Agrégateur de flux

Audi (Support d’emblème sur une calandre)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Marque de l’Union européenne : un constructeur automobile peut interdire l’usage d’un signe identique ou similaire à la marque dont il est titulaire pour des pièces détachées

Laudamotion (Renoncement à un vol tardif)
Transport
Pas de droit à indemnisation forfaitaire en l’absence de présentation à l’embarquement d’un vol qui est arrivé avec un retard important ni lorsque l’achat d’un billet sur un vol de remplacement a permis d’arriver à destination avec moins de trois heures de retard

The latest issue of the International & Comparative Law Quarterly (Volume 73, Issue I) is now available. This issue features one article and one book review that focus on private international law.

Toni Marzal, The Territorial Reach of European Union Law: A Private International Law Enquiry into the European Union’s Spatial Identity, 29-63

This article offers a reconstruction of how the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) justifies the territorial scope of application of EU law. Scholarship on this issue tends to advocate for an expansive projection of EU norms in the pursuit of global values, subject to the external limits of public international law. This article will develop a critique of this approach by pointing to its underlying assumptions as to the territorial dimension of the EU’s rule, the insoluble practical issues that it leads to, and the need to consider differently the EU’s spatial identity and relation to the wider world. It will also be argued that, in fact, other case law sometimes already reflects an alternative vision, by imagining the EU implicitly, not as a ‘global actor’ promoting universal values, but as a concretely situated and spatially bounded community. It will be shown that this is so with the methodological help of private international law, and in particular three doctrines that are traditional to this discipline—the localisation of cross-border relations, international imperativeness, and the public policy exception. This will ultimately allow for a more sophisticated understanding of the EU’s territory to emerge—irreducible to the physical coordinates of its acts of intervention, or the mere sum of the physical spaces under Member State sovereignty, but as a distinct space of social relations, informed and delineated by the particular axiology and structure of the EU legal system.

Chukwuma Okoli, Jurisdiction Over Non-EU Defendants: Should the Brussels Ia Regulation be Extended? by Tobias Lutzi, Ennio Piovesani and Dora Zgrabljić Rotar (eds) [Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2023, 376pp, ISBN: 978-1-5099-5891-7, £90.00 (h/bk)], 281-283

The whole issue is available here.

In its decision of 20 December 2023 (Case No. XII ZB 117/23), the German Federal Supreme Court has referred three questions to the CJEU relating to the interpretation of Art. 8 (a), (b) of the Rome III Regulation. The following is a convenience translation of the German press release:

Facts of the Case:

The spouses, German nationals, married in 1989. Initially, they lived together in Berlin since 2006. In June 2017 , the couple deregistered their domicile from the German population register (Melderegister) and moved to Stockholm, where the husband was employed at the German embassy. They nonetheless maintained their rented apartment in Berlin so that they could return as soon as the husband’s posting in Sweden was completed. However, when in September 2019 the husband was once again transferred to the embassy in Russia, the parties changed their place of residence from Stockholm straight to Moscow, where the couple lived in a flat on the embassy compound. Both spouses hold diplomatic passports.

In January 2020, the wife travelled to Berlin to undergo medical surgery, but subsequently returned in February. According to the husband, the couple informed their two (adult) children in March 2021 that they had decided to file for divorce. The ensuing separation at the end of May 2021 resulted in the wife returning to the flat in Berlin and the husband continuing to live in the flat on the Moscow embassy premises.

Procedural History:

In July 2021, the husband filed an application for divorce with the German local court (Amtsgericht Kreuzberg), which the wife at the time successfully contested on the grounds that the year of separation (Trennungsjahr) mandatory under German law had not yet passed, as the separation had taken place in May 2021 at the earliest.

Following the husband’s appeal, the Berlin regional court  (Kammergericht) nethertheless divorced the marriage in accordance with Russian substantive law. In its reasoning, the court stated that (in the absence of a choice of law according to Art. 5) the applicable law was governed by Art. 8 (b) of the Rome III Regulation, because it could be assumed that the last common habitual residence in Moscow did not end until the wife’s depature to Germany in May 2021, i.e. less than one year beforce the court was first seised as required under Art. 8 lit. b) of the Rome III Regulation.

Subsequently, the wife lodged an appeal on points of law to the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) seeking a divorce under German substantive law.

Questions:

The German Federal Supreme Court has referred to the CJEU the following three questions: According to which criteria is the habitual residence of the spouses to be determined within the meaning of Art. 8 lit. a) and lit. b) Rome III Regulation, in particular:

1. Does the posting as diplomat affect the assumption of habitual residence in the receiving State or does it even preclude such an assumption?

2. Is it necessary that the physical presence of the spouses in a State must have been of a certain duration before habitual residence can be assumed to be established?

3. Does the establishment of habitual residence require a certain degree of social and family integration in the state concerned?

Implications

In the ideal case, the expected decision of the ECJ will provide for legal certainty for families and people employed in the diplomatic service and similar professions. In addition, the decision could also, more generally, bring about further insights into the concept of habitual residence in EU secondary law and thus also be of interest with regard to the related European Matrimonial Property Regulation/European Registered Partnership Regulation, Brussels IIter Regulation and possibly also the European Succession Regulation.

The Press Release (available in German only) for the decision can be found here.

 

Delta-Sport Handelskontor / EUIPO - Lego (Élément de construction d'une boîte de jeu de construction)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Propriété intellectuelle : le Tribunal de l'Union européenne confirme la validité de la protection de la brique de jeu LEGO

I have frequently reported in the use of English restructuring and law, including Plans and Schemes of Arrangement, and the forum and applicable law shopping strategies for same. Readers will find the tag ‘restructuring’ or ‘scheme of arrangement’ useful.

My post on Apcoa  summarises many of the issues and cross-refers to many other postings. The same post in a later update reports on Codere, which has become standard reference, and to AGPS Bondco Plc, Re, where the Court’s jurisdiction was unsuccessfully challenged on the basis that the Issuer Substitution was ineffective or invalid as a matter of German law.

That latter judgment has now been successfully appealed in Strategic Value Capital Solutions Master Fund LP & Ors v AGPS BondCo PLC (Re AGPS BondCo PLC) [2024] EWCA Civ 24. The Court of Appeal held that the first instance judge had unjustifiably departed from the paru passi distribution of assets principle in sanctioning the cross-class cram down.

Of note for the blog however is Lord Justice Snowden’s obiter reference to the jurisdiction [29] ff as follows:

1. 1. 1. After the failure of the consent solicitation, the Group announced its intention to implement the proposed restructuring by an alternative route. This was to propose a restructuring plan under Part 26A and to ask the English court to exercise its cram down power to overcome the objections of the Appellants. To that end, the Plan Company was incorporated in England and Wales as a subsidiary of the Parent Company on 23 December 2022.

1. 1. 1. On 10 January 2023, the Appellants put forward an alternative restructuring proposal to the Group. That elicited no immediate response, but on 19 January 2023 the SteerCo informed the Company that the Appellants’ proposal was not acceptable.

1. 1. 1. On 11 January 2023 the Plan Company was substituted for the Parent Company as the issuer of the Notes, ostensibly pursuant to the substitution procedure under the Notes (the “Issuer Substitution”). In connection with that substitution, the Parent Company guaranteed the Plan Company’s obligations under the Notes, and the Parent Company issued back-to-back loan notes to the Plan Company on the same terms as the Notes.

1. 1. 1. It is self-evident, and the Plan Company accepted before the Judge, that the Issuer Substitution was carried out for the sole purpose of introducing an English company into the Group structure in order to persuade the English court to exercise its jurisdiction under Part 26A. Absent the Issuer Substitution, a proposal for the compromise of foreign law debts owed by a foreign company with no relevant connection with England would not have been entertained by the English court.

1. 1. 1. The technique of inserting a newly incorporated English company as a substitute obligor or co-obligor of debt owed by a foreign company in order to engage the jurisdiction of the English court under Part 26 or Part 26A has been used in a number of schemes and plans that have been sanctioned at first instance over the last few years: see e.g. Codere Finance (UK) Limited [2015] EWHC 3778 (Ch) and Gategroup Guarantee Limited [2021] EWHC 775 (Ch) at [12]-[23]. Mr. Bayfield KC told the Judge that it was “an established technique”. It has, however, not been the subject of consideration at an appellate level.

1. 1. 1. The Appellants did not oppose the Plan before the Judge on the basis that the Issuer Substitution was an artificial device that could not justify the exercise of discretion to sanction the Plan. The point did not, therefore, arise for consideration on this appeal. For the avoidance of doubt, and without expressing a view one way or the other, I would wish to make it clear that the fact that this judgment does not deal with this issue should not be taken as an endorsement of the technique for future cases.

1. 1. 1. The Appellants did, however, challenge the legality of the Issuer Substitution as a matter of German law, both before the Judge, and by proceedings in Germany itself. The Judge heard expert evidence and was satisfied that it complied with German law. The Appellants also indicated that irrespective of our decision on this point, they reserved the right to continue their challenge to the Issuer Substitution in Germany.

(emphasis added)

The point is clearly made obiter, seeing as the issue was not appealed (although it is being litigated in Germany, which evidently will raise interesting further issues); and of course it is possible that Snowden LJ simply mentions the issue for it was litigated at first instance. Yet often if that is the case, the Court of Appeal simply keeps schtum about it. Therefore just possibly it may be hinting that the often applied arguendo approach to jurisdiction for Schemes and Plans (“arguments put forward are not barmy and they are not really opposed by any party therefore we accept jurisdiction”) may not work at least across the board in restructuring cases.

An obiter hint of note.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 5.35 ff.

Interesting, successful appeal against sanction of cross-class cram down
Held unjustified departure from pari passu distribution
Re jurisdiction [34] obiter Snowden LJ neither confirming nor rejecting technique of issuer substitution by EN corporation to justify E&W jurisdiction

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 24, 2024

Noah Clothing / EUIPO - Noah (NOAH)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Le Tribunal confirme que le signe figuratif NOAH peut continuer d’être enregistré comme marque de l’Union européenne pour les « polos » et les « chandails »

This post was written by Mathilde Codazzi, who is a doctoral student at the University Paris II Panthéon-Assas.

In a judgment of 22 November 2023, the French Supreme Court has ruled that a court is “deemed to be seized” under Article 16(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation at the time which the document instituting proceedings is lodged with the court, irrespective of whether the applicant lacked diligence in the accomplishment of the required steps to serve the defendant.

Background

The parents of a child born in 2012 in France separated in 2014. The mother and the child lived in Germany from 2015 to 2018. The father brought an action before the Family Court of Nantes (juge aux affaires familiales) on 28 May 2019, two months before the mother and the child went back from France to Germany, for the purpose of deciding upon the terms and conditions of parental responsibility.

In December 2019, the Family Court issued a summon to the defendant’s address (the mother) in France for the hearing, which came back stating that the recipient was unknown at this address. In January 2020, the Court invited the plaintiff to serve the defendant for a hearing which was eventually postponed because of COVID. On 18 September 2020, the father eventually served the defendant notice of the act introducing the proceedings, as required by the Court.

On 17 March 2020, however, the defendant had seized the German court for the purpose of deciding upon parental responsibility.

The French Family court declined its jurisdiction on the ground that that German court had been seized first.

Court of Appeal

By a judgment of 25 October 2021, the Rennes Court of Appeal upheld the first instance court’s decision. It ruled that by failing to inform in due course the court registry of the defendant’s new address in Germany and the defendant of the ongoing proceedings against her before serving her, the applicant had been grossly negligent within the meaning of Article 16(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation as he failed to take the required steps to serve the defendant. As a result, by the time the applicant served the defendant, the child’s habitual residence had been transferred to Germany and German courts were thus competent to rule on parental responsibility.

Judgment

The issue was therefore to determine whether the applicant’s failure to inform the court registry of the defendant’s new foreign address and the defendant of the pending proceeding before serving the document on the defendant is constitutive of a “failure to take the [required] steps” under Article 16(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation.

By a judgment of 22 November 2023, the French Supreme Court overruled the Rennes Court of Appeal’s decision.

The Court first recalled that pursuant to Article 8 of the Brussels II bis Regulation, the competent courts in matters of parental responsibility are the courts of the Member State in which the child is habitually resident at the time the court is seized. The Court went on to rule that, according to Article 16(a) of the Regulation, a court is deemed to be seized upon accomplishment of only one formality: the filing of the document instituting proceedings. Therefore, the Rennes Court of Appeal, having noted that the applicant had filed the request then properly served the defendant, could not decline jurisdiction on the ground that the applicant had failed to take the required steps to serve the defendant.

The French Supreme Court also refused to stay the proceedings and refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary reference as there was no reasonable doubt about the interpretation of Article 16(a) of the Brussels II bis regulation.

Assessment

The applicant having regularly lodged the document instituting proceedings with the court, the French court was already seized even though the defendant had not been served yet. This interpretation of Article 16(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation is rather strict: the court is deemed to be seized as soon as the document instituting proceedings is regularly filed by the applicant, without the circumstances in which the required steps are then accomplished by the applicant being relevant for this purpose.

In a report presenting the judgment, the Court explained that the concept of negligence should be given an objective meaning, and be understood as an ‘omission’ to serve the document. The lower court had, in contrast, given the concept a subjective meaning focused on whether the plaintiff had been negligent.

Arguably, this interpretation remains relevant under the Brussels II ter Regulation, which applies since 1 August 2022, given that Article 17(a) of the latter text is basically identical to Article 16(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation.

The Yearbook of Private International Law for 2022/2023 (volume XXIV) is out. It features the following contributions.

Doctrine

Elisabetta Bergamini, Raluca Bercea, Andreea Verteș-Olteanu, The Changing Scenario on Advance Directives between National Rules and Private International Law

Gerald Goldstein, Objective, Subjective and Imperative Localization in the Resolution of Conflict of Laws

Giesela Rühl, Man Yip, Success and Impact of International Commercial Courts – A First Assessment

Adam Samuel, A “Common Law” of International Arbitration? – In Memory of Claude Reymond

Sharon Shakargy, Un-Identifying Identification

Guojian Xu, Xin Cai, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China – Legal Framework and Recent Developments

New Technologies and Private International Law

Andrea Bonomi, Blockchain and Private International Law – Some General Remarks

Narges Keshavarzbahadori, Due Process Requirements in Blockchain-based Arbitration

Marta Zamorska, Artificial Intelligence-Supported Arbitral Awards – A Pandora’s Box or the Future of International Commercial Arbitration?

Robert Walters, Harsha Rajwanshi, Reconciling “Confidentiality” in Data Protection, Cyber Security, Artificial Intelligence in International Arbitration

The French Draft Private International Law Code

Cyril Nourrissat, The Draft Code of French Private International Law

Dominique Bureau, Horatia Muir Watt, Codifying against the Clock… – On a French Project for the Codification of Private International Law

Marie Goré, Rules on Trust in the French Draft Code of Private International Law

Recognition of status filiationis within the EU and Beyond

Cristina González Beilfuss, Ilaria Pretelli, The Proposal for a European Regulation on Filiation Matters – Overview and Analysis

Tamir Boldbaatar, Batzorig Enkhbold, Surrogate Motherhood under Different Laws – Legal Arrangements and Challenges of Mongolia

Valentina Calderai, Rachele Zamperini, Surrogacy Contracts and the (In)Alienability of Fundamental Rights a View from Italy – On Case No 38162/2022 of the Corte di Cassazione

Helga Luku, Free Movement, Children’s Rights and National Identity in the EU Parenthood Proposal

Paulina Twardoch, Surrogacy Agreements from the Conflict-of-Laws Perspective Today and Tomorrow

Recent Developments in International Successions

Georges Khairallah, The New Right of Compensation under French International Succession Law – A Provision with an Uncertain Future

Eva Lein, Choice of English Succession Law and German Ordre Public

Andrea Bonomi, Revocation of the Will upon Marriage – Issues of Characterisation, Applicable Law, and Renvoi – An Italian Supreme Court’s Decision and Some Reflexions on the Potential Outcome under the European Succession Regulation

National Reports

Chukwuma Okoli, The Enforcement of Foreign Jurisdiction Clauses in Nigeria – A Critique of the Nigerian Court of Appeal’s Recent Restatement

Forum

Yves El Hage, “How to Locate a Cyber Tort?”

Des années après son adoption, la décision-cadre relative au mandat d’arrêt européen suscite toujours autant d’interrogations. En témoigne les trois arrêts rendus par la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, le 21 décembre 2023, après avoir été saisie de diverses questions préjudicielles soulevées par le Tribunal régional supérieur de Berlin. Concrètement, elles portent sur l’applicabilité, puis sur l’application de l’article 4 bis, § 1er, du texte, lequel prévoit un motif de refus facultatif en présence d’un jugement rendu par défaut. 

Sur la boutique Dalloz Droit et pratique des audiences correctionnelles et de police 2024/2025 Voir la boutique Dalloz

en lire plus

This case, C-632/22 – AB Volvo ./. Transsaqui SL, arises from a reference for a preliminary ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain (Tribunal Supremo). The core question is whether a claimant may serve process on a domestic subsidiary of a defendant in another Member State. In principle, the answer is simply no (absent special arrangements), because the subsidiary is a self-standing legal entity. If it is the foreign mother company that is the defendant, process must be served on her.

The reason to put this into question was the ECJ’s judgment of 6 October 2021, C-882/19 – Sumal. There, the Court held that private enforcement of cartel damages claims could be directed both at the parent company and its subsidiaries. To put it differently: The question was whether the effet utile of private enforcement of cartel damages would affect and alter the EU’s procedural law in order to facilitate service of process for the claimant beyond what is offered to the claimant under the EU’s Service Regulation. Therefore, the case must be seen in the context of a tension between strong policies of substantive law and the autonomous rationales of procedural law, not only in areas of the autonomy of the Member States’ procedural law but also in areas of the EU’s own procedural law. More often than not, this tension has been resolved in favour of the substantive policies. Not so here, according to the Advocate General’s Opinion, and this is to be welcomed.

The facts were (summarised) the following: During 2008 the claimant (Transsaqui SL, Spain) purchased two Volvo trucks. In its decision of 19 July 2016, the EU Commission found that a number of truck manufacturers had infringed Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 53 EEA by taking part in a cartel. Volvo was found to be one of the cartelists at the time. In July 2018, the claimant brought an action against Volvo at Valencia, Spain, claiming damages of approx. EUR 25,000.- Despite Volvo having its registered office in Gothenburg, Sweden, the claimant nevertheless indicated as Volvo’s address its subsidiary, Volvo Group España SAU in Spain (Madrid). The subsidiary refused acceptance of the documents sent by postal mail. In the following hearing before the court at Valencia (Juzgado de lo Mercantil nº 1), the claimant submitted that the defendant holds 100% of the share capital of its Spanish subsidiary and that mother and subsidiary should thus be treated as a single undertaking, according to the principles of competition law as established by the ECJ in Sumal. The court at Valencia indeed ordered service on the subsidiary on these grounds, but all attempts failed, as the subsidiary refused accepting the documents. On 26 February 2020, the court issued a default judgment ordering Volvo to pay the claimed (approx.) EUR 25,000.- plus interest and costs. The cost order was likewise served on the subsidiary, whereupon Volvo filed an application for revision of the judgment before the Tribunal Supremo (ATS nº13837/2022, de 7 octubre de 2022). This is the proceeding where the reference arose from. The Tribunal Supremo framed the question as follows: (1) Would Art. 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in conjunction with Art. 101 TFEU, allow at all such serving of process on the domestic subsidiaries in cartel damages cases? (2) If so, would Art. 53 of the EU Charter allow higher standards under the domestic law of the Member State as assessed by the Spanish Constitutional Court[1] for service of process?

Advocate General Szpunar rightly referred to the principle under the EU Service Regulation that a defendant domiciled in another Member State must imperatively be served in that Member State (ECJ, judgment of 19 December 2012, C-325/11 – Alder, para. 25). National law cannot deviate from this principle by offering options for substituted service. Further, according to the Opinion, Article 101 TFEU as much as Article 47 of the Charter do not call into question this principle. Thus, primary EU law (in this constellation) does not set aside the EU’s secondary law on service. This is all the more true as the judgment in Sumal relates to substantive (competition) law, whereas the Service Regulation forms part of the EU’s legislation on judicial cooperation in civil matters, i.e. is procedural law. Very rightly, the Advocate General underlined that service of process is a “sensitive issue” and that the defendant’s right to be heard and to defend must be carefully protected, and it is carefully protected, as Articles 45(1)b and 46 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation show. Indeed, “attenuating the provisions of [the Service Regulation] by allowing for the service of a document on another (legal) person (in casu a subsidiary) could ultimately amount to a lack of mutual trust in judicial cooperation. Mutual trust implies and is based on the assumption that procedural requirements – especially those stemming directly from EU law (in casu [the Service Regulation] – have been complied with and fulfilled when proceedings have been initiated” (para. 53).

There is nothing to add. It would be a strange result if the EU’s own law on service of process turned out to be “ineffective” under Article 101 TFEU for pursuing cross-border cartel damages claims. If that were the case, the same would probably have to be assumed for claims of consumers under EU consumer law and other areas of EU law implementing strong policies, which would push the Service Regulation into absurdity. Even if one considered to limit the impact of substantive policies on service to cartel damages proceedings  (in light of the case of Sumal), the extended possibilities of service would depend on rather complex considerations on substantive antitrust law, and the stage of proceedings for service are certainly not the right place to address these. Translation costs cannot be an argument. They are part of the balancing approach under the Regulation, and Article 8 (of the then applicable EU Service Regulation 1393/2007; now Article 9 of the Regulation 2020/1784) does not require translation under all circumstances but merely gives the defendant the right to reject acceptance of an untranslated document. In the case at hand, the claimant never had attempted to serve in Sweden based on documents in Spanish, nor did the claimant make any submissions as to the precise costs. Thus, the Opinion upholds and strengthens the “autonomy” of EU procedural law, and, as I said at the beginning, that must be welcomed.

On an abstract level, it is interesting to note that the concept of mutual trust, as employed by the Advocate General, does not only speak to the Member States amongst each other applying EU law on judicial cooperation but also to the EU itself vis-à-vis its Member States (as has been argued elsewhere, in other contexts, by the author of these lines), including its Court of Justice, and this Court must keep in mind predictability and reliability of agreed secondary legislation. “Adding to the provisions of [the EU Service Regulation] a combined reading of Article 101 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter would, in my view, not serve judicial cooperation, but constitute a small but significant step to de facto eradicating it” (para. 53 in fine). In my view as well.

 

[1]      The Tribunal Supremo explicitly refers to STC nº 91/2022, de 11 de julio 2022 (BOE núm. 195 de 15 de agosto de 2022) – Iveco S.p.A where the Constitutional Court held that Iveco SpA’s right to effective judicial protection had been infringed because service had not been effected at Iveco SpA’s registered office in Italy, but had been attempted at the registered office of its subsidiary in Spain, Iveco España, SL.

The Tug of War over Online Gambling

Many Member States try to limit gambling through strict prohibitions, with the sole exclusion for governmental monopolies.

Malta, however, has a burgeoning online gambling industry with pan-European reach, which it deems to be protected by the freedom of services enshrined in primary EU law.

The island state resists the enforcement of judgments from courts in other Member States that take a different view; to this end, it even plans to adopt an explicit legislative provision prohibiting the enforcement of such judgments by Maltese courts (see here). [image from freepik]

The Recent Episodes in Austria

Meanwhile, gamblers in Austria who have lost money have found a lucrative alternative. Instead of bringing their claims themselves, they sell and assign them to a Swiss company, which then tries to enforce these claims before Austrian courts. This raises the question of the latters’ international jurisdiction.

In a number of decisions, the Austrian Supreme Court (OGH) has answered it in the affirmative (22 June 2023, 27 June 2023, and 25 September 2023). The reasons are of general interest; inter alia because they add a further aspect to the complex discussion on the localisation of financial loss under Article 7 No 2 of the Brussels I bis Regulation (see already here and here).

Consumer Protection is Out

To the uninitiated, Article 18 Brussels I bis seems to provide a basis of jurisdiction for the gamblers’ claims. Yet in the eyes of the Austrian Supreme Court, this provision is inapplicable because the plaintiff is not asserting his own claims, but assigned ones. This is in line with the case law of the CJEU, who excluded assigned claims from the scope of the consumer protection provisions (see the Schrems case, C-498/16, paras 42–49).

Choice of Forum

Another potential stumbling block could be a clause contained in the contracts between the gamblers and the operator according to which all disputes should be decided by the courts of Malta. The Austrian Supreme Court rightly denies any effects of this clause against the Swiss litigation vehicle. As the CJEU had ruled in DelayFix (C-519/19, para 42), such a clause produces effects only between the parties to the initial agreement.

Where Are Gambling Contracts Performed?

We are getting closer to the meat of the case, which is Art 7 Brussels Ibis. First, the contractual head of jurisdiction under Article 7 No 1 Brussels I bis needs to be analysed. Undoubtedly, the parties had entered into a contract, more precisely a service contract in the (European-autonomous) sense of lit. b. But where was the service to be performed?

The Austrian Supreme Court locates the place of performance within the meaning of Article 7 No 1 lit b Brussels I bis in the state of the service provider, i.e. in Malta. The courts there would also have jurisdiction to hear claims for the restitution of money paid under the gambling contracts. Hence, this head of jurisdiction does not allow a claim in Austria.

Where does Gambling Damage Occur?

This brings us to the last and thorniest question, whether the tort/delict jurisdiction under Art 7 No 2 Brussels Ibis points to Austria.

Two of the decisions try to reach this result by a rather classic localisation exercise. Citing the CJEU’s decision in Kolassa (C-375/13), they deem the habitual residence of the victim as the place of damage, provided another element of the case takes place there. The fact that the gambler held an account in Malta was considered irrelevant since the final damage of the gambler materialised in Austria.

Yet then, these decisions add a very different element, namely the violation of the Austrian gambling laws. The decision of 22 June 2023 phrases it in the following way:

Above all, however, the damage materialised in Austria because the damage asserted results from alleged violations of Austrian gambling law by the defendant and therefore from violations of Austrian public policy rules.

Yet the decision of 25 September 2023 follows a different line of thought. It does even attempt a classic localisation approach, but puts the violation of public law at the centre of its reasoning. In its own words:

The breach of duty relevant to the damage is located in Austria, which is why the international jurisdiction of the court of first instance for the tortious claims for damages asserted is to be affirmed pursuant to Article 7 No 2 Brussels I bis Regulation.

Assessment

The quoted passages merit criticism. A breach of duties, even under public policy rules, does not amount to a damage. The violation of rules is actually a tortious act that causes the damage, but not the damage itself. The two must be distinguished.

The Austrian Supreme Court may have been led astray by some utterances of the CJEU in the VEB decision, which referred, in determining jurisdiction under Article 7 No 2 Brussels I bis, to the place where a securities issuer company had to comply with statutory reporting obligations (VEB v BP C-709/19 para 359). Yet this was done to ensure the foreseeability of the competent court, not to locate the damage itself.

The violation of a state’s public policy provisions therefore does not allow its courts to exercise jurisdiction. The damage under Article 7 No 2 Brussels I bis must still be determined by localising a loss. Following the Kolassa reasoning, the country of the habitual residence of the gambler can be used under the condition that another element of the case takes place there. This other element could be the payment from the account of a bank established there, as the CJEU had ruled. Unfortunately, the Austrian Supreme Court did not make any determinations in this regard, but it may be assumed that the gamblers’ banks were established in Austria. Arguably, this would provide a sufficient reason to locate the damage there, without the need to refer to the Austrian public policy provisions on gambling.

— Thanks to Paul Eichmüller, Felix Krysa and Verena Wodniansky-Wildenfeld for reviewing this post.

By Biset Sena Günes, Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg

Recently, on 25 October 2023, the Austrian Supreme Court (‘OGH’) [2 Ob 179/23x, BeckRS 2023, 33709] ruled on whether a jurisdiction clause included in the terms of purchase (‘ToP’) was valid when a written contract made reference to the website containing the ToP but did not provide the corresponding internet link. The Court held that such a clause does not meet the formal requirements laid down under Article 25 of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation and, hence, is invalid. The judgment is undoubtedly of practical relevance for the conclusion of international commercial contracts that make reference to digitally available general terms and conditions (‘GTCs’), and it is an important follow-up to the decisions by the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) in the cases of El Majdoub (C-322/14, available here) and Tilman (C-358/21, available here).

Factual Background and Procedure

A German company and an Austrian company concluded a service agreement in which the German company (‘the service provider’) undertook to provide the engineering plans for a product to the Austrian party (‘the client’). The Austrian party sent its order to the service provider on a written form which stated (in translation): ‘we order in accordance with the terms of purchase known to you (available on our website) and expect your confirmation by email immediately’. The order specified the client’s place of business as the place of delivery. The German party subsequently signed and returned the same document, ticking its relevant parts and naming it as the ‘order confirmation’. This confirmation was also in written form. The ToP – which were not attached to the contract, but which were available on the client’s website – contained a jurisdiction clause conferring jurisdiction on the Austrian courts for the resolution of disputes arising from the parties’ contract. The clause also allowed the Austrian party to sue in another competent court and was thus asymmetric. The ToP additionally included a clause defining the place of performance for the delivery of goods or for the provision of services as the place specified by the client in the contract.

Upon a disagreement between the parties due to the allegedly defective performance of the service provider, the Austrian party brought proceedings against its contracting partner before the competent district court of Vienna, Austria, in reliance on the jurisdiction clause. The defendant successfully challenged the jurisdiction of the court by claiming that the clause did not meet the formal requirements of Article 25 of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation. Upon appeal, this issue was not addressed, but the judgment was nevertheless overturned as, in the court of appeals’ view, the first instance court was competent based on the parties’ agreement as to the place of performance. According to the court, the parties’ numerous references to the place of business of the client should be understood as an agreement on the place of performance within the meaning of Article 7 of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, even though the defendant argued that the engineering plans were actually drafted at their place of business and not that of the client. The defendant appealed against the judgment before the Austrian Supreme Court.

The Issue at Stake and the Judgment of the Court

As could be easily identified from the facts and the parties’ dispute, the main question in this case is whether the formal requirements of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, and in particular its demand of ‘written form’, could be satisfied by a simple reference to a website where the party’s ToP – including the jurisdiction clause – could (allegedly) be retrieved, hence allowing the court to conclude that parties indeed reached an agreement as to jurisdiction.

The Court answered the first question in the negative and found the jurisdiction clause invalid. This is because the ‘written form’ requirement under Article 25(1) (a) of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation is met only if the contract expressly refers to the GTCs containing a jurisdiction clause and if it can be proved that the other party actually received them. According to the Court’s reasoning, the mere reference to the website did not make the jurisdiction clause (or the ToP, in general) accessible to the other contracting party in a reproducible manner; this is unlike the case of a written contract providing a specific link (as in Tilman) or the case of ‘click-wrapping’ (as in El Majdoub), as those are contractual constellations sufficiently establishing that the parties had access to the terms of the agreement (paras 19–20 of the judgment).

General Assessment in Light of the Case Law of the CJEU

Choice-of-court agreements are undoubtedly an important part of today’s highly digitalised business environment, and it is to be expected that they will be found in digitally available GTCs. Yet in practice their validity is often challenged by one of the parties. The Court of Justice has indeed had to deal with such issues in the past, and the present case gives us cause to briefly revisit those rulings.

In El Majdoub (commented before on blogs, here and here), the CJEU had to decide on the question of whether a ‘click-wrap’ choice-of-court clause included in the GTCs provided a durable record which was to be considered as equivalent to a ‘writing’ under the then current Article 23(2) of the Brussels Regulation. In the El Majdoub case, a sales contract was concluded electronically between the parties by means of ‘click-wrapping’, i.e. in order to conclude the agreement, the buyer had to click on a box indicating acceptance of the seller’s GTCs. The GTCs – which containing the agreement as to jurisdiction – were available in that box via a separate hyperlink that stated ‘click here to open the conditions of delivery and payment in a new window’. Although this window did not open automatically upon registration to the website and upon every individual sale, the CJEU found that such a clause provided a durable record as required by Article 23(2) of the Brussels I Regulation since it gave the buyer the possibility of printing and saving the GTCs before conclusion of the contract. This holding should be welcomed as the CJEU gave its blessing to the already existing and much-used practice of ‘click-wrapping’ in the digital business environment, and the Court thus showed its support for the use of technology in contractual practices (in line with aims previously stated in the Commission Proposal (COM(1999) 348 Final)). The Court’s conclusion is, of course, limited in the sense that it only confirms that the ‘click-wrapping’ method provides a durable record of the agreement; there is no analysis as to the requirement of a ‘consensus’ on jurisdiction between the parties in the case of digital contracts. Since the buyer had to accept the terms before the purchase, the Court took this as a consent and did not address the issue (see, similarly, van Calster and Dickinson and Ungerer, LMCLQ 2016, 15, 18–19). It should, in this regard, be observed that establishing the existence of such an agreement is the purpose of the form requirements, a fact confirmed by the case law of the Court, see, e.g. Salotti, para 7 (C-24/76, available here). Still, one should admit that questions as to the existence of consent would probably not be much of an issue in the ‘click-wrapping’ context, especially in B2B cases, as the ‘click’ concludes the agreement – unless, of course, there are other circumstances (e.g. mistake) that affect the quality of consent (see, similarly, van Calster on Tilman).

In the later case of Tilman (previously commented on PIL blogs on a couple of occasions, see the comments by Pacula, by Ho-Dac, and by Van Calster, here and here), the situation was more complex. There was a written agreement between the parties in which the GTCs – which for their part contained an agreement as to jurisdiction in favour of English courts – were referred to by provision of the link to the website where they could be accessed. In other words, there was no ‘click-wrap’ type of agreement; rather, it was a written agreement specifying the link (i.e. the internet address) of the website on which the GTCs could be retrieved. The CJEU then had to deal with the question of whether this manner of incorporating a jurisdiction clause satisfies the conditions of Article 23(1) and (2) of the Lugano II Convention, which are identical to Article 23(1) and (2) of the Brussels I Regulation. The Court answered this question in the affirmative and expanded the possibility of making reference to GTCs by inclusion of the link in written contracts because, in the Court’s view, making those terms accessible to the other party via a link before the conclusion of the contract is sufficient to satisfy formal requirements, especially when the transaction involves commercial parties who can be expected to act diligently. There is no further requirement of actual receipt of those terms. This, again, is a modern and pragmatic approach that simplifies commercial contractual practice, and it is a ruling that should be welcomed. However, it is unfortunate that the Court did not address the technical details in the facts of the case; namely, the link did not open the GTCs directly and instead opened a page on which the GTCs could be searched for and downloaded (see, Summary of the Request for Preliminary Ruling, para 14, available here). This is a point which may give rise to questions as to the proper incorporation of GTCs into a contract (in this regard, see also Finkelmeier, NJW 2023, 33, 37; Capaul, GPR 2023, 222, 225) or as to the existence of consent (on further thoughts as regards the question of consent in both of the CJEU cases, see van Calster). The facts of the case also leave room for a different interpretation in other circumstances, such as when the link refers to a homepage, the link is broken, or the website has been updated (see, in this regard, Finkelmeier, 37; Capaul, 225, and also Krümmel, IWRZ, 131, 134).

In the present case before the Austrian Supreme Court, we encounter yet a different scenario in which there is definitely room for different interpretations. Again, there is a written contract which makes reference to GTCs and which states that they are available on the client’s website. But here, the client did not supply the service provider with the hyperlink address creating accessibility to the GTCs. And the Court rightly held that the CJEU’s conclusion in Tilman should not be understood as saying that a general reference to GTCs in the contract will always be sufficient to prove they have been made available. In the Austrian Court’s understanding, the mere reference to the existence of the GTCs was not sufficient so as to constitute their proper inclusion into the contract and to prove consensus between the parties in a clear and precise manner (paras 19–20 of the judgment). One could, of course, always argue in favour of a further relaxation of the form requirements, especially when the transaction involves commercial parties who should act diligently when entering into contracts. But it is obvious that in a case in which the written contract does not even provide the necessary link, it will be a burden for the counterparty to search the website and retrieve the actual version of the referenced GTCs before entering into the contract, whereas the other party would unduly benefit from being able to fulfil her/his obligation by making a mere reference to the existence of the GTCs. Hence, it is good that the Austrian court did not further extend Tilman’s already broad interpretation.

Conclusion

Despite being an important part of cross-border commercial practice, choice-of-court agreements often become the source of an additional dispute between the parties in terms of their existence and validity. In the vast majority of cases, these disputes are complex. This is probably even more the case with the increasing use of technology in contracting. All these cases are indeed good examples of such disputes. But they can only be seen as new and different additions to the jigsaw puzzle rather than the final pieces. More cases with even more complex scenarios will likely follow, as contracting practices continue to develop along with technological advancements.

Postscript: The Place of Performance

Having found the jurisdiction clause invalid, the Court would have had to determine the place of performance of the contract as another basis for special jurisdiction under the Regulation. A decision on this latter issue was deferred, however, since the Court had already referred a similar question on the determination of the place of performance to the CJEU in a different proceeding (OGH, decision of 13 July 2023, 1 Ob 73/23a) concerning a service contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada has granted leave to appeal in Sinclair v Venezia Turismo. In light of the test for obtaining leave and the relatively low number of cases in which leave is granted, this offers at least some suggestion that the top court is interested in considering the legal issues raised in the case.

The case has factual similarities to the Brownlie litigation in England. The plaintiffs, residents of Ontario, were injured on a gondola ride in Venice, Italy. They are suing in tort in Ontario. Three Italian corporations challenged the Ontario court’s jurisdiction. At first instance the judge held Ontario had jurisdiction but on appeal the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that it did not. The key issues, at least thus far, have been whether the plaintiffs could establish a “presumptive connecting factor” (PCF) between those corporations and Ontario and if so, whether that presumption had been rebutted. Common law Canada considers that a contract made in the forum that is connected to a tort that happens elsewhere is a PCF to the forum. It is relevant here because the plaintiffs made some of the arrangements for their trip to Italy with other parties through contracts made in Ontario. In the Court of Appeal, two judges found the PCF was not established while the third found that it was. All three found that if it was established, it had been rebutted by the corporations: the connection to Ontario was insufficient.

More information is available here.  The written legal arguments by the parties for and against leave should end up posted on that site and they should be an interesting read.  As is the practice in Canada, no reasons are provided by the court for the granting of leave. The decision below is here. It contains discussion of the key precedents on jurisdiction.

The Court of Justice delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑531/22 (Getin Noble Bank S.A.), where it has, once more, defended the right of the national judge to, ex officio, examine the potential unfairness of a clause in a contract concluded by a consumer (Directive 93/13).

The decision is available in all EU languages, albeit not in English. Here is the French version:

“1) L’article 6, paragraphe 1, et l’article 7, paragraphe 1, de la directive 93/13/CEE du Conseil, du 5 avril 1993, concernant les clauses abusives dans les contrats conclus avec les consommateurs, doivent être interprétés en ce sens que : ils s’opposent à une réglementation nationale prévoyant qu’une juridiction nationale ne peut procéder d’office à un examen du caractère éventuellement abusif des clauses figurant dans un contrat et en tirer les conséquences, lorsqu’elle contrôle une procédure d’exécution forcée fondée sur une décision prononçant une injonction de payer définitive revêtue de l’autorité de la chose jugée :

– si cette réglementation ne prévoit pas un tel examen au stade de la délivrance de l’injonction de payer ou

– lorsqu’un tel examen est prévu uniquement au stade de l’opposition formée contre l’injonction de payer concernée, s’il existe un risque non négligeable que le consommateur concerné ne forme pas l’opposition requise soit en raison du délai particulièrement court prévu à cette fin, soit eu égard aux frais qu’une action en justice entraînerait par rapport au montant de la dette contestée, soit parce que la réglementation nationale ne prévoit pas l’obligation que soient communiquées à ce consommateur toutes les informations nécessaires pour lui permettre de déterminer l’étendue de ses droits.

2) L’article 3, paragraphe 1, l’article 6, paragraphe 1, l’article 7, paragraphe 1, et l’article 8 de la directive 93/13 doivent être interprétés en ce sens que : ils ne s’opposent pas à une jurisprudence nationale selon laquelle l’inscription d’une clause d’un contrat au registre national des clauses illicites a pour effet que cette clause soit considérée comme étant abusive dans toute procédure impliquant un consommateur, y compris à l’égard d’un autre professionnel que celui à l’encontre duquel la procédure d’inscription de ladite clause à ce registre national avait été engagée et lorsque la même clause ne présente pas un libellé identique à celui enregistré, mais revêt la même portée et produit les mêmes effets sur le consommateur concerné ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=281795&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4026751

Co-edited  by Rishi Gulati and Philippa Webb, the Special Issue of the King’s Law Journal, Volume 34, Issue 3 on “The Legal Accountability of Transnational Institutions: Past, Present and Future” is now out. The 9 articles in this Special Issue are authored by leading experts on the accountability of public international organisations (IOs), MNCs, as well as NGOs.

The Introduction is open access and discusses what may be learnt by comparing the legal accountability of IOs, MNCs and NGOs. In addition to the Introductory article by Rishi Gulati and Philippa Webb, the Special Issue consists of the following contributions. Assessing the Accountability Mechanism of Multilateral Development Banks Against Access to Justice: The Case of the World Bank (Edward Chukwuemeke Okeke); Holding International Organizations Accountable: Recent Developments in U.S. Immunities Law (David P. Stewart); Protecting Human Rights in UN Peacekeeping: Operationalising Due Diligence and Accountability (Nigel D. White); Nature and Scope of an International Organisation’s Due Diligence Obligations Under International Environmental Law: A Case Study of the Caribbean Development Bank (S. Nicole Liverpool Jordan); Civil Liability Under Sustainability Due Diligence Legislation: A Quiet Revolution? (Youseph Farah, Valentine Kunuji & Avidan Kent); Accountability of NGOs: The Potential of Business and Human Rights Frameworks for NGO Due Diligence (Rosana Garciandia); Arbitrating disputes with international organisations and some access to justice issues (August Reinisch); Transnational Procedural Guarantees – The Role of Domestic Courts (Dana Burchardt).

The graduate resesarch programme DynamInt (Dynamic Integration Order) of Humboldt University is inviting international PostDocs to apply for a short-term (3 to 6 months), fully paid research stay in Berlin.

The PostDoc is supposed to pursue her/his research project in the field of European Law. She/he is also expected to interact with the group of young researchers, who all work on their dissertation projects within the thematic framework of harmonization and plurality tendencies in the EU

More information are available here.

 

The United Nations Agenda 2030 with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) seems to have a blind spot for the role of private and private international law. That blind spot is beginning to be closed. A collective volume with global outlook published in 2021 addressed “the private side of transforming our world”: each of the 17 SDGs was discussed in one chapter of the book devoted to the specific relevance of private law and private international law. In 2022, the IACL-ASADIP conference in Asunción, Paraguay discussed sustainable private international law with regard to Latin America; the contributions published in 2023 in a special issue of the University of Brasilia Law Journal – Direito.UnB., V.7., N.3 (2023).

In this occasion the focus is on Asia. The Chinese Journal of Transnational Law invites submissions for its Vol. 2 Issue 2, to be published in 2025, engaging critically with the functions, methodologies and techniques of private international law in relation to sustainability from an Asian perspective, as well as in relation to the actual and potential contributions of private international law to the SDGs in Asia.

Contributions should focus on Asian perspectives, either addressing a specific global challenge through the lens of the relevant normative framework of a particular country, sub-region, or community/ies in Asia; or ‘glocalising’ the challenge, analysing specific issues affecting concrete contexts in the region in relation to the global objectives included in the UN 2030 Agenda.

Topics could include, but are not limited to:

• Relationships between the international and the domestic, or/and the public and the private in the pursue of the UN Agenda 2030 in Asia
• Sustainability in global supply/value chains and private international law in Asia
• Intra-regional (South-South) migration in Asia and private international law (focus on specific kinds of migration, such as labour migration, climate change migration, forced displacement, refugees, etc)
• Clean energy in Asia and private international law
• Decent work (and economic growth) in Asia, and of Asian workers beyond Asia, and private international law
• Sustainable consumption and production in Asia and private international law (focus on a specific sector, such as apparel, food, agricultural products, etc)
• Gender equality in Asia and private international law
• Sustainable Asian cities and communities and private international law
• Establishment and proof of personal identity in Asia; portability across borders of identity documents in Asia and beyond
• (Non-) recognition of foreign child marriages and forced marriages in and from Asia
• Availability and sustainable management of water (and sanitation) in Asia and the role of private international law
• Private international law and cross-border environmental damage/ adverse effects of climate change/ loss of biodiversity from an Asian perspective.

Note: The issue of transnational access to justice in relation to sustainable development has been considered extensively, including from an Asian perspective, so we suggest interested contributors to refrain from submitting contributions based exclusively on SDG 16.

An abstract of 500-800 words should be submitted by 20 Feburary 2024 to PIL.sustainability.CJTL@ed.ac.uk and CJTL.Editor@whu.edu.cn (please send the abstract to both email addresses). Please include the contributor’s last name in the email title. Selected contributors will be invited to submit a draft paper by 1 October 2024 in advance of a hybrid conference at Wuhan University in November 2024 . The submission of the full article through the journal’s homepage: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/ctl is required by 1 March 2025. Accepted articles will be published online first as advanced articles. Contributors may choose between: Research articles (up to 11,000 words inclusive of footnotes) or short articles (up to 6,000 words inclusive of footnotes). The special issue will be published in September 2025.

Those interested may contact the guest editors Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Ralf Michaels and Hans van Loon at PIL.sustainability.CJTL@ed.ac.uk.

Within the framework of the PAX 2.0 Project, Université Paris Dauphine will host the PAX Judicial Training, which will take place on 4-5 March 2024.

While the PAX Moot Court is oriented to students, the PAX Judicial Training is designed for judges and aspiring judges seeking to enhance their understanding of EU private international law.

Taking into account this year’s PAX Moot competition, whose case has been previously dealt with in this blog, judicial training will focus on international jurisdiction in cross-border civil disputes, provisional measures in EU private international law, legal capacity and parental authority and other EU private international law-related issues.

Registrations are open until 15 February 2024 at ramachandra.oviode-siou@dauphine.eu.

Speakers include Arnaud Raynouard, Marta Pertegás Sender, Vesna Lazić, Hélène van Lith, Boriana Musseva, Tsvetelina Dimitrova, Neža Pogorelčnik Vogrinc, Beatriz Añoveros Terradas, Jona Israël, Laura van Bochove, Thalia Kruger, Erlis Themeli and Duncan Fairgrieve.

The detailed programme is available here.

La décision de gel d’un bien meuble corporel se trouvant dans un autre État membre obéit au même régime que la saisie à visée confiscatoire d’un tel bien. L’appel n’est donc pas permis, seules pouvant être formées une requête en nullité et/ou une demande de restitution. Pour statuer sur la demande de restitution, la chambre de l’instruction doit démontrer à travers les mentions de son arrêt que le requérant a eu accès aux pièces utiles, notamment à la décision de gel, selon les formes officielles prévues à l’article 197 du code de procédure pénale, et pas seulement au certificat transmis aux autorités étrangères.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Droit et pratique des saisies et confiscations pénales 2024/2025 Voir la boutique Dalloz

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