Flux européens

Tele2 (Netherlands) e.a.
Rapprochement des législations ETAB SERV PROT TELE
Le consentement d’un abonné téléphonique à la publication de ses données couvre également l’utilisation de celles-ci dans un autre État membre

G4S Secure Solutions
Principes du droit communautaire
Une règle interne d’une entreprise interdisant le port visible de tout signe politique, philosophique ou religieux ne constitue pas une discrimination directe

A e.a.
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice EXT PESC DFON CHDF
Les activités de forces armées en période de conflit armé, au sens du droit international humanitaire, peuvent constituer des « actes de terrorisme »

Issued on the same day as Zulfikarpašić, Pula Parking Case C-551/15 deals with similar core issues, with a few extras thrown in. Pula Parking, a company owned by the town of Pula (Croatia), carries out, pursuant to a decision of the mayor of that town, the administration, supervision, maintenance and cleaning of the public parking spaces, the collection of parking fees and other related tasks. In September 2010, Mr Tederahn, who is domiciled in Germany, parked his vehicle in a public parking space of the town of Pula. Pula Parking issued Mr Tederahn with a parking ticket. Since Mr Tederahn did not settle the sums due within the period prescribed, Pula Parking lodged, on 27 February 2015, with a notary whose office is in Pula, an application for enforcement on the basis of an ‘authentic document’. A notary issued a writ of execution on 25 March 2015, on the basis of that document.  In his opposition, Mr Tederahn put forward a plea alleging that the notary who issued the writ of execution of 25 March 2015 did not have substantive and territorial jurisdiction on the ground that that notary did not have jurisdiction to issue such a writ on the basis of an ‘authentic document’ from 2010, against a German national or a citizen of any other EU Member State.

Does the Brussels I recast apply at all? And does it relate also to the jurisdiction of notaries in the Republic of Croatia?

On the temporal scope of the Brussels I Recast, the Court repeats its (Brussels Convention) Sanicentral (Case 25/79) finding: the only necessary and sufficient condition for the scheme of the Regulation to be applicable to litigation relating to legal relationships created before its entry into force is that the judicial proceedings should have been instituted subsequently to that date. Accession timing is irrelevant to the case: per C-420/07 Apostolides the Act of Accession of a new Member State is based essentially on the general principle that the provisions of EU law apply ab initio and in toto to that State, derogations being allowed only in so far as they are expressly laid down by transitional provisions.

On the substantial scope of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, for the issue of ‘civil and commercial’ the Court refers to its standing case-law (particularly most recently Aertssen and Sapir). In casu, it would seem (the national court is asked to confirm) that the parking debt claimed by Pula Parking is not coupled with any penalties that may be considered to result from a public authority act of Pula Parking and is not of a punitive nature but constitutes, therefore, mere consideration for a service provided. Brussels I applies.

However, notaries in casu do not act as courts: in a twin approach with Zulfikarpašić, the Court holds that the writ of execution based on an ‘authentic document’, issued by the notary, is served on the debtor only after the writ has been adopted, without the application by which the matter is raised with the notary having been communicated to the debtor. (at 58) Although it is true that debtors have the opportunity to lodge oppositions against writs of execution issued by notaries and it appears that notaries exercise the responsibilities conferred on them in the context of enforcement proceedings based on an ‘authentic document’ subject to review by the courts, to which notaries must refer possible challenges, the fact remains that the examination, by notaries, in Croatia, of an application for a writ of execution on such a basis is not conducted on an inter partes basis.

Geert.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.1.1. Chapter 6, Heading 6.2.1.

 

Si terrà a Torino, il 17 e il 18 marzo 2017, il secondo tirocinio formativo dedicato al regolamento n. 1215/2012 concernente la competenza giurisdizionale, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale (Bruxelles I bis), il quarto evento organizzato nella cornice del progetto European Civil Procedure for Lawyers: Promoting Training to Improve the Effectiveness of Transnational Justice, cofinanziato dalla Commissione europea (si veda questo post).

Si tratta, come i precedenti (organizzati a Lucca e a Torino, per cui vedi qui, qui e qui), di un un tirocinio formativo a partecipazione attiva con presentazione, discussione e risoluzione di casi concreti rientranti nell’ambito di applicazione del regolamento Bruxelles I bis. La prima giornata sarà dedicata ai criteri di giurisdizione e agli accordi di attribuzione della competenza giurisdizionale, mentre nel secondo giorno si parlerà di riconoscimento ed esecuzione delle decisioni. I lavori saranno presieduti da Elena D’Alessandro (Univ. Torino), Silvana Dalla Bontà (Univ. Trento), Paolo Lombardi (Bar of Turin), Ester di Napoli (Bar of Florence), Violetta Zancan and Carlo Negro (both Bar of Turin).

La partecipazione al seminario è gratuita, prevede la distribuzione di materiali didattici e l’attribuzione di 4 crediti formativi per gli avvocati. L’evento è aperto fino ad un massimo di 30 partecipanti.

Per maggiori informazioni scrivere a: info@europeancivilprocedureforlawyers.eu. La locandina dell’evento è disponibile qui.

The Special Commission set up by the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to prepare a preliminary draft convention on the recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the Judgments Project) met for the second time between 16 and 24 February 2017.

Building on the draft text elaborated in 2016, the Special Commission completed a new draft (the February 2017 draft Convention), which should form the basis for a new round of discussions in November 2017.

The Court held  yesterday in Zulfikarpašić Case C-484/15. I review Bot AG ‘s Opinion here.  At issue is the interpretation of ‘court’ and ‘judgment’ in the European enforcement order Regulation. Mutatis mutandis therefore the case has implications for most other EU private international law instruments, which employ similar terms. In all of these Regulations, the terms ‘court’ and ‘judgment’ are under- or not at all defined. The CJEU in fact refers to considerations under the Brussels I Recast in its judgment yesterday.

For the determination of a ‘court’ the AG had emphasised guarantees as to independence and impartiality; the power to decide on one’s own authority; leading to a finding which was or may be subject to an exchange of arguments and may be challenged before a judicial authority. The AG had suggested that whether these conditions are fulfilled is for the national courts to assess.

The Court itself referred to a number of classic principles for the interpretation of EU private international law: autonomous interpretation; mutual trust; legitimate expectations. It then reformulated but essentially suggests similar criteria as its AG: for a finding to be qualified as a judgment, it must have been delivered in court proceedings offering guarantees of independence and impartiality and of compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem (at 43).In the Croatian procedure at issue, the notary issues an authentic instrument which, if it is challenged as to its content, is moved up the pecking order to court proceedings. The proceedings before the notary not meeting with the Court’s generic criteria, in contrast with the AG the Court itself already holds that the notaries at issue do not act as courts and their decisions are not ‘judgments’.

Geert.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.1.1. Chapter 6, Heading 6.2.1.

 

Piringer
SERV
Les États membres peuvent réserver aux notaires la faculté d’authentifier les signatures apposées sur les documents nécessaires à la création ou au transfert de droits réels immobiliers

Zulfikarpašić
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Les notaires en Croatie, agissant dans les procédures d’exécution forcée sur le fondement d’un « document faisant foi », ne peuvent être qualifiés de « juridiction » ni au sens du règlement sur le titre exécutoire européen ni aux fins de l’application du règlement sur la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale

Manni
Rapprochement des législations
La Cour considère qu’il n’existe pas de droit à l’oubli pour les données à caractère personnel figurant dans le registre des sociétés

Samsung SDI e.a. / Commission
Concurrence
La Cour maintient les amendes infligées à Samsung SDI et Samsung SDI (Malaysia) pour leur participation à l’entente des tubes pour téléviseurs et pour écrans d’ordinateur

In C-54/16 Vinyls Italia (in full: Vinyls Italia SpA, in liquidation v Mediterranea di Navigazione SpA) Szpunar AG opined last week (the Opinion is not available in English). At the core of the case is the application of Article 13 of the Insolvency Regulation 2000 (Article 16 in the 2015 version; see my general review here), however the case opens an interesting discussion on the meaning of ‘international’ in ‘private international law’.

For the general context of Article 13 (16 new) I should like to refer to my review of Lutz and Nike. At issue in the case at hand are payments made by Vinyls to Mediterranea for the transport of chemicals of the former by the latter. Both are Italian registered companies. Shipment was presumably carried out in Italy (an extra-Italian element in the actual transport does not feature in the factual analysis re ‘international’, which I refer to below). However the contract made choice of law in favour of English law. Mediterranea makes recourse to Article 13 juncto English law as the lex contractus to ward off an attempt by Vinyls to have the payments return to its books.

First up is the question whether courts should apply Article 13 ex officio: for Mediterranea’s claim was made after the procedural deadline foreseen by Italian law. Szpunar AG in my view justifiably suggest it does not: he refers to the Virgos Schmit report [„Article 13 represents a defence against the application of the law of the State of the opening, which must be pursued by the interested party, who must claim it” – § 136 of that report, para 43 of the AG’s Opinion) and to the CJEU’s finding in C-310/14 Nike at 26. The AG does point to the particulars of the case: Mediterranea seemingly had provided proof supporting its view that the substantial conditions of Article 13 had been met (in particular an expert opinion by an English lawyer) but had not expressis verbis requested its application. Szpunar refers the final say to the Italian court, which needs to judge on the basis of Italian civil procedure however does suggest that it seems fairly inconceivable to have provided proof for the fulfillment of a legal proviso, without meaning to request its application.

The question on the applicability of Rome I at all (which is required if Mediterranea want to make recourse to the provisions of English law as lex contractus per Rome I or the Rome convention) may not make it to the CJEU. As Szpunar AG notes, the underlying contract dates prior to 17 December 2009, which is the cut-off date of the Rome I Regulation. The referring court being a court of first instance, it is not in a position to request preliminary review of Rome I’s predecessor, the 1980 Rome Convention. The AG completes the analysis anyway (the Court itself will not, should it find Rome I not to be applicable) and takes in my view the right, expansionist approach (one which I also defend in my handbook): especially given the presence of Article 3(3)’s proviso for ‘purely domestic’ contracts, it is clear that it suffices for Rome I to be applicable that parties make choice of court in favour of a foreign law. Further in the opinion (137 ff) he also suggests that such application is not tantamount to fraude a la loi (fraus legis) and again I agree: the relevance of fraus has been seriously diminished by the provisions on party autonomy in both Rome I and the Rome Convention.

The use of choice of law per Rome I (or the Convention) in turn serves as a jack to trigger the application of the insolvency Regulation. That too is correct in my view, and with undramatic consequences. Choice of law for the underlying contract only identifies its lex causae (where relevant, with an impact on Article 13 of the Insolvency Regulation). It does does not of course in and of itself determine the lex concursus: the latter is determined by the Insolvency Regulation once /if insolvency occurs. Parties have no means to manipulate this at the time of the formation of the contract.

Exciting, conceptual stuff. Most probably the Court itself will not be in a position to assess it all.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.1; Heading 3.2.8.1; chapter 5; Heading 5.7.1.

X et X
DFON
Les États membres ne sont pas tenus, en vertu du droit de l’Union, d’accorder un visa humanitaire aux personnes qui souhaitent se rendre sur leur territoire dans l’intention de demander l’asile, mais ils demeurent libres de le faire sur la base de leur droit national

United Parcel Service / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal de l’UE annule, pour vice de procédure, la décision par laquelle la Commission a refusé la concentration entre UPS et TNT dans le secteur de la distribution express des petits colis

RPO
Fiscalité TVA INST
Le principe d’égalité de traitement ne s’oppose pas à ce que les livres, les journaux et les périodiques numériques fournis par voie électronique soient exclus de l’application d’un taux réduit de TVA

Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs Frankfurt am Main
Rapprochement des législations
Le coût d’un appel vers un numéro téléphonique de service après-vente ne doit pas excéder celui d’un appel standard

Monique Hazelhorst, Free Movement of Civil Judgments in the European Union and the Right to a Fair Trial, Springer, 2017, ISBN 9789462651616, pp. 448, EUR 155,99

This book examines the attainment of complete free movement of civil judgments across EU member states from the perspective of its conformity with the fundamental right to a fair trial. In the integrated legal order of the European Union, it is essential that litigants can rely on a judgment no matter where in the EU it was delivered. Effective mechanisms for cross-border recognition and the enforcement of judgments provide both debtors and creditors with the security that their rights, including their right to a fair trial, will be protected. In recent years the attainment of complete free movement of civil judgments, through simplification or abolition of these mechanisms, has become a priority for the European legislator.

By an order of 23 February 2017, the Court of Appeal of Trento recognised the parent-child relationship of two twins born from foreign surrogacy with a same-sex couple.

One of the two men who formed the couple was the biological father of the twins, but a foreign judgment (the country of origin of which does not appear on the available copy of the order) had subsequently changed the birth certificates, indicating both men as the fathers of the children.

The couple had first tried to register the the birth certificates in Italy, but their request had been denied by the civil registrar on the ground that it was at odds with the Italian public policy.

Seised of the recognition of the foreign judgment, the Court of Trento relied on a recent judgment of the Italian Supreme Court (judgment No 19599/2016, on the recognition of a parent-child relationship between a child born through medically assisted procreation and the two women indicated as the child’s mothers in a birth certificate issued in Spain), to assert that a child’s right to the continuity of the status lawfully acquired abroad is grounded, inter alia, on Article 33 of the Italian Statute on Private International Law (No 218 of 1995), regarding filiation.

This right, the Court added, is also implicitly enshrined in Article 8(1) of the UN Convention on the rights of the child, pursuant to which States Parties have undertaken ‘to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference’.

The Court further stated that despite surrogacy is prohibited in Italy under Law No 40 of 2004 on medical assisted procreation, that prohibition is not enough to deny the recognition of such foreign measures, issued in accordance with the law applicable in the country of origin, as recognise a parent-child relationship between the non-biological parent and the children born from surrogacy in the framework of a parental project.

Actually, according to the Court, ‘the consequences of the violation of the rules set forth in Law No 40 of 2014 committed by adults should not fall back on the new born’.

Con ordinanza depositata il 23 febbraio 2017, la Corte d’appello di Trento ha riconosciuto lo status di figlio a due gemelli nati da un contratto di maternità surrogata all’estero stipulato da una coppia di persone dello stesso sesso.

Si evince dalla decisione che uno dei due uomini era il genitore biologico dei gemelli e che un provvedimento straniero (gli omissis che compaiono nel testo attualmente disponibile dell’ordinanza impediscono di identificare lo Stato d’origine) aveva successivamente modificato gli atti di nascita dei minori in modo che entrambi gli uomini risultassero padri dei gemelli.

La coppia aveva dapprima richiesto la trascrizione dei certificati di nascita nei registri dello stato civile, ma l’istanza era stata respinta in ragione della sua contrarietà all’ordine pubblico italiano. Chiamata a pronunciarsi sull’efficacia del provvedimento straniero, la Corte trentina ha fatto leva sui rilievi svolti dalla Cassazione nella sentenza n. 19599/2016 relativa al riconoscimento del rapporto di filiazione tra un minore e le due donne indicate come madri nel relativo atto di nascita, formato in Spagna. Essa ha così rilevato che “il diritto alla continuità [dello status di figlio legittimamente acquisito all’estero] è conseguenza diretta del favor filiationis scolpito [nell’art.] 33 commi 1 e 2 della legge n. 218 [del 1995, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato] ed [è] implicitamente riconosciuto nell’art. 8 par. 1 della convenzione di New York [sui diritti del fanciullo]”, in virtù del quale gli Stati contraenti si sono impegnati, fra l’altro, a rispettare l’identità, dei minori, compresa la loro nazionalità, il nome e le relazioni familiari, così come riconosciute dalla legge, senza ingerenze illegittime.

La Corte ha poi affermato che il divieto di ricorrere alla maternità surrogata, sancito dalla legge n. 40 del 2004, sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita, non basta a “negare effetti nel nostro ordinamento al provvedimento [straniero] che, in applicazione della legge [del paese d’origine] ha riconosciuto un rapporto di filiazione tra il [genitore non biologico] ed i minori nati facendo ricorso alla maternità surrogata e nell’ambito di un progetto genitoriale”.

Secondo la Corte, infatti, “le conseguenze della violazione delle prescrizioni e dei divieti posti dalla legge n. 40 del 2014 imputabili agli adulti … non possono ricadere su chi è nato”.

France / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal de l’UE confirme l’obligation pour la France de récupérer l’aide de 220 millions d’euros accordée à la SNCM au titre de certains services de transport maritime assurés entre Marseille et la Corse

NF / Conseil européen
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Le Tribunal de l’UE se déclare incompétent pour connaître des recours de trois demandeurs d’asile à l’encontre de la déclaration UETurquie tendant à résoudre la crise migratoire