Flux européens

In its judgment of 7 July 2016, in the case of Hőszig Kft. v Alstom Power Thermal Services (case C-222/15), the Court of Justice ruled as follows.

Article 23(1) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I) must be interpreted as meaning that a jurisdiction clause which, first, is set out in the client’s general terms and conditions, referred to in the instruments witnessing the contracts between those parties and forwarded upon their conclusion, and, secondly, designates as courts with jurisdiction those of a city of a Member State, meets the requirements of Article 23 relating to the consent of the parties and the precision of the content of such a clause.  

Nella sentenza del 7 luglio 2016 relativa alla causa Hőszig Kft. c. Alstom Power Thermal Services (causa C-222/15), la Corte di giustizia ha affermato quanto segue.

L’art. 23, par. 1, del regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 concernente la competenza giurisdizionale, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale (Bruxelles I), dev’essere interpretato nel senso che una clausola attributiva di giurisdizione che, da un lato, sia stata stipulata nell’ambito delle condizioni generali di contratto del committente, menzionate negli atti contenenti i contratti inter partes e trasmesse all’atto della loro conclusione, e che, dall’altro, designi quali giudici competenti quelli di una città di uno Stato membro, soddisfa i requisiti del suddetto art. 23, relativi al consenso tra le parti ed alla precisione del contenuto di tale clausola.

 

DEI / Alouminion tis Ellados et Commission
Aide d'État
La prolongation de la durée de validité d’une aide d’État existante doit être considérée comme la modification de cette aide et donc comme une aide nouvelle

Orange / Commission
Aide d'État
La Cour rejette le pourvoi de France Télécom dans l’affaire de la réforme du financement des retraites des fonctionnaires rattachés à cette entreprise

By a judgment of 21 June 2016 (No 19599), the First Chamber of the Italian Court of Cassation held that the recognition of a child as the son of two mothers (the woman who gave birth to the child, and the woman who donated her ova for the purposes of the medically assisted procreation), as indicated in a birth certificate issued abroad, is not incompatible with the Italian public policy. In the Court’s view, the recognition is in fact necessary to guarantee the right of the child to the cross-border continuity of his personal and social identity.

Nella sentenza 21 giugno 2016 n. 19599, la Prima Sezione della Corte di cassazione ha ritenuto che non sia contrario all’ordine pubblico italiano il riconoscimento dello stato di figlio di un bambino che, secondo un certificato di nascita rilasciato all’estero, risulta nato da due madri (l’una avendolo partorito, l’altra avendo donato gli ovuli necessari alla procreazione medicalmente assistita). Ciò in considerazione dell’interesse del minore alla continuità della propria identità personale e sociale attraverso le frontiere.

In C-471/15 Sjelle Autogenbrug, Bot AG opined a few weeks ago. I find myself curiously drawn to VAT cases these days. Especially since I reported how in a VAT case, the CJEU perhaps accidentally came to a major decision on the Aarhus Convention. Also have a look for instance on how the same AG discusses ‘cultural services’ within the context of VAT (C-592/15 BFI). Or perhaps it is because I have a past (and potentially, a future) in customs duties and excise.

It is particularly interesting to ponder how terminology that is used across the board in EU law, specifically also regulatory law, is interpreted in the context of VAT. (Incidentally the Advocate General gives an excellent summary of VAT rules and why VAT can /should be set-off between traders). In the case at hand, Directive 2006/112 provides i.a. the following definition for second-hand goods: “second-hand goods” means movable tangible property that is suitable for further use as it is or after repair, other than works of art, collectors’ items or antiques and other than precious metals or precious stones as defined by the Member States; 

Sjelle Autogenbrug I/S is a vehicle reuse undertaking whose main activity is the resale of used motor vehicle parts which it removes from end-of-life vehicles. It also engages in the environmental and waste treatment of end-of-life vehicles, a service for which it charges a standard price. Lastly, a lesser part of the undertaking’s overall turnover derives from the sale of scrap metal remaining after removal of the motor vehicle parts. Sjelle Autogenbrug purchases end-of-life vehicles — which are either vehicles whose lifespan has expired or total write-offs — from individuals and insurance companies who do not declare VAT on sales made. Sjelle Autogenbrug currently declares VAT pursuant to the applicable general rules. In 2010, it asked the tax authorities to apply the special margin scheme for second-hand goods to its activity of reselling used motor vehicle parts taken from end-of-life vehicles. The authorities refused.

Since the goods are reintroduced into the distribution chain, the taxable dealer is liable for VAT when he resells the goods. However, as the taxable dealer did not pay VAT when he purchased the second-hand goods from the non-taxable individual, he cannot deduct such VAT from the amount to be paid to the State, being an amount comprised exclusively of the VAT charged upon resale of those goods. This results in a lack of VAT neutrality and in the double taxation of the goods (at 26). The margin scheme was adopted to alleviate that difficulty. It aims to harmonise the rules applicable to the acquisition of new goods subject to VAT which are later resold as second-hand goods and to prevent double taxation and the distortion of competition between taxable persons in the area of second-hand goods.

The Danish government submits that the use in that provision of the words ‘as it is’ demonstrates that, in order to be classified as ‘second-hand goods’, the goods must retain their identity, which is not the case with spare parts since Sjelle Autogenbrug acquires, first of all, a complete vehicle. Furthermore, it argues that even if those spare parts could be classified as ‘second-hand goods’, it would not be possible to apply the margin scheme because the purchase price of the spare parts cannot be precisely determined.

Bot AG disagrees:

• the EU legislature did not intend to exclude goods originating from a single whole which could be separated, such as parts taken from end-of-life vehicles (at 33)
• the key factor in the classification of goods as ‘second-hand goods’ is that the used goods must retain the characteristics they had when new (at 35). He refers in this context also tho the end-of life-vehicles Directive, 2000/53, which defined ‘reuse’ as ‘any operation by which components of end-of-life vehicles are used for the same purpose for which they were conceived’. ‘Motor vehicle parts fall squarely within that definition since, even when separated from the vehicle, they retain their original characteristics as they will be reused for the same purpose in another vehicle. The fact that those parts were removed from the vehicle is therefore of little consequence.‘ (at 35)

The Advocate General further considered that were the special margin scheme not to be applied, dealers of second hand spare parts would be disfavoured vis-a-vis those dealing in new spare parts. Hardly indeed a result that would be conducive to the circular economy.

EU waste law does not employ the notion ‘second hand goods’. In practice these goods have raised all sorts of demarcation issues. Summarising all these, if one and the same good is simply passed on to ‘a second hand’, ie the original owner no longer has a use for it but it can be passed on by someone else who will employ it for its original purpose and without there being a need for treatment or processing, it should not be regarded as waste.

It is only be looking into all nooks and crannies of EU law that  ambitious projects like the circular economy will be a real success. Current Opinion is a good illustration of such successful consideration.

Handbook of EU Waste Law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 1.

Infringement of personality rights, including invasion of privacy, is exempt from the Rome II Regulation on applicable law for non-contractual relations. TLT at the High Court shows how distinct national laws may look upon the issue of quantification of damages very differently. Robin Hopkins reviews precedent and the case itself here, and One Crown Office Row zoom in on the case itself here. This case did not involve conflict of laws, however I thought I would highlight it anyway, for it is common knowledge that national laws assess damages in cases like these very differently.

It is worth pointing out in this respect that infringement of personality rights is exempt from Rome II not because it is irrelevant. Rather the contrary: it is very relevant indeed and no agreement could be found on an applicable law rule.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4.

The program of the conference Politics and Private International Law (?) is now available. As announced on this blog, the conference will be held on 6 and 7 April 2017 at the University of Bonn. The registration deadline is February 28th 2017. Further information are available here.

È disponibile il programma della convegno Politics and Private International Law (?) che, come segnalato in un post precedente, si svolgerà il 6 e il 7 aprile 2017 presso l’Università di Bonn. Il termine per la registrazione è il 28 febbraio 2017. Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

In a judgment of 25 July 2016 (No 15343), the First Chamber of the Italian Court of Cassation held that the application of the law of Pakistan, specifically, the application of the rules that allow marriage proceedings to be conducted over the telephone or by telematic means (subject to certain conditions, such as the presence of witnesses), is not incompatible with the Italian public policy.

Nella sentenza 25 luglio 2016 n. 15343, la Prima Sezione della Corte di cassazione ha escluso che produca effetti contrari all’ordine pubblico italiano la norma pakistana, resa applicabile in forza del richiamo di cui all’art. 28 della legge 31 maggio 1995 n. 218, che ammette — a certe condizioni, come la presenza di testimoni — che uno dei coniugi possa prestare il proprio consenso non già personalmente di fronte all’autorità officiante ma per via telefonica o telematica.

On 26 October 2016 the University of Macerata will host a conference on the Digital Single Market. The programme is available here.

Il 26 ottobre 2016 l’Università di Macerata ospiterà un convegno sul mercato unico digitale. Il programma è disponibile qui.

Massimo V. Benedettelli, Five Lay Commandments for the EU Private International Law of Companies, in Yearbook of Private International Law, 2015/2016, p. 209-251.

While praising European company law as a “cornerstone of the internal market”, the EU institutions have devoted limited attention to issues of competent jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition of judgments which necessarily arise when companies carry out their business on a cross-border basis. This is a paradox, especially if one considers that in this area the EU often follows a policy of “minimal harmonization” of the laws of the Member States and that this policy leads to the co-existence of a variety of different rules and institutions directly or indirectly impinging on the regulation of companies, thus to possible conflicts of jurisdictions and/or laws. The European Court of Justice’s “Centros doctrine” fills this gap only partially: this is due not only to the inherent limits of its case-law origin, but also to various hidden assumptions and corollaries on which it appears to be grounded and which still need to be unearthed. Hence, time has come for a better coordination of the legal systems of the Member States in the field of company law, possibly through the enactment of an ad hoc instrument. To be properly carried out, however, such coordination requires a preliminary clarification of what the EU private international law of companies really is and how it should be handled at the current stage of the European integration. This article tries to contribute to such clarification by proposing five main guidelines, in the form of “commandments” for the European legislator, courts and practitioners. It is submitted that, first, one should understand the different scope of the three legal disciplines (EU law, private international law and company law) which interact in this field so as to assess when and to what extent the lack of coordination of the Member States’ domestic laws may affect the achievement of the objectives pursued by the EU. As a second analytical step, the impact that the EU constitutional principles of subsidiarity and proportionality may have on the scope of the relevant regulatory powers of the EU and of the Member States should be determined. Third, the issue of “characterization” should be addressed so that the boundaries of company law vis-à-vis neighbouring disciplines (capital markets law, insolvency law, contract law, tort law) are fixed throughout the entire EU legal space in a uniform and consistent way. Fourth, the Member States’ legal systems should be coordinated on the basis of the “jurisdictional approach” method (which de facto inspires the ECJ in Centros and its progenies) by granting a role of prominence to the Member State under the laws of which a company has been incorporated. Fifth, any residual conflict which may still arise among different Member States in the regulation of a given company should be resolved, in principle, by respecting the will of the parties to the corporate contract and the rights “to incorporate” and “to re-incorporate” which they enjoy under EU law. In the author’s opinion, an EU private international law of companies developed on the basis of these guidelines not only would achieve a fair balance between the needs of the integration and the Member States’ sovereignty, but would also create a framework for a European “market of company law” where a “virtuous” forum and law shopping could be performed in a predictable and regulated way.

In its judgment of 18 October 2016 regarding the case of Nikiforidis (Case C‑135/15), the Court of Justice ruled as follows.

(1)      Article 28 of Regulation No 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) must be interpreted as meaning that a contractual employment relationship that came into being before 17 December 2009 (the date on which the Regulation became applicable) falls within the scope of the regulation only in so far as that relationship has undergone, as a result of mutual agreement of the contracting parties which has manifested itself on or after that date, a variation of such magnitude that a new employment contract must be regarded as having been concluded on or after that date, a matter which is for the referring court to determine.

(2)      Article 9(3) of Regulation No 593/2008 must be interpreted as precluding overriding mandatory provisions other than those of the State of the forum or of the State where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed from being applied, as legal rules, by the court of the forum. The Regulation, however, does not preclude the court from taking such other overriding mandatory provisions into account as matters of fact in so far as this is provided for by the national law that is applicable to the contract pursuant to the regulation. This interpretation is not affected by the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU. 

Regarding the opinion delivered by SG Szpunar in this case, see here.  

Nella sentenza del 18 ottobre 2016 relativa al caso Nikiforidis (causa C-135/15), la Corte ha affermato quanto segue.

(1)      L’art. 28 del regolamento n. 593/2008 sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali (Roma I) dev’essere interpretato nel senso che un rapporto contrattuale di lavoro sorto prima del 17 dicembre 2009 (la data di applicabilità del regolamento) rientra nell’ambito di applicazione di tale regolamento solo nei limiti in cui detto rapporto ha subito, per effetto di un consenso reciproco delle parti contraenti che si sia manifestato a decorrere da tale data, una modifica di ampiezza tale da dover ritenere che sia stato concluso un nuovo contratto di lavoro a decorrere dalla medesima data, circostanza che spetta al giudice del rinvio determinare.

(2)      L’art. 9, par. 3, del regolamento n. 593/2008 deve essere interpretato nel senso che esso esclude che norme di applicazione necessaria diverse da quelle dello Stato del foro, o dello Stato nel quale gli obblighi derivanti dal contratto devono essere o sono stati eseguiti, possano essere applicate, in quanto norme giuridiche, dal giudice del foro. Esso non osta, tuttavia, a che il giudice prenda in considerazione siffatte altre norme di applicazione necessaria in quanto elementi di fatto nei limiti in cui ciò è previsto dal diritto nazionale applicabile al contratto in forza delle disposizioni di tale regolamento. Detta interpretazione non è rimessa in discussione dal principio di leale cooperazione enunciato all’articolo 4, paragrafo 3, TUE.

Vedi qui una sintesi delle conclusioni presentate in questa causa dall’Avvocato Generale Szpunar.

Intel Corporation / Commission
Concurrence
L’avocat général Wahl propose d’accueillir le pourvoi d’Intel dirigé contre l’amende de 1,06 milliard d’euros infligée pour abus de position dominante

By Implementing Regulation 2016/1823 of 10 October 2016, the European Commission has established the forms referred to in Regulation No 655/2014 of 15 May 2014 on the European Account Preservation Order (EAPO) procedure, which is set to become available on 18 January 2017. The forms include, inter alia, the form to be used by the creditor to apply for a EAPO, the forms to be used by the court for the issue and the revocation of a EAPO, and the form to be used by the debtor to apply for a remedy against a EAPO. Each form comes with an explanatory text providing practical guidelines. The Commission is now expected to make publicly available the information that the Member States, pursuant to Article 50 of Regulation No 655/2014, were required to provide before 18 July 2016 as regards the organisation of the EAPO procedure in their legal systems (such as the courts designated as competent to issue a EAPO and the authorities charged with the enforcement of EAPOs).

Con il regolamento di esecuzione 2016/1823 del 19 ottobre 2016, la Commissione europea ha adottato i moduli standard previsti dal regolamento n. 655/2014 del 15 maggio 2015 che istituisce una procedura per l’ordinanza europea di sequestro conservativo su conti bancari, esperibile a partire dal 18 gennaio 2017. Fra i moduli così elaborati rientrano quello di cui deve servirsi il creditore per domandare il rilascio di un’ordinanza, quello che deve adoperare il giudice competente per disporre o revocare l’ordinanza e quello che deve utilizzare il debitore per ricorrere contro l’ordinanza. Ogni modulo è corredato da una nota esplicativa contenente delle istruzioni pratiche. Ci si attende ora che la Commissione renda pubbliche le informazioni che gli Stati membri erano tenuti a fornirle entro il 18 luglio 2016 circa l’attuazione del regolamento n. 655/2014 nei rispettivi ordinamento (come l’indicazione delle autorità competenti alla concessione dell’ordinanza o quelle investite della sua esecuzione).

Breyer
Rapprochement des législations
L’exploitant d’un site Internet peut avoir un intérêt légitime à conserver certaines données à caractère personnel des visiteurs afin de se défendre contre les attaques cybernétiques

Deutsche Parkinson Vereinigung
Libre circulation des marchandises
Les prix uniformes fixés en Allemagne pour les médicaments soumis à prescription sont contraires au droit de l’Union

Marie-Elodie Ancel, Pascale Deumier, Malik Laazouzi, Droit des contrats internationaux, Sirey, 2016, ISBN 9782247084784, 742 pp., EUR 36.

Le présent ouvrage est le premier manuel consacré au seul droit des contrats internationaux, ce qui se justifie pleinement en raison du développement du phénomène et des évolutions constantes de la matière. Il en donne une présentation riche et rigoureuse, prenant en compte les textes récemment adoptés ou discutés au plan national, européen ou international. Une fois posés les principes généraux de la matière, examinés à travers le prisme du contentieux judiciaire et de la justice arbitrale, le lecteur pourra prendre connaissance des régimes des contrats les plus fréquents dans l’ordre international, selon qu’il s’agit de contrats d’affaires (vente de marchandises et contrats d’intermédiaire), relatifs à des secteurs spécifiques (assurances et transports), impliquant une partie faible (contrats de travail et de consommation) ou une personne publique (française ou étrangère).

 

Cedric Vanleenhove, Punitive Damages in Private International Law, Intersentia, 2016, ISBN 9781780684161, 260 pp., EUR 60.

Although European scholars have called U.S. punitive damages an “(undesired) peculiarity of American law” and the “Trojan horse of the Americanisation of continental law”, the European Union cannot close its eyes to this important feature of U.S. law. Despite being under constant scrutiny, punitive damages have a strong foothold on the other side of the ocean. Moreover, due to increased globalisation, transnational litigation is arguably on the rise. In cross-border law suits, it is inevitable that a jurisdiction will encounter legal institutions that are alien to the substantive law of the forum. This book examines the private international law treatment of American punitive damages in the European Union. It poses the crucial question whether U.S. punitive damages (should) penetrate the borders of the European Union through the backdoor of private international law. More specifically, three areas of private international law are analysed: service of process, applicable law and enforcement of judgments. In addition to describing the current positions in case law and scholarship, the book takes a normative perspective and attempts to formulate concrete guiding principles that can be used when the European legal order faces U.S. punitive damages. It, therefore, provides an invaluable resource for practitioners, judges and authorities confronted with this controversial remedy. Furthermore, as a nation’s private international law attitude indicates the country’s level of tolerance towards a foreign concept unknown in its own legal system, the book can form an essential building block for discussions amongst legislators surrounding the introduction of the remedy of punitive damages in substantive law.

In its judgment of 13 October 2016, case C-294/15, Mikołajczyk, the Court of Justice stated as follows.

(1)    Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, must be interpreted as meaning that an action for annulment of marriage brought by a third party following the death of one of the spouses falls within the scope of that Regulation.

(2)    The fifth and sixth indents of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that a person other than one of the spouses who brings an action for annulment of marriage may not rely on the grounds of jurisdiction set out in those provisions.

Nella sentenza resa il 13 ottobre 2016, relativa alla causa C-294/15, Mikołajczyk, la Corte di giustizia ha affermato quanto segue.

(1)     L’art. 1, par. 1, lett. a), del regolamento n. 2201/2003 relativo alla competenza, al riconoscimento e all’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e in materia di responsabilità genitoriale va interpretato nel senso che un’azione per l’annullamento del matrimonio proposta da un terzo successivamente al decesso di uno dei coniugi rientra nell’ambito di applicazione di detto regolamento.

2)      L’art. 3, par. 1, lett. a), del medesimo regolamento, segnatamente il quinto e il sesto trattino (che valorizzano la residenza abituale dell’attore come titolo di giurisdizione in materia matrimoniale), va interpretato nel senso che una persona diversa da uno dei coniugi che proponga un’azione per l’annullamento del matrimonio non può avvalersi dei criteri di competenza previsti in tali disposizioni.

The European Parliamentary Research Service has published a study accompanying a legislative initiative report on the protection of vulnerable adults to be prepared by the French MEP Joëlle Bergeron for the purposes of Article 225 of the TFEU. Its purpose is to assess the potential added value of taking legislative action at EU level in this field, in particular as regards situations where a cross-border element is present. The study builds on expert research carried out for the purpose, inter alia, by Ian Curry-Sumner (Voorts Juridische Diensten, Dordrecht), and Joëlle Long (Univ. Turin). The research papers are annexed to the study.

Il Servizio Ricerca del Parlamento europeo ha pubblicato uno studio destinato ad accompagnare una relazione di iniziativa legislativa ai sensi dell’art. 225 del TFUE dedicata alla protezione degli adulti e affidata alla Parlamentare europea francese Joëlle Bergeron. Lo studio punta ad accertare il valore aggiunto di un’azione legislativa condotta in quest’ambito a livello europeo, in particolare per quanto concerne le situazioni caratterizzate da elementi di internazionalità. Lo studio si basa su ricerche svolte, fra gli altri, da Ian Curry-Sumner (Voorts Juridische Diensten, Dordrecht) e Joëlle Long (Univ. Torino). Il testo integrale di tali lavori di ricerca è allegato allo studio.

Mikołajczyk
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Le droit de l’Union s’applique à une action en annulation de mariage introduite par un tiers postérieurement au décès de l’un des époux