Flux européens

Home Credit Slovakia
Rapprochement des législations PROT
L’omission du prêteur d’un crédit à la consommation d’inclure dans le contrat certaines informations essentielles peut être sanctionnée par la déchéance du droit aux intérêts et aux frais

Lehman Brothers [2016] EWHC 2699 (Comm) does not involve conflict of laws. Yet its discussion of the notion of ‘close of business’ reminded me of the relevance of Article 12(2) Rome I:

In relation to the manner of performance and the steps to be taken in the event of defective performance, regard shall be had to the law of the country in which performance takes place.

Lex loci solutionis supplements lex contractus for factual considerations such as closing times.

In the case at issue, between parties, a notice had to be served ‘by close of business’. A relevant fax transmission started at 5:54 PM and ended at 6:02 PM. Close of business by sender, it was alleged, was understood to be 7 PM. Recipient claimed COB was 5 PM. Blair J in para 147 ff justifiably points to the intention of flexibility behind the notion of COB: had parties wanted a precise cut-off time, they would and should have specified it. The High Court therefore relied on the (little) evidence given as to COB and accepted that in the modern world of commercial banking and even leaving aside the near non-existence of closing hours for investment bankers and the like, more or less 7 PM should be considered COB. (It was specifically stated that no precedent value can be attached to that time slot).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3.

The Universities of Genoa, Valencia, Amsterdam, Glasgow, Mainz, the Turība University, the Charles University in Prague, the Institute of Private International Law in Sofia, and IPR Verlag Munich are conducting a research project, co-funded by the European Union, to collect and develop private and procedural international law best practices in cross-border insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings. Practitioners and academics are invited to answer (anonymously) to a questionnaire elaborated to this effect. The questionnaire is available here. 

Le Università di Genova, Valencia, Amsterdam, Glasgow, Magonza, la Biznesa augstskola Turība, la Charles University di Praga, l’Istituto di Diritto internazionale privato di Sofia e la casa editrice IPR Verlag di Monaco di Baviera stanno conducendo un progetto di ricerca,co-finanziato dall’Unione europea, volto alla collezione ed allo sviluppo di best practices di diritto internazionale privato e processuale in materia di insolvenza e pre-insolvenza transfrontaliera. Pratici ed accademici sono invitati a rispondere (in modo anonimo) a un questionario predisposto a questo fine.  Il questionario è disponibile qui.

A workshop is scheduled to take place at the European Parliament on 8 November 2016 to discuss the Commission’s proposal to recast Regulation No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility. A compilation of the speakers’ briefings is available here.

Il Parlamento europeo ospita, l’8 novembre 2016, un seminario dedicato alla proposta della Commissione concernente la rifusione del regolamento n. 2201/2003 sulla competenza giurisdizionale, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e di responsabilità genitoriale. Il testo delle relazioni è disponibile a questo indirizzo.

Dowling e.a.
Liberté d'établissement PEM
Le droit de l’Union ne s’oppose pas à l’augmentation du capital d’une banque sans l’accord de l’assemblée générale dans une situation de perturbation grave de l’économie et du système financier d’un État membre

Ognyanov
Justice et Affaires intérieures
La peine de prison d’un détenu ne peut pas être réduite, lors de son transfèrement d’un État membre vers un autre, en fonction du temps de travail effectué en prison dans le premier État membre si ce dernier État n’a pas, en application de son droit national, accordé une telle réduction de peine

On 21 November 2016, the Italian Ombudsman for Childhood and Adolescence and the University of Ferrara will host a conference devoted to Combating the sexual abuse and exploitation of children. The implementation of the Lanzarote Convention in Italy: application experiences and outstanding problems.  The event is part of the initiatives that mark the European Day on the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse promoted by the Council of Europe, and it is addressed to lawyers, psychologists and social workers.

The flyer is available here. For more information: Ester di Napoli at dnpstr@unife.it.

Il 21 novembre 2016 l’Autorità Garante per l’Infanzia e l’Adolescenza e l’Università di Ferrara organizzano un convegno su La lotta all’abuso e allo sfruttamento sessuale dei minori. L’attuazione della Convenzione di Lanzarote in Italia: esperienze applicative e problemi aperti. L’incontro si colloca nel contesto della Giornata europea per la protezione dei bambini contro lo sfruttamento e gli abusi sessuali promossa dal Consiglio d’Europa e si rivolge ad un pubblico di giuristi, psicologi ed operatori sociali.

La locandina dell’evento è disponibile a questo indirizzo. Per maggiori informazioni, contattare Ester di Napoli (dnpstr@unife.it).

In a judgment of 27 October 2016 regarding the case of Child and Family Agency v. J.D. (Case C‑428/15), the Court of Justice ruled as follows.

(1)   Article 15 of  Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003  concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility must be interpreted as meaning that it is applicable where a child protection application brought under public law by the competent authority of a Member State concerns the adoption of measures relating to parental responsibility, such as the application at issue in the main proceedings, where it is a necessary consequence of a court of another Member State assuming jurisdiction that an authority of that other Member State thereafter commence proceedings that are separate from those brought in the first Member State, pursuant to its own domestic law and possibly relating to different factual circumstances.

(2)  Article 15(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that:
– in order to determine that a court of another Member State with which the child has a particular connection is better placed, the court having jurisdiction in a Member State must be satisfied that the transfer of the case to that other court is such as to provide genuine and specific added value to the examination of that case, taking into account, inter alia, the rules of procedure applicable in that other Member State;
– in order to determine that such a transfer is in the best interests of the child, the court having jurisdiction in a Member State must be satisfied, in particular, that that transfer is not liable to be detrimental to the situation of the child.

(3)  Article 15(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that the court having jurisdiction in a Member State must not take into account, when applying that provision in a given case relating to parental responsibility, either the effect of a possible transfer of that case to a court of another Member State on the right of freedom of movement of persons concerned other than the child in question, or the reason why the mother of that child exercised that right, prior to that court being seised, unless those considerations are such that there may be adverse repercussions on the situation of that child.

Nella sentenza del 27 ottobre 2016,  relativa al caso Child and Family Agency c. J.D. (causa C‑428/15), la Corte di giustizia ha stabilito quanto segue.

(1)  L’articolo 15 del regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 del Consiglio, del 27 novembre 2003, relativo alla competenza, al riconoscimento e all’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e in materia di responsabilità genitoriale, che abroga il regolamento (CE) n. 1347/2000, deve essere interpretato nel senso che si applica in presenza di un ricorso in materia di tutela dei minori presentato sulla base del diritto pubblico dalla competente autorità di uno Stato membro e avente ad oggetto l’adozione di misure relative alla responsabilità genitoriale, come quello di cui al procedimento principale, qualora la dichiarazione di competenza di un organo giurisdizionale di un altro Stato membro necessiti, a valle, dell’avvio, da parte di un’autorità di tale altro Stato membro, ai sensi del suo diritto interno e alla luce di circostanze di fatto eventualmente diverse, di un procedimento distinto da quello avviato nel primo Stato membro.

(2)  L’articolo 15, paragrafo 1, del regolamento n. 2201/2003 deve essere interpretato nel senso che:
– per poter stabilire che un’autorità giurisdizionale di un altro Stato membro con il quale il minore ha un legame particolare è più adatta, il giudice competente di uno Stato membro deve accertarsi che il trasferimento del caso a detta autorità giurisdizionale sia idoneo ad apportare un valore aggiunto reale e concreto al trattamento dello stesso, in particolare tenendo conto delle norme di procedura applicabili in detto altro Stato membro;
– per poter stabilire che un siffatto trasferimento corrisponde all’interesse superiore del minore, il giudice competente di uno Stato membro deve in particolare accertarsi che tale trasferimento non rischi di ripercuotersi negativamente sulla situazione del minore.

(3)  L’articolo 15, paragrafo 1, del regolamento n. 2201/2003 deve essere interpretato nel senso che il giudice competente di uno Stato membro non deve tenere conto, in sede di attuazione di tale disposizione in un determinato caso in materia di responsabilità genitoriale, né dell’incidenza di un possibile trasferimento di detto caso a un’autorità giurisdizionale di un altro Stato membro sul diritto di libera circolazione delle persone interessate diverse dal minore interessato, né del motivo per il quale la madre di tale minore si è avvalsa di tale diritto, prima che detto giudice fosse adito, salvo che considerazioni di questo tipo siano tali da ripercuotersi in modo negativo sulla situazione di tale minore.

Luciano Garofalo, Giuseppina Pizzolante, Spunti per una teoria post-moderna dell’analogia, Giappichelli, 2016, ISBN 9788892104167, pp. 166, EUR 16.

Il volume “Spunti per una teoria post-moderna dell’analogia. Princípi generali, analogia e diritti ‘alieni’” è una raccolta di scritti organizzati in base all’idea di fondo che la funzione interpretativa assuma una connotazione del tutto peculiare nelle situazioni che possiamo definire, atecnicamente, di contatto o osmosi tra più sistemi giuridici. In questa ottica, il volume traccia le caratteristiche del procedimento analogico in alcuni ordinamenti giuridici non statali (ordinamento internazionale, ordinamento dell’Unione europea) – e in segmenti particolari degli ordinamenti giuridici statali (sistema di conflitto di leggi) – per poter fornire indicazioni sistematicamente corrette sulle caratteristiche dello stesso procedimento in tali “condizioni” di sistema. “Spunti per una teoria post-moderna dell’analogia. Princípi generali, analogia e diritti ‘alieni’” è rivolto anzitutto agli studiosi di diritto internazionale e dell’Unione europea ma è impostato in modo tale da renderlo “leggibile” anche agli studenti universitari. In ogni caso, esso è di evidente utilità per gli operatori giuridici in genere, venendo in giuoco problematiche interpretative da gestire a cavallo tra valori giuridici provenienti da ordinamenti diversi.

Dominique Carreau, Fabrizio Marrella, Diritto internazionale, Giuffrè, 2016, ISBN 9788814207709, pp. XXX + 758, EUR 49.

Questo libro esamina,con un taglio teorico-pratico, le principali tematiche del diritto internazionale contemporaneo consentendo agli operatori giuridici di varia estrazione professionale un approccio di immediata comprensione per la ricerca e l’applicazione delle norme della vita di relazione internazionale, norme utili anche e soprattutto per la trattazione delle controversie dinanzi alle Magistrature superiori o in un arbitrato internazionale. L’analisi giuridica viene integrata da vari esempi tratti dalla prassi vigente in materia di formazione, accertamento e applicazione del diritto internazionale e transnazionale con riferimento alle principali caratteristiche delle organizzazioni internazionali e dei non State actors. In tale ottica, vengono esaminate varie questioni circa – tra l’altro- i trattati internazionali, il trattamento degli stranieri e le loro attività economiche, i diritti umani, le immunità giurisdizionali, il divieto dell’uso della forza, i meccanismi di soluzione delle controversie internazionali. Il volume è corredato da tavole analitiche per consentire ogni approfondimento dottrinale e giurisprudenziale nonché da schede di sintesi per facilitare l’apprendimento della materia. Per queste sue peculiari caratteristiche, il libro si rivolge, sia agli studenti per una efficace preparazione dell’esame o di un concorso, sia ad ogni operatore giuridico, compresi gli avvocati d’affari, i magistrati, i dottori commercialisti ed i notai che intendano affinare la loro cultura giuridica o aggiornare la loro preparazione professionale.

Reinhard Bork e Kristin van Zwieten (eds / a cura di), Commentary on the European Insolvency Regulation, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 1032, ISBN 9780198727286, GBP 195.

This book provides the most detailed article-by-article commentary on the revised EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (EIR), written by a group of experts drawn from several jurisdictions. The commentary is prefaced by an introductory chapter which provides an overview on scope and the key features of the EIR. This new commentary has been published in time to cover the long-awaited and much-debated revised Regulation which was finalized in 2015. The timing of publication will enable practitioners and scholars to equip themselves with a thorough understanding of the EIR ahead of full implementation in 2017. The article-by-article analysis has a multi-jurisdictional focus which reports and evaluates significant developments in the application of the Regulation across member states. This is a key new work for all those who advise on or research European insolvency law.

I reported earlier on the AG’s Opinion in C‑428/15, Child and Family Agency. The Court held late October. It first of all confirms earlier case-law relating to the interpretation of the notion ‘civil matters’, with reference to the need for autonomous interpretation. ‘Civil matters’ may include adoption of child protection measures, including cases where those measures are considered, under the domestic law of a Member State, to be governed by public law (at 32).

More fundamentally, the question of forum non conveniens. Article 15(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 provides that the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of a case may request the transfer of that case, or a specific part thereof, to a court of another Member State with which the child has a particular connection, if they consider that that court is better placed to hear the case, and where the transfer is in the best interests of the child. Article 15(3) lists exhaustively the factors that can be taken into account in this respect.

Not surprisingly of course the CJEU puts the interests of the child at the core of its analysis. The criterion of proximity (leading to the principal jurisdiction for the courts of the habitual residence of the child) can only be set aside if there are facts-specific considerations that to do so is in the better interest of the child.

Article 15(3) being an exhaustive list, the Court is not willing to consider any other consideration: the impact of the referral on the free movement rights of others, in particular the parents, can not be of any relevance, lest such impact in turn has an impact on the free movement of the child itself. Moreover, the concern of the Irish court that referred, namely that a transfer of children from the UK to Ireland (following the parent’s exercise of her freedom of movement), thus amending their habitual residence, may be an abusive form of forum shopping, cannot be a relevant consideration.

Geert.

Maria Hook, The Choice of Law Contract, Hart Publishing, 2016,  ISBN 9781849467643, pp. 288, GBP 60.

This book offers a contractual framework for the regulation of party autonomy in choice of law. The party autonomy rule is the cornerstone of any modern system of choice of law; embodying as it does the freedom enjoyed by parties to a cross-border legal relationship to agree on the law applicable to it. However, as this study shows, the rule has a major shortcoming because it fails to give due regard to the contractual function of the choice of law agreement. The study examines the existing law on choice of law agreements, by reference to the law of both common and civil law jurisdictions and international instruments. Moreover, it suggests a new coherent approach to party autonomy that integrates both the law of contract and choice of law. This important new study should be read with interest by private international law scholars.

Edina Márton, Violations of Personality Rights through the Internet – Jurisdictional Issues under European Law, Nomos / Hart Publishing, 2016, ISBN 9781509908028, pp. 384, GBP 95.

This book considers jurisdictional issues on violations of personality rights through the Internet under the so-called ‘Brussels-Lugano Regime’ and centres on the special rule of jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, delict, or quasi-delict. It notes the governing objectives and underlying principles of this special rule; analyses its interpretation through the judgments of the ECJ, especially Bier, Shevill, and eDate and Martinez; and explores views expressed in legal theory and national judicial practice regarding its application for localising online violations of personality rights. The book aims to examine how the eDate and Martinez approaches advance administrability, predictability, and litigational justice and to assess whether they are suitable jurisdictional bases in Europe, where common legal norms, interests, and values increasingly integrate and connect persons. It concludes that they are not and recommends their possible reform.

Photini Pazartzis, Maria Gavouneli (eds / a cura di), Reconceptualising the Rule of Law in Global Governance, Resources, Investment and Trade, Hart Publishing, 2016, ISBN  9781849468800, pp. 520, GBP 65.

The relevance and importance of the rule of law to the international legal order cannot be doubted and was recently reaffirmed by the Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Level’s solemn commitment to it on behalf of states and international organizations. In this edited collection, leading scholars and practitioners from the fields of global governance, resources, investment and trade examine how the commitment to the rule of law manifests itself in the respective fields. The book looks at cutting-edge issues within each field and examines the questions arising from the interplay between them. With a clear three-part structure, it explores each area in detail and addresses contemporary challenges while trying to assure a commitment to the rule of law. The contributions also consider how the rule of law has been or should be reconceptualised. Taking a multi-disciplinary approach, the book will appeal to international lawyers from across the spectrum, including practitioners in the field of international investment and trade law.

Registrations are now open for the 2017 summer courses at the Hague Academy of International Law. The private international law session will run from 31 July to 18 August 2017. The general course will be given by Horatia Muir-Watt. Special courses will be delivered by Burkhard Hess, Michael Karayanni, Alan Scott Rau, Andrés Rodrìguez-Benot, Francesco Salerno, Carmen Tiburcio and Patrick Wautelet. Geneviève Saumier and Laura Carballo Piñeiro will serve a directors of studies. The complete programme is available here.

Sono aperte le iscrizioni per i tradizionali corsi estivi di dell’Accademia di Diritto Internazionale dell’Aja. La sessione di diritto internazionale privato si svolgerà fra il 31 luglio e il 18 agosto 2017. Il corso generale sarà impartito da Horatia Muir-Watt, quelli speciali da Burkhard Hess, Michael Karayanni, Alan Scott Rau, Andrés Rodrìguez-Benot, Francesco Salerno, Carmen Tiburcio e Patrick Wautelet. Geneviève Saumier e Laura Carballo Piñeiro saranno i direttori degli studi. Il programma completo è disponibile qui.

When I reviewed Szpunar AG’s Opinion in C-195/15 Mulhaupt /SCI Senior Home, I predicted (it’s a safe prediction, nothing whiz-bang about it) that the Court would probably come to the same conclusion in less words and with less references to the overall context.

It did. It cherry-picked the AG’s arguments and came to the same conclusion. Of particular note is its insistence, with the AG, that even though a derogation must be interpreted strictly, it is nonetheless appropriate to ensure that the exception is not deprived of its effectiveness.

Please refer to my review of the AG’s Opinion for more detail. Final conclusion: security created by virtue of a provision of national law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, by which the real property of a person owing real property taxes is, by operation of law, to be subject to a public charge and that property owner must accept enforcement of the decision recording that tax debt against that property, constitutes a ‘right in rem’ for the purposes of that article.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.7.1 ).

 

On 23 October 2016, AG Szpunar delivered his opinion in the case of Agro Foreign Trade & Agency Ltd v Petersime NV (C‑507/15). He suggested the Court to rule as follows.

 

Article 17 of Directive 86/653/EEC on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents requires mandatory protection of a commercial agent who carries out his activity in the internal market. It does not preclude a law of a Member State according to which such protection is not afforded for a commercial agent who carries out his activity outside the internal market.

Neither the 1963 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, nor the 1972 Additional Protocol thereto, preclude a law of a Member State according to which protection under Directive 86/653 is only afforded where a commercial agent carries out his activity in that Member State and not where a principal is established in that Member State and a commercial agent is established in and carries out his activity in Turkey.

L’Avvocato generale Szpunar ha presentato il 23 ottobre 2016 le sue conclusioni nella causa Agro Foreign Trade & Agency Ltd v Petersime NV (C‑507/15). A suo avviso, la Corte dovrebbe statuire quanto segue.

L’art. 17 della direttiva 86/653/CEE relativa al coordinamento dei diritti degli Stati Membri concernenti gli agenti commerciali indipendenti esige in termini imperativi la protezione dell’agente che svolge la propria attività nel mercato interno. Come tale, esso non è di ostacolo a una legge di uno Stato Membro che riconosca una simile protezione a un agente la cui attività si sviluppi al di fuori del mercato interno.

Né l’Accordo di associazione del 1963 tra la Comunità economica europea e la Turchia né il suo Protocollo addizionale del 1972 sono d’ostacolo a una legge di uno Stato Membro in forza della quale la protezione garantita ai sensi della Direttiva 86/653 opera solo nell’ipotesi in cui l’agente svolge la propria attività in detto Stato Membro e non invece nell’ipotesi in cui il preponente sia stabilito in tale Stato Membro e l’agente svolga la propria attività in Turchia.

Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law, Oxford University Press, 2016, ISBN 9780190496722, pp. 840, USD 225.

Choice of Law provides an in-depth sophisticated coverage of the choice-of-law part Conflicts Law (or Private International Law) in torts, products liability, contracts, forum-selection and arbitration clauses, insurance, statutes of limitation, domestic relations, property, marital property, and successions. It also covers the constitutional framework and conflicts between federal law and foreign law. The book explains the doctrinal and methodological foundations of choice of law and then focuses on its actual practice, examining not only what courts say but also what they do. It identifies the emerging decisional patterns and extracts predictions about likely outcomes.

As my review of Szpunar AG’s Opinion in Nikiforidis highlighted, on the issue of temporal applicability to continued contracts, the AG suggested along the lines of Rome I Article 10’s regime (the von Munchausen or the ‘bootstrap’ principle) that the lex causae has to determine the moment of ‘conclusion’.

The employment relationship at issue is conducted in Germany and subject to German law, which does not permit reductions in remuneration similar to those to which the Hellenic Republic had recourse (as a result of austerity).

The Court held last week and points out (at 20) that if the Rome I Regulation did not apply to the main proceedings, Article 34 of the EGBGB (the relevant provisions  of residual German private international law concerning contractual relationships) would permit it to take into account the overriding mandatory provisions of another State. Provisions like those are exactly why the UK and Luxembourg in particular (concerned about financial services contracts subject to their laws) insisted on Article 9 Rome I seriously constraining the room for manoeuvre of the forum.

Different from its AG, the Court squarely rejects (at 30) any role here for Article 10. In support, it refers to the original proposal of the European Commission with a view to the adoption of what eventually became Rome I. COM(2005) 650 referred to ‘contractual obligations’: ‘‘contractual obligations arising after its entry into application’; as opposed to the Regulation’s eventual use of ‘‘contracts’ concluded as from 17 December 2009.

At 34: ‘Whilst the reference, proposed by the Commission, to contractual obligations arising after the entry into application of that regulation covered, in addition to contracts concluded after its entry into application, the future effects of contracts concluded before then, that is to say, obligations arising from the latter after then, this is not so in the case of the wording of Article 28 of the Rome I Regulation, which covers exclusively contracts concluded on or after 17 December 2009, the date on which that regulation became applicable pursuant to Article 29 thereof. It follows that, contrary to what the referring court envisages, any agreement by the contracting parties, after 16 December 2009, to continue performance of a contract concluded previously cannot have the effect of making the Rome I Regulation applicable to that contractual relationship without thwarting the clearly expressed intention of the EU legislature.’

Now, I have admittedly only quickly scanned the travaux preparatoires in writing up this post, yet I do think the Court’s conclusion on this point may be misguided. It was Parliament which introduced ‘contracts’ as opposed to ‘contractual obligations’. It did so in response to the EC’s proposed sentence which read in full

‘It shall apply to contractual obligations arising after its entry into application. However, for contractual obligations arising before its entry into application, this Regulation shall apply where its provisions have the effect of making the same law applicable as would have been applicable under the Rome Convention of 1980.’

Parliament proposed lifting the first sentence into a separate Article and to drop the second sentence altogether, citing ‘Unlike in the case of torts and delicts, contracts are entered into deliberately and voluntarily. It is essential for the parties to know that the provisions on applicable law contained in this Regulation will apply only to contracts concluded after its date of application. Therefore proceedings brought after the date of application concerning contracts concluded before that date will apply the Rome Convention.’

This intervention therefore I believe was targeted at avoiding debates on equality between Rome I and Rome Convention outcomes. No indication was given that the change from ‘contractual obligations’ to ‘contract’ was of any specific relevance for the debate.

However, in the end that discussion in my view does not really matter because the Court itself does subsequently admit that its observation, that the Regulation cannot mean that ‘any, even minor, variation made by the parties, on or after 17 December 2009, to a contract initially concluded before that date were sufficient to bring that contract within the scope of the Rome I Regulation’ (at 35) , should not negate that

‘the possibility remains, as the Commission has pointed out in its written observations, that a contract concluded before 17 December 2009 may be subject, on or after that date, to a variation agreed between the contracting parties of such magnitude that it gives rise not to the mere updating or amendment of the contract but to the creation of a new legal relationship between the contracting parties, so that the initial contract should be regarded as having been replaced by a new contract, concluded on or after that date, for the purposes of Article 28 of the Rome I Regulation.’ (at 37).

Whether such ‘new legal relationship’ has been formed in casu, is down to the national court to decide. The CJEU does not give any indication whatsoever of what law is to guide that court in that decision. A European ius commune? I don’t see it. Lex fori? Perhaps. But that would encourage forum shopping. Lex causae? But the Court had dismissed Article 10 of having any relevance. I am at a loss.

Now, to the question of overriding mandatory requirements (please refer again to my review of Szpunar AG’s Opinion for context): here the Court I believe misses the mark. After pointing out, justifiably (and in contrast with the AG), that Article 9 needs to be interpreted restrictively, it holds that ‘the list, in Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation, of the overriding mandatory provisions to which the court of the forum may give effect is exhaustive. (at 49).

Check.

This means Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation must be interpreted ‘as precluding the court of the forum from applying, as legal rules, overriding mandatory provisions other than those of the State of the forum or of the State where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed. Consequently, since, according to the referring court, Mr Nikiforidis’s employment contract has been performed in Germany, and the referring court is German, the latter cannot in this instance apply, directly or indirectly, the Greek overriding mandatory provisions which it sets out in the request for a preliminary ruling.’ (at 50).

Check.

But then, at 52:

‘On the other hand, Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation does not preclude overriding mandatory provisions of a State other than the State of the forum or the State where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed from being taken into account as a matter of fact, in so far as this is provided for by a substantive rule of the law that is applicable to the contract pursuant to the regulation.‘

And in conclusion, at 53:

Accordingly, the referring court has the task of ascertaining whether Laws No 3833/2010 and No 3845/2010 are capable of being taken into account when assessing the facts of the case which are relevant in the light of the substantive law applicable to the employment contract at issue in the main proceedings.

Err, here I really do not follow. Surely such de facto circumvention of Article 9’s restrictive scope, negates its effet utile. If and when a law other than the lex causae may be taken into account ‘as a matter of fact’, the Rome modus operandi is to say so: see in this respect in particular Article 17 Rome II. And what would ‘taking into account as a matter of fact’ mean for the case at issue?

Now you see it, now you don’t. In West Tankers the Court took effet utile to extreme length. Here it arguably entirely negates it. I am not convinced.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016. Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.3, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.5 , heading 3.2.8.