? (p. 449 ss.); Salvatore Patti, Il certificato successorio europeo nell’ordinamento italiano (p. 466 ss.).

L’indice completo del fascicolo è disponibile a questo indirizzo.

Nella sentenza 26 febbraio 2016, n. 3802, le Sezioni unite della Corte di cassazione si sono pronunciate sull’interpretazione dell’art. 5 n. 1 del regolamento n. 44/2001 concernente la competenza giurisdizionale, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale (Bruxelles I), e sulla rilevanza, in rapporto ad essa, dell’art. 31 della Convenzione di Vienna del 1980 sulla compravendita internazionale di beni mobili (CISG).

La prima delle norme richiamate, oggi sostituita dall’art. 7 n. 1 del regolamento n. 1215/2012 (Bruxelles I bis), istituisce un foro speciale delle liti in materia contrattuale, concorrente con il foro generale del domicilio del convenuto. In forza di tale disposizione, il convenuto, domiciliato in uno Stato membro, può essere attratto, in un diverso Stato membro, dinanzi al giudice del luogo in cui l’obbligazione dedotta in giudizio è stata o deve essere eseguita (locus solutionis), con la precisazione, indicata al primo trattino della lett. b) della norma, che, in caso di compravendita di beni, tale luogo deve intendersi coincidere con quello in cui i beni “sono stati o avrebbero dovuto essere consegnati in base al contratto”.

La Convenzione di Vienna, recante norme materiali internazionalmente uniformi in tema di vendita internazionale di merci, nel dettare la disciplina delle obbligazioni del venditore, precisa all’art. 31 che, quando la vendita implichi il trasporto dei beni, il venditore assolve il suo obbligo di consegna — in mancanza di diverse pattuizioni — rimettendo le merci al primo vettore.

Nella fattispecie si faceva questione di un contratto di somministrazione concluso fra una società italiana e una società spagnola. I beni forniti da quest’ultima alla società italiana erano stati rimessi a un vettore in Spagna per essere fatti pervenire alla società italiana. La consegna, agli effetti della Convenzione di Vienna, doveva quindi ritenersi perfezionata in quel paese.

La Cassazione, rifacendosi alla propria giurisprudenza e a quella della Corte di giustizia (segnatamente, per quest’ultima, alla sentenza Car Trim), ha affermato che in assenza di uno specifico accordo sul luogo della consegna, tale luogo dev’essere identificato, ai fini della giurisdizione, nel luogo di destinazione finale delle merci, quello in cui l’acquirente consegue o dovrebbe conseguire la disponibilità materiale, e non soltanto giuridica, dei beni. Le regole sostanziali applicabili al contratto sono, in questo caso, prive di rilievo ai fini dell’individuazione del locus solutionis.

Tale modo di intendere il concetto di luogo di consegna, ha ribadito la Corte, non è solo il più idoneo al soddisfacimento dell’obiettivo di prevedibilità. Garantendo una stretta correlazione tra il contratto e il giudice chiamato a pronunciarsi su di esso, esso risponde altresì al principio di prossimità, soddisfacendo in tal modo un altro obiettivo del regolamento Bruxelles I.

Ripercorrendo, infine, in chiusura, le argomentazioni del giudice comunitario relative al caso Electrosteel, la Corte ha sottolineato come, per verificare se le parti abbiano contrattualmente concordato il luogo di consegna delle merci, occorra aver riguardo a tutti i termini e a tutte le clausole rilevanti del contratto, compresi termini e clausole generalmente riconosciuti e sanciti dagli usi del commercio internazionale, quali gli Incoterms della Camera di commercio internazionale.

Non rinvenendosi nella specie pattuizioni di questo genere, la Corte ha rigettato il ricorso e dichiarato la giurisdizione del giudice italiano.

Marshall v MIB [2015] EWHC 3421 (QB) involved a road traffic accident that occurred in France. On 19th August 2012 an uninsured Peugeot motor car registered in France driven by Ms Bivard, a French national, hit Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard, both British nationals, as they were standing behind a Ford Fiesta motor car and its trailer, while it was being attended to by a breakdown recovery truck on the side of a motorway in France. The Ford Fiesta motor car was registered in the UK and insured by Royal & Sun Alliance (“RSA”), and the recovery truck was registered in France and insured by Generali France Assurances (“Generali”). The Peugeot then collided with the trailer shunting it into the Ford Fiesta which in turn was shunted into the vehicle recovery truck. Mr Pickard suffered serious injuries. Mr Marshall died at the scene.

This case raises points about among others (1) the law applicable to an accident involving a number of persons and vehicles; and (2) the application of the French Loi Badinter to the facts of this case, if French law applies: The second main issue is if French law applies, whether the Ford Fiesta motor car and recovery truck are “involved” within the meaning of the Loi Badinter, which it is common ground is the applicable French statute. If those vehicles are “involved” it is common ground that RSA, as insurer of the Ford Fiesta, and Generali, as insurer of the recovery truck, are liable to Mrs Marshall, and that Generali, as insurer of the recovery truck, is liable to Mr Pickard.

Two actions were commenced. The first by Mrs Marshall (Mr Marshall’s widow) against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (“the MIB”). Mrs Marshall relied on relevant English 2003 Regulations. The 2003 Regulations make the MIB liable in respect of liabilities of compensation bodies in other EEA states for losses caused by uninsured drivers. The relevant compensation body in France responsible for such losses is the Fonds de Garantie (“FdG”). The MIB denied liability, contending that the FdG would not be liable to Mrs Marshall because under the Loi Badinter Mr Pickard and RSA, as driver and insurer of the Ford Fiesta, and Generali, as insurers of the recovery truck, were liable. The second action was brought by Mr Pickard against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau relying on the 2003 Regulations. The MIB deny liability and contend that Generali, as insurers of the recovery truck, are liable to Mr Pickard.

The High Court was asked (1) what law applies per Article 4 Rome II, and (2) whether under the circumstances, Article 4(3) Rome II might have any relevance.

Save for Mrs Marshall’s claim for dependency which if English law applies is under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (“FAA 1976”), it is common ground that the direct damage occurred in France for all of the claims, including Mrs Marshall’s claim on behalf of Mr Marshall’s estate. In respect of the FAA 1976 claim, RSA (Mr Marshall’s insurers) submits that the direct damage occurred in the location where Mrs Marshall has suffered her loss of dependency, which is in England and Wales. Dingemans J resolves this issue of ricochet damage with reference to the AG’s Opinion in Lazar: the CJEU’s judgment in same was issued about a month after the High Court’s judgment in Marshall. The Advocate General, having regard to the relevant principles of consistency, foreseeability and certainty, in his opinion considered that “the damage occurs” for the purposes of a claim such as an FAA 1976 claim where the relevant death occurs. The AG noted that different EEA states took different approaches to the characterisation of a dependency claim. For example in both England and Italy it is considered that the damage for a loss of dependency occurs in the country where the dependant is situated, but that this is not a European wide approach. The opinion, Dingemans J notes, shows that the Advocate General was influenced by the need to avoid different Courts in different EEA states adopting different solutions to applicable law in fatal accident cases, which would lead to a diversity of approach in different jurisdictions.

The action between Mrs Marshall and Mr Pickard triggers Article 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation, identifying as applicable law the law of the country were both the ‘person’ claimed to be liable and the ‘person’ sustaining damage, are habitually resident at the time the damage occurs. Dingemans J rightly (at 17) dismisses the suggestion (made in scholarship) that the moment more than two ‘persons’ are involved, Article 4(2) becomes inoperable.

Turning then to Article 4(3), the escape clause of a ‘manifestly closer connection’. Dingemans J entertains the interesting proposition that Article 4(3) has to lead to a law different from the law which would be applicable per Article 4(1) or (2). This in particular would mean that once Article 4(2) is engaged, it cannot be undone by recourse to Article 4(3). Dingemans J insists that Article 4(3) must be employed generally, even if it leads to a resurrection of Article 4(1), and goes on to find French law to be applicable (at 19-20):

In my judgment this case provides an illustration of when French law is provided as the governing law under article 4(1), excluded (for part of the claims) under article 4(2), and then required again under article 4(3).

It is also common ground that article 4(3) imposes a “high hurdle” in the path of a party seeking to displace the law indicated by articles 4(1) or 4(2), and that it is necessary to show that the “centre of gravity” of the case is with the suggested applicable law. In this case there are a number of circumstances which, in my judgment, make it clear that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with France than England and Wales. These are: first that both Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard were hit by the French car driven by Ms Bivard, a national of France, on a French motorway. Any claims made by Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard against Ms Bivard, her insurers (or the FdG as she had no insurers) are governed by the laws of France; secondly the collision by Ms Bivard with Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard was, as a matter of fact and regardless of issues of fault or applicable law, the cause of the accident, the injuries suffered by Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard and the subsequent collisions; and thirdly any claims that Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard have against Generali, as insurers of the vehicle recovery truck, are also governed by the laws of France.

This judgment to my knowledge, with Winrow v Hemphill  is one of few discussing Article 4(3)’s escape clause in such detail. (The add-on being that in Marshall Article 4(3) was found as being able to override Article 4(2). A judgment which, like Winrow, does justice to both the exceptional nature of the provision, and the need to consider all relevant factors.

Geert.

Ps very soon the Supreme Court will hear further argument on the application of the Rome II Regulation in Moreno v MIB.

A report issued by the European Commission on 10 March 2016 analyses the functioning of the European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters (COM(2016) 129 final).

The Network was set up by Council Decision No 2001/470/EC and operates in accordance with the latter Decision, as amended by Decision No 568/2009/EC (see here for the consolidated text of the Decision). It ensures direct contacts and case-handling between national Network contact points, facilitates cross-border access to justice through information given to practitioners and the general public and evaluates and shares experience on the operation of specific Union law instruments in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters.

The report identifies a number of issues on which action should be taken to improve the Network’s functioning.

These issues relate, inter alia, to the resources and support given to contact points at national level, the synergies of the Network with other European networks pursuing similar aims, the visibility of the Network, including in the national websites of the institutions to which Network members belong to, and the Network’s role “in the full ex post evaluation of existing instruments”, which should be “further developed through the identification and collection of key statistical data based on national data collection mechanisms”.

As already announced on this blog, a conference is scheduled to take place in Bonn on 6 and 7 April 2017, under the title Politics and Private International Law (?). The aim of the initiative is to improve the exchange between young scholars of private international law.

A call for papers has now been issued to select the speakers.

The call may be found here (in German) and here (in English).

The deadline for submissions is 30 June 2016.

It has already been reported on this blog that the Council of the European Union was expected to authorise Austria to sign and ratify, and Malta to accede to, the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, “in the interest of the Union”.

A decision to this effect has in fact been adopted on at the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 10 March 2016, accompanied by a statement of the German government.

In the statement, Germany expresses its doubts as to whether the decision in question “falls within the exclusive external competence of the European Union”.

It is not clear, the statement observes, “why the future application of the Hague Service Convention to Austria and Malta could affect common rules on judicial cooperation between Member States in civil matters or alter their scope (Article 3(2) TFEU)”, since the Hague Service Convention applies in relation to third countries, whereas between European Union Member States, Regulation No 1393/2007 “clearly takes precedence over that Convention”.

In the view of the German government, the decision “should therefore not be used as a model for and should be without prejudice to any other measures in which the exclusive external competence of the European Union may play a role which may be taken by the European Union to resolve other similar cases”.

 

I have earlier reported on the referral in Universal, Case C-12/15. Szpunar AG opined today, 11 March (the English text of the Opinion is not yet available at the time I write this post) and suggests (at 37) that the Court not apply its Erfolgort /Handlungsort distinction per Case 21/76  Bier /Minnes de Potasse. He reminds the Court of Bier’s rationale: a special link between the Erfolgort and the case at hand, so as to make that place, the locus damni, the place where the damage arises, well suited to address the substantive issues raised by the claim. (He also reminds the Court, at 30, that the language of what is now Article 7(2) only refers to the harmful event; not in the slightest to damage).

In cases where the only damage that arises is purely economic damage, the locus damni is a pure coincidence (in the case of a corporation suffering damage: the seat of that corporation), bearing no relation to the facts of the case at all (lest it be entirely coincidental). The Advocate General skilfully distinguishes all relevant CJEU precedent and in succinct yet complete style comes to his conclusion.

The Court itself embraces its Bier ruling more emphatically than its AGs do (see the similar experience of Cruz Villalon AG in Hejduk).  That Universal Music is quite clearly distinguishable from other cases may sway it to follow the AG in the case at issue. However its fondness of Bier (judgment in 1976; it had been a hot summer that year) may I fear lead it to stick to its fundamental twin track of Erfolg /Handlungsort no matter the circumstances of the case.

Geert.

By a ruling of 8 March 2016, the German Federal Supreme Court declared that claims brought by German holders of Greek bonds against Greece, for damages suffered as a result of the Greek debt restructuring, were barred on grounds of State immunity (a press release may be found here, pending the publication of the full text of the decision).

The following is an excerpt of the report posted by Peter Bert at Dispute Resolution in Germany.

The bonds that the claimants had acquired – in Germany and through German Banks – where governed by Greek law. They did not contain collective action clauses. This notwithstanding, the terms of the bonds were subsequently amended by a majority vote of the bondholders and these amendments were declared binding upon all bondholders by laws passed by the Greek parliament. The measures that were implemented contained both a 53.5% haircut and an extension of the duration of the bonds.

Today, the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the actions as inadmissible (unzulässig). The Hellenic Republic was protected by the principle of sovereign immunity against these lawsuits in Germany. The international public law concept of sovereign immunity is recognized in German law (Sec. 20 para. 2 Courts Constitution Act; Art. 25 Basic Law; GG)

Raising capital by issuing bonds, according to the court, is per se not itself an sovereign act (nicht-hoheitliches Handeln; acta iure gestionis). However, whether the Hellenic Republic was protected by sovereign immunity was not only determined by the legal nature of the relationship between the parties, but also by the nature of the acts of state which are in dispute between the parties.

Accordingly, in the case at hand, it is not the issuance of bonds or the contractual relationship between the bondholders and Greece which is relevant for decision on immunity, but the legal nature of the acts that Greece took in order to restructure its debt. In particular, the dispute between the parties centred on the validity of the Greek law 4050/2012 of February 23, 2012 and the decisions of the Greek Council of Ministers dated March 9, 2012. These were the legal acts that declared the majority vote of the bondholders binding on all bondholders, and they clearly were sovereign acts (acta iure imperii).

In the words of the court, the very idea behind the concept of sovereign immunity is to prevent one state from ruling on the legality of sovereign acts of another state (“Der Grundsatz der Staatenimmunität will gerade Entscheidungen eines Staates über die Rechtmäßigkeit der hier maßgeblichen hoheitlichen Maßnahmen eines anderen Staates verhindern.”). But this is exactly what the German courts would have to do, were they to decide these disputes on the merits.

Thanks to Peter Bert for giving permission for the reproduction of his post.

Granted, the (bad) pun in the title would have worked better around the end of year, which is when I had originally planned this posting, before I got sidetracked. Bob Wessels has excellent overview here (including admirably swift and exact translation of core parts of the judgment). OOO PROMNEFTSTROY v Yukos at the Dutch Supreme Court is but one instalment in running litigation literally taking place across the globe.

Of particular interest to the blog is the court’s finding (at 3.4.2) that the existence of a corporation is subject to the lex incorporationis not, as the Court of Appeal had held, the lex concursus in the event of insolvency. The EU’s Insolvency Regulation does not apply for COMI is not within the EU. The Insolvency Regulation does not in so many words say the same as the Dutch Supreme Court however it is likely that under the EIR, too, this issue falls under lex societatis /lex incorporationis (see e.g. Miguel Virgos & Francisco Garcimartin, The European Insolvency Regulation: Law and Practice, Kluwer, 2004, p.82 (par 123, f: dissolution of the company).

One can imagine of course the one or two complications arising out of the seizure of assets of a company which no longer exists.

Geert.

Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs on the EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, 3a ed., Oxford University Press, 2016, ISBN 9780199687800, GBP 175.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – This practical book provides complete analysis of the revised EU
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (EIR), the main Regulation on cross-border insolvencies in the EU. This is an essential work for anyone who requires knowledge of insolvency law in the UK or in any of the other 26 EU countries to which the Regulation is directly applicable. Timed to take into account the final amended version of the EIR, this third edition of the leading work contains detailed analysis and opinion on the effect of the changes to Regulation in practice. It also considers the numerous ECJ and relevant national cases which have been decided since the last edition. 

Ulteriori informazioni sul volume, che tiene conto del regolamento 2015/848, recante la rifusione del regolamento n. 1346/2000, sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

 

HeidelbergCement / Commission
Concurrence
La Cour de justice annule les décisions de la Commission relatives aux demandes de renseignements adressées aux cimentiers

Esther Bendelac, Le transfert de biens au décès autrement que par succession en droit international privé, Le choix de la loi applicable aux institutions d’estate planning, Bruylant 2016, pp. 426, ISBN-13 9782802752431, Euro 140.

[Dal sito dell’editore] Les institutions d’Estate Planning, issues des droits anglais et américain, permettent à une personne physique de transférer un bien, à son décès, à un bénéficiaire antérieurement désigné par lui, autrement que par succession. L’analyse de ces mécanismes juridiques dans leur contexte d’origine, puis la mise en œuvre de la qualification téléologique-fonctionnelle n’ont pas permis d’assimiler les institutions anglo-américaines à celles de l’ordre juridique français. Pour identifier la loi qui leur est applicable, les propositions doctrinales contemporaines ont été éprouvées. En raison des spécificités constitutives de ces institutions d’Estate Planning – le right of survivorship, le life interest et le contournement de la procédure de probate -, la transposition des actuelles règles de conflits de lois est peu pertinente : les limites du système conflictuel ont été dévoilées. La seule voie qui pouvait encore être explorée, pour accueillir ces institutions dans l’ordre juridique français, était celle de l’émancipation du droit international privé du droit interne. Afin de vérifier la pertinence de l’élaboration d’une catégorie autonome et d’un critère de rattachement qui lui est propre, il a été nécessaire de s’interroger sur l’existence de lois de police et le contenu de l’ordre public international. Aucun de ces procédés alternatif et correctif de la méthode conflictuelle ne constitue un empêchement à l’énoncé de notre proposition de règle de conflit de lois spécifique aux institutions d’Estate Planning. Cet ouvrage comprend d’une part, des développements théoriques – principalement relatifs au droit international privé et au droit européen – destinés aux théoriciens du droit et, d’autre part des développements techniques qui permettront à de nombreux professionnels de découvrir les institutions d’Estate Planning.

L’indice dell’opera è reperibile qui. Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

The Department of Law of the University of Ferrara hosts a series of seminars, organised by Alberto De Franceschi, under the title New Features of European Contract Law – Towards a Digital Single Market.

The seminars, in English, will run from 9 March to 25 May 2015 2016.

Speakers include Michael Lehmann (Ludwig Maximilian Univ. of Munich and Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition), Christian Twigg-Flesner (Univ. of Hull), Rodrigo Momberg Uribe (Univ. of Oxford), Herbert Zech (Univ. of Basel), Fryderyk Zoll (Univ. of Kraków and Univ. of Osnabrück), Geraint Howells (City Univ. of Hong Kong), Reiner Schulze (Univ. of Münster), Peter Kindler (Ludwig Maximilian Univ. of Munich), Martin Gebauer (Univ. of Tübingen) and Jorge Morais Carvalho (Univ. Nova of Lisbon).

Two seminars are specifically concerned with private international law issues: on 13 May 2016, Peter Kindler will talk about The law applicable to contracts in the Digital Single Market, while, on 18 May 2016, Martin Gebauer will speak of Contracts concluded by electronic means in cross-border transactions.

The complete programme may be downloaded here.

Attendance is free. For more information: alberto.defranceschi@unife.it.

 

As I have reported in December, the Gerechtshof Den Haag confirmed jurisdiction against Shell’s Nigerian daughter company. The proceedings can be joined with the suit against the mother company Royal Dutch Shell (RDS, headquartered in The Netherlands whence easily sued on the basis of Article 4 Brussels I Recast (Article 2 of the Regulation applicable to the proceedings)). I have finally gotten round to properly reading the court’s judgment (which deals with jurisdiction issues only). As I have pointed out, Article 6(1) (now 8(1) of the Brussels I Recast) cannot be used against defendants not domiciled in the EU. Dutch rules on joinders applied therefore. The Gerechtshof however took CJEU precedent into account, on the basis that the preparatory works of the relevant Dutch rules on civil procedure reveal that they were meant to be so applied. Consequently a lot of CJEU precedent is reviewed (the most recent case quoted is CDC). The Gerechtshof eventually holds that lest it were prima facie established that liability of RDS for the actions committed by its Nigerian daughter is clearly unfounded, use of RDS as an anchor can go ahead. Only clearly abusive attempts at joinders can be sanctioned. (A sentiment most recently echoed by the CJEU in Sovag).

The Gerechtshof Den Haag, without being definitive on the issue, also suggested that applicable law for considering whether merger operations inserting a new mother company were abusive (merely carried out to make Royal Dutch Shell escape its liability), had to be addressed using ‘among others’ the lex incorporationis (at 3.2). That is not undisputed. There are other candidates for this assessment.

The judgment being limited to jurisdiction, this case is far from over.

Geert.

Antonio Leandro, Le procedure concorsuali transfrontaliere, in Trattato delle procedure concorsuali, a cura di Alberto Jorio, Bruno Sassani, volume III, Giuffrè, 2016, ISBN 9788814201899, Euro 90, pp. 740-875.

[Indice sommario] 1. Osservazioni introduttive. — 2. Impostazioni teoriche del fenomeno: unificazione di forum e ius alla luce del principio di territorialità della legge processuale e del nesso di strumentalità tra obiettivi della procedura e situazioni da regolare al suo interno. — 3. Segue: contrapposizione e bilanciamento tra universalità e territorialità del fallimento. —4. Segue: altre ricostruzioni teoriche sulla unificazione di forum e ius nell’insolvenza transfrontaliera. — 5. Il reg. 1346/2000: osservazioni generali e àmbito di applicazione. — 6. La giurisdizione sulla domanda di apertura della procedura principale: la determinazione del COMI soprattutto in caso di società. — 7. Segue: la natura del COMI e gli interessi rilevanti. — 8. Segue: l’insolvenza di gruppo. — 9. Segue: il trasferimento del COMI prima e dopo la domanda di apertura. I trasferimenti “fittizi” di sede. — 10. Fasi e vicende interne alla procedura principale: l’accertamento dei presupposti dell’apertura. — 11. Segue: l’individuazione dei soggetti legittimati a domandare l’apertura. —12. Segue: l’individuazione delle “autorità” della procedura. —13. Segue: gli accertamenti sui crediti. L’insinuazione.—14. Segue: la liquidazione dei beni. —15. La giurisdizione sui processi interni alla procedura: la vis attractiva sulle azioni ancillari. — 16. La procedura secondaria/territoriale. — 17. Segue: i soggetti legittimati a domandare l’apertura. Differenze tra procedura “secondaria” e procedura “territoriale”. — 18. L’accertamento dello stato di insolvenza. — 19. Il coordinamento tra le procedure. Gli obblighi dei curatori e il difetto di regole di coordinamento tra i fori. — 20. Il diritto applicabile nel corso della procedura: l’applicazione della lex concursus agli effetti sul debitore. — 21. Gli effetti nei confronti di creditori e terzi: osservazioni generali. — 22. Segue: la compensazione dei crediti nel corso della procedura. — 23. Segue: verifica e insinuazione dei crediti.—24. Segue: gli effetti sulle azioni individuali e sui procedimenti pendenti. Rinvio. — 25. La determinazione del grado dei crediti: conflitto e coordinamento tra le varie leges concursus. — 26. La salvaguardia dei diritti reali su beni situati all’estero. — 27. La riserva di proprietà. — 28. Gli effetti sui rapporti giuridici pendenti. — 29. Gli atti pregiudizievoli. — 30. Segue: la disciplina della revocatoria (fallimentare).—31. La disciplina speciale per taluni atti a titolo oneroso.—32. Considerazioni conclusive sul richiamo di leggi diverse dalla lex concursus. —33. Segue: normativa fallimentare o normativa comune? — 34. L’assenza di prescrizioni sull’ordine pubblico e sulle c.d. norme di applicazione necessaria. — 35. L’efficacia delle decisioni: osservazioni introduttive. — 36. Segue: la nozione di decisione di apertura. — 37. Segue: la natura principale o secondaria della procedura aperta. — 38. Il momento dell’apertura. La priorità della decisione (e della procedura) in base al principio del riconoscimento automatico. — 39. L’efficacia esecutiva. — 40. L’esercizio transfrontaliero dei poteri del curatore. — 41. Assimilazione e differenze di ordine quantitativo tra Stato d’origine e Stato richiesto circa gli effetti della decisione di apertura. — 42. Segue: gli effetti sui procedimenti pendenti all’estero. Considerazioni conclusive e riepilogative sul trattamento delle azioni individuali dei creditori. — 43. L’efficacia di decisioni diverse da quella di apertura: il caso del concordato.—44. La revoca dell’apertura. — 45. Considerazioni conclusive e riepilogative sui rapporti e sul coordinamento tra i curatori nominati in distinte procedure. — 46. L’ordine pubblico come limite alla circolazione degli effetti di decisione e procedura.—47. Le novità del reg. 2015/848. — 48. Cenni sulla disciplina residuale di diritto comune.

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