In Case C‑471/18 P in which Tanchev AG Opined last month, Germany is asking the CJEU to set aside judgment in T‑283/15 Esso Raffinage v ECHA by which the General Court annulled entitled a European Chemical Agency (‘ECHA’) letter entitled ‘Statement of Non-Compliance following a Dossier Evaluation Decision under [REACH]’. The letter concerned the outcome of ECHA’s compliance check of Esso Raffinage’s registration dossier for a particular chemical substance. The main thrust of its appeal is that the REACH Regulation does not provide for further examination by ECHA of the conformity of the information submitted with the first compliance check decision, and that this matter falls within the competences of the Member States pursuant to the REACH enforcement provisions. In support of its position, it argues that a registrant must conduct animal testing specified in the Evaluation Decision, and cannot submit adaptations at that stage.
Esso and ECHA find themselves in an unusual alliance with animal rights activists who argue that a registrant must be able to submit adaptations in lieu of performing animal testing specified in a first compliance check decision.
The case mostly concerns the respective competences of Member States and ECHA under Reach, I highlight it here for the AG’s emphasis on the relevance of animal welfare in the Regulation: consideration of animal welfare through the reduction of animal testing is one of the objectives pursued by the REACH Regulation. At 158: ‘Viewed more broadly, as indicated by Esso Raffinage and [NGO], the promotion of animal welfare and alternative methods to animal testing in the REACH Regulation reflects Article 13 TFEU, pursuant to which, in formulating and implementing the European Union’s policies, the European Union and the Member States are to pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals.’
Animal welfare has come a long way since Michael Rose and I submitted it in CJEU C-1/96 Compassion in World Farming.
Geert.
For those interested in #AnimalWelfare & #REACH
Tanchev AG Opinion yday re allocation of competences between #ECHA and MS in assessing conformity of registration dossiers with #REACH.
Broader implications for the promotion of animal welfare under EU lawhttps://t.co/wxaJIxOfV1
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) September 25, 2020
The ‘transparency’ or ‘notification’ Directive 2015/1535 (the successor to Directive 98/34) featured twice at the CJEU yesterday. In Case C‑711/19 Admiral Sportwetten, the Court held that a national tax rule that provides for taxation of the operation of betting terminals does not constitute a ‘technical regulation’ that needs to be notified under the Directive. In Case C-514/19 Union des industries de la protection des plantes it held more directly than Kokott AG had opined, that France had validly informed the Commission of the need to take measures intended, in particular, to protect bees by banning the use of 3 active substances of the neonicotinoid family which had been authorised for use under the relevant EU procedure. That procedure is regulated by Directive 1107/2009 on plant protection products.
The complication in the case in essence is a result of the dual procedure for national safeguard measures as a result of the existence of both the PPP and the notification Directive. May a communication of a Member State under the Notification Directive, double as notification of emergency measures under the PPP Directive? The CJEU held it can, provided the notification contains a clear presentation of the evidence showing, first, that those active substances are likely to constitute a serious risk to human or animal health or to the environment and, second, that that risk cannot be controlled without the adoption, as a matter of urgency, of the measures taken by the Member State concerned, and where the Commission failed to ask that Member State whether that communication must be treated as the official provision of information under the regulation.
The Court referred to its findings in C-116/16 Fidenato, that a Member State’s power, provided by an EU act, to adopt emergency measures requires compliance with both the substantive conditions and procedural conditions laid down by that act (a requirement, I would add, which conversely also applies to the European Commission), but adds that a notification to the Commission under Article 71(1) of Regulation 1107/2009 requires only that the Member State concerned ‘officially informs’ that institution, without having to do so in a particular manner.
More generally, the Court emphasises the principle of sound administration imposed upon the EC, which explains its insistence on the EC having proactively to ensure the Member State concerned be aware of its obligations under the EU law concerned or indeed adjacent law. A certain parallel here may be made with the rules of civil procedure which require from those soliciting the courts that they approach the court with clean hands.
The Court in essence, I submit, finds that, the consequences for the Member State concerned in failing to meet the requirements for it to be able to make use of a safeguard provision in secondary law being so great, the conditions imposed on them must be met by a strict due diligence on behalf of the European Commission.
Of note is that the judgment does not entail any finding on the substantive legality of the French ban.
Geert.
PJSC Tatneft v Bogolyubov & Ors [2020] EWHC 2437 (Comm) is another example of a case where privilege is firmly considered to be subject to lex fori, like in the New York courts but unlike the approach of the Dutch courts. Moulder J did discuss the extent to which the rule applies to foreign unregistered, in-house lawyers. However she does this purely from the English point of view and without any consideration of either Rome I or Rome II. That is not very satisfactory in my view. As I have signalled before, one can discuss whether privilege is covered by the evidence and procedure exception in the Rome Regulations, however it must be discussed and cannot be just brushed under the carpet.
Geert.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Chapter 4.
(3rd ed forthcoming February 2021).
Thank you Irene Pietropaoli for alerting me to the European Parliament’s draft proposal for a mandatory human rights due diligence Directive. The official title proposed is a Directive on Corporate Due Diligence and Corporate Accountability). Parliament also proposes insertions in both Brussels Ia and Rome II. For the related issues see a study I co-authored on the Belgian context, with links to developments in many jurisdictions.
I do not in this post go into all issues and challenges relating to such legislation, focusing instead on a first, preliminary analysis of the conflicts elements of the proposal.
A first issue of note in the newly proposed Directive is the definitional one. The proposal’s full title as noted uses ‘corporate due diligence and corporate accountability’. However in its substantive provisions it uses ‘duty to respect human rights, the environment and good governance’ and it defines each (but then with the denoter ‘risk’) in Article 3. For human rights risks and for governance risks these definitions link to a non-exhaustive list of international instruments while for the environment no such list is provided.
The proposed Directive points out the existence of sectoral EU due diligence legislation e.g. re timber products and precious metals, and suggests ‘(i)n case of insurmountable incompatibility, the sector-specific legislation shall apply.’ This is an odd way to formulate lex specialis, if alone for the use of the qualifier ‘insurmountable’. One assumes the judge seized will eventually be the arbitrator of insurmountability however from a compliance point of view this is far from ideal.
As for the proposed amendment to Brussels Ia, this would take the form of a forum necessitatis as follows:
Article 26a
Regarding business-related civil claims on human rights violations within the value chain of a company domiciled in the Union or operating in the Union within the scope of Directive xxx/xxxx on Corporate Due Diligence and Corporate Accountability, where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction under this Regulation, the courts of a Member State may, on an exceptional basis, hear the case if the right to a fair trial or the right to access to justice so requires, in particular: (a) if proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted or would be impossible in a third State with which the dispute is closely related; or (b) if a judgment given on the claim in a third State would not be entitled to recognition and enforcement in the Member State of the court seised under the law of that State and such recognition and enforcement is necessary to ensure that the rights of the claimant are satisfied; and the dispute has a sufficient connection with the Member State of the court seised.
This proposal is a direct copy paste (with only the reference to the newly proposed Directive added) of the European Commission’s proposed forum necessitatis rule (proposed Article 26) at the time Brussels I was amended to Brussels Ia (COM (2010) 748). I discussed the difficulty of such a forum provision eg here (for other related posts use the search string ‘necessitatis’). The application of such a rule also provokes the kinds of difficulty one sees with A33-34 BIa (including the implications of an Anerkennungsprognose).
Coming to the proposed insertion into Rome II, this text reads
Article 6a
Business-related human rights claims
In the context of business-related civil claims for human rights violations within the value chain of an undertaking domiciled in a Member State of the Union or operating in the Union within the scope of Directive xxx/xxxx on Corporate Due Diligence and Corporate Accountability, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of the damage sustained shall be the law determined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking compensation for damage chooses to base his or her claim on the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred or on the law of the country in which the parent company has its domicile or, where it does not have a domicile in a Member State, the law of the country where it operates.
I called this a choice between lex locus damni; locus delicti commissi; locus incorporationis; locus activitatis. Many of the associated points of enquiry of such a proposal are currently discussed in Begum v Maran (I should add I have been instructed in that case).
A first obvious issue is that the proposed Article 6a only applies to the human rights violations covered by the newly envisaged Directive. It does not cover the environmental rights. These presumably will continue to be covered by Rome II’s Article 7 for environmental damage. This will require a delineation between environmental damage that is not also a human rights issue, and those that are both. Neither does the proposed rule apply to the ‘good governance’ elements of the Directive. These presumably will continue to be covered by the general rule of A4 Rome II, with scope for exception per A4(3).
My earlier description of the choice as including ‘locus incorporationis’ is not entirely correct, at least not if the ‘domicile’ criterion is the one of Brussels Ia. A corporation’s domicile is not necessarily that of its state of incorporation and indeed Brussels Ia’s definition of corporate domicile may lead to more than one such domicile. Does the intended rule imply claimant can chose among any of those potential domiciles?
Locus delicti commissi in cases of corporate due diligence (with the alleged impact having taken place abroad) in my view rarely is the same as locus damni, instead referring here to the place where the proper diligence ought to have taken place, such as at the jurisdictional level in CJEU C-147/12 OFAB, and for Rome II Arica Victims. This therefore will often co-incide with the locus incorporationis.
Adding ‘locus activitis’ as I called it or as the proposal does, the law of the country where the parent company operates, clearly will need refining. One presumes the intention is for that law to be one of the Member States (much like the proposed Directive includes in its scope ‘limited liability undertakings governed by the law of a non-Member State and not established in the territory of the Union when they operate in the internal market selling goods or providing services’). Therefore it would be be best to replace ‘country where it operates’ with ‘Member State’ where it operates. However clearly a non-EU domiciled corporation may operate in many Member States, thereby presumably again expanding the list of potential leges causae to pick from. Moreover, the very concept of ‘parent’ company is not defined in the proposal.
In short, the European Parliament with this initiative clearly hopes to gain ground quickly on the debate. As is often the case in such instances, the tent pegs have not yet been quite properly staked.
Geert.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Heading 8.3.
(3rd ed forthcoming February 2020).
Yesterday (30 September 2020), Belgium ratified the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults, which will enter into force for Belgium on 1 January 2021.
Source:
I flagged [2020] EWHC 2191 (Ch) Virgin Atlantic (the plan in the meantime has been sanctioned in [2020] EWHC 2376 (Ch)) in an update of my earlier post on the Colouroz Investment Scheme of Arrangement.
Restructuring practitioners have been justifiably excited by this new addition to England’s regulatory competition in restructuring tourism.
In my many posts on Schemes of Arrangements (see in particular Apcoa with the many references to later cases in that post; and Lecta Paper), I have summarised the modus operandi: no firm decision on jurisdiction under Brussels Ia is made (it is by no means certain but scheme creditors have so far not taken much of a swipe seeing as they tend to accept the attraction of the debtor company continuing as a going concern following the use of an English scheme). If at least one of the creditors is domiciled in England, it is considered sued and a defendant per Article 4 Brussels Ia. Other, non-England domiciled creditors are then pulled into English jurisdiction using the one anchor defendant per Article 8(1). Trower J extends that assumption to Restructuring Plans at 58 ff:
Article 25 BIa jurisdiction is obiter dismissed at 62 for not all creditors have credit arrangements subject to English choice of court.
Restructuring Plans do have features which differ from Schemes of Arrangement and some of those do trigger different considerations at the recognition and enforcement level than have hitherto been the case for Schemes.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5. Note: 3rd of the Handbook is forthcoming (February 2021).
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament has released today its report on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights (A9-0170/2020). The rapporteur is Michal Šimečka.
It is attached to this post.
In Marriott v Fresson & Ors [2020] EWHC 2515 (Comm) at issue in the jurisdictional challenge is whether Articles 24(2) or (3) Brussels Ia are engaged in litigation essentially seeking to uphold commitments included in two contracts expressly governed by English law and with an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of England. The goal of the agreements being the transfer of shares in Spanish-domiciled corporation (PEV), the question is whether they ‘have as their object the validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or associations of natural or legal persons, or the validity of the decisions of their organs’ (A24(2)) alternatively ‘have as their object the validity of entries in public registers’ (A24(3)).
Toledano DJ referred ia to Koza, Zavarco, and C-144/10 BVG and held that the principal object of the proceedings is the enforcement of shareholder agreements.
Even the defendants, in their jurisdictional challenge, do not suggest that the proceedings directly call into question the validity of any specific decision of PEV organs. Rather, they contend that the proceedings are principally concerned with a claim to the legal ownership of shares in PEV which impacts upon the composition of the shareholders of PEV and prospectively therefore upon the validity of decisions of the shareholders as an organ of that company.
That was a bit optimistic for Brussels Ia’s exclusive jurisdictional rules quite clearly do not aim at claims whose eventual effect might engage the heads of jurisdiction listed in them. The distinction however is not always easy to make. Claimants may creatively formulate their claims so as they do not fall within A24 (a tactic used particularly in A24(4) intellectual property rights cases, hence requiring the judge to decide what the true object of the proceedings might be; see e.g. Chugai v UCB).
Marriott v Fresson clearly differs from Ferrexpo, which is discussed in the judgment, where validity of the resolutions of the company’s general meeting of shareholders was the direct and specifically formulated claim engaged Article 24 which was applied reflexively.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6, Heading 2.2.6.5.
Challenge to jurisdiction on the basis of Articles 24(2) and (3) Brussels Ia. Fails. Principal object of the proceedings held to be the enforcement of shareholder agreements. https://t.co/479ryb3lV5
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) September 25, 2020
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