In C-54/16 Vinyls Italia (in full: Vinyls Italia SpA, in liquidation v Mediterranea di Navigazione SpA) Szpunar AG opined last week (the Opinion is not available in English). At the core of the case is the application of Article 13 of the Insolvency Regulation 2000 (Article 16 in the 2015 version; see my general review here), however the case opens an interesting discussion on the meaning of ‘international’ in ‘private international law’.
For the general context of Article 13 (16 new) I should like to refer to my review of Lutz and Nike. At issue in the case at hand are payments made by Vinyls to Mediterranea for the transport of chemicals of the former by the latter. Both are Italian registered companies. Shipment was presumably carried out in Italy (an extra-Italian element in the actual transport does not feature in the factual analysis re ‘international’, which I refer to below). However the contract made choice of law in favour of English law. Mediterranea makes recourse to Article 13 juncto English law as the lex contractus to ward off an attempt by Vinyls to have the payments return to its books.
First up is the question whether courts should apply Article 13 ex officio: for Mediterranea’s claim was made after the procedural deadline foreseen by Italian law. Szpunar AG in my view justifiably suggest it does not: he refers to the Virgos Schmit report [„Article 13 represents a defence against the application of the law of the State of the opening, which must be pursued by the interested party, who must claim it” – § 136 of that report, para 43 of the AG’s Opinion) and to the CJEU’s finding in C-310/14 Nike at 26. The AG does point to the particulars of the case: Mediterranea seemingly had provided proof supporting its view that the substantial conditions of Article 13 had been met (in particular an expert opinion by an English lawyer) but had not expressis verbis requested its application. Szpunar refers the final say to the Italian court, which needs to judge on the basis of Italian civil procedure however does suggest that it seems fairly inconceivable to have provided proof for the fulfillment of a legal proviso, without meaning to request its application.
The question on the applicability of Rome I at all (which is required if Mediterranea want to make recourse to the provisions of English law as lex contractus per Rome I or the Rome convention) may not make it to the CJEU. As Szpunar AG notes, the underlying contract dates prior to 17 December 2009, which is the cut-off date of the Rome I Regulation. The referring court being a court of first instance, it is not in a position to request preliminary review of Rome I’s predecessor, the 1980 Rome Convention. The AG completes the analysis anyway (the Court itself will not, should it find Rome I not to be applicable) and takes in my view the right, expansionist approach (one which I also defend in my handbook): especially given the presence of Article 3(3)’s proviso for ‘purely domestic’ contracts, it is clear that it suffices for Rome I to be applicable that parties make choice of court in favour of a foreign law. Further in the opinion (137 ff) he also suggests that such application is not tantamount to fraude a la loi (fraus legis) and again I agree: the relevance of fraus has been seriously diminished by the provisions on party autonomy in both Rome I and the Rome Convention.
The use of choice of law per Rome I (or the Convention) in turn serves as a jack to trigger the application of the insolvency Regulation. That too is correct in my view, and with undramatic consequences. Choice of law for the underlying contract only identifies its lex causae (where relevant, with an impact on Article 13 of the Insolvency Regulation). It does does not of course in and of itself determine the lex concursus: the latter is determined by the Insolvency Regulation once /if insolvency occurs. Parties have no means to manipulate this at the time of the formation of the contract.
Exciting, conceptual stuff. Most probably the Court itself will not be in a position to assess it all.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.1; Heading 3.2.8.1; chapter 5; Heading 5.7.1.
Monique Hazelhorst, Free Movement of Civil Judgments in the European Union and the Right to a Fair Trial, Springer, 2017, ISBN 9789462651616, pp. 448, EUR 155,99
This book examines the attainment of complete free movement of civil judgments across EU member states from the perspective of its conformity with the fundamental right to a fair trial. In the integrated legal order of the European Union, it is essential that litigants can rely on a judgment no matter where in the EU it was delivered. Effective mechanisms for cross-border recognition and the enforcement of judgments provide both debtors and creditors with the security that their rights, including their right to a fair trial, will be protected. In recent years the attainment of complete free movement of civil judgments, through simplification or abolition of these mechanisms, has become a priority for the European legislator.
By an order of 23 February 2017, the Court of Appeal of Trento recognised the parent-child relationship of two twins born from foreign surrogacy with a same-sex couple.
One of the two men who formed the couple was the biological father of the twins, but a foreign judgment (the country of origin of which does not appear on the available copy of the order) had subsequently changed the birth certificates, indicating both men as the fathers of the children.
The couple had first tried to register the the birth certificates in Italy, but their request had been denied by the civil registrar on the ground that it was at odds with the Italian public policy.
Seised of the recognition of the foreign judgment, the Court of Trento relied on a recent judgment of the Italian Supreme Court (judgment No 19599/2016, on the recognition of a parent-child relationship between a child born through medically assisted procreation and the two women indicated as the child’s mothers in a birth certificate issued in Spain), to assert that a child’s right to the continuity of the status lawfully acquired abroad is grounded, inter alia, on Article 33 of the Italian Statute on Private International Law (No 218 of 1995), regarding filiation.
This right, the Court added, is also implicitly enshrined in Article 8(1) of the UN Convention on the rights of the child, pursuant to which States Parties have undertaken ‘to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference’.
The Court further stated that despite surrogacy is prohibited in Italy under Law No 40 of 2004 on medical assisted procreation, that prohibition is not enough to deny the recognition of such foreign measures, issued in accordance with the law applicable in the country of origin, as recognise a parent-child relationship between the non-biological parent and the children born from surrogacy in the framework of a parental project.
Actually, according to the Court, ‘the consequences of the violation of the rules set forth in Law No 40 of 2014 committed by adults should not fall back on the new born’.
Con ordinanza depositata il 23 febbraio 2017, la Corte d’appello di Trento ha riconosciuto lo status di figlio a due gemelli nati da un contratto di maternità surrogata all’estero stipulato da una coppia di persone dello stesso sesso.
Si evince dalla decisione che uno dei due uomini era il genitore biologico dei gemelli e che un provvedimento straniero (gli omissis che compaiono nel testo attualmente disponibile dell’ordinanza impediscono di identificare lo Stato d’origine) aveva successivamente modificato gli atti di nascita dei minori in modo che entrambi gli uomini risultassero padri dei gemelli.
La coppia aveva dapprima richiesto la trascrizione dei certificati di nascita nei registri dello stato civile, ma l’istanza era stata respinta in ragione della sua contrarietà all’ordine pubblico italiano. Chiamata a pronunciarsi sull’efficacia del provvedimento straniero, la Corte trentina ha fatto leva sui rilievi svolti dalla Cassazione nella sentenza n. 19599/2016 relativa al riconoscimento del rapporto di filiazione tra un minore e le due donne indicate come madri nel relativo atto di nascita, formato in Spagna. Essa ha così rilevato che “il diritto alla continuità [dello status di figlio legittimamente acquisito all’estero] è conseguenza diretta del favor filiationis scolpito [nell’art.] 33 commi 1 e 2 della legge n. 218 [del 1995, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato] ed [è] implicitamente riconosciuto nell’art. 8 par. 1 della convenzione di New York [sui diritti del fanciullo]”, in virtù del quale gli Stati contraenti si sono impegnati, fra l’altro, a rispettare l’identità, dei minori, compresa la loro nazionalità, il nome e le relazioni familiari, così come riconosciute dalla legge, senza ingerenze illegittime.
La Corte ha poi affermato che il divieto di ricorrere alla maternità surrogata, sancito dalla legge n. 40 del 2004, sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita, non basta a “negare effetti nel nostro ordinamento al provvedimento [straniero] che, in applicazione della legge [del paese d’origine] ha riconosciuto un rapporto di filiazione tra il [genitore non biologico] ed i minori nati facendo ricorso alla maternità surrogata e nell’ambito di un progetto genitoriale”.
Secondo la Corte, infatti, “le conseguenze della violazione delle prescrizioni e dei divieti posti dalla legge n. 40 del 2014 imputabili agli adulti … non possono ricadere su chi è nato”.
Ilaria Riva, Il certificato successorio europeo. Tutele e vicende acquisitive, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2017, ISBN 9788849532630, pp. 228, EUR 28
Il lavoro propone in primis un’analisi dei contenuti più rilevanti per lo studioso del diritto privato del recente Regolamento UE n. 650/2012 sulle successioni internazionali, particolarmente significativo per le scelte in materia di legittima e di patti successori. In un’ottica più generale, emerge come il Regolamento segni un momento di svolta per il diritto delle successioni, ponendosi quale primo passo verso una possibile armonizzazione di una branca del diritto notoriamente refrattaria all’uniformazione e quale chiaro segnale dell’urgenza di una nuova attenzione a questa materia: una nuova attenzione rivestita da una rinnovata sensibilità alla prospettiva europea e internazionale. Lo studio si concentra poi sul tema del certificato successorio europeo, introdotto in Italia e negli altri Stati aderenti al Regolamento con l’intento di fornire ai soggetti coinvolti a vario titolo in successioni per causa di morte aventi collegamenti con diversi Stati membri una sorta di «documento di legittimazione» proveniente da una pubblica autorità, utile a far valere ovunque la propria qualità e i propri poteri. I rilevanti effetti di diritto sostanziale riconosciuti al certificato, in un’ottica di tutela dell’affidamento dei terzi e di sicurezza della circolazione dei beni di provenienza ereditaria, conducono l’indagine verso il tema delle vicende circolatorie dei diritti, e precisamente all’interno della multiforme categoria degli acquisti a non domino.
This post should be preceded by a boast alert, but hey: a pat on one’s own shoulder does not hurt once in a while. With Dr Leonie Reins I have written EU Environmental Law, which has now been published by Edward Elgar. The blurb is here. Leonie and I have given a concise yet we hope complete overview of this ever-growing part of EU law. We hope it will please the reader!
I have copy /pasted the TOC below.
We are now turning our attention to (inter alia): EU energy law.
Geert.
Contents: 1. Setting the context
PART I BASICS/FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2. Principles of European Environmental Law 3. Environmental law making in the European Union 4: Implementation and enforcement Public Participatory Rights 6. Additional tools in implementing European Environmental Law 7. Environmental and Strategic Impact Assessment 8. Environmental Liability and Environmental Crime 9. State Aid and Competition Law
PART II SUBSTANTIVE LEGISLATION 10. Biodiversity and Nature Conservation 11. Water protection legislation and policy 12. Noise pollution legislation and policy 13. Air pollution legislation and policy 14. Climate Change legislation and policy 15. Waste legislation and policy 16. Chemicals legislation and policy 17. Trade and the Environment
Index
Private International Law – South Asian States’ Practice, edited by / a cura di S. R. Garimella, J. Stellina, Springer, 2017, ISBN 9789811034572, 442 pp., EUR 207,99.
This book shows how, with the increasing interaction between jurisdictions spearheaded by globalization, it is gradually becoming impossible to confine transactions to a single jurisdiction. Presented in the form of a compendium of essays by eminent academics and practitioners in the field, it provides a detailed overview of private, international law practice in South Asian nations, addressing contemporary discourse within this knowledge domain. Conflict of laws/private international law arises from the universal acknowledgment that it is difficult to govern human transactions solely by the local law. The research presented addresses the three major threads of private international law – jurisdiction, choice of law and enforcement – within each of the South Asian countries in the areas of family law and commercial law. The research in family law domain includes traditional areas such as marriage, divorce and maintenance, as well as some of the contemporary concerns in this region – inter-country child retrieval, surrogacy, and the country statement on accession to the Hague Conventions related to this domain. In commercial law the research explores the concerns raised with regard to choice of law issues in transnational contracts, and also enforcement of foreign judgment/arbitral awards in the nations of this region.
Le contrôle étatique des sentences arbitrales internationales, Jérémy Jourdan-Marques, L.G.D.J., 2017, ISBN 978-2-275-05552-7, 576 pp. Eur 56.
Par un étonnant paradoxe, le contrôle étatique des sentences arbitrales internationales conduit à réintroduire la justice étatique là où les parties avaient voulu l’exclure. Mais ce paradoxe pourrait n’être qu’apparent. Une approche fondée sur la distinction entre les intérêts publics et les intérêts privés ouvre de nouvelles perspectives. L’examen réalisé par le juge étatique l’invite à s’assurer, d’une part, du respect par les arbitres des intérêts privés des parties et, d’autre part, à contrôler la compatibilité de la sentence avec ses intérêts publics. Aussi paraît-il concevable que l’intérêt en cause puisse modifier directement la nature du contrôle exercé. Parallèlement, le juge compétent est tantôt indirectement désigné par les parties, tantôt déterminé par le lieu d’exécution de la sentence. Par conséquent, il est légitime d’assigner aux juges de l’annulation et de l’exequatur une mission distincte, mais complémentaire. Le juge de l’annulation examinerait les intérêts privés et le juge de l’exequatur garantirait la conformité de la sentence aux intérêts publics. En définitive, la distinction des intérêts privés et des intérêts publics pourrait devenir un instrument de redéfinition du contrôle étatique des sentences arbitrales internationales. À la fois plus respectueux de la volonté des parties, plus protecteur des intérêts étatiques et offrant une solution au désordre actuel du contrôle des sentences arbitrales, ce nouveau paradigme concourrait à l’efficacité de l’arbitrage.
The Court of Justice rendered on 16 February 2017 its judgment in Agro Foreign Trade & Agency Ltd v Petersime NV (Case C‑507/15), a case involving a commercial agency contract concluded between a Belgian principal and a Turkish agent. The contract had been submitted by the parties to Belgian law and featured a choice-of-forum clause conferring jurisdiction to the courts of Ghent, in Belgium.
The issue submitted to the Court concerned the interpretation of Directive 86/653 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents and of the 1963 Agreement establishing an association between the EU and Turkey, together with the Additional Protocol thereto.
Specifically, the Court was asked to determine whether the above texts preclude national legislation transposing the directive into the law of a Member State (Belgium, in the case at issue), which excludes from its scope of application a commercial agency contract in the context of which the agent is established in Turkey, where it carries out activities under that contract, and the principal is established in that Member State. The exclusion was such that, in the circumstances, the agent could not rely on rights which the directive guarantees to commercial agents after the termination of the contract.
The Court held that the Directive and the Association Agreement do not preclude such national legislation.
In its reasoning, the Court began by focusing on the scope of application of the Directive. Having noted that the situation of a contract between a EU principal and a non-EU agent is not expressly referred to in the Directive, the Court observed, relying on the second and third recitals of the Directive, that the harmonising measures provided thereunder seek to protect commercial agents in their relations with their principals, to eliminate restrictions on the carrying-on of the activities of commercial agents, to make the conditions of competition within the Community uniform, to promote the security of commercial transactions, and to facilitate trade in goods between Member States by harmonising their legal systems within the area of commercial representation.
It added that the purpose of the regime established in Articles 17 to 19 of the Directive is to protect freedom of establishment and the operation of undistorted competition in the internal market.
Accordingly, where the commercial agent carries out its activities outside the EU, the fact that the principal is established in a Member State does not present a sufficiently close link with the EU for the purposes of the application of the Directive.
The Court then moved on to determine whether the application of the Directive to commercial agents established in Turkey can follow from the Association Agreement.
The Court acknowledged that, pursuant to the Agreement, the provisions of the Treaties on the free movement of workers and the freedom to provide services must be extended, so far as possible, to Turkish nationals to eliminate restrictions on the freedom to provide services between the contracting parties.
It noted, however, that the interpretation given to the provisions of EU law concerning the internal market cannot be automatically applied by analogy to the interpretation of an agreement concluded by the EU with a non-Member State, and that the Association Agreement, which is intended essentially to promote the economic development of Turkey, does not establish any general principle of freedom of movement of persons between Turkey and the European Union. Its purpose is rather to guarantee the enjoyment of certain rights only within the territory of the host Member State.
By contrast, the Court stressed that, in the context of EU law, the protection of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, by means of the regime provided for by Directive 86/653 with respect to commercial agents, reflects the objective of establishing an internal market, conceived as an area without internal borders, by removing all obstacles to the establishment of such a market.
The Court concluded that the differences between the Treaties and the Association Agreement preclude the system of protection laid down by the Directive from being held to extend to commercial agents established in Turkey, in the context of that agreement.
Jean-Sylvestre Bergé (University of Lyon) has published an interesting analysis of the judgment in his blog Droit & Pluriel.
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