It is one of the pinnacle theories of conflict of laws and when first introducing students to it, they almost invariably respond glassy-eyed. Renvoi has an unlimited ability to surprise parties and courts alike. It is best excluded, either by Statute, or by the parties, but frankly to be on the safe side: always and everywhere best by both. (Lest there are well considered arguments not to do so in a specific instance. As readers of my book now, the Brussels I Recast provisions on renvoi for choice of court (complicating less fori prorogati) is not such an instance: Handbook 2016, p.128-129, Heading 2.2.9.4.2).
At issue in Dankor [Dancor Construction, Inc. v. FXR Construction, Inc., 2016 IL App (2d) 150839] was the choice of court and governing law clause cited by the court at 44:
“The parties agree that this agreement was executed in Kane County, Illinois and shall be governed by the law of the State of Illinois. Any claims, lawsuits, disputes or claims arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be litigated in Kane County, Illinois.”
This clause could be a boilerplate or midnight clause except those routinely do exclude renvoi. ‘The law of the State of Illinois’ in the clause would then be followed by ‘excluding its choice of law rules’ or something of the kind. Why it was dropped here is entirely unclear. As Clifford Shapiro writes ‘So what happens when an Illinois general contractor fires a New York subcontractor who was working on a New York project under a subcontract that required Illinois law to apply and litigation to take place in Illinois? Unfortunately for litigants, what can happen is nearly three years of jurisdictional litigation in both New York and Illinois, and then dismissal of the Illinois case less than 60 days before trial with an order directing the case to be re-filed in New York.’
As the court notes (at 69) choice of court and choice of governing law are separate issues (for that reason they are als best deal with in clearly separated contractual clauses). Relevant precedent for the validity of the former is Rieker 378 Ill. App. 3d 77, 86 (2007). Applying Rieker, and following Section 187(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the Court held (reference is best made to Clifford’s summary or to the judgment itself) that New York law applied to the validity of the clause, leading to its being void: New York law mandatorily prohibits application of another State’s law or litigation outside of the State for New York construction projects (Illinois incidentally has a mirror provision).
Need one say more? Renvoi is always best excluded. It would not necessarily have made this clause enforceable: ordre public discussions could always still be raised. However it sure as anything would have made the validity of the clause much more likely.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 1, Heading 1.4).
Recognition of Foreign Administrative Acts, edited by / a cura di J. Rodríguez-Arana Munoz, M. Garcìa Pérez, J.J. Perna Garcìa, C. Aymerich Cano, Springer, 2016, ISBN 9783319189741, pp. 388, EUR 135,19.
This book presents an analysis of the concept of the administrative act and its classification as ‘foreign’, and studies the administrative procedure for adopting administrative acts in a range of countries in and outside Europe. While focusing on the recognition and execution of foreign administrative acts, the book examines the validity, efficacy and enforceability of foreign administrative acts at national level. The book starts with a general analysis of the issue, offering general conclusions about the experiences in different countries. It then analyses the aforementioned themes from the perspective of the domestic law of different European nations and a number of international organisations (European Union, MERCOSUR, and Andean Community). In addition, the book studies the role of the European Union in the progress towards the recognition and execution of foreign administrative acts, where the principle of mutual recognition plays a vital part. Finally, the book analyses the international conventions on the recognition and execution of administrative acts and on the legalisation of public documents.
Gerard McCormack, Andrew Keay, Sarah Brown, European Insolvency Law – Reform and Harmonization, Edward Elgar, 2017, ISBN: 9781786433305, 512 pp, GBP 95
Critically analysing the substantive law of insolvency in the EU countries as a whole, this book carries out horizontal cross-cutting analysis of the data gathered from a study of national insolvency laws. It selects particular areas for detailed discussion and considers the pros and cons of particular legislative solutions. Using the US and Norway as comparator countries, the expert authors identify areas where disparities in national laws produce problems that have impacts outside national boundaries. They analyse these against key policy goals including: improving economic performance throughout the EU; promoting a more competitive business environment; efficient asset allocation; and building more stable and sustainable human capital in terms of support for entrepreneurs and responses to consumer over-indebtedness. The book also considers possible reform and harmonization measures situated against the wider contextual background of the Capital Markets Union and the Europe 2020 agenda of promoting jobs and growth. Discerning and practical, European Insolvency Law will appeal to academics in both insolvency and finance as well as insolvency practitioners and lawyers. Its reform suggestions will be of interest to EU Member States’ government departments, while also providing a useful reference for consumer associations and debt charities.
A quick note to tickle the interest of the BIT community out there: I have come across a suggestion that recent initiatives on supply chain liability (for the notion see my earlier reblog of Penelope Bergkamp’s piece) may run counter the protection of foreign investment under Bilateral investment treaties. The analysis at issue is directed at Queensland’s chain of responsibility laws. While it is clearly a law firm’s marketing pitch (heyho, we all have to make rain somehow), the issue is real: supply chain liability laws can I suppose under circumstances qualify as regulatory takings just as any other new law.
Or can they?
Geert.
L’11 e il 12 maggio 2017 il Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università Roma Tre ospita la nuova edizione dell’annuale incontro fra i giovani cultori del diritto internazionale. Il tema di quest’anno è Frontiere, spazi giuridici e territorio.
Le relazioni toccano, fra gli altri, anche temi di diritto internazionale privato.
Il programma completo dell’incontro è disponibile a questo indirizzo.
Saugmandsgaard ØE this morning Opined in Joined Cases C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, Nogueira et al and Osacar v Ryanair. Reference in the case was made by the Court of Appeal at Mons /Bergen in the Ryanair case I reported on in first instance. The weakest part of that judgment, I noted, was that it looked to the employer’s organisation as the most relevant criterion when deciding upon place of habitual employment. That clearly went against the favor laboris inherent in Article 19 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation.
The Advocate General at 100 in particular agrees with that view. Regular readers will know that I do not tend to paraphrase for the sake of it hence reference is best made to the AG’s Opinion as a whole. In summary: Saugmandsgaard ØE recalls that CJEU case-law on the matter essentially requires the courts to either identify the ‘place where’ the employee principally carries out his obligations vis-à-vis his employer, or the ‘place from which’ he principally carries out those obligations. The workers at issue were employed as cabin crew on aircraft operated by Ryanair. Those employees performed their work in more than one Member State, namely in Belgium, where the airport of departure (Charleroi) was situated, the Member State of the airport of arrival and any other Member States crossed during the flight. The AG suggests (at 92) that it is not possible, in such circumstances, to identify a ‘place where’ those employees principally carried out their obligations vis-à-vis their employers, for it is difficult to attach greater weight to the tasks carried out by those employees in the airport of departure, on board the aircraft or in the airport of arrival.
A ‘place from which’ those employees principally carried out their obligations vis-à-vis their employers, however, can be identified. The referring court had listed a number of factual considerations among which the AG suggests the following as being highly relevant: (97 ff)
First, appellants started and ended their working day at Charleroi Airport. To the AG’s mind, that fact is of overriding importance, which he suggests is confirmed by the Court’s consistent case-law in particular Koelzch and Voogsgeerd.
Second, appellants received the instructions relating to their tasks and organised their work at Charleroi Airport, by consulting their employers’ intranet. (It is on this point that the AG rejects any relevance of the location of organisation of the work schedule by the employer).
Third, the aircraft operated by Ryanair, and on board which appellants worked as cabin staff, were based at Charleroi. Here the AG refers to CJEU case-law that, in the international transport sector, the place where the work tools are located constitutes a relevant indicium for the purposes of determining the place from which the worker principally fulfils his obligations vis-à-vis his employer.
Fourth, appellants were contractually required to live less than one hour from Charleroi Airport. It is noteworthy that this indication refers not to the worker’s actual place of residence but rather to the place of work near which he lives, namely Charleroi Airport in the main proceedings (at 103).
Fifth, the referring court noted that Ryanair and Crewlink jointly had a ‘crew room’ at Charleroi Airport. The existence of an office made available by the employer is another factor the relevance of which has been emphasised in the Court’s case-law. That this is not formally a ‘branch’ of either company, is irrelevant.
Finally, appellants were required to attend Charleroi Airport if they were unfit for work and in the event of disciplinary problems.
The AG points out that on the basis of the criteria, the Court at Mons formally will have to complete the analysis, however he concludes (at 107) that on the basis of the findings of fact communicated by that court in its request for a preliminary ruling, those six indicia unequivocally designate the courts of the place where Charleroi Airport is situated.
A few other issues are worth mentioning. Firstly (at 108) whether the worker is directly employed by Ryanair (Case C‑169/16) or assigned to Ryanair by Crewlink (Case C‑168/16) is irrelevant for the purposes of identifying the place where the work is habitually carried out, within the meaning of Article 19(2)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001. That place, the AG suggests, is independent of the legal link between the worker and the person who benefits from the work done.
Further, the AG suggests not to have the concept of ‘home base’ infiltrate the analysis: this is a term used in relevant EU civil aviation law. At 109 ff: ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’, used in Article 19(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, should not have to depend on a concept in an act of Union law which belongs to a quite different area, namely that of the harmonisation of rules in the civil aviation sector. At 116: the relevance of the home base, for the purposes of identifying the place where the contract of employment is habitually carried out, is only indirect. Indeed, it should be taken into account only in so far as it supports the indicia mentioned above as relevant for the purposes of identifying that place.
Further and convincingly, the AG emphatically suggests that the nationality of the aircraft is entirely irrelevant for the discussion (118 ff).
Finally, at 73 ff the AG suggests that there ought to be parallel interpretation of the findings on jurisdiction, and the rules on applicable law, among others in the Rome I Regulation. Those rules were not included in the referring court’s request for preliminary ruling.
We have to await the Court’s judgment, of course. However all in al this is a convincing Opinion which, as specifically flagged by the AG (at 101), is instrumental in addressing forum shopping by employers and consequently will be extremely helpful in addressing social dumping in the EU.
Geert.
Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed 2016, Chapter 2, Heading , Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.5.
The first issue of a new periodical, called Freedom, Security & Justice: European Legal Studies, is now on-line.
In addition to the inaugural editorial by Angela Di Stasi, the issue hosts contributions (some written in Italian, others in English) by Maria Caterina Baruffi (on international child abduction), Dominik Düsterhaus (on mutual trust), Caterina Fratea (on the labour mobility), Angela Maria Romito (on cross-border debt recovery), Valentina Faggiani (on fundamental guarantees in criminal proceedings), Maria Font i Mas (on the movement of public documents across borders), Sílvia Morgades-Gil (on forced migration) and Alfredo Rizzo (on the external dimension of the European area of freedom, security and justice).
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