Flux européens

The Court of Justice delivered last week (10 December 2020) its judgment in case C‑80/19 (A. B., B. B. v Personal Exchange International Limited), which is about Brussels I. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

“L’article 15, paragraphe 1, du règlement (CE) no 44/2001 […] doit être interprété en ce sens qu’une personne physique domiciliée dans un État membre qui, d’une part, a conclu avec une société établie dans un autre État membre un contrat pour jouer au poker sur Internet, contenant des conditions générales déterminées par cette dernière, et, d’autre part, n’a ni officiellement déclaré une telle activité ni offert cette activité à des tiers en tant que service payant ne perd pas la qualité de « consommateur » au sens de cette disposition, même si cette personne joue à ce jeu un grand nombre d’heures par jour, possède des connaissances étendues et perçoit des gains importants issus de ce jeu ».

Source : http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=58831D1B50FE81EB65264CF9F4A957CD?text=&docid=235347&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=18043820

Ness Global Services Ltd v Perform Content Services Ltd [2020] EWHC 3394 (Comm)  engages Articles 33-34 of the Brussels Ia Regulation, its so-called forum non conveniens light regime. I reported on it before of course, most recently re Municipio de Mariana in which the judge arguably failed to engage with BIa properly (making A33-34 a carbon copy of abuse and /or forum non arguments in my view is noli sequi).

Perform and Ness are UK-registered companies with offices in London.  Perform are defendants in the UK action. Ness Global Services and its parent Ness Technologies Inc are defendants in parallel proceedings in New Jersey. Both sets of proceedings are based on the same facts and matters. These are said to constitute the basis for termination by both sides of a written agreement.

Ness argue application of A33-34 must be dismissed for there is non-exclusive choice of court in favour of England which, it argues, makes the A33-34 threshold very high. (The clause reads ‘”Governing Law and Jurisdiction. The Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales and the parties hereby irrevocably submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of England and Wales as regards any claim, dispute or matter arising under or in connection with this Agreement.”)

Houseman J introduces BIa’s scheme clearly and concisely, using the excellent Adrian Briggs’ suggestion of there being a hidden hierarchy in the Regulation – which in my Handbook I have also adopted (clearly with reference to prof Briggs) as the ‘jurisdictional matrix’. Houseman J at 39 notes that non-exclusive jurisdiction is hardly discussed in the Regulation. and concludes on that issue ‘If the internal hierarchy is “hidden” then is fair to say that the concept of non-exclusive prorogated jurisdiction is enigmatic and elusive. It is The Scarlet Pimpernel of the Regulation.’ Later non-EJA is used as shorthand for non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement.

At 62 after consideration of the reflexive application of exclusive jurisdictional rules, including choice of court, the text of A33-34, and recital 24, the judge considers that the recital

focusses upon connections with the ‘first seised’ Non-Member State, rather than the ‘second seised’ Member State which is applying Article 33 or Article 34. This is conspicuous notwithstanding the fact that the jurisdictional gateway language presupposes some connection between either the defendant (domicile) or the circumstances of the case (special jurisdiction) and the ‘second seised’ forum. Further, there is no obvious room in this wording for accommodating or giving effect to a Non-EJA in favour of the courts of the latter forum, and no warrant for affording it the significance that it would receive under English private international law principles, as noted below. In contrast, the second paragraph of the recital appears to contemplate the conferral of exclusive prorogated jurisdiction (albeit reflexively) in favour of the ‘first seised’ Non-Member State, as noted above.

At 80, Houseman J emphasises that in his view the internal hierarchy of the Regulation (the matrix) has no direct role to play in interpreting or applying the gateway language in A33-34. Those articles are themselves part of such hierarchy and are themselves a derogation from the basic rule of domiciliary jurisdiction. He then refers in some support to UCP v Nectrus (reference could also have been made to Citicorp) to hold at 95 that

where Article 25 operates to confer prorogated jurisdiction upon the courts of the ‘second seised’ Member State, whether exclusive or non-exclusive, Articles 33 and 34 are not applicable. In such a case it cannot be said that the court’s jurisdiction is “based upon” Article 4.

A suggestion at 96 that in such case A33-34 can apply reflexively is justifiably rejected.

At 109 application of A33-34 had they been engaged is declined obiter as being not in the interest of proper administration of justice. At 107 mere reference, neither approving nor disapproving was made ia to Municipio de Mariana which effectively places the Articles on a forum non footing.  At 112 it is held obiter

Without engaging in a full granular balancing exercise, given that this is a hypothetical inquiry in the present case, I am not persuaded that it is or would have been necessary for the proper administration of justice to stay these proceedings in favour of the NJ Proceedings. The parties bargained for or at any rate accepted the risk of jurisdictional fragmentation and multiplicity of proceedings by agreeing clause 20(f). That risk has manifested, largely through the tactical choice made by Perform to commence proceedings pre-emptively in New Jersey. The continuation of these proceedings, notwithstanding the existence of the NJ Proceedings, is a foreseeable consequence of the parties’ free bargain and a risk that Perform courted by suing first elsewhere.

An interesting addition to the scant A33-34 case-law, in an area this time of purely commercial litigation.

Geert.

European Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.539 ff.

Application (dismissed) for a stay on the basis of Articles 33-34 Brussels Ia, 'forum non conveniens light'. https://t.co/gwl3B5y3hl

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 11, 2020

Junqueras i Vies / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
Le Tribunal déclare irrecevable le recours de M. Junqueras i Vies contre le constat, par le Parlement européen, de la vacance de son siège

The CJEU held last week in C-774/19 AB and BB v Personal Exchange International Limited. I propose for the sake of our memories that we call it Personal Exchange International Limited or even PEIL. (No English version of the judgment available at the time of writing).

May an online poker playing contract, concluded remotely over the internet by an individual with a foreign operator of online games and subject to that operator’s general terms and conditions, also be classified as a contract concluded by a consumer for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, where that individual has, for several years, lived on the income thus obtained or the winnings from playing poker, even though he has no formal registration for that type of activity and in any event does not offer that activity to third parties on the market as a paid service?

The case echoes Schrems, Petruchová and Reliantco and the CJEU refers to the two former extensively.

At 21 the referring court had signalled the linguistic difference in e.g. the Slovenian and the English version of Article 17 BIA (A15 in BI which is discussed in the judgment), where mention is made of elements over and above the  use of ‘professional’ in the other language version (e.g ‘trade and profession’ in the English version). The CJEU at 27 refers to the classic collective authentic force of the various language versions to dismiss paying too much attention to this difference.

With reference to Petruchová, the Court at 23 dismisses the relevance of whether the player’s winnings allow him to earn a living. Since the player does not beforehand know those winnings, the consumer title would become unpredictable which is of course a big no-no.

At 37 ff the intimate knowledge of the market is dismissed, too, with reference to Schrems: for this would make the title too dependent upon the subjective situation of the individual.

At 41 ff the Court does reiterate the dynamic interpretation of the title per Schrems (reminder: that has only so far been held in the direction of losing the protection one once has a consumer).

Finally, the frequency and length of play does not constitute a singularly relevant criterion either (at 46), even if they can be taken into account. However the Court confusingly (and unlike eg in  Salvoni) does here refer to substantive consumer law in which it has held (eg in C‑105/17 Kamenova) that these elements do play some role.

All in all a fairly standard re-emphasis of earlier case-law. The referring court is asked to do the remaining math itself.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.235 ff.

 

 

 

CJEU this morning in PEIL confirms dynamic interpretation of concept of 'consumer' within the meaning of Brussels Ia (as in Schrems).
Extent of knowledge of the market, by the individual, not as such determinanthttps://t.co/w9TfLmGWCj

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 10, 2020

In Tate v Allianz IARD SA (A Company Incorporated Under the Laws of France) [2020] EWHC 3227 (QB) the E&W courts undoubtedly have jurisdiction on the basis of the insurance Title of BIa. Claimant is a UK national domiciled in the UK. Defendant insurer is domiciled in France. Claimant suffered injury as a pedestrian in Boulogne-sur-Mer when in 1991 he was struck by a bus belonging to a local bus company and insured by the Defendant. He sued in France in 1994.

In the event of deterioration in a claimant’s condition, French law allows a further claim, known as an ‘action en cas d’aggravation’, to be made for additional compensation. That is the claim now pending and in which defendant argues lack of jurisdiction on the basis of lis alibi pendens: the suggested ‘lis’ being the initial, 1994 and by reason of the aggravation element, ‘open’ claim as it were.

Reference by counsel is largely to Gubisch Maschinenfabrik and to The Tatry, Soole J added The Alexandros. On ‘action pending’ he holds that there is no such action. Although the notion must be an autonomous, EU one, nevertheless the impact of the French rules must have an impact. Here, at 57, the action ‘en cas d’aggravation’ is held to be free-standing and not to depend upon any prior order or permission from the court nor require any reservation of right by the claimant. Soole J holds that the French 1994 proceedings have come to an end. They are res judicata and current action is a new one.  There cannot therefore be a risk of irreconcilability, either, regardless of the double actionability rule which the English courts will apply (Rome II not applying as a result of its scope ratione temporis) and of the fact that the assessment of damages will be viewed by them as one of procedure, subject to lex fori (again, given that Rome II does not apply).

At 68 ‘same parties’ and ‘same cause of action’ are dealt with obiter.

Geert.

European Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.512 ff.

 

Application for stay on the basis of lis alibi pendens Articles 29-30 Brussels Ia. Dismissed. Held: no pending action in France. Even if there is, not 'related' to the English proceedings. https://t.co/hWZcn515Mg

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 27, 2020

 

The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered yesterday (8 December 2020) its judgment in case C‑626/18 (Republic of Poland v European Parliament), which is about the posting of workers, including in relation to Rome I.

Background: “By its application, the Republic of Poland asks the Court, principally, to annul Article 1(2)(a) and (2)(b) and Article 3(3) of Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services […] (‘the contested directive’), and, in the alternative, to annul that directive in its entirety”.

Relevant part of the case: “the Republic of Poland refers to Article 9 of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation and considers that the contested directive does not constitute a lex specialis, within the meaning of Article 23 of that regulation.

131 On that point, it must be observed that Article 8(1) of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation establishes a general conflict-of-law rule that is applicable to employment contracts, the designated law being the law chosen by the parties to such a contract, and that Article 8(2) of that regulation provides that, where such a choice has not been made, the individual employment contract is to be governed by the law of the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his or her work, that country not being deemed to have changed if the employee is temporarily employed in another country.

132 However, Article 23 of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation provides for the possibility of derogation from the conflict-of-law rules established by that regulation, where provisions of EU law lay down rules on the law applicable to contractual obligations in certain areas, while recital 40 of that regulation states that the ‘Rome I’ Regulation does not exclude the possibility of inclusion of conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations in provisions of EU law with regard to particular matters.

133 Given both their nature and their content, both Article 3(1) of the amended Directive 96/71, with respect to posted workers, and Article 3(1a) of that directive, with respect to workers who are posted for a period that, in general, exceeds 12 months, constitute special conflict-of-law rules, within the meaning of Article 23 of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation.

134 Further, the drafting process of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation demonstrates that Article 23 of that regulation covers the special conflict-of-law rule previously laid down in Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71, since, in the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (COM(2005) 650 final) of 15 December 2005, the Commission had annexed a list of special conflict-of-law rules established by other provisions of EU law, which mentions that directive.

135 Last, while the Republic of Poland considers that Article 3(1a) of the amended Directive 96/71 does not comply with Article 9 of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation, suffice it to state that the latter article, which must be interpreted strictly, refers to ‘overriding mandatory provisions of the law’ of the Member States, namely mandatory provisions respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests (judgment of 18 October 2016, Nikiforidis, C‑135/15, EU:C:2016:774, paragraph 41 and 44). There is nothing in the documents submitted to the Court to indicate that Article 3(1a) of the amended Directive 96/71 is contrary to such overriding mandatory provisions of law”.

Source: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=235183&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=17610010

Groupe Canal + / Commission
Concurrence
La Cour annule une décision de la Commission rendant obligatoires des engagements offerts par une entreprise pour préserver la concurrence sur les marchés

Hongrie / Parlement et Conseil
Libre circulation des personnes
La Cour rejette les recours en annulation introduits par la Hongrie et la Pologne contre la directive renforçant les droits des travailleurs détachés

Staatsanwaltschaft Wien (Ordres de virement falsifiés)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Contrairement à un mandat d’arrêt européen, une décision d’enquête européenne peut être adoptée par le parquet d’un État membre exposé au risque d’être soumis à des instructions individuelles provenant du pouvoir exécutif

JK Fabrications Ltd v Fastfix Ltd & Anor [2020] NIQB 63 is a good illustration of how not to draft choice of court (and governing law, in fact) provisions generally, let alone in general terms and conditions – GTCs. Albeit with a shaky obiter suggestion on identifying a court.

Tobsteel GmbH domiciled in Őhringen, Germany seeks to set aside a third party notice served on it on the ground that the Northern Irish courts have no jurisdiction to determine the third party proceedings brought by Fastfix, domiciled in Ireland.  Fastfix is the defendant in proceedings brought by JK Fabrications, domiciled in Northern Ireland.  In separate proceedings JK Fabrications Limited is sued by SMBJV, an unincorporated joint venture in respect of a major sewerage project in London.  Bolts are the common element in dispute in both cases; the bolts supplied by Tobsteel to Fastfix who in turn supplied these bolts to JK Fabrications.

As justifiably held by Larkin J, the choice of court upon which Tobsteel bases its argument, itself was not properly bolted. The clause at issue is included in a  “General Terms of Supply and Payment for TOBSTEEL GmbH” document which  General Terms of Delivery and Payment document in which clause VIII reads

“VIII. Place of performance, choice of forum, applicable legislation. 

 1.        The place of performance and choice of forum for deliveries and payments (including complaints regarding cheques or bills) and for all disputes arising between us and the purchaser from the purchase contracts concluded between us and him or her shall be Öhringen.  However, we shall be entitled to file a complaint against the purchaser at his or her residence or registered business address.

2.         The legal relationship between us and our customers or between us and third parties shall be governed exclusively by the legislation of the Federal Republic of Germany”

The judgment shows that Tobsteel itself in fact did not initially see clear as to which GTCs applied. In earlier affidavits, two more, and different, versions of GTCs were said to apply.

The first level of discussion was whether there had at all been consent to the GTCs. The judge held there had not been. At 16:

The instrument on which Tobsteel relies as the vehicle of agreement is a combination of the words “Subject to our general terms of business if requested a print can be provided” and Mr Connolly’s [of Fastifx, GAVC] email containing the words “Alex, this is O.K.”. This combination is too fragile to bear that weight.

This was not so much (at 17) because it could not be established that the clause had actually been consulted by Mr Connolly. Larkin J, in line with the Report Jenard:

While it is often a commercially necessary fiction that a party has ‘agreed’ terms that he may not have seen in advance, far less read, based on his signature indicating his consent to be bound by such terms or some other manifestation of acceptance, …

Rather, it has to be clear which version of what is actually referred to: at 17:

..it is observable that in those cases in which this commercially necessary fiction operates, it will be clear what the applicable terms are.

At 19-20:

If Tobsteel wished, as I find it did, to secure agreement on Clause VIII.1 with Fastfix it needed an adequate mechanism or instrument for obtaining that agreement.  In the event, and taking the evidence for Tobsteel at its reasonable height, Tobsteel sought to bind Fastfix in the documents referred to above to Tobsteel’s “general terms of business”.  Clause VIII.1 of June 2014 is not contained in a document entitled “general terms of business” but in a document entitled “General Terms of Supply and Payment for TOBSTEEL GmbH”.  One might properly say, further, that in 2017  Herr Gebert, insofar as he thought specifically about the matter, meant to refer to the June 2004 text, but whether he meant to or not, he did not refer to it so as to permit the creation of an agreement between Tobsteel and Fastfix that Clause VIII.1 should apply.

In none of the cases on Article 25 or its antecedents is there an example of a term incorporating X by reference being held to incorporate Y by reference and thus satisfy the requirements of [A25].

In conclusion, consent had not been clearly and precisely demonstrated. Again, this is a clear emphasis on the need for proper GTC filekeeping.

At 21 ff the judge obiter but in this case in my view wrongly, holds that even if he had found there to have been consent to the clause, it did not meet with the requirements of A25 BIa. As a reminder, the clause reads

 1.        The place of performance and choice of forum for deliveries and payments (including complaints regarding cheques or bills) and for all disputes arising between us and the purchaser from the purchase contracts concluded between us and him or her shall be Öhringen.  However, we shall be entitled to file a complaint against the purchaser at his or her residence or registered business address.

2.         The legal relationship between us and our customers or between us and third parties shall be governed exclusively by the legislation of the Federal Republic of Germany”

The judge argues that the proviso at 1 does not identify a court at all and that the choice of law proviso in 2 cannot come to the rescue (it could conversely, under Rome I) for choice of court and law as recently emphasised in Enka Insaat are to be looked at differently.

I agree 1 is an odd mix of anchoring locus solutionis typically done under A7(1) BIa, with what seems to be a unilateral choice of court pro Tobsteel; and that on that basis it might be vulnerable as choice of court under A25 (but it could be rescued under A7(1). I disagree that the name of a town that has a court (let alone a court; which the judge agrees with) needs to be included for it to be proper choice of court: name any town and local civil procedure rules will tell you the relevant court.

‘(A)n agreement on ‘Derry Recorder’s Court’ would satisfy the requirement of Article 25 that a court be agreed but that an agreement on ‘Derry’ would not.’: I do not think that is correct.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. Feb 2021, 2.296, 2.315 ff

https://twitter.com/GAVClaw/status/1334893216211013632

Rather like I note in my report on Highbury Poultry Farm,  Secretary of State for Health & Ors v Servier Laboratories Ltd & Ors [2020] UKSC is another example of why the UK Supreme Court and counsel to it will be missed post Brexit.

The case in essence queries whether a CJEU annulment (in General Court: Case T-691/14, currently subject to appeal with the CJEU) of a finding by the European Commission that companies breached Article 101 and 102 TFEU’s ban on anti-competitive practices, is binding in national proceedings that determine issues of causation, remoteness and mitigation of loss. The answer, in short: no, it does not.

The case essentially revolves around the difficulty of applying common law concepts of authority and precedent to the CJEU’s more civil law approach to court decisions. For those with an interest in comparative litigation therefore, it is a case of note.

The essence in the national proceedings is whether Claimants [who argue that Servier’s breaches of EU and UK competition law led to a delay in generic Perindopril entering the UK market, resulting in higher prices of Perindopril and financial loss to the NHS) failed to mitigate the loss they claim to have suffered as a result of Servier’s (the manufacturer of the drug) infringement of the competition rules. The Court of Appeal’s judgment is best read for the facts.

In T-691/14 Servier SAS v European Commission, the General Court of the EU had annulled only part of the European Commission’s decision by which it was found that the Appellants had infringed Article 102 TFEU. In the present proceedings, Servier seek to rely on a number of factual findings made by the
GCEU in the course of its judgment and argue that the English courts are bound by those findings. The High Court and the Court of Appeal have held that the propositions on which the Appellants seek to rely are not res judicata.

Core CJEU authority discussed is Joined Cases C-442/03P and C-471/03P P&O European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA and Diputación Foral de Vizcaya v Commission.

Lord Lloyd-Jones reaches the crux of his reasoning, on the basis of CJEU authority, at 39:

The principle of absolute res judicata gives dispositive effect to the judgment itself. It is the usual practice of EU courts to express the outcome of the action in a brief final paragraph of the judgment referred to as the operative part. While this will have binding effect, it will be necessary to look within the judgment beyond the operative part in order to ascertain its basis, referred to as the ratio decidendi. (EU law has no system of stare decisis or binding precedent comparable to that in common law jurisdictions and this EU concept of ratio decidendi is, once again, distinct from the concept bearing the same name in the common law.) It will be essential to look beyond the operative part in this way in order to identify the reason for the decision and in order that the institution whose act has been annulled should know what steps it must take to remedy the situation. In a case where the principle of absolute res judicata applies, it will extend to findings that are the necessary support for the operative part of the annulling judgment.

The GC’s findings were based on a limited ground only, relating to too narrow a market definition under A102 TFEU. As presently constituted, the claim in the national proceedings is a claim for breach of statutory duty founded on alleged infringements of article 101 TFEU. No question arises in the proceedings before the national court as to the relevant product market for the purposes of A102 or the applicability of A102.

The national proceedings therefore concern causation, remoteness and mitigation of loss in the arena of article 101 TFEU. The narrow res judicata window, it was held, clearly does not apply to them and that is acte clair which needs no referral to Luxembourg.

Geert.

 

 

Binding scope of #CJEU annulment of EU measure
Viz Res judicata, issue estoppel and abuse of process as understood in common law jurisdictions
Whether annulment of EC 101 TFEU finding is binding in national proceedings re issues of causation, remoteness and mitigation of loss https://t.co/yrgyoosoVr

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 6, 2020

Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC has been published today at the OJEU.

The text is attached to this post.

collective-redress-directiveDownload

The new Evidence and Services Regulations were published at the OJEU of 2 December 2020:

__ Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters (taking of evidence) (recast)

__ Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents) (recast)

They are attached to this post.

evidence-regulation-bisDownload service-regulation-terDownload

The European Commission adopted yesterday (2 December) “a package of initiatives to modernise the EU justice systems. The two main pillars of the new package are the Communication on the digitalisation of justice in the EU, and the new Strategy on European judicial training. This digital justice toolbox aims at further supporting Member States to move ahead their national justice systems towards the digital era and at improving EU cross-border judicial cooperation between competent authorities. As regards European judicial training, the Commission equips judges, prosecutors and justice professionals for the challenges of the 21st century, such as digitalisation. It further aims at promoting a common European judicial culture, based on the rule of law, fundamental rights and mutual trust”.

Extracts of the press release:

__ “Communication on the Digitalisation of Justice in the EU provides a toolbox to promote the use of digital tools by Member States […]:

Making digital the default option in cross-border judicial cooperation: To date, many judicial proceedings, including those that transcend borders, still take place with paper and by post. The European Commission will work on a legislative proposal to digitalise cross-border judicial cooperation procedures in civil, commercial and criminal matters. Adoption is planned for the end of 2021.

[…]

Better access to information: Electronic databases are easy to consult, they minimise costs for users and are resilient to crises. Therefore, Member States should strive to digitalise their registers and work towards their interconnections.

IT tools for cross-border cooperation: e-CODEX (e-Justice Communication via Online Data Exchange) is the main tool for secure cooperation in civil, commercial and criminal law proceedings across borders. To date, only some Member States use e-CODEX. With the adoption of today’s legislative proposal, the Commission aims to make e-CODEX the gold standard for secure digital communication in cross-border judicial proceedings in all Member States. As of 1 July 2023, the Commission entrusts this system to the Agency eu-LISA. Another digital tool is eEDES (e-evidence digital exchange system), which some Member States use to swiftly and securely exchange European Investigation Orders, mutual legal assistance requests and associated evidence in digital format instead of by post. With the legislative proposal adopted today, the Commission encourages all Member States to connect to eEDES. These IT tools will modernise EU justice systems and generate real European added-value”.

__ “EU Strategy on Judicial Training […]: by 2024, 65% of judges and prosecutors and 15% of lawyers shall be trained yearly on EU law. The strategy also supports justice professionals in the Western Balkans and in other EU partner countries, in Africa and Latin America. In addition, justice professionals will be able to look for training courses on EU law via the European Training Platform, launched today for a first test phase and planned to be fully operational in the course of 2021”.

Source: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2246

(with further documents)

Austrian Airlines
Transport
Selon l’avocat général Pikamäe, le simple déroutement d’un vol vers un aéroport de repli situé à proximité de l’aéroport initialement prévu n’a pas pour conséquence de donner droit à une indemnisation forfaitaire

Commission / Belgique et Magnetrol International
Aide d'État
Tax rulings : selon l’avocate générale Kokott, la Commission a considéré à juste titre que la pratique des autorités belges d’ajustement négatif des bénéfices des entreprises faisant partie d’un groupe multinational constitue un régime d’aides

Commission / Espagne (Détérioration de l’espace naturel de Doñana)

Selon l’avocate générale Kokott, le captage excessif des eaux souterraines dans l’espace naturel de Doñana situé en Andalousie constitue un manquement au droit de l’Union

Hongrie / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
Selon l’avocat général Bobek, la Cour devrait rejeter le recours de la Hongrie contre la résolution du Parlement déclenchant la procédure de constatation de l’existence d’un risque clair de violation grave, par cet État membre, des valeurs sur lesquelles l’Union est fondée

Star Taxi App
Rapprochement des législations
Un service qui met en relation directe, au moyen d’une application électronique, des clients avec des chauffeurs de taxi constitue un service de la société de l’information dès lors qu’il ne constitue pas une partie intégrante d’un service global dont l’élément principal serait une prestation de transport

Région de Bruxelles-Capitale / Commission
Agriculture
La Région Bruxelles-Capitale n’est pas recevable à demander l’annulation du règlement d’exécution de la Commission renouvelant l’approbation de la substance active glyphosate