Flux européens

Lego / EUIPO - Delta Sport Handelskontor (Élément de construction d'une boîte de jeu de construction)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
L’EUIPO a, à tort, déclaré nul un dessin ou modèle d’une brique de boîte de jeu de construction de LEGO

NAMA e.a.
Rapprochement des législations
Le droit de l’Union s’oppose à une pratique nationale selon laquelle un candidat exclu d’une procédure de passation de marché public peut uniquement invoquer, dans son recours contre la décision acceptant l’offre d’un autre soumissionnaire, la violation du principe d’égalité dans l’appréciation des offres

Prefettura Ufficio territoriale del governo di Firenze
SOPO
Les conducteurs de camions, d'autocars et d'autobus qui, au cours d’un contrôle, ne présentent pas les feuilles d’enregistrement du tachygraphe relatives à la journée du contrôle et aux 28 jours précédents sont passibles d’une seule sanction, quel que soit le nombre de feuilles d’enregistrement manquantes

MCP
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La compétence de la juridiction d’un État membre saisie d’une action en responsabilité parentale ne peut être établie sur le fondement de l’article 10 du règlement Bruxelles II bis en cas d’enlèvement d’un enfant vers un État tiers

Many thanks Alain Devers for alerting us back in October to the French Supreme Court’s judgment in PWC Landwell v LY, on agreements to arbitrate and the consumer rights Directive 93/13. Apologies for late posting.

The Supreme Court held [20 ff] that the contract between a client, domicoled at France, and PWC Landwell’s Spanish offices (Landwell used to be the trading name of the law firm side of this multidisciplinary practice), fell within the consumer title of Brussels IA. The Court of Appeal’s judgment had clearly run through the CJEU-sanctioned ‘directed at’ test and found it satisfied in the case at issue (the Landwell website boasting international coverage of its services as well as international contact numbers as strong indicators).

The SC also held that the requirement to turn to arbitration was incompatible with the Consumer Rights Directive 93/13, in particular its A6 which per CJEU C‑147/16 Karel de Grote — Hogeschool Katholieke Hogeschool Antwerpen confirmed in C-51/17 OTP Bank et OTP Faktoring is of ordre public character. The SC agreed with the CA that the clause, despite the client having been in the presence of a bank employee when the contract was put to her, was not properly negotiated and qualifies as a clause abusif.

Geert.

EU Private International Law 3rd ed 2021, para 2.277.

 

French SC on EU consumer rights Directive and #arbitration agreements. https://t.co/SD5A8foNQM

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 11, 2020

Airhelp
Transport
Une grève organisée par un syndicat du personnel d’un transporteur aérien et destinée notamment à obtenir des augmentations de salaire ne relève pas de la notion de « circonstance extraordinaire » susceptible de libérer la compagnie aérienne de son obligation de payer des indemnités d’annulation ou de retard important pour les vols concernés

NB v MI [2021] EWHC 224 (Fam) engages capacity to marriage. A marriage was formed on 1 June 2013 in Pakistan under sharia law between the parties. 18 years earlier, when she was 6, the wife was involved in a serious accident which left her among others badly neurologically damaged. She only slowly recovered from these injuries, to the extent that expert evidence suggested she does now, but did not have capacity in all the areas of life canvassed including to marry and enter sexual relations, at the time of her 2013 marriage.

Mostyn J considers the issues of whether partners understand the constituent elements of what it means to get married, starting with Durham v Durham [1885] 10 PD 80 and of course noting the changed approaches to the institute of marriage since. The core test then is to check whether at the time of marriage, the partners understood what it means to get married: financially, emotionally, sexually.

Mostyn J upon review of the evidence held that the wife lacked awareness of the difference between Islamic and English marriage; or the financial consequences depending on the contract; or her husband’s potential claims against her estate; or her husband’s proposed living arrangements. Yet that these say nothing at all about her capacity to marry [37]: ‘They may say quite a lot about her wisdom in getting married, but that is not the issue I have to decide.’ Although reference is made to KC & Anor v City of Westminster Social & Community Services Dept. & Anor [2008] EWCA Civ 198 I find the conflict of laws analysis could have been made clearer: is the overpowering engagement of English law a finding of confirmation of lex domicilii (the lex patriae of the wife is not mentioned but might be British), entirely disregarding a role for the lex loci celebrationis?

This is not my core area – I imagine others may have a more expert insight.

Geert.

Validity of Pakistani marriage valid under #sharia law, per English law, on grounds of mental capacity following neurological injuries suffered earlier in life. https://t.co/VXrfjiIDVl

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 8, 2021

A quick post on an issue I actively published on last year, including with Kathleen Garnett: the innovation principle. My post here is a bit of a documentation gateway on same. I just wanted to draw readers’ attention to two developments.

First, the European Risk Forum which stood at the cradle of a proposed innovation ‘principle’ has been rebranded into the ‘European Regulation and Innovation Forum’ – ERIF. This of course even more than ‘Risk Forum’ is meant to conjure up positive feelings: who could possibly be against Regulation let alone innovation? It calls itself a think tank but it is in fact a trade association – interest group.

Further, the focus of the campaign has now changed. No longer it seems is the introduction of a new innovation principle the aim of the campaign. Rather, a restrictive take on regulation using cost benefit analysis and ‘proportionality’ – both existing principles of e.g. EU environmental law and at odds e.g. with the recently proposed essential use idea within the EU’s chemicals policy. It seems ERIF looks among others to the EU’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board to keep proposed laws in check.

Worth keeping an eye on, I suggest.

Geert.

Allemagne / Pologne
Énergie
Selon l’avocat général Campos Sánchez-Bordona, le principe de solidarité énergétique peut être utilisé pour contrôler la légalité des actes des institutions de l’Union dans le domaine de l’énergie

An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara, Éire agus an tArd-Aighne
Rapprochement des législations
Une juridiction d’un État membre est tenue d’exercer le pouvoir que lui confère le droit national d’adopter une déclaration juridictionnelle selon laquelle cet État n’a pas correctement transposé une directive de l’Union et est tenu d’y remédier

Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureşti
Libre circulation des personnes
Lorsqu’un travailleur a conclu avec le même employeur plusieurs contrats de travail, la période minimale de repos journalier s’applique aux contrats pris dans leur ensemble et non à chacun des contrats pris séparément

Association One Voice et Ligue pour la protection des oiseaux
Environnement et consommateurs
Un État membre ne peut pas autoriser une méthode de capture d’oiseaux entraînant des prises accessoires dès lors qu’elles sont susceptibles de causer aux espèces concernées des dommages autres que négligeables

Airhelp
Transport
Selon l’avocat général Pikamäe, une grève organisée par des syndicats de pilotes constitue, en principe, une circonstance extraordinaire pouvant libérer la compagnie aérienne de son obligation de payer des indemnités d’annulation ou de retard important pour les vols concernés

Commission / Pologne
Aide d'État
L’impôt polonais dans le secteur de la vente au détail et la taxe hongroise sur la publicité ne violent pas le droit de l’Union en matière d’aides d’État

Jamieson v Wurttemburgische Versicherung AG & Anor [2021] EWHC 178 (QB) has been in my draft folder for a while – Master Davison refused an application for a stay on the basis of A29 Brussels I’a’s lis alibi pendens rule, holding that the issue of which court was being seized first, was properly sub judice in the German courts, as is the issue whether litigation subject to the protected categories, should rule out a stay in cases where the weaker party is being disadvantaged.

James Beeton has the background to the case here. Claimant was injured in a road traffic accident in Munich. He was working as a commodities broker for the second defendant. He was attending the Oktoberfest with clients, whom he was entertaining. He was walking from the beer hall to his hotel. He crossed a busy highway and was struck by a taxi, sustaining very severe injuries. The precise circumstances of the collision are in dispute. The taxi was insured by the first defendant, against whom the claimant has a direct right of action.

I tell students and pupils alike that too strong a hint of judicial action in pre-litigation action may trigger a torpedo suit in a court not preferred by client. That is exactly what happened in this case. In pre-action correspondence the insurers for the taxi were asked to confirm that they would not issue proceedings in another jurisdiction – to which they never replied other than by issuing proceedings in Germany for a negative declaration, i.e. a declaration that they were not liable for the accident. Those proceedings had been issued on 18 July 2017. Claimants then issued protectively in England on 10 May 2018. The to and fro in the German proceedings revealed that the correct address for the English claimant was not properly given to the German courts until after the English courts had been seized. 

Hence two substantive issues are before the German courts: when were they properly seized (a discussion in which the English courts could formally interfere using A29(2) BIa); and if they were seized first, is A29 subordinate to the protected categories’ regime: for if the German torpedo goes ahead, claimant in the English proceedings will be bereft of his right to sue in England.

The suggestion for the second issue is that either in Brussels Ia, a rule needs to be found to this effect (I do not think it is there); or in an abuse of EU law (per ia Lord Briggs in Vedanta) argument (CJEU authority on and enthusiasm for same is lukewarm at best).  Despite Master Davison clear disapproval of the insurer’s actions at what seems to be an ethical level, he rules out a stay on the basis of comity and of course CJEU C-159/02 Turner v Grovit: the English High Court must not remove a claim from the jurisdiction of the German courts on the basis of abuse of EU law before those courts.

A most interesting case on which we may yet see referral to the CJEU – by the German courts perhaps.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed 2021, Heading 2.2.9.4, 2.2.15.1.

Lis alibi pendens, Articles 29 &32 Brussels Ia.
Application for stay refused. https://t.co/rIyTL62nPa

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 5, 2021

L’avocat général Hogan propose à la Cour de déclarer que, même si l’Union a signé la convention d’Istanbul, le Conseil peut attendre, sans toutefois y être obligé, le commun accord de tous les États membres à être liés par cette convention avant de décider si l’Union conclura la convention et quelle sera la portée de cette conclusion

VG Bild-Kunst
Liberté d'établissement
Lorsque le titulaire du droit d’auteur a adopté ou imposé des mesures de restriction contre la transclusion (framing), l’incorporation d’une œuvre dans une page Internet d’un tiers, par cette technique, constitue une mise à la disposition de cette œuvre à un public nouveau

Radiotelevizija Slovenija (Période d’astreinte dans un lieu reculé)
SOPO
Une période de garde sous régime d’astreinte ne constitue, dans son intégralité, du temps de travail que lorsque les contraintes imposées au travailleur affectent très significativement sa faculté de gérer, au cours de cette période, son temps libre

Gilles Cuniberti  discusses Koch Films v Ouragan Films et al at the French Supreme Court, a case which as also signalled by Hélene Péroz. The judgment is an important one for it signals the continuing uncertainty of interpreting ‘provisional’ under Brussels Ia. In its earlier case-law (Ergo; Haras de Coudrettes) the SC took a more relaxed approach than a strict reading of CJEU St.Paul Dairy might suggest. Unlike Gilles I do not think the SC’s judgment here necessarily signals a return to orthodoxy. In rebuking the Court of Appeal for having too readily dismissed the measures as not being provisional, and in demanding it review whether the measures might not (also) be meant to preserve evidence, it could be said that the opposite might be true: as long as the measure at least in part preserves evidence, other motives do not endanger its provisional character.

En se déterminant ainsi, par une affirmation générale, sans rechercher si ces mesures, qui visaient à obtenir la communication de documents en possession des parties adverses, n’avaient pas pour objet de prémunir la société Koch contre un risque de dépérissement d’éléments de preuve dont la conservation pouvait commander la solution du litige, la cour d’appel a privé sa décision de base légale au regard des textes susvisés [7]

One will have to await future direction.

Geert.

EU Private International Law 3rd ed 2021, 2.559.

 

French SC holds that application by DE film producer, for discovery (involving bailiff) of ICT data from French corporation holding exclusive distribution rights, in spite of choice of court in favour of DE court, may be included in A35 BIa provisional or protective measures. https://t.co/XOxhdwDot6

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 27, 2021

Gilles Cuniberti on French SC in Koch Films v Ouragan Films et al
Provisional measures under BIa
Compare its earlier case-law in Ergo, and Haras de Coudrettes https://t.co/pCIypgvASu which, Gilles argues, has been overruled. https://t.co/WgaZaXhOnW

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 8, 2021

As I seem to be in pedagogic blog mode today, a note on AdActive Media Inc v Ingrouille [2021] EWCA Civ 313. The case shows the complications that arise in recognition and enforcement proceedings outside of the Brussels regime. The proceedings were initiated prior to the end of the Brexit transition period however seeing as they involve a judgment from outside the EU, Brussels Ia was never engaged. Even had BIa been engaged, an interesting discussion would have ensued, I am sure, as to the impact of the arbitration exclusion on the case at issue.

The consultancy agreement between the parties (AdActive Media are incorporated in Delaware, Mr Ingrouille is resident in the UK) is by its express terms governed by the law of the State of California. It contains three provisions dealing with jurisdiction, two of which confer jurisdiction on US District and State Courts in California and the other provides for arbitration. The provision for arbitration expressly excludes claims by the company under two clauses, one of which (clause 7) contains covenants against the misuse and unauthorised disclosure of confidential information. Alleged breaches of clause 7 featured prominently in the claims made in the US proceedings. The relationship between these provisions and their effect is one of the issues arising on this appeal. The company argued before the judge who was asked to confirm recognition, that they were irreconcilable, and that the arbitration clause was ineffective. Alternatively, it argued that as the US proceedings included claims in respect of the misuse and unauthorised disclosure of confidential information, they were properly brought in the US Court.

Under the common law of recognition and enforcement, if the US proceedings were properly brought in the US Court in accordance with the terms of the consultancy agreement, that court is recognised as having jurisdiction over the claim against Mr Ingrouille and its judgment will prima facie be enforceable in England. However the lack of the Brussels’ regime mutual trust and harmonisation of jurisdictional rules means the English court will second-guess US jurisdiction under section 32 of the England and Wales Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (I have copied the relevant extract below).

What follows are 50-odd paras of discussion of the scope of clause 7, reference to Fiona Trust and Enka, and a conclusion by Richards LJ that the judgment entered against Mr Ingrouille in the US proceedings cannot be enforced in England, by reason of the application of section 32(1) of the 1982 Act. Summary judgment was entered in favour of Mr Ingrouille.

Geert.

Successful appeal against the recognition and enforcement of a US (DC CAL) judgment on grounds of lack of US jurisdiction, resulting from issue being within scope of #arbitration clause interpreted under lex fori, EN law, not lex contractus, CAL law. https://t.co/iQELdp3FEg

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 5, 2021

S32:

“(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a judgment given by a court of an overseas country in any proceedings shall not be recognised or enforced in the United Kingdom if –

(a) the bringing of those proceedings in that court was contrary to an agreement under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in the courts of that country; and

(b) those proceedings were not brought in that court by, or with the agreement of, the person against whom the judgment was given; and

(c) that person did not counterclaim in the proceedings or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of that court.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply, where the agreement referred to in paragraph (a) of that subsection was illegal, void or unenforceable or was incapable of being performed for reasons not attributable to the fault of the party bringing the proceedings in which the judgment was given.

(3) In determining whether a judgment given by a court of an overseas country should be recognised or enforced in the United Kingdom, a court in the United Kingdom shall not be bound by any decision of the overseas court relating to any of the matters mentioned in subsection (1) or (2).”