Agrégateur de flux

The Institute for Comparative and Private International Law (Department 3) at Freiburg University (Germany) is seeking a Research Associate (m/f/d), 26%, to begin as soon as possible.

The responsibilities of this position include supporting the professorship in organizational and pedagogical matters, participating in the professorship’s research projects, and conducting own courses. The opportunity to pursue a doctorate is offered. The position is suitable for parallel training or doctoral funding. Applicants are expected to demonstrate a particular interest in the professorship’s key areas of focus and have passed the first (or second) state examination with above-average results (at least fully satisfactory). Knowledge of German civil law and international private and procedural law is also required. Applicants with severe disabilities will be given preference if they are suitable.

The position is initially limited to two years. Remuneration is based on the TV-L E13 salary scale.

We particularly welcome applications from women for the position advertised here.

For further information, please click here.

On 19 May 2025, the leaders of the European Union (António Costa, President of the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission) and the United Kingdom (Keir Starmer, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom) met in London for the first EU-UK summit since the UK withdrew from the EU. At the […]

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

In X v Amstelveen Equity Trust BV et al, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2025:2975 (anonymised presumable because of the family issues in the litigation; not a convincing reason to anonymise imo) claimant seeks damages in excess of 1.3 billion $ from two of his uncles and a series of corporations associated with them. The nephew (a similar claim by his ssiter was settled earlier, In Turkey) claims that the uncles mismanaged the shares which were held by his father in the two defendant Turkish companies, a shareholding in which he claims he has succeeded his father.

The claim alleges that the two Turkish corporations transferred the shares to their own ownership and subsequently transferred them to the two Dutch corporations who are also defendants, without paying the proper value to the nephew. Claimant has also seized a Turkish court, with a claim to value the shares, and to annul the decisions of the Turkish corporations to transfer the shares first into their own names and subsequently to the Dutch corporations.  The transfer of the shares is based on relevant article in the Turkish Corporations Act which reads

“if the shares have been acquired by inheritance, division of inheritance, provisions of the property regime between spouses or by compulsory execution, the company may refuse to give approval to the person acquiring the shares only if he proposes to take over the shares at their real value”

Current judgment deals only with the defendant’s request, which it grants, to stay the Dutch proceedings, pending the decision by the Turkish court. [3.14] the shares meanwhile have been sequestered by earlier decision of the Dutch courts.

[5.2] and [5.3] the Court holds that Article 26 Brussels Ia (voluntary appearance aka prorogation aka submission) applies equally to non-EU domiciled defendants, with reference to CJEU C-412/98 Group Josi [44]:

Admittedly, under Article 18 of the Convention, the voluntary appearance of the defendant establishes the jurisdiction of a court of a Contracting State before which the plaintiff has brought proceedings, without the place of the defendant’s domicile being relevant.

As I explain in my critical review of X v Trustees of Max Stern, I do not think that section of Group Josi relates to the non-EU element of the defendant’s domicile, rather its domicile full stop (within the EU). Neither the German Supreme Court nor the Amsterdam court here are right, in my view, and the issue is most certainly not acte claire, particularly given the language of Article 6 Brussels Ia.

[5.4] ff then discusses the call of both the Dutch and the Turkish defendants upon either Article 33 lis pendens or Article 34 related cases, or their residual Dutch equivalent.

The court [5.6] swiftly decides that the Turkish defendants’ call upon Articles 33-34 does not go anywhere seeing as Article 6 (which it, imo wrongly, held grounds its jurisdiction) is not listed as one of the jurisdictional anchors which may be corrected by Articles 33-34. Yet [5.41] the court holds that the (Dutch) ‘sound administration of justice’ justifies a stay ‘on the same considerations’ which led to its granting  a stay on A33-34 grounds viz the Dutch defendants. This is cakeism. Either you hold that Brussels Ia applies and then you apply all of Brussels Ia, including the consequences of the A33-34 limits. Here: if an A33-34 stay is not possible, then neither is a case-management stay or a ‘sound administration of justice’ stay if these merely recycle the, by definition inapplicable, A33-34 analysis (see also my earlier posts echoing ‘circumventing Owusu via the back door’, ia viz de Jong and Municipio): for that is just a ‘me too’ A33-34 stay in circumstances where these Articles clearly do not apply.

Viz the Dutch defendants, the court first of all holds that A33 does not apply for the lis pendens conditions are not met: [5.12] while the Turkish proceedings only concern the Turkish corporations, the Dutch concern both the Dutch and the Turkish ones, and a number of directors; both materially and from the point of view of procedures, the defendants in the Dutch proceedings have a very different position both among themselves and, for the Turkish defendants, viz their position in the Turkish proceedings. [5.13] neither do the proceedings concern the same matters of law, seeing as the Dutch one relates to tort and unjust enrichment, while the Turkish one concerns corporate law as well as economic law.

However the call upon A34 forum connexitatis /related action is successful. I discuss all conditions here and will not repeat them all at length in this post.

[5.19] the court matter of factly posits that for the condition of ‘relatedness’, A30 Brussels Ia’s approach (A30 applies in case of lis pendens between EU Courts) equally applies to A34. It holds that [5.25] the ownership question over the shares is core to, at the least very relevant in, both the Turkish and the Dutch procedures, as is [5.26] the valuation of the shares. [5.27] diverging answers to these questions by the Turkish cq Dutch courts would lead to a risk of irreconcilable judgments. [5.28] that the pending cases in Turkey concern more than just one procedure is held to be irrelevant for the purposes of A34.

Further, applying an Anerkennungsprognose, any future Turkish judgment is likely to be recognisable in The Netherlands following the criteria of the Dutch Supreme Court in Gazprom.

As for the ‘proper administration of justice’, [5.35] the court holds that the Turkish proceedings are likely to be completed within a reasonable period (reference here is made to the Dutch courts likely not deciding such a complex case in a shorter timeframe); the Turkish proceedings already having been underway for quite a while (and for some of them, under an exclusive ground of jurisdiction); and the close link with Turkey even in the Dutch proceedings. [5.40] the court reminds the parties that if circumstances change the balance of competing interests (one would imagine, excessive delay in the Turkish procedures, perceived bias, etc), an application to lift the stay may be made.

Both the A6 decision and the effective application of A33-34 to the Turkish defendants despite these Articles not applying to relevant claim, are a weak link in my view in current judgment. The A33-34 analysis is a touch on the concise size with a view to proper administration of justice.

At any rate, a judgment of note, seeing the extensive engagement with A33-34.

Geert.

European Private International Law, 2.572 ff.

 

A new issue of ZEuP – Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht is now available and includes contributions on EU private law, comparative law and legal history, legal unification, private international law, and individual European private law regimes. The full table of content can be accessed here.

The following contributions might be of particular interest for the readers of this blog:

• Anspruchsverjährung im deutsch-spanischen Rechtsverkehr
  David Cuenca Pinkert and Alexander Kronenberg on the statute of limitation in cross-border situations involving Germany and Spain: Against the background of the relevance of the application of foreign law in practice, the article analyses the institute of the statute of limitations under Spanish substantive law and also deals with similarities and differences to German law as well as selective references to conflict of laws and particularities. Due to its practical relevance, the article focuses on the treatment of the limitation period for tortious claims for damages, especially as a result of road traffic accidents.
• EGMR „Klimaseniorinnen“ – Konsequenzen für private Klimaklagen?
  Marc-Philippe Weller and Franka Weckner comments on the decision by the ECtHR in Klimaseniorinnen and discuss the consequences of this decision for climate litigation brought before civil courts.

The third issue of the IPRax (Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts) for 2025 has been published. The following English abstracts have been kindly provided by the editor of the journal. M.F. Müller-Berg, The effects of the new product liability directive on international product liability [German] The concepts of damage, marketing and the person sustaining […]

Le droit de séjour découlant de l’article 20 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne naît-il en vertu du droit de l’Union européenne ? Et à quel moment ce droit prend-il naissance ? La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne était interrogée sur les droits d’un ressortissant de pays tiers lié à une personne ayant le statut de citoyen de l’Union.

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If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

Our University’s reminder re open access policies and our publication repository, reminds me of the interesting provision inserted in 2018 in Article X.196 of Belgium’s Economic Law Act: (DeepL translation)

The author of a scientific article that is the result of at least half publicly funded research retains, even if, in accordance with Article XI.167, he has disposed of his rights to a journal publisher or placed them under an ordinary or exclusive licence, the right to make the manuscript available free of charge in open access to the public in a journal after the expiry of a period of 12 months for human and social sciences and six months for other sciences after the first publication, provided that the source of the first publication is mentioned.
The publishing contract may provide for a shorter period than that stipulated in the first paragraph.
The King [that is shorthand for the Government, GAVC] may extend the period stipulated in the first paragraph.
The right described in the first paragraph cannot be waived. This law is mandatory and applies irrespective of the law chosen by the parties as soon as there is a link in Belgium. It also applies to works created before the entry into force of this paragraph and which do not belong to the public domain at that time.

Under Article 9 Rome I 

1.   Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.

2.   Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum.

3.   Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. In considering whether to give effect to those provisions, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application.

This is the ‘overriding mandatory law’, aka lois de police aka lois d’application immédiate provision.

Clearly even in Belgian courts the provision is bound to trigger interesting discussions. First of all of course the statutory construction of ‘scientific’ [note that the Dutch (‘wetenschappelijk’) and French use of ‘scientific’ is a much broader category than the English language ‘scientific’; humanities faculties for instance are very much ‘scientific’ in the ‘wetenschappelijk’ sense]. Is a historic novel loosely based on scientific research, a ‘scientific’ work? Further, the meaning of ‘at least half publicly funded research’: that’s a statutory construction quagmire and I suspect the travaux might help (I have not consulted them for this post). Finally, at least for purposes of this blog, the limitation to cases with ‘a link to Belgium’: e.g. would the mere seizing of a Belgian court not suffice? Further, any choice of court away from Belgium, in copyright and other agreements is likely to upend the impact of the provision, seeing as a non-Belgian, EU Member States courts (and the UK under Rome I) will have much more flexible room for manoeuvre under  Rome I (see above) to apply the Belgian Act. This may be managed by authors either by seizing a Belgian court first (in a denial of (copyright) infringement claim, presumably), or potentially by claiming the illegality of choice of court away from Belgium (not such an easy proposition I imagine; e.g. the consumer contract protection prima facie would seem unavailable). Fun with conflict of laws. Have I mentioned it’s exam season? (I know, I am on sabbatical. But not everyone is). Geert. Handbook of EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 3.73 ff.

Under Article 10 of the Spanish Law 14/2006 of 26 May 2003 on assisted human reproduction techniques, gestation agreements, for a price or not, by a woman who renounces to motherhood in favour of a party to the contract or of a third party are null and void. As a rule, the parenthood of children born […]

In preparation of the University of Bologna (Ravenna Campus) Summer School on Transnational Litigation, already noted on this blog, a warm-up webinar will take place on 19 May 2025, from 6 to 7 pm CET. The session will feature Marco Pasqua (PhD at Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan) who will speak on […]

RRC Sports
Concurrence
Avocat général Emiliou : les instances dirigeantes du sport sont limitées dans leur autorégulation en cas d’impact significatif sur les matières régies par le droit de l’Union

The Cambridge Law Journal has published, on First View (that is, online before print), an interesting article by Marcus Teo (Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore) on proof of foreign law in English law, titled The Inference of Similarity English courts have long professed to apply a “presumption of similarity” when faced with […]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Written by Catherine Shen, Senior Assistant Director, ABLI

Following successful sessions in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the Singapore-based Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI) and the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) return after a one-year hiatus with their fourth joint webinar, this time on electronic service of documents and remote taking of evidence.

Titled Cross-border Commercial Dispute Resolution – Electronic Service of Documents and Remote Taking of Evidence, the webinar will take place on Thursday 10 July between 5 to 6:10pm (Singapore time) or 11am to 12:10 noon (CEST), and is expected to discuss, among others, electronic transmission of requests under the Service Convention, such as the use of IT for communication among Central Authorities and other competent authorities, service by electronic means across different jurisdictions, and remote taking of evidence by video-link and electronic evidence under the Evidence Convention.

Invited speakers include Melissa Ford, Secretary of HCCH,  Lucinda Orr, Partner of Enyo Law LLP, Justice Anselmo Reyes, International Judge of the Singapore International Commercial Court, and Dr Xu Guojian, Senior Partner of SGLA Law Firm.

More about the webinar and its speakers can be found in the flyer.

For more information or to register, click here. Early bird discount is available till 10 June. Queries about the webinar can be directed to Catherine of ABLI at abli_info@abli.asia.

La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne engage une clarification des critères relatifs à la nécessité et aux modalités de contrôle des actes de procédure du parquet européen par les juridictions nationales, rappelant le principe d’équivalence des recours entre les situations relevant du droit national et celles relevant du droit de l’Union. 

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This is an academic public service claxon: the European Commission Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports COM(2025)440 is an absolute treasure trove for questions in current exam season underway in much of the Northern Hemisphere at least.

The Roadmap obviously has solid security credentials in the light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and raises the type of issues which imo are excellent to discuss with students particularly in an oral exam:

what are the implications of the consequential trade restrictions viz international trade law;

how does the EC propose to deal with ongoing long-term contracts (both in the suggestions for communication of these contracts to Commission services, and the roadmap towards ending them. Flag viz the latter element: these contracts are subject to a smorgasbord of dispute resolution clauses, governing law provisions etc. How does force majeur in war times impact on contracts subject to different national laws? (The Commission suggesting ia ‘Building on joint European preparations, the assessment of the impact of the measures carried out by the Commission since the Versailles Declaration, including effects on gas security of supply, market, prices and legal aspects (including contracts), the Commission intends to propose legal measures for the effective phase out of gas imports from Russia.’);

what is the impact of any EU measure on claims under international investment law, particularly for claims that may be brought outside of the EU;

etc. Should guarantee at least half an hour of discussion which may gauge a student’s knowledge of the issues in various legal subjects quite nicely.

You’re welcome.

Geert.

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

In HM Treasury & Anor v Global Feedback Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 624, the Court of Appeal overturned the finding by Lang J in [2024] EWHC 1943 (Admin) that the relevant UK statutory provisions on trade in agricultural products (specifically: beef), giving effect to the UK-Australia 2021 Free Trade Agreement (FTA), are a “provision of [a Contracting State’s] national law relating to the environment” (emphasis added) in Article 9(3) of the Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (“the Aarhus Convention“).

The judgment has an important impact, before you start wondering why I am reporting on a nerdy issue of international environmental law.

A9(3) Aarhus (the Convention was ratified by the United Kingdom on 23 February 2005, and Brexit has no impact on its membership) requires each Party to ensure that members of the public “have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment.”

A9(4) in turn requires inter alia those procedures, and also procedures under Art.9(1) and (2), to “provide adequate and effective remedies” and not to be “prohibitively expensive”. The latter element has been transposed in English civil procedure law as follows:

Part IX of the civil procedure rules – CPR 46 give partial effect to A9(4) by imposing costs limits on “Aarhus Convention claims”. That expression means “a claim brought by one or more members of the public by judicial review or review under statute which challenges the legality of any decision, act or omission of a body exercising public functions, and which is within the scope of Art. 9(1), 9(2) or 9(3)” of the Aarhus Convention (CPR 46.24(2)(a)).

The central issue in this appeal is therefore the meaning and width of the phrase “which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment” in Art.9(3).

The issue has arisen in a claim for judicial review brought by Global Feedback Limited (GFL) against the UK Government viz its 23 February 2023 to make the Customs Tariff (Preferential Trade Arrangements and Tariff Quotas) (Australia) (Amendment) Regulations 2023 (SI 2023 No. 195) (“the 2023 Regulations”). The 2023 Regulations give effect to tariff preferences on Australian imports under the Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”) between the UK and Australia which was signed on 17 December 2021 and came into force on 31 May 2023.

GFL claims that the 2023 Regulations will harm the environment by adversely impacting on climate change. It says that the FTA would lead to a substantial increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the production of cattle meat, because (i) beef production methods in Australia produce significantly more GHG emissions per weight of beef than those in the UK and (ii) the lower prices of Australian beef compared to UK beef are likely to lead to a net increase in production of Australian beef for consumption in the UK. According to GFL, “carbon leakage” occurs when production moves from one country to another resulting in higher net GHG emissions, for example where the production process in the new country is more GHG intensive.

GFL’s specific target is the insufficient nature, it argues, of the Impact Assessment that coincided with the amendments to the UK’s customs classifications and -tariffs resulting from the UK-AUS FTA.

Lang J ordered that the costs limits in CPR 46 should apply. [58-59] of the current judgment summarise her findings as

the judge decided at [12]-[14] that the present claim does fall within Art.9(3) and (4). She said that it was arguable that s.28 of the 2018 Act required the appellants to have regard to relevant international obligations, including the UNFCCC, and those obligations were directly concerned with environmental issues. The appellants were under obligations in UK national law to have proper regard to their environmental obligations under international law when making the 2023 Regulations. This was sufficient to bring the claim within the scope of Art. 9(1), applying a broad purposive approach.

The judge also took into account at [13] the nature of the alleged contravention. She was not persuaded that the appellants’ obligations only related to GHG emissions in the UK as opposed to Australia, in circumstances where the implementation of the FTA by the 2023 Regulations would promote a market for the importation of Australian produce into the UK with a risk of increased emissions in Australia. There is a public interest in the environmental issues raised by the claim and the scope of s.28 of the 2018 Act may be relevant to other free trade agreements which are being implemented.

The Court of appeal disagrees with the first instance judge.

Holgate LJ reminds parties first of the informative yet non-binding nature of both the findings of the Aarhus Compliance Committee, and the Guidance documents drawn up by the EU when the EU itself acceded to the Convention. He turn summarises the relevant interpretative provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – VCLT, incl [5v2] in fine, with reference to A33 VLCT, the provision on authentic (language) versions of the Convention.

[74] ff he considers first “relating to”. That, “(and other similar connectors) shows that the nature and strength of the link will depend upon the surrounding language, the wider context of the legislation and its purpose.” Discussion of CJEU authorities not being of determinative help, he then [82] turns to the travaux préparatoires and the French text of the Aarhus Convention to find [88] that the French text confirms that “relating to” is used as a strong, not a loose or broad, connector:

The relevant legal provision of national law should be to do with, or be concerned with, the environment. This is consistent with saying that to fall within Art.9(3) the purpose of the legal provision in question should be for the protection or regulation of the environment. The preparation of the Convention shows that the Parties were not prepared to agree that Art.9(3) should apply to any claim or matter related to the environment or the protection of the environment.

Discussion of relevant case-law does not he decide help claimants, and [134] ‘the present case raises this issue: does Art.9(3) of the Aarhus Convention apply where a claim alleges that a defendant’s decision or act under a legal provision not relating to the environment is vitiated by a public law error in some way connected to the environment or an effect on the environment?’ He decides [141]

it cannot be assumed that the Court’s reasoning in Venn [Venn v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] 1 WLR 2328], which was specific to the nature of the well-established role played by the planning regime in environmental protection, is transferrable to open-ended statutory requirements to take into account relevant considerations in other legislation enacted for non-environmental purposes, such as funding for overseas projects, financial market controls or international trading arrangements.

and [148]

this is a challenge which amounts to allegations of breaches of public law principles and not any breach of this country’s law relating to the environment or environmental law. It therefore falls outside the scope of Art.9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. Any costs protection could only be considered through an application for a costs protection order.

Evidently the views of the Court of Appeal are debatable, and one imagines there might be more in the Aarhus travaux that might help claimants. For those interested in the domestic implementation of Treaty law, this is an interesting judgment.

Geert.

1/2 Cost caps, public interest litigationMeaning of "provisions of..national law relating to the environment" A9(3) Aarhus ConventionCustoms provisions in UK-Australia FTA with impact on Greenhouse Gas emissions[HMG] v Global Feedback [2025] EWCA Civ 624bailii.org/ew/cases/EWC…

— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-05-14T06:45:07.686Z

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

Seeing as it is exam time across many universities, this is one of a series of posts where some core elements of international litigation strategy is considered. One or two students of the law might find these ponderings useful e.g. in essay submissions.

In African Export-Import Bank v National Government of the Republic of South Sudan & Anor  [2025] EWHC 1079 (Comm), claimant would be entitled to apply for default judgment.  Yet it seeks a reasoned judgment from the Court on the merits, so as to aid its efforts to enforce any judgment abroad. Accordingly, Afreximbank applied for permission to apply for summary judgment, and to be granted such judgment – both of which were granted by Lionel Persey KC. 

The case clearly echoes DVB Bank v Vega Marine, to which the judge here also refers, and Trafigura v Republic of South Sudan[2020] EWHC 2044 (Comm).

[19] Defendants have been given full notice of the proceedings (with detail provided of course by claimant) and the proceedings take place in the forum agreed in the relevant facility agreement for the resolution of the parties’ disputes. Defendants have utterly declined to participate.

[20] The principles governing the applications were summarised by Bryan J in European Union v Syria [2018] EWHC 1712 (Comm) at [61]-[62] and can be summarised as follows:

(1) The purpose of the rule requiring permission to apply for summary judgment against a defendant prior to the filing of an acknowledgement of service is (a)  to ensure that no application for summary judgment is made before a defendant has had an opportunity to participate in the proceedings, and (b)  to protect a defendant who wishes to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction from having to engage on the merits pending such application.

(2) Permission should generally be granted only where the Court is satisfied that the claim has been validly served and that the Court has jurisdiction to hear it.

If those conditions as to valid service and jurisdiction are met, there is generally no reason why the Court should prevent a claimant with a legitimate claim from seeking summary judgment – all the more so in the light of the relevance to smooth enforcement.

[30] ff a claim for sovereign immunity (appropriately flagged by counsel for claimant as a possible defence, should defendants have appeared) is dismissed: but the ‘prior written agreement’ and the ‘commercial activities’ exception to immunity readily apply.

A good reminder of the principles.

Geert.

Summary money judgment re facility agreementsNote express concession by claimant & OK of same by judge, that summary judgment will assist enforcement abroad better than judgment by defaultAfrican Export-Import Bank v [South Sudan] [2025] EWHC 1079 (Comm)bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH…

— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-05-10T07:47:42.290Z

https://x.com/GAVClaw/status/1921109738827256108

 

Stevi et The New York Times / Commission
Droit institutionnel
Accès aux documents : la décision de la Commission refusant à une journaliste du New York Times l'accès aux messages textes échangés entre la présidente von der Leyen et le PDG de Pfizer est annulée

Recent legislative initiatives in the United States reflect concerns over the extraterritorial implications of Directive (EU) 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDDD). One such initiative consists of a bill titled Prevent Regulatory Overreach from Turning Essential Companies into Targets Act of 2025 (Protect USA Act of 2025), introduced in the US Senate by Senator […]

The European Parliamentary Research Service has recently released a Briefing, by Nikolina Šajn, on the European Commission’s proposal for a regulation on cooperation among enforcement authorities responsible for the enforcement of Directive (EU) 2019/633 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain. Background The proposal aims at improving farmers’ […]

La jurisprudence des mois de mars et avril 2025 se caractérise par des affaires françaises qui sont moins nombreuses qu’en janvier-février mais qui peuvent présenter un intérêt majeur comme celle relative à la répression des actes sexuels non consenties et par des affaires venues d’ailleurs mettant encore plus en évidence que d’habitude l’importance envahissante dans le contentieux européen de l’article 8 qui consacre le doit au respect de la vie privée et familiale, de la correspondance et du domicile.

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