Officiers publics ou ministériels ; Avoué
« La révision au fond est interdite au juge de l’exequatur ».
Bien que les recours exercés aient été effectifs, si les autorités françaises décidaient de mettre à exécution la décision de renvoi de la requérante menacée de mauvais traitements par sa famille en Guinée, il y aurait violation de l’article 3 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.
Filiation
For the facts of the case, and the reasoning of the AG in C-559/14 Meroni, I refer to my earlier posting. At the end of May (I am indeed still hoovering up the queue) the Court held very much alongside Kokott AG’s Opinion, I shall therefore not repeat its reasoning here. The CJEU does insist that if third parties rights are directly affected with the intensity as in the case at issue, that third person must be entitled to assert his rights before the court of origin (which English courts provide for), lest one runs the risk of the injunction being refused recognition under ordre public. As I had feared, the Court does not address the AG’s concern whether Mareva orders actually constitute a ‘judgment’ for the purposes of the Regulation.
Post Brexit, this considerable attraction of English courts in interlocutory proceedings might become a lot less real. (Like many of us, I am working on a short review of Brexit consequences for European private international law).
Geert.
(Handbook of) European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, 2.2.16.1.1, 2.2.16.1.4
Où se situe le dommage lorsque le préjudice consiste exclusivement en une perte financière qui se matérialise directement sur le compte bancaire du demandeur et qui résulte directement d’un acte illicite commis dans un autre État membre ?
Dr. Chris Thomale, University of Heidelberg, has kindly provided us with the following thoughts on the possible consequences of Brexit for European private international law.
Hitherto, academic debate is only starting to appreciate the full ambit and impact a Brexit would have on the European legal landscape. Notably, two important aspects have been neglected, despite their crucial importance in upcoming negotiations about withdrawal arrangements between the EU and the UK under Art. 50 section 2 TEU: First, the vital British interest to leave in force the fundamental freedom of establishment. Second, a possible revival of regulatory competition of corporate laws among remaining Member States, once UK Limited Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships were to lose their EU or EEA status.
As Hess and Requejo-Isidro are correct in pointing out, Brexit will directly hit the UK judicial market. Brussels Ibis and its ancillary instruments will cease to apply. It remains yet to be seen if and to what extent new bilateral or multilateral agreements with Member States will make up for this suspension of EU free movement of judgments. This includes an accession to the Lugano Convention, which in itself is due to be reformed. In the meantime, negotiations will have to be based on a default position, according to which not only EU secondary law on jurisdiction and enforcement but notably mutual trust with regard to its application by UK courts will be suspended. The latter aspect cannot be emphasized enough: British insolvency proceedings in particular have been displaying tendencies to find a Centre of Main Interest of companies and entire global corporate groups inside the UK, often based on hardly understandable factual assertions and the most laconic reasonings given by UK courts (see, e.g. the Nortel case).
The mentioned expansionist aspect of the UK judicial market neatly ties in with a similar regulatory export of corporate forms. Under the aegis of Art. 49 seqq. TFEU and Art. 31 seqq. of the EEA Agreement, UK companies profit from being recognised throughout the EEA in their original British legal form of establishment, regardless of their actual place of management. This privilege has been incentivizing a common form of legal arbitrage: Investors establish a Ltd or LLP in the UK, while doing business anywhere else inside the EEA, thereby being able to circumvent mandatory rules applying at their state of business such as laws on co-determination, minimum capital, or mandatory insurance requirements. Such setups will not be available anymore once the UK were to leave the EEA. Putting it bluntly, from the moment UK effectively leaves the EU and the EEA, British companies operating e.g. in France or Germany will be subject to the corporate laws of their administrative seat. For these countries follow the ‘real seat’ theory, i.e. a conflict of company laws rule that designates the substantive law of the administrative seat as the applicable company law. UK companies not having to show any registration as, say, a Société à responsabilité limitée at their real seat, by default will immediately be treated as partnerships, entailing, inter alia, unlimited shareholder liability. In order to avoid this, UK companies operating inside the EU will be well advised to reincorporate, i.e. convert into a EU legal form, which better serves their economic interests.
However, will the UK simply let them go? Once Brexit becomes effective, the Directive 2005/56/EC on cross-border mergers will not apply anymore; neither will rulings rendered by the CJEU in Cartesio or Vale. Restrictions may be put into place, similar to those displayed by British authorities in Daily Mail, when corporate mobility required consent by UK Treasury. This may induce a corporate exodus from the UK while its EU membership is still active. Still, leaving UK company forms behind represents only one side of the deal. A second uncertainty rests with the question, exactly which new legal forms UK companies operating abroad will choose instead. Will they go for an Irish Private Company Limited by Shares, a Dutch Besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid or a German Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung? We could witness a revival of regulatory competition within the EU. However, even before that, Member States’ interests in the Art. 50 section 2 TEU withdrawal negotiations, regarding the question of preserving or abolishing freedom of establishment between the UK and the EU, will be influenced by their individual prospects and ambitions in such regulatory competition. At this point, there is no telling, who will win the race nor whether it will lead to the top of legal reform or to the bottom of deregulation. Be this as it may, exciting days have found us – not only for game theorists.
È in programma per i giorni 30 settembre e 1° ottobre 2016 a San Ginesio (MC) la sesta edizione dell’Incontro dei dottorandi di ricerca di diritto internazionale.
L’evento, promosso dalla Società Italiana di Diritto Internazionale e di diritto dell’Unione europea in collaborazione con il Centro Internazionale Studi Gentiliani, offre ai dottorandi di ricerca in diritto internazionale, diritto internazionale privato e diritto dell’Unione europea iscritti al secondo anno la possibilità di presentare i risultati parziali delle proprie indagini e di promuovere il dibattito sui temi affrontati.
I dottorandi interessati possono inviare la propria candidatura compilando questo modulo ed inviandolo all’indirizzo mail info@sidi-isil.it entro il 20 luglio 2016.
Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili qui.
Le droit de l’Union s’oppose à ce que la réglementation linguistique d’un État membre oblige, sous peine de nullité absolue, l’établissement des factures transfrontalières dans une langue spécifique.
Par un arrêt du 21 juin 2016, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme conclut à l’absence de violation de l’article 10 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme quant à la condamnation pour diffamation aggravée d’un salarié, au regard des allégations de détournement de fonds publics dénoncées sur le fondement d’une rumeur non vérifiée, caractérisant l’absence de bonne foi.
Rendu au regard de la législation espagnole, l’arrêt de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne du 9 juin 2016, qui a fait l’objet d’un communiqué de presse, s’oppose à un système qui ne garantit pas que le coût de la compensation équitable destinée aux auteurs en cas de copie privée de leurs oeuvres ne soit pas finalement supporté par les utilisateurs de ces copies.
La Cour de Strasbourg a considéré qu’en jugeant irrecevable l’appel formé par le nouvel avocat d’un justiciable qui n’avait pas été désigné conformément aux dispositions du code de procédure pénale, elle l’a privé d’un examen au fond de son recours. La France est condamnée pour violation de l’article 6 § 1 de la Convention qui garantit le droit à un procès équitable.
On 20 April 2016, AG Szpunar delivered his Opinion in the case C-135/15, Hellenic Republic v Nikiforidis. The case concerns the temporal scope of application of Regulation (EC) 593/2008 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome I), and the interpretation of Article 9(3) of the same Regulation, concerning the overriding mandatory provisions of third countries.
The referring court, the German Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Court for Labour Matters), was seised by Mr Nikiforidis, a teacher in a public school that was managed and run, in Germany, by the Hellenic Republic. Mr Nikiforidis’ claim concerned the salary due to him from 2010 to 2012. The amount of the salary had been unilaterally reduced by the employer under one of the austerity packages adopted by the Greek legislature in connection with the country’s sovereign debt crisis. This led Mr Nikiforidis to sue the Greek Ministry of Education, seeking the payment of the sums withheld.
The Bundesarbeitsgericht found that the Hellenic Republic could not avail itself of State immunity, since the duties performed by a public school teacher are not so closely connected to its sovereign or governmental activities as to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts of any other State. The Federal Court further held it possessed jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 18(1) and 19(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussel I).
As to the applicable law, the Bundesarbeitsgericht observed that the contract should be deemed to be governed by German law, although it failed to specify the provisions on which this finding was grounded. It conceded, however, that the Greek statutes mentioned above could be regarded as overriding mandatory provisions of a third country, insofar as their respect is, quite indisputably, crucial for safeguarding the public interests of the Hellenic Republic, namely its economic organisation.
The first question submitted to the ECJ precisely concerns the legal basis upon which ‘effect may be given’ to provisions of this kind. As it is, the approach taken by the Rome I Regulation in respect of overriding mandatory provisions of third countries is somewhat stricter than the one adopted under the Rome Convention of 19 June 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations.
While Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention provides that ‘effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of [any] country with which the situation has a close connection’, Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation sets forth, for these purposes, two requirements. The rules in question, in fact: (i) must belong to ‘the law of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed’; (ii) may be taken into consideration for the purposes of Article 9(3) only insofar as the effect of their application consists in rendering the performance of the contract ‘unlawful’.
It is also worth remembering that the Republic of Germany has entered into a reservation to Article 7(1) of the 1980 Rome Convention, which, according to the EU Commission, translates into the impossibility, for German courts, of giving effect, by any means, to overriding mandatory provisions of third countries when that instrument applies rations temporis (cfr. para 99 of the Opinion).
Pursuant to its Article 28, the Rome I Regulation applies to ‘contracts concluded after 17 December 2009’. As far as continuing contracts are concerned, this rule evidently determines a considerable extension of the temporal emprise of the regime set forth by the Rome Convention, insofar as it will still apply to durable contractual relationships constituted before that date. According to AG Szpunar, anyway, the intrinsic characteristics of the contract concerned have no bearings in the interpretation and application of Article 28, which therefore applies also to continuing contracts (para 51).
As the relevant point in time for the conclusion of the contract, the Advocate General suggests that it shall be determined according to the provisions of the putatively applicable lex causae. The Rome I Regulation accordingly applies, ratione temporis, provided that, under the (substantive) law which would govern the case were that Regulation applicable, the contract is regarded as concluded after 17 December 2009 (para 40). The shaping, to these purposes, of an autonomous solution of EU law is, in fact, deemed impractical (para 41).
The putatively applicable lex causae shall also determine whether any subsequent modification occurred to the contractual relationship is of such a kind and extent as to be regarded as conclusion of a new contract.
The second question submitted to the Court of Justice presupposes the ascertained applicability, ratione temporis, of the Rome I Regulation. The seised court asks whether ‘effect may be given’ under its domestic law (namely article 241(2) BGB) to overriding mandatory provisions of a third countries. This on the assumption that the pre-conditions for the triggering of Article 9(3) are not satisfied, being Germany – and not Greece – the place of performance of the obligations arising out of the contract at stake.
In the Advocate General’s view, nonetheless, Article 9(3) might still apply to the case under examination. The pre-requirements set forth by that provision should not, he contends, be narrowly understood, because a strict reading would run counter the very rationale underlying the “taking into consideration” of overriding mandatory provisions of a third country (para 87). On the other hand, a more lenient understanding of the concepts therein employed would favour more equitable solutions in the specific case and prevent forum shopping malus (paras 88-89).
In particular, the identification of the ‘place of performance of the obligations arising out of the contract’ should not follow, under Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation, the same reasoning postulated by Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation. Under the former provision, that concept should rather be understood as encompassing not only the place in which the obligation in question has to be materially executed, but also any other place featuring a significant connection with either the legal order or the sovereign powers of the concerned third-country (para 93).
Hence, the fact that the Hellenic Republic contributes, with its budget, to the funding of the (public) service provided by the school in which Mr Nikiforidis is employed may be an argument for finding that the obligations arising out of the contract of employment are to be performed, to a certain extent, also in Greece.
The third preliminary question submitted to the ECJ concerned the role of the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU in the (indirect) application of overriding mandatory provisions of another Member State. According to the Advocate General, said principle has no bearing in the application of the substantive law appointed by the instruments of private international law. Specifically, it could not, as such, compel the seised court to apply the overriding mandatory provisions of another Member State, not even when these latter are meant to implement a measure decided by the EU itself. This circumstance might, nonetheless, be taken into account to the purposes of the assessment required to the court under the final line of Article 9(3).
Szpunar AG’s Opinion in C-135/15 Hellenic Republic v Grigorios Nikiforidis has travelled half the world with me in my briefcase. Time to tackle the blog queue…
As I had reported earlier, the Bundesarbeitsgericht has given the CJEU an opportunity to provide much needed clarity on the application of Rome I to continuing (employment) contracts, and on the Regulation (or as the case may be, the Rome convention)’s provisions on overriding mandatory law.
The Opinion (not available in English) first of all clarifies the temporal scope of Rome I. Article 28 Rome I provides that it applies to contracts concluded ‘as from 17 December 2009’ (this is the corrected format; initially Article 28 read ‘after’). When exactly a contract is ‘concluded’ needs to be determined in accordance with the putative lex causae as identified by the Regulation (an extension of Article 10(1), suggested by most if not all of relevant scholarship). What, however, about ‘continuing’ contracts’: those concluded before the temporal scope of the Regulation, continuing after, however renewed, renegotiated, amended…: do these continue to be covered by the Rome convention ad infinitum, or is there a cut-off point at which these continuing contracts become newly concluded?
I had suggested in my earlier posting that one’s intuitive assumption may be to prefer autonomous interpretation of the concept ‘concluded’. That, after all, is the standard approach of the Court. However I argued that in the current state of (lack of) harmonisation of contractual law, it is more likely that the Court will prefer an Article 10(1) type solution. Szpunar AG is of the same opinion. He first of all points out (at 33) that secondary EU law need not necessarily include verbatim transitionary measures. In the absence of a specific regime, the general rule is that the new provisions immediately apply to future effects of situations that arose under the old regime. Rome I’s transitory regime therefore, with its reference to date of ‘conclusion’ is an exception to that general principle. Can that moment of conclusion be autonomously defined? Szpunar AG shares my intuition (at 35 ff): along the lines of Article 10’s regime (the van Munchausen or the ‘bootstrap’ principle) the lex causae has to determine the moment of conclusion. For long-term contracts, this will inevitably lead to uncertainty (at 49). Yet that does not take away the soundness of the rule.
Next up is the application of Article 9’s provision on overriding mandatory provisions. This is the first time the CJEU will rule on that Article (Unamar was held under the Rome Convention). The Regulation quite deliberately limited the room for manoeuvre for the court seized to apply overriding mandatory law other than that of the forum: only such laws of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract ‘have to be performed’ can come into calling. That place is likely to be Germany in the case at issue (the Regulation does not define ‘place of performance’ under Article 9(3)) – however the AG suggests differently: there are a variety of reasons to assume that Greece, too, can be that place (at 95).
Szpunar AG first of all, in his very first para, remarks that scholarly attention to ‘lois de police’ far exceeds its featuring in practice. He also notes that von Savigny himself discussed ordre public (at 68 with references) and succinctly discusses the difference between the two (at 69-70). He repeats (at 78) that scholarly attention to overriding mandatory law has been excessive. He then rejects the suggestion that Article 9(3) needs to be applied restrictively to such a degree that its application becomes pretty much near-impossible. Importantly, he rejects in the process (a la Kainz) a strict parallel between ‘performance’ in Article 9(3) Rome I and Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast, and suggest that while the latter needs strict interpretation in line with the overall interpretative rules of that Regulation, there is no such need for Article 9(3) (at 92).
I wonder whether the Court will still hold before the recess (professor Szpunar Opined in April: I did flag there is a queue of cases waiting to be reviewed…
Geert.
Lorsque la personne réclamée, qui comparaît devant la chambre de l’instruction selon la procédure d’extradition simplifiée, déclare ne plus consentir à son extradition, la procédure ne peut se poursuivre selon les règles de droit commun que s’il est constaté qu’une demande d’extradition est parvenue aux autorités françaises.
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