On 2 July 2015, Advocate General Pedro Cruz Villalón delivered his Opinion in Thomas Cook Belgium (C-245/14), a case before the ECJ concerning the interpretation of Regulation No 1896/2006 creating a European order for payment procedure (the Opinion is not available in English; the French version may be found here, the Italian version here and the German version here).
The request for a preliminary ruling arose from a dispute concerning a contract concluded between a Belgian travel agency and an Austrian company.
The Austrian company applied for a European order for payment, alleging that the travel agency had failed to fulfill its obligations under the contract. The application was filed before the Vienna Commercial Court on the assumption that jurisdiction could be asserted on the basis of Article 5(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 (Brussels I), now Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 (Brussels Ia), Vienna being the place of performance of the relevant obligation.
In the application, the Austrian company omitted to mention that the contract concluded with the travel agency featured a choice-of-court agreement conferring exclusive jurisdiction on Belgian courts.
The Vienna Commercial Court issued the order for payment. The defendant was duly served with the order, but did not lodge a statement of opposition within the 30-day time limit indicated in Article 16(2) of Regulation No 1896/2006. Only later did the travel agency applied for a review, relying on Article 20 of the Regulation (“Review in exceptional cases”).
Seised of the request for review, the Vienna Commercial Court asked the ECJ to clarify the interpretation of Article 20(2). Pursuant to this provision, the defendant is entitled to apply for a review “where the order for payment was clearly wrongly issued, having regard to the requirements laid down in this Regulation, or due to other exceptional circumstances”. According to Recital 25 of the Regulation, such other exceptional circumstances “could include a situation where the European order for payment was based on false information provided in the application form”.
Specifically, the Vienna Commercial Court asked whether “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of Article 20(2) could be deemed to exist when an order for payment has been issued on the basis of information provided in the application form, which subsequently turned out to be inaccurate, where the jurisdiction of the seised court depends on such inaccurate information.
In his Opinion, the AG begins by noting that Article 20(2) is to be interpreted restrictively. It allows for review only “where the order for payment was clearly wrongly issued”. Thus, only false or inaccurate information which could not be detected by the defendant before the expiry of the time limit for opposition may be considered to amount to “exceptional circumstances” for the purposes of the provision in question. By contrast, if it is established that the defendant could have reacted to those false or inaccurate information by lodging a timely statement of opposition, he should not be allowed to avail himself of Article 20(2).
According to the AG, this conclusion equally applies to cases where the seised court asserted its jurisdiction based on false or inaccurate information provided by the applicant. In this connection, he reminded that, according to Recital 16, the court should examine the application, including the issue of jurisdiction, “on the basis of the information provided in the application form”.
Since the court is merely required to determine if jurisdiction is “plausible” pursuant to the Brussels I Regulation, and the defendant is informed that the order “has been issued solely on the basis of the information provided by the claimant and not verified by the court”, the defendant – once the order has been served on him – must be deemed to be aware that the applicant did not inform the court about the existence of a choice-of-court agreement.
The AG goes on to recall that the parties may always waive their choice-of-court agreement and concludes that, in circumstances like those of the case at hand, the fact for the applicant of referring to the place of performance of the relevant contractual obligation as a basis for jurisdiction does not amount to providing “false information” for the purposes of Article 20 of Regulation No 1896/2006.
The mere presence of a choice-of-court clause in the contract, he adds, leaves the issue open of whether the clause is vlid, or not. Assessing the validity of such a clause requires, in fact, a broader examination than that provided under Article 8 of Regulation No 1896/2006, regardless of whether the judge is aware of the existence of the clause itself. If the applicant has a doubt as to the validity of the choice-of-court agreement, he is not required to mention that clause in the application form, since similar issues cannot be discussed in the framework of this kind of proceedings.
In conclusion, according to the AG, the ECJ should state that, under Article 20(2) of Regulation No 1896/2006, read in conjunction with Recital 25, the “exceptional circumstances” that entitle the defendant to apply for a review of the order for payment cannot be said to already exist for the mere fact that the order for payment, effectively served on the defendant, is based on “false or inaccurate information”, even if the jurisdiction of the court depends on such information.
This does not preclude the defendant from relying on Article 20 when he can show that he could discover such falsity or inaccuracy only after the expiry of the time limit for opposition.
Il 2 ottobre 2015, l’Università degli Studi di Milano ospiterà il convegno dedicato al tema della Libera circolazione e riconoscimento delle famiglie: profili di diritto internazionale privato, tutela dei diritti e ordinamento interno.
L’incontro è organizzato nell’ambito del modulo Jean Monnet on European Family Law, di cui è titolare Chiara Ragni, in cooperazione con la Rivista GenIUS, Rivista di studi giuridici sull’orientamento sessuale e l’identità di genere.
I lavori si articoleranno in due sessioni, dedicate al riconoscimento degli status e delle situazioni familiari e a quello della trascrizione di atti giuridici stranieri attestanti l’esistenza di rapporti familiari. A conclusione di ciascuna sessione è previsto un incontro programmato: chi ne abbia interesse può sottoporre una proposta di intervento sul tema del convegno nel settore del diritto internazionale privato, della tutela internazionale dei diritti umani, del diritto dell’Unione europea o del diritto costituzionale.
[Dalla presentazione del convegno] – L’eterogeneità normativa che caratterizza la disciplina dei rapporti familiari, ancora significativamente condizionata dai principi etico-morali e dalle tradizioni culturali − e spesso religiose − dominanti in ciascuno Stato, ha spesso come effetto il mancato riconoscimento nello Stato di rapporti instaurati altrove ai sensi di una legge straniera, in considerazione della loro contrarietà all’ordine pubblico ovvero per la mancata previsione di istituti giuridici ad essi assimilabili nei quali poterli inquadrare, con la conseguente proliferazione di rapporti giuridici c.d. claudicanti. In tale contesto le norme di diritto internazionale privato da un lato non sono spesso in grado di fornire risposte adeguate ai problemi descritti, dall’altro la loro rigida applicazione può condurre a risultati incompatibili sia con l’esercizio delle libertà comunitarie, che con la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo. A tale ultimo riguardo, la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo ha recentemente ribadito che il diritto al rispetto della vita familiare, sancito dall’art. 8 Cedu, implica che sia garantita la continuità degli status o, meglio, delle situazioni familiari che fanno capo all’individuo o che quantomeno ne sia assicurata una protezione equivalente a quella fornita nello Stato dove il legame si è instaurato. Nell’ambito della più ampia tematica del riconoscimento degli effetti giuridici derivanti da rapporti costituiti altrove si pongono pertanto sia problemi di bilanciamento tra interessi confliggenti, sia di coordinamento tra i diversi sistemi giuridici che ne sono espressione.
L’abstract dell’intervento – che non dovrà superare le 500 parole in lingua italiana o inglese – dovrà essere inviato in formato pdf, entro il 20 agosto 2015, all’indirizzo chiara.ragni@unimi.it e dovrà riportare quattro parole chiave oltre a cognome e nome del proponente, la qualifica accademica o professionale, unitamente a tutti i contatti utili (telefono, cellulare, e-mail).
Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili qui.
I have reported previously on this action, when it was launched. The Court at The Hague held late June. For good (and impressive) measure, it immediately released an English translation of the judgment. Jolene Lin has excellent overview here, I will simply add the one or two things which I thought were particularly striking.
Firstly, this judgment was not written by a bunch of maverick ‘environmental’ judges. It is the commercial court at The Hague which issued it (see the reference to ‘team handel’, ‘handel’ meaning commerce, or trade).
The judgment hinges on the State’s duty of care which the court established. Urgenda, applicant, had suggested that regardless of the individual behaviour of Dutch citisens and corporations, the Government carries overall or ‘systemic’ responsibility (‘systeemverantwoordelijkheid’), as the representative of the sovereign Dutch nation, to ensure that it controls emissions emanating from The Netherlands. Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution and the international no harm (sic utere tuo) principle featured heavily in the court’s acceptance of the State duty of care. That the Dutch action might only be a drop in the ocean, did not impress the judge: plenty of pennies make a pound, and at any rate, The Netherlands, as a developed nation, were found to have increased responsibility.
At 4.42 and 4.43, the Court then applies what in EU law is known as the Marleasing principle.
‘From an international-law perspective, the State is bound to UN Climate Change Convention, the Kyoto Protocol (with the associated Doha Amendment as soon as it enters into force) and the “no harm” principle. However, this international-law binding force only involves obligations towards other states. When the State fails one of its obligations towards one or more other states, it does not imply that the State is acting unlawfully towards Urgenda. It is different when the written or unwritten rule of international law concerns a decree that “connects one and all”. After all, Article 93 of the Dutch Constitution determines that citizens can derive a right from it if its contents can connect one and all. The court – and the Parties – states first and foremost that the stipulations included in the convention, the protocol and the “no harm” principle do not have a binding force towards citizens (private individuals and legal persons). Urgenda therefore cannot directly rely on this principle, the convention and the protocol. (….)
This does not affect the fact that a state can be supposed to want to meet its international-law obligations. From this it follows that an international-law standard – a statutory provision or an unwritten legal standard – may not be explained or applied in a manner which would mean that the state in question has violated an international-law obligation, unless no other interpretation or application is possible. This is a generally acknowledged rule in the legal system. This means that when applying and interpreting national-law open standards and concepts, including social proprietary, reasonableness and propriety, the general interest or certain legal principles, the court takes account of such international-law obligations. This way, these obligations have a “reflex effect” in national law.‘
In this respect the court also referred extensively to the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law on the duty of a State to put into place a legislative and administrative framework to address the challenges posed by dangerous activities.
The Court also, with reference to international scientific consensus, concluded that climate mitigation, rather than adaptation, is the more effective, efficient and least expensive way to address climate change.
Eventually it settles for a finding of duty of care and ensuing responsibility to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases by at least 25% viz 1990 levels, by 2020. This 25% is the floor of what the international scientific community suggests is needed properly to address the dangers of climate change. (The court, in deference to trias politica, therefore did not want to go higher than that floor).
Next up (other than appeal, one might imagine): the Belgian courts, which have been seised of a similar action.
Geert.
Declaration of interest: I advice the Belgian litigation pro bono.
Travel is a wonderful opportunity to catch up on reading back issues of The Economist. Now I have made a valiant effort in recent years to reduce the pile. I am now only a few months behind. (I read the magazine diagonally when it comes out. Properly a little later). In the issue of 28 February of this year, there is a report on the town of Windsor, New York, along with 14 other towns along New York’s border with Pennsylvania, wanting to secede and join Penn. I have not been able to get an update on the state of affairs, and I am not sure whether the idea got much traction.
It is the ultimate answer to regulatory competition: to move an entire slice of territory into what is perceived as a preferable regulatory regime. The cause? New York’s strict (some might say: cautious) policy on fracking /shale gas. Penn State is fracking friendly. New York has banned it.
The Economist also flag that State secession in the US has only ever succeeded in 1777: when a chunk of New York became Vermont. Now, that’s a State where others pack and move to in upwards harmonisation fashion: for Vermont is arguably the top of the regulatory curve when it comes to environment and food regulation.
Geert.
L’annata 2015 del Japanese Yearbook of International Law raccoglie, fra gli altri, alcuni contributi relativi alla Convenzione dell’Aja del 1980 sugli aspetti civili della sottrazione internazionale di minori (ratificata dal Giappone nel 2014).
Tra questi: Introductory Note: Japan’s Conclusion of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspect of International Child Abduction (Tatsuki Nishioka, Takako Tsujisaka); International Child Abduction Cases and the Act for the Implementation of the Hague Convention — Impact on Domestic Cases and Family Law — (Masayuki Tanamura); Case Proceedings for the Return of an Abducted Child and the Compulsory Execution in Japan (Masako Murakami); The 1980 Hague Convention and Mediation — A German Perspective — (Martina Erb-Klünemann); Return Orders under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction — The Issues Facing the Japanese courts — (Nigel Vaughan Lowe).
Ulteriori informazioni sul fascicolo sono qui disponibili.
On 3 and 4 December 2015, the University of Bologna will host a conference on the topic The EU as a forum of labour migration: Entrepreneurship, Exploitation, Dignity and Development.
After a keynote speech, three roundtables will focus on the role of migrants as entrepreneurs and job seekers, labour exploitation of migrants, and future perspectives between countries of destination and countries of origin.
Scholars and experts are invited to submit their papers.
[From the introduction to the call] – Despite the ideas and intentions for a more dynamic EU economy, the EU still continues to have national labour markets, with obstacles to a real regime of free movement of not European workers. Migrants whose human rights are duly promoted and respected, who are well integrated in the countries where they live, and who are able to exercise their talents and energy in productive employment and decent work, can contribute mightily to the development of their countries of origin and destination, and to the well-being of their families and communities, while providing economic, social and cultural added value and also pursuing their own development as human beings. A policy framework that is respectful of the human rights and dignity of every human being, in particular of minors, women and vulnerable persons, is a prerequisite for realizing the full developmental potential of international migration and averting negative manifestations such as forced labour, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of migrants, discrimination and xenophobia.
Submissions, accompanied by a summary and a cv, must be sent before 10 October 2015 to migrationconference@puntoeuropa.eu.
Further information available here.
Much of the analysis in Swissmarine would have been redundant had Denmark been subject to the Insolvency Regulation. Please refer to the judgment for the many lines of arguments by applicants and defendants – Alexis Hogan has good summary over at the RPC blog.
SwissMarine Corporation Limited (“SwissMarine”) applied for an anti-suit injunction against O. W. Supply & Trading A/S (“OW Supply”), a Danish company that had filed for bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court of Aalborg, Denmark on 7 November 2014. SwissMarine sought an order restraining OW Supply (i) from proceeding with an action that it had brought in the District Court in Lyngby, Denmark (the “Lyngby action”) and (ii) from commencing any other or further proceedings in Denmark or elsewhere against SwissMarine directed to obtaining a “disputed” sum claimed under an ISDA Master Agreement (the “ISDA Agreement”) or any transaction thereunder. (For a related discussion of the ISDA Agreement, see Anchorage).
Brussels I recast does not apply for the dispute arguably falls under that Regulation’s insolvency exception. The Insolvency Regulation as noted does not apply for Denmark has opted out of it. The High Court held essentially that the Lygnby action is not covered by the jurisdiction agreement because it is not a suit, action or proceedings relating to a dispute arising out of or in connection with the ISDA Agreement or any non-contractual obligations arising out of or in relation to it. The Court followed the defendant’s argument that OW Supply is not seeking to have determined any dispute under the ISDA Agreement or about the parties’ rights and obligations under it, and there is no dispute about their contractual rights and obligations. The question for the Lyngby court will be how the Danish insolvency regime applies to them. In the words of Smith J: ‘The wording (of the choice of court clause in the ISDA Agreement – GAVC) does not bear on the question whether OW Supply can invoke the protection of Danish insolvency rules, or whether the jurisdiction agreement was intended to prevent this. I cannot accept that the parties evinced an intention in the schedule that OW Supply (or SwissMarine) should abandon the protection of its national insolvency regime.’ (at 26) In conclusion, SwissMarine have not shown a sufficient case that the jurisdiction agreement applies to the Lyngby action to justify its submission that it should be granted an anti-suit injunction on the grounds that in bringing and pursuing the action OW Supply is acting in breach of it. (at 29).
Smith J also discusses at length the impact of the Brussels I and Brussels I recast Regulation on the reference, in the choice of court provision of the ISDA Agreement, to ‘Convention’ (ie 1968 Brussels Convention) parties. Athough this discussion had no bearing on the eventual outcome, the Court’s (disputable) conclusion that reference to Convention States should be read as such (and not include ‘Regulation’ States), in my view would merit adaptation, by parties ad hoc or generally, of the relevant choice of court clause.
Geert.
Geert.
Quel avenir pour la théorie générale des conflits de lois? Droit européen, droit conventionnel, droit commun, a cura di Tristan Azzi e Olivera Boskovic, Bruylant, 2015, pp. 266, ISBN 2802749366, Euro 70.
[Dal sito dell’editore] – La période contemporaine se caractérise en droit international privé par une très importante diversification des sources. Cette diversification est particulièrement présente dans le domaine des conflits de lois. Depuis le début du XXIe siècle, de nombreuses règles de conflit nouvelles ont été adoptées : certaines sont issues de règlements européens ou de conventions internationales ; d’autres ont été créées à l’initiative des législateurs nationaux. À la diversité des sources s’ajoute une diversité des matières concernées : obligations contractuelles et non contractuelles, divorce et séparation de corps, successions, obligations alimentaires, adoption, partenariats enregistrés, mariage, etc. On constate ainsi une accumulation de textes spéciaux. Ce double mouvement – diversification des sources et multiplication des textes spéciaux – invite à s’interroger sur l’avenir de la théorie générale des conflits de lois. Pareille théorie repose sur l’étude de mécanismes transversaux afférents à la mise en œuvre des règles de conflit : qualification, renvoi, lois de police, exception d’ordre public, fraude à la loi, règles relatives à l’office du juge… Ces mécanismes ont pour objet d’assurer le bon fonctionnement des règles de conflit et la promotion des objectifs traditionnellement assignés au droit international privé. Or, l’analyse des textes évoqués précédemment révèle d’importants bouleversements en la matière. Certains mécanismes comme le renvoi semblent être sur le point de disparaître, d’autres ont vu leur teneur précisée et unifiée au sein des règlements européens susmentionnés, d’autres encore ont été abandonnés à la discrétion des États membres, lesquels les encadrent comme bon leur semble. Parallèlement, certains mécanismes ont vu le jour, tels que la clause dite « marché intérieur », ou se sont généralisés, comme la clause d’exception. On assiste en somme à un profond renouvellement de la théorie générale des conflits de lois. La situation est telle que l’on s’interroge sur l’opportunité de l’adoption d’un règlement européen qui lui serait exclusivement dédié. Il est donc fondamental de réfléchir à l’avenir de ladite théorie et de proposer des solutions cohérentes assurant un fonctionnement satisfaisant des règles de conflit nationales et européennes. Cet ouvrage intéressera les praticiens du droit international privé et du droit du commerce international (avocats, notaires, huissiers de justice, magistrats…) ainsi que les universitaires.
La prefazione al volume, redatta da Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon (Univ. Panthéon-Assas) e Paul Lagarde (Univ. Panthéon-Sorbonne), è reperibile a questo indirizzo. Il sommario ed ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili qui.
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