Don’t it always seem to go, you don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone. Recognition and enforcement intra-EU is now so smooth in civil and commercial matters, the European Commission wanted to abolish potential for refusal altogether in the Brussels I Recast (regular readers are aware I reported on it at the time of negotiation).
Thank you Clyde & Co for alerting me to the case: In [2017] EWHC 519 (Comm) Midtown Acquisitions v Essar Global parties settled their dispute in an agreement, under which the defendant accepted liability and “confessed to judgment”. The New York courts then entered a Judgment by Confession (similar to an English consent judgment). Recognition and enforcement was sought in England.
In the Brussels system, discussion is still possible on the very notion of ‘judgment’ as I have recently reported (see my postings on Pula Parking and Zulfikarpašić). Refusal of recognition is possible on very narrow grounds. Famously, under the Brussels regime, recognition does not require res judicata of the foreign (intra-EU) judgment. (A misleadingly simple statement made in all Reports. But I’ll leave the detail for another time (see eg Gothaer for earlier analysis).
Outside the Brussels regime however (lest the Brexit negotiations yield a continuing bridge between civil procedure in the UK and EU this will also apply to judgment issued by UK courts), discussion on these two points re-emerges: when can a ruling be considered a ‘judgment’, and does it have res judicata? Defendant in Midtown argues that the New York judgment was not a “judgment” as that expression is used in English law because (i) there was no lis between the parties in New York, (ii) the New York judgment was not final and conclusive and (iii) the New York judgment was not on the merits.
Teare J rejected all three arguments on the basis of relevant precedent. The judgment merits reading for it is a good reminder of the extent of argument ensuing when one is not covered by the umbrella of EU or international harmonisation of recognition and enforcement. Complications which are not likely to assist the London legal market in maintaining its attraction post Brexit.
Geert.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.
Rincon ((2017) 8 Cal. App 5th 1) is another case suited to comparative conflicts classes. It applies California’s restrictive regime on waiver of jury trial to a contract governed by New York law and with choice of court for New York.
‘Lois de police‘, also known as lois d’application immédiate or lois d’application nécessaire, are included in the EU’s Rome I Regulation (on applicable law for contracts) in Article 9. (I reported earlier on their application in Unamar).
Jason Grinell has background to the case. Parties had made choice of law and choice of court in favour of New York. The link with New York was real (in EU terms: this was not a ‘purely domestic’ situation), inter alia because of the involvement of New York-based banks, parties being sophisticated commercial undertakings, and the contract having been negotiated in NY. However the real estate development is located at San Francisco, giving CAL a strong link to the case. Under CAL law, parties generally cannot waive a jury trial before the commencement of a lawsuit unless they use one of two methods approved by the legislature. New York law does not have the same provision and choice of court clauses in favour of New York do not include reference to the only options available under CAL law.
In the case at issue, the boilerplate choice of court clause was set aside by the Court of Appeal. The lower court had denied a substantial enough Californian interest in the case – the CA disagreed. The relevant part of the judgment runs until p.22.
That comparative conflicts binder is filling out nicely.
Geert.
The House of Commons’ report on ‘negotiating priorities for the justice system’ reviews more than conflict of laws, indeed it is a tour d’horizon of most (if not all) issues relevant to Justice and Home Affairs in the EU. Martha Requejo makes a number of valid points on the report and indeed plenty of these, and others, have been made by a number of conflicts commentators: I will not review all here. There is a scholarly cottage industry on post-Brexit issues and the area of private international law is no exception.
The report mentions among others that a role for the CJEU in respect of essentially procedural legislation concerning jurisdiction, applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments, is a price worth paying to maintain the effective cross-border tools of justice discussed throughout our earlier recommendations. That is a very sensible approach, not just within the overall context of UK /continent judicial co-operation: it is also an obvious lifeline for London’s legal services market. Without proper integration into the EU’s civil procedure corpus, judgments from UK courts will immediately lose a lot of their appeal. The Government however have manoeuvred itself into a cul-de-sac by rejecting a role for the European Court of Justice post Brexit. The report’s call, and many with it, therefore is likely to fall upon deaf ears. Both for the UK and for EU conflicts rules, this will be a great loss. Few continental courts live up to the same standards as their UK counterparts when it comes to applying the intricate detail of conflict of laws, whether EU based or not.
Geert.
Il Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Roma Tre ospita una serie di incontri su temi di diritto internazionale privato.
Interverranno: Pietro Franzina (il 10 Aprile 2017, La tutela internazionale dell’adulto vulnerabile), Caroline Adolphsen (2 maggio 2017, Children seeking asylum in Europe: a Scandinavian approach), Francesco Salerno (2 maggio 2017, “Bruxelles I-bis” e titolo esecutivo europeo: l’efficacia delle decisioni straniere nelle discipline uniformi europee), Javier Carrascosa González (8 maggio 2017, Il nome nel diritto internazionale privato e Matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso e unioni registrate in Europa), Maria Asunción Cebrián Salvat (8 maggio 2017, Il regime patrimoniale nel matrimonio e nelle unioni registrate), Javier Carrascosa González e Maria Asunción Cebrián Salvat (9 maggio 2017, Il divorzio nel diritto dell’Unione europea: giurisdizione e legge applicabile e Il regolamento dell’Unione europea sulle successioni) e Francesca Pietrangeli (15 maggio 2017, La clausola di individuazione della legge applicabile al contratto).
Gli incontri si collocano nel quadro delle attività della Cattedra di Diritto internazionale della prof.ssa Antonietta Di Blase.
Maggiori informazioni nella locandina reperibile a questo indirizzo.
Closely linked to my post this morning re Chiquita and CSR, here’s a review of the French CSR corporate vigilance /duty of care Act. I had planned to do my own review but hey, why re-invent the wheel when Ms Bergkamp’s is ticking over nicely.
See also a follow up post here http://bit.ly/2ofirlK on the French Constitutional court seeing little issue with the civil liability side of the Act.
On 21 February 2017, the French Parliament adopted a law (the “Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law” or “Law”) that creates novel corporate supply chain liability. Specifically, the Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law imposes a duty of vigilance on large companies to prevent serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and serious environmental damage in their supply chain. In a previous post, I discussed the concept of supply chain liability. As I pointed out there, the concept had not been defined by law makers yet. The French legislature has now attempted to operationalize the concept through new legislation.
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The title of this post is a result of my confusion on the state of various suits against Chiquita, on alleged collusion in or perpetration of human rights abuses in Columbia. I had reported earlier (scroll down to ‘update on linked development’; this hyperlinks to all relevant links) that the US Supreme Court had denied certiorari in a ruling of the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Miami. This left that ruling standing (a strict application of SCOTUS’ view in Kiobel).
End November (I had tweeted it at the time; my ledger has not left me an opportunity to post on it since) the Southern District court of Florida dismissed an application on forum non conveniens grounds in what must be related litigation. Except my limited knowledge of jurisdictional levels in the US leaves me in doubt where the link is between these two developments (US readers please assist if you can).
At any rate, the ruling reviewed here is a textbook example of forum non conveniens (motion dismissed, nota bene) and a great source for a comparative conflicts class. Such as I teach at Monash :-).
Geert.
(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.14.5.
In [2017] EWHC 25 (Ch) the Frogmore Group, there are three relevant companies: FREP (Knowle) Limited. FREP (Ellesmere Port) Limited and FREP (Belle Vale) Limited all of which were incorporated in and have their registered office in Jersey. The Companies form part of Frogmore group (of which the ultimate parent is Frogmore Property Company Limited). The Frogmore group specialises in real estate investment and management in the UK and each of the Companies owns a shopping centre located at Ellesmere Port in Cheshire, Belle Vale in Liverpool and Knowle in Bristol respectively. Each of these shopping centres is managed by Frogmore Real Estate Investment Managers Limited (“FREPIM”), a company formed in England and Wales with its registered office and base for operations at London.
The Nationwide seeking enforcement of security, the group sought a declaration that COMI was at Jersey.
Marshall DJ held with reference to the familiar precedents of Eurofood and Interedil, both featuring heavily in my earlier postings on COMI, but also to Northsea Base Investments in which Birss J paid particular attention to the largest shareholders. Of note is that this reference to the largest shareholders does not entail (and indeed is not so constructed in either Northsea Base or Frogmore) that these get the pick of what COMI might entail. Rather, that the dealings with and experience of one place as being the place where the company’s interest are being managed from, is of particular interest for the Interedil emphasis on ascertainability by third parties. Marshall DJ also rekindles the discussion on whether Interedil’s emphasis is on identifying the ‘Head office’ of the companies: a conclusion which one needs to treat with caution for even in Interedil’s tacit support for the head office approach, the emphasis continues to lie with the combination of factors, all leading to transparency and publicity.
The High Court in the end held with reference to the following: (at 39; all wording as the judgment but with one or two words left out)
(1) Day- to-day conduct of the business and activities of the Companies has been in the hands of an agent appointed in England, namely FREPIM. Under the Advisory Agreement (which was itself governed by English law and had an English exclusive jurisdiction clause) FREPIM was to take on full responsibility for providing a very large range of services to the Companies, including day-to-day management of the Shopping Centres and dealing with their financing, accounting, marketing and formulation of their business strategy. FREPIM itself acknowledged that it worked on investment strategy and business plans for the Companies; instructed lawyers, surveyors and consultants for them; negotiated the purchase and sale of properties on their behalf; dealt with their borrowing requirements; and attended to the provision of accounting systems and the preparation of management and annual accounts. These actions were not just limited commercial activities but included the types of function that one would expect a head office to discharge.
(2) Day-to-day dealings with third parties are carried out from the offices of FREPIM at London. This is confirmed by the evidence of the activity of FREPIM described above but it is also supported by, for example, the Companies’ VAT returns where their business address is stated to be those offices. In their day-to-day dealings with third parties regarding expenditure these offices are given as the address for invoices.
(3) If one has regard to the point of view of the largest creditor, Nationwide, the Facility Agreement and the Nationwide Debentures are governed by English law and have an English jurisdiction clause. Under the Facility Agreement the Shareholder is the service agent for the Companies. In the case of the Nationwide Debentures, they have express reference to the power to appoint administrators under the 1986 Act. FREPIM took over the day-to-day contact with Nationwide as well as providing Nationwide with various pieces of information (such as quarterly compliance packs and accounts for borrowers) and did so from London. FREPIM also accepted that the management of the relationship between the Companies and Nationwide had been carried out by [the group treasurer] and the Chairman of the Frogmore group, who was also based in London.
(4) I also note that under the terms of the debentures securing the advances made by the Shareholder that the governing law is English, there is an English exclusive jurisdiction clause, that FREPIM is appointed the service agent of the Companies and there is express provision for the appointment of administrators under the 1986 Act.
The case is a good reminder that even intricate SPV structures should not detract from COMI finding on well-established principles. And that COMI determination always depends on a basket of criteria.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.6.1.2., Heading 5.6.1.2.4.
I reported earlier on the November 2015 draft ‘Judgments project’ of the Hague Conference on private international law, otherwise known as the draft convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to civil and commercial matters. The working group now has a February 2017 draft out. (The project nota bene has even increased in relevance given Brexit).
I could have titled this post ‘spot the differences’ for of course there are changes in formulation between current and previous version. However my main point of concern remains: the absence of Wally: some type of institutional redress which will assist courts in the interpretation of the Convention. Article 23 now calls for uniform interpretation, and there will, one assumes, be a report accompanying its adoption. (Judging by the size of commentaries on the EU mirror, Brussels I Recast, this could turn out to be a very sizeable report indeed). However without a court system ensuring uniformity of application, the Convention in my view will risk being a dead duck in the water.
Geert. (Not by nature pessimistic. But probably realistic).
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2.
After Shell/Okpabi, the High Court has now for the second time in 2017 rejected jurisdiction to be established against the foreign subsidiary (here: in Kenya) using the mother company as an anchor. In [2017] EWHC 371 (QB) AAA et al v Unilever and Unilever Tea Kenya ltd, Unilever is the ultimate holding company and registered in the UK. Its subsidiary is a company registered in Kenya. It operates a tea plantation there. Plaintiffs were employed, or lived there, and were the victims of ethnic violence carried out by armed criminals on the Plantation after the Presidential election in Kenya in 2007. They claim that the risk of such violence was foreseeable by both defendants, that these owed a duty of care to protect them from the risks of such violence, and that they had breached that duty.
Laing J unusually first of (at 63 ff) all declines to reject the case on ‘case management’ grounds. Unlike many of her colleagues she is more inclined to see such stay as ignoring ‘through the back door’ Owusu‘s rejection of forum non conveniens. I believe she is right. Instead the High Court threw out the case on the basis that the claims, prima facie (on deciding jurisdiction, the Court does not review the substantial merits of the case; a thin line to cross) had no merit. Three issues had to be decided:
i) By reference to what law should the claim be decided? This was agreed as being Kenyan law.
ii) Are the criteria in Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 satisfied? (A leading English law case on the test for the duty of care). The relevance of English law on this issues comes about as a result of Kenyan law following the same Caparo test: as I have noted elsewhere, it is not without discussion that lex fori should apply to this test of attributability. Laing J held that the Caparo criteria were not fulfilled. The events were not as such foreseeable (in particular: a general breakdown in law and order). Importantly, with respect to the holding company and as helpfully summarised by Herbert Smith:
At 103, Laing J discussed and dismissed plaintiff’s attempts at distinguishing Okpabi. In her view, like in Shell /Okpabi, the mother’s control is formal control exercised at a high level of abstraction, and over the content and auditing of general policies and procedures. Not the sort of control and superior knowledge which would meet the Chandler test.
iii) Are the claims barred by limitation? This became somewhat irrelevant but the High Court ruled they were not. (This, under the common law of conflicts, was a matter of lex causae: Kenyan law, and requiring Kenyan expert input. Not English law, as the lex fori).
The case, like Okpabi, is subject to appeal however it is clear that the English courts are not willing to pick up the baton of court of prefered resort for CSR type cases against mother companies.
Geert.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Heading 8.3.
This post has been written by Nicolò Nisi, Research Assistant at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg
On 10 March 2017, the German Bundestag finally voted the bill to facilitate the handling of domestic group insolvencies (Gesetzes zur Erleichterung der Bewältigung von Konzerninsolvenzen), which was initially presented in early 2013.
It is a much-awaited development, which follows the introduction in the new EU Insolvency Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/848) of specific provisions addressing the insolvency of EU groups of companies, i.e., groups where the parent company and the subsidiaries have their centre of main interests in at least two Member States.
Under current German law, each legal entity is subject to its own insolvency proceeding and the decision to open the proceedings is determined separately and independently for each entity (‘one company, one insolvency, one proceeding’). It means that different insolvency courts open separate proceedings for each insolvent group member, with the appointment – in many cases – of several insolvency practitioners. This approach has its benefits in terms of legal certainty, but it overlooks the wider picture of the group. It is, in fact, not suitable for the group restructuring or the sale of the group business as a going concern.
Although the principle that separate proceedings are to be opened in respect of different group members remains unchanged, the new provisions introduce four main innovations to the German Insolvency Code (Insolvenzordnung).
To begin with, they establish the possibility for a group company – not necessarily the (ultimate) parent – to apply for the opening of insolvency proceedings over the other insolvent group entities (so-called procedural consolidation), provided that such concentration of jurisdiction is justified by the common interests of the group’s creditors and the requesting company is not manifestly of minor importance for the group as a whole (§ 3a).
A ‘group venue’ is then established for all the group companies. In the case of more applications, a priority rule applies or, when not possible, the application made by the company with the highest number of employees in the previous financial year prevails. If a request to open insolvency proceeding against a group member is submitted afterward to a different court, the latter may transfer the proceeding to the group court (§ 3d).
Secondly, when insolvency proceedings in respect of various group members are opened in different courts, it is possible to appoint the same person as insolvency practitioner for all group companies concerned, insofar it is in the creditors’ interests and possible conflicts of interest may be covered by the appointment of a special practitioner (§ 56b). This should avoid the occurrence of frictions, inefficiencies and information asymmetries, which could endanger an optimal result.
Thirdly, the insolvency practitioners appointed in the proceedings opened in relation to different members of the same group are obliged to cooperate and share all relevant information, insofar as the interests of the creditors of the respective group company would not be prejudiced (§ 269a). Similar duties are also provided concerning insolvency courts (§ 269b) and creditors’ committees (§ 269c). Under the last provision, however, cooperation shall only take place by request of one of the creditors’ committees and through the appointment of a group creditors’ committee, which should assist the insolvency practitioners and the creditors’ committee within the individual proceedings.
Finally, each group company in whose respect an insolvency proceeding has been requested or already opened – alternatively the (preliminary) creditors’ committee of a group company – may request before the court of the group venue the opening of a ‘coordination proceeding’, which should further facilitate the coordinated liquidation or restructuring of insolvent groups (§ 269d). The coordination court shall then appoint an independent coordinator (§ 269e), who oversees the execution of the proceeding in the interest of creditors, in particular by submitting a coordination plan (§ 269f).
Such plan should describe in detail all the relevant measures to be implemented within the individual insolvency proceedings, including the proposals concerning (i) the restoration of economic performances of the group members; (ii) the settlement of intra-group disputes; and (iii) the contractual arrangements among insolvency practitioners (§ 269h).
It is worth stressing that the group coordination proceeding does not have a binding effect on the individual proceedings, in that the insolvency practitioners may decide not to follow the recommendations of the coordinator, only subject to the duty to explain to the creditors the reasons for doing so (‘comply or explain’) (§ 269i). However, if the creditors are not persuaded and vote in favour of the arrangements contained in the group plan, but the practitioner does not adapt accordingly the insolvency plan at the level of individual proceeding, he may risk to be held liable for damages.
Except for the first point on procedural consolidation, which is positively considered by the prevailing literature in the case of an integrated group as a tool to simplify the going-concern sale of the business or the global group-wide restructuring, the new German rules resemble closely the ones recently adopted in the Recast Insolvency Regulation. The latter, in fact, were proposed by the German delegations within the European Parliament and the Council. Also at the European level, a group coordination proceeding has been introduced in order to facilitate the group restructuring, even though the participation of various practitioners is not binding and rests on a voluntary basis (see Articles 61 et seq.).
This solution has been the object of different evaluations, mostly skeptical. Indeed, it seems that the introduction of a coordination proceeding will not make a significant difference in the practice of group insolvencies. Even overlooking the problems arising from non-compliance with the coordinator’s recommendations, one should pay attention to limiting the costs (including the coordinator’s remuneration under § 269g) and the duration of the proceeding, in order to preserve its efficiency and to ensure its success in the interest of creditors, thus avoiding it may result in additional complexity.
The one sorry outcome of [2017] EWHC 374 (Ch) Microsoft (Nokia) v Sony is that by rejecting jurisdiction, the Commercial Court did not have an opportunity to review the application of Rome II’s provisions on applicable law in the case of infringement of competition law.
The following background is by Kirsty Wright, who also alerted me to the case: the claim centred on allegations by Microsoft (who had acquired Nokia of Finland) that the Defendants had caused loss by engaging in anti-competitive conduct relating to the sale of Li-ion Batteries over a period of 12 years. In 2001 Nokia and the Sony Corporation (the mother corporation: with seat outside of the EU) concluded a Product Purchase Agreement for Li-ion Batteries. This agreement contained an English choice of law clause and required any dispute to be resolved by way of arbitration in the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Microsoft became the assignee of these rights following its purchase of parts of Nokia in 2013 and therefore could bring claims in contract against Sony Corporation and claims in tort against the other three Defendants. Sony Corporation is a subsidiary of Sony Europe Limited: it is the anchor defendant in this case: none of the corporations other than Sony Europe are domiciled in the EU.
Smith J in a lengthy judgment determined that the agreement between Microsoft and Sony Corporation to arbitrate in the ICC also extended to the parent company Sony Europe. Therefore proceedings against all defendants were stayed in favour of ICC arbitration subject to English law. This required him first of all to hold that under English law, the arbitration agreement (as opposed to, under EU law, for the issue of choice of court: see CDC) extends to non-contractual obligations (infringement of competition law evidently not being part of one’s contractual rights and obligations; see here for a review of the issues; in Dutch I’m afraid: must find time for an EN version) but also that the clause extended to the mother company: hence releasing the jurisdictional anchor.
Microsoft had anticipated such finding by suggesting such finding may be incompatible with EU law: its contention was that the operation of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) must permit the effective protection of rights derived from competition law, including private law rights of action for infringement, these being rights accorded by EU law, and that an arbitration clause which caused the fragmentation of such rights of action was, for that reason, in breach of EU law (at 76). It made extensive reference to Jaaskinen AG’s call in CDC for the Brussels I Recast to be aligned with Rome II’s ambition to have one single law apply to the ensuing tort. (The jurisdictional regime as noted leads to a need to sue in various jurisdictions).
As I have noted in my review of the CJEU’s judgment, on this point the Court however disagreed with its AG. Indeed while the AG reviews and argues the issue at length (Smith J recalls it in the same length), the Court summarily sticks to its familiar view on the application of (now) Article 7(2) in competition cases; it is the CJEU’s view which the Commercial Court of course upholds.
A great case, extensively argued.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9.1; Heading 2.2.9; Chapter 4, Heading 4.6.2).
Fraus omnia corrumpit (fraud corrupts all; alternatively formulated as ex turpi causa non oritur actio) is not easily applied in conflict of laws. See an earlier post here. In Sinocore International Co Ltd v RBRG Trading , the Commercial Court granted permission for the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award despite allegations that the transaction in question had been “tainted” by fraud: this is how the case is summarised by Mayer Brown and I am happy broadly to refer to their overview and analysis.
The Commercial Court’s relaxed attitude is another sign of strong support of the English courts for the New York Convention and its narrow application of ordre public.
An interesting case for comparative conflicts /arbitration classes.
Geert.
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