Agrégateur de flux

The Assas International Law Review (Revue de droit international d’Assas) is an open access online journal published once a year by the doctoral school of the University. It features articles on public and private international law written by professors and doctoral students.

The main theme of the 2021 issue is art and international law.

The issue features seven articles on this topic (including one on litigation aimed at returning cultural objects). It also includes short articles summarizing the doctoral theses recently defended at the University and four more articles on various topics.

Of particular note for private international law scholars are the following articles.

In the first article, Marie Elodie Ancel offers a French perspective on the judgment of the UK Supreme Court in Enka v. Chubb (La loi applicable à la Convention d’arbitrage au Royaume-Uni: les enseignements de l’arrêt Enka). She concludes as follows:

Par conséquent, le raisonnement conflictualiste tel qu’il est pratiqué par la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni ne présente pas de pertinence particulière dans le contexte français. À l’inverse, il serait concevable pour la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni de s’inspirer de la méthode française et de forger des règles matérielles que les juges anglais pourraient appliquer pour statuer, aux divers moments que le droit anglais leur ménage pour ce faire, sur la validité, l’étendue ou l’interprétation de la clause d’arbitrage. D’ailleurs, comme the validation principle, les présomptions et contre-présomptions censées permettre d’établir un éventuel choix tacite de la loi applicable à la clause d’arbitrage ont la nature de règles matérielles du for. La Cour suprême démontre d’ailleurs un indéniable talent pour créer de telles règles… En théorie, elle pourrait donc l’exercer pour définir directement le régime substantiel des clauses d’arbitrage. Cependant, puisque le Royaume-Uni a intégré la Convention de New York dans sa législation de manière stricte et sans profiter de l’article VII (1) et que la Cour suprême préconise d’appréhender la clause d’arbitrage de la même manière, quel que soit le moment où le juge anglais est amené à en vérifier la validité ou l’efficacité, il ne faut pas espérer de révolution méthodologique outre-Manche. La méthode conflictualiste y sera sans doute encore longtemps pratiquée, quitte à réviser et reconcevoir les présomptions censées établir un choix tacite de la loi applicable. Les deux rives de la Manche ne sont pas près de se réunir.

The second article is written in English by Diana Reisman and is concerned with 2019 Hague Judgments Convention (Breaking Bad: Fail-Safes to the Hague Judgement Convention).

This Note explores a contingency that is neither acknowledged nor addressed by the Judgments Convention: a marked deterioration in the judiciary of a party following the expiration of the twelve-month suspension period. When a state obligates itself, under the terms of the Judgments Convention, to enforce the civil and commercial judgments of another State Party, it does so with confidence in the quality of the judicial culture of that other state, including the degree of fairness and judicial transparency with which cases are prosecuted. However, the integrity of the judiciary is not necessarily enduring, nor is it immune to the effects of political change in the state. Suppose that a State Party whose judicial culture was judged fair and transparent at the time of ratification or accession experiences internal change, leading to a sudden or a gradual alteration in its judicial culture, which causes concerns for some of the other treaty partners. As drafted, the Judgments Convention would oblige the other States Parties to continue to perform their treaty obligations to that State Party. Herein lies the conundrum of the Judgments Convention: It relies on the assumption that its parties’ quality of justice is stable over time such that their private law judgments should be enforced on a fast track in each other’s courts. Should the quality of one state’s justice system later decline, litigants contesting enforcement of one of that state’s civil judgments would have the burden of conforming their objections to the Judgments Convention’s narrow grounds for nonrecognition. Other States Parties would find themselves in the position of recognizing and enforcing problematic civil judgments issued from the compromised State Party.

The 2021 Issue is freely available here.

The fourth issue of 2021 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:

Antonietta Di Blase, (formerly) Professor at the University “Roma Tre”, Genitorialità della coppia omosessuale e riconoscimento dello status filiationis nell’ordinamento italiano (Same-Sex Couples and Recognition of Parentage in the Italian Legal System) [in Italian]

This paper addresses the recognition of the status of the child when a same-sex couple accesses techniques of assisted reproduction abroad. According to recent European and Italian Constitutional case law, a form of legal recognition in favor of both partners is due when at least one of them is genetically linked to the child, on account of the duty to grant the child’s identity within a family. The need and the legal form of recognition has to be assessed in the light of the interests of the child, which should prevail over national rules limiting the use of medically assisted reproduction.

Luigi Fumagalli, Professor at the University of Milan, Problemi vecchi e nuovi nella cooperazione per l’assunzione delle prove all’estero in materia civile: la rifusione della disciplina nell’Unione europea (Old and New Problems in the Cooperation for the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil Matters: The Recasting of the EU Regime) [in Italian]

The analysis of Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 of 25 November 2020 provides an opportunity to review the overall regulatory framework of cooperation in the taking of evidence applicable in the relations between the Member States of the European Union, to underline the elements of novelty or to detect the critical issues that still exist. It shows that the mechanisms envisaged appear to be suitable for achieving the objectives which the uniform framework sets itself: they oblige the authorities of the Member States to cooperate, almost without exception; the instruments by which this is achieved are shown to be capable of allowing, in reasonably short terms and without excessive formalism, the taking, in a manner which is absolutely tolerable for the Member State in which it is carried out, of evidence that can be used in the proceedings for which it is required. The main novelty profile consists in the wide space left to the use of communication technologies for the implementation of judicial assistance mechanisms: they mark the distance with respect to the oldest communication tools and touch each “segment” of the overall activity through which evidence is taken in a State other than that of the trial. However, the framework defined by Regulation 2020/1783 continues to suffer from certain limitations. In the first place, one cannot fail to highlight a series of formal (relating to the Italian version of the text) or conceptual inaccuracies. Alongside this, it should be noted the strong constraints that derive, for the implementation of the assistance procedures brought by the Regulation, from domestic procedural law, which the European legislation has not modified (nor has it intended to modify). Within these limits, the rules laid down appear, however, to take into account the complexity of the procedural mechanisms involved in the implementation of international judicial assistance procedures, and mark a step forward in the integration between the systems, laying the foundations for further developments.

Alberto Malatesta, Professor at the University “Cattaneo LIUC” in Castellanza, Circolazione delle sentenze tra Unione europea e Regno Unito: a favore di una cooperazione in seno alla Conferenza dell’Aja (Circulation of Judgments between the European Union and the United Kingdom: In Support of a Cooperation in the Framework of the Hague Conference) [in Italian]

This essay outlines the various options for a future cooperation between the EU and the UK in the field of recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. After examining some alternatives, it focuses especially on the 2007 Lugano Convention, which appears to be a good tool for this purpose. However, pursuant to Art. 72(3) of the Convention itself, the EU has recently objected to the UK’s application of accession. The Author explains the reasons why the EU’s position is appropriate from the point of view of the Member States’ interests and upholds the Hague Conference of Private International Law as the best venue where cooperation between the EU and the UK can be strengthened.

The following comments are also featured:

Silvia Marino, Associate Professor at the University of Insubria, La climate change litigation nella prospettiva del diritto internazionale privato e processuale (Climate Change Litigation from the Perspective of Private International and Procedural Law) [in Italian]

The present article tackles the classic private international law issues in the field of climate change litigation. The introduction offers a definition of climate change litigation according to the current case-law. The article then proceeds to investigate international law commitments on climate change and environmental protection, noting that no specific international conventions exist on the subject-matter. Therefore, the EU system within the civil judicial cooperation appears relevant. Against this background, Regulations EU No 1215/2012 and No 864/2007 are examined in the light of the climate change litigation, stressing their potential solutions and problems within this field. In this framework, some recent suggestions and proposals for the improvement of the private international law systems in the human rights’ field are discussed. Finally, the concluding remarks pay due attention to the efficiencies of the current EU system, yearning for a more articulated international cooperation in all the possible involved facets.

Emilia Maria Magrone, Researcher at the University of Bari, Pluralità di fonti per la tutela di un minore straniero presente in Italia e necessità di un loro coordinamento (Plurality of Sources in the Protection of a Foreign Child Present in Italy and Need for Coordination) [in Italian]

This article analyses a decree issued by the Court of Appeal of Bari rejecting the complaint of an Albanian citizen against a previous decree of the Family Tribunal of Bari. The Tribunal had ordered the forfeiture of the woman from parental responsibility towards her young child (an Albanian citizen, as well) and other measures for the protection of the child. The cross-border features of the case have provided the opportunity for highlighting the different regulatory sources likely to be applied in the field of protection of foreign children such as Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, the 1996 Hague Convention on the protection of children and the Italian rules on jurisdiction and applicable law, and to verify whether the relevant rules relating to both jurisdiction and applicable law have been correctly applied. In this regard, the decree of the Court of Appeal is substantially compliant with the best interests of the child, but raises some perplexities for the failure to ascertain the habitual residence of the child and consequently for having applied the internal rule on tacit acceptance of jurisdiction rather than Article 8 of Regulation No 2201/2003. Another unclear aspect of the Court’s ruling is that it did not specify on the basis of which conflict-of-law rule Italian law was applied.

In addition to the foregoing, in this issue Fausto Pocar, Professor Emeritus at the University of Milan, penned a moving tribute in memoriam of Professor Alegría Borrás.

Finally, this issue features the following book review by Francesca C. Villata, Professor at the University of Milan: Andrew DICKINSON, Edwin PEEL (eds), A Conflict of Laws Companion. Essays in Honour of Adrian Briggs, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021, pp. XLIX-377.

Today, Advocate General Maciej Szpunar delivered his Opinion in the above mentioned case on the concept of „habitual residence“ under Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, as well as under Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, as well as impacts of Article 47 of the EU Charta on Fundamental Rights in relation to a forum necessitatis as referred to in Article 7 of Regulation No 4/2009. 

Opening by a quote from the General Course of 1986 by Paul Lagarde for the Hague Academy of International Law „ ‘The principle of proximity … is nearest to life and is a title of nobility. It carries with it a lesson in modesty by teaching us that no political will, no judge, however pure his or her intention, can claim jurisdiction, in the long term, to rule according to his or her laws on life relationships that are outside his or her discretion.’, the Opinion results, after careful deliberation, in the following elements for a concept of „habitual residence“:

„1.      The spouses’ status as contract staff of the European Union in a third State is not a decisive factor in determining the place of habitual residence, whether in the meaning of Articles 3 and 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, or Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations.

2.      It is not possible, for the purposes of determining the children’s place of habitual residence, within the meaning of Article 8 of Regulation No 2201/2003, only to take into consideration criteria such as the mother’s nationality, the fact that she resided in a Member State before her marriage, the nationality of the minor children and their birth in that Member State.

3.      With regard to the application for divorce, if the court seised cannot establish its jurisdiction on the basis of Articles 3 to 5 of Regulation No 2201/2003, Article 6 of that regulation then precludes the application of the residual clause contained in Article 7(1) of that regulation and, consequently, the defendant – a national of a Member State – can be sued only before the courts of that Member State.

So far as concerns parental responsibility, if the court seised does not have jurisdiction under Articles 8 to 13 of Regulation No 2201/2003, Article 14 of that regulation applies regardless of the children’s place of habitual residence and the nationality of the defendant.

4.      Article 7 of Regulation No 4/2009 must be interpreted as meaning that the state of necessity may result from exceptional, very serious or emergency situations such that proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted or would be impossible in a third State with which the dispute is closely connected. Those conditions are met, in particular, when the court of the third State with which the dispute is closely connected refuses to exercise jurisdiction or there are abusive procedural requirements, when, due to civil unrest or natural disasters, it is dangerous to go to certain places and the third State’s normal activity is affected, and, lastly, when access to justice is unduly hampered, in particular when legal representation is prohibitively expensive, when the length of proceedings is excessively long, when there is serious corruption within the judicial system, or when there are failures concerning the fundamental requirements for a fair hearing or systemic failures. The parties are not required to demonstrate that they initiated or attempted to initiate proceedings in that State with a negative result.

5.      Articles 7 and 14 of Regulation No 2201/2003, relating to subsidiary jurisdiction in matters of divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment respectively, and Article 7 of Regulation No 4/2009, with regard to the forum necessitatis in matters relating to maintenance, must be interpreted by the court seised in the light of Article 47 of the Charter. National rules on residual jurisdiction, including those relating to the forum necessitatis, must be applied in the light of that same article.“

These findings have emerged from a reference by the Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona (Provincial Court, Barcelona), by judgment of 15 September 2020, in which no less than six rather detailed questions were raised (para.) 26, with a view to the following facts (paras. 17 et seq.):

„17. M P A, a citizen of Spanish nationality, and LC D N M T, a citizen of Portuguese nationality, were married on 25 August 2010 at the Spanish Embassy in Guinea-Bissau. They have two minor children, born on 10 October 2007 and 30 July 2012 in Manresa (Barcelona, Spain). The children have dual Spanish and Portuguese nationality.

18. The spouses lived in Guinea-Bissau from August 2010 to February 2015 and then moved to Lomé (Togo). Following their de facto separation, in July 2018, the applicant in the main proceedings and the children continued to reside in the marital home in Togo and the spouse resided in a hotel in that country.

19.      The spouses are both employed by the European Commission as contract staff of the European Union in its delegation in Togo. The referring court states that contract staff – servants of the European Union in the EU Member States – have the status of diplomatic staff of the European Union only in the country of employment.

20.      On 6 March 2019, the applicant in the main proceedings brought an application before the Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manresa (Court of First Instance, Manresa, Spain) for divorce and sought the dissolution of the matrimonial property, the determination of the regime and procedures for exercising custody and parental responsibility over the minor children, the grant of a maintenance allowance for the children and rules for the use of the family home in Lomé. She also requested the adoption of interim measures.

21.      The defendant in the main proceedings claimed that the Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manresa (Court of First Instance, Manresa) did not have international jurisdiction. By order of 9 September 2019, the court declared that it lacked international jurisdiction to hear the case on the ground that the parties were not habitually resident in Spain.

22.      The applicant in the main proceedings brought an appeal against that decision before the referring court. She claims that both spouses enjoy diplomatic status as accredited servants of the European Union in the country of employment and that this status extends to the minor children.“

Willem 1, Buddhist mummy. Statue (L), CT scan (R). (Photos: Drents Museum)

by Zhen Chen, PhD researcher in the Department of Private International Law, University of Groningen, the Netherlands (ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5323-4271)[1]

In Buddha Mummy Statue case, the Chinese village committees sued the Dutch defendants for the return of a stolen golden statue which contains a 1000-year old mummified buddhist. The parties had different opinions on the legal nature of the mummy contained in the statue. The Chinese court classified the statue as a cultural property and applied the choice of law over movable properties provided in Article 37 of Chinese Private International Law (lex rei sitae). Based on a comparative study, this article argues that a mummy does not fall within the traditional dichotomy between a person and a property. Instead, a mummy should be classified as a transitional existence between a person and a property. If the classification of a mummy has to be confined to the traditional dichotomy, a mummy can be regarded as a quasi-person, or a special kind of property. Following this new classification, a new choice of law rule should be established. In this regard, the Belgian Private International Law Act, which adopts the lex originis rule supplement by the lex rei sitae, is a forerunner. This article advocates that the adoption of the lex originis rule may help to stop the vicious circle of illegal possession and to facilitate the return of stolen cultural objects, especially those containing human remains, to their country of origin.

 

1. Gold or God?

As to the legal nature of the Buddha Mummy Statue in dispute, from the Chinese villagers’ perspective, the mummy contained in the golden statute is a person or God, instead of a property. Specifically, the mummified buddhist Master Zhanggong was their ancestor, who used to live in their village and has been worshipped as their spiritual and religious God for over 1000 years. Master Zhanggong was preserved in a statue moulded with gold to prevent decomposition and to maintain his immortality. The villagers celebrated Master Zhanggong’s birthday every year with feast, music and dance performance, which has become their collective memory and shared belief.

In contrast, from the Dutch art collector’ perspective, the golden statute containing a mummy is a property not a person. It is merely a cultural property with great economic value and worthy of collection or investment. Thus, it is not surprising that the Dutch collector asked for a compensation of 20 million Euro, of which the Chinese villagers whose annual income was around 1000 Euro could not afford it.

The Chinese village committees sued the Dutch art collector both in China and in the Netherlands. The Chinese village committees asserted that the mummified Master Zhanggong contained in the statue was a corpse within the meaning of the Dutch Liability Decree, and the ownership thereof was excluded under the Dutch law.[2] The claimants as the trustees or the agents had the right of disposal.[3] The Dutch art collector argued that the mummified monk contained in the golden statue was not a corpse, as the organs of the monk were missing. The Dutch court did not touch upon the issue of classification of the Buddha Mummy Statue, as the case was dismissed on the basis that the Chinese village committees had no legal standing nor legal personality in the legal proceedings.[4]

 

2. The lex situs under Article 37 Chinese Private International Law Act

The Chinese court classified the Buddha Mummy Statue as a cultural property and applied the law of the country where the theft occurred, namely Chinese law, by virtue of Article 37 Chinese Private International Law Act. Such classification is not satisfactory, as the mummy in dispute was essentially considered as a property. Chinese law was applied because the place of theft was in China and the lex situs was construed by the Chinese court as the lex furti. However, what if the mummy was stolen in a third country during the transportation or an exhibition? The lex furti does not necessarily happen to be the lex originis in all cases involving stolen cultural objects.

Moreover, cultural objects containing human remains are special in comparison with other cultural objects without, as human remains contain biological information of a person. The application of the traditional lex rei sitae rule to all cultural objects, including those containing human remains, is far from satisfactory. In general, the law on dead human bodies precedes over the sale of corpses, and no person, including a good faith purchaser can own somebody else’s corpse both in civil law and common law systems.[5] A corpse must not be downgraded to the status of a property.[6] The characterization of human remains as properties objectifies human remains and thus may violate human dignity.[7] Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish cultural objects containing human remains from other types of cultural objects. The question is how to draw a distinction and what is the legal nature of a cultural object containing human remains, such as a mummy. If a mummy does not fall within the scope of traditional category of a person nor a property, does it mean a new category need to be created? In this regard, the classification of the legal nature of a fertilized embryo in Shen v. Liu may be relevant,[8] since the judge addressed the issue by thinking out of the box and provided a new solution.

 

3. Is a Fertilized Embryo a Property or a Person?

Shen v. Liu was the first case in China that involved the ownership of frozen embryos. Specifically, Shen and Liu, who got married in 2010 and died in 2013 in a car accident, left four frozen fertilized embryos in a local hospital. The parents of Shen (Mr and Mrs Shen), sued the parents of Liu (Mr and Mrs Liu), who also lost their only child, claiming the inheritance of the four frozen fertilized embryos of the deceased young couple.[9] The local hospital where the embryos were preserved was a third party in this case.

 

3.1 A property, a special property, or ‘a transitional existence between person and property’?

The third party Gulou Hospital argued that the frozen embryos do not have the nature of a property. Since Mr. and Mrs. Shen had passed away, the expired embryos should be discarded. Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants should inherit the embryos.[10] The first-instance court held that fertilized embryos had the potential to develop into life, and thus are special properties that contain biological characteristics of a future life. Unlike normal properties, fertilized embryos can not be the subject of succession, nor be bought or sold.[11]

Nevertheless, the appellate court took the view that embryos were ‘a transitional existence between people and properties’. Therefore, embryos have a higher moral status than non-living properties and deserve special respect and protection. The embryo ethically contains the genetic information of the two families and is closely related to the parents of the deceased couple. Emotionally speaking, the embryo carries personal rights and interests, such as the grief and spiritual comfort for the elderly. The court held that the supervision and disposal of the embryos by the parents from these two families was in line with human ethics and can also relieve the pain of bereavement for both parties.[12] Clearly, the court did not classify the fertilized embryos as people or properties. Instead, the embargo was considered as ‘a transitional existence between a person and a property’, since it is not biotic nor abiotic but a third type in-between.

 

3.2 A mummy as ‘a continuum between a person and a property’

With regard to the distinction between a person and a property, the judgment of Shen v. Liu shows that the Chinese court was not confined to the traditional dichotomy between a person and a property. The same should be applicable to mummies. Embryos and mummies have something in common, as they are two different kinds of life forms. Whereas the embryo in Shen v. Liu is the form of life which exists before the birth of a human being, the mummy in Buddha Mummy Statue case is another form of life which exists after the death of a human being.

Embryos and mummies, as the pre-birth transition and after-death extension of life forms of a human being, involve morality and ‘human dignity’.[13] Such transitional existence or continuum of life forms contains personal rights and interests for related parties, which may justify the adoption of a new classification. As a special form of life, embryos and mummies should not be considered as merely a property nor a person. The strict distinction between people and properties does not apply well in embryos and mummies. Instead, they should be regarded as ‘a transitional existence between a person and a property’ or ‘a continuum between a person and a property’. If it is not plausible to create a third type for the purpose of classification, they should be regarded, at least, as a quasi-person, or a special property with personal rights and interests. An embryo and a mummy cannot be owned by someone as a property. Rather, a person can be a custodian of  an embryo and a mummy. This is also the reason why cultural objects containing human remains should be treated differently.

 

4. A New Classification Requires a New Choice of Law Rule

In order to distinguish cultural objects containing human remains from other cultural objects, or more generally to distinguish cultural properties from other properties in the field of private international law, a new choice of law rule needs to be established. In this regard, the 2004 Belgian Private International Law Act might be the forerunner and serve as a model for not only other EU countries but also non-EU countries.[14]

 

 4.1 The lex originis overrides the lex situs

The traditional lex situs rule is based on the location of a property and does not take cultural property protection into consideration. Courts resolving cultural object disputes consistently fail to swiftly and fairly administer justice, and much of the blame can be put on the predominant lex situs rule.[15] The lex situs rule allows parties to choose more favorable countries and strongly weakens attempts to protect cultural objects.[16]

In Belgium, as a general rule, the restitution of illicitly-exported cultural objects is subject to the lex originis, rather than the lex rei sitae. Article 90 of 2004 Belgian Private International Law Act stipulated that if one object that has been recorded in a national list of cultural heritage is delivered outside this country in a way that against its law, the lawsuit filed in this country for the return of that particular object shall apply the law of the requesting country. This provision designates the law of the country of origin, also known as the lex originis rule. In comparison with the lex rei sitae or the lex furti rule, the lex originis rule is more favorable to the original owners

 

4.2 Facilitating the return of human remains to their country of origin

The establishment of a new choice of law rule for cultural relics containing human remains or cultural objects in general is in line with the national and international efforts of facilitating the return of stolen or illicitly cultural objects to their country of origin. Mummies exist not only in China, but also in many other countries, such as as Japan, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, USA, Russia, and Italy. The adoption of the lex originis rule could facilitate the return of stolen or illicitly exported cultural objects which contain human remains to their country of origin or culturally-affiliated place. This objective is shared in many international conventions and national legislations.

 

5. Concluding remarks

The mummy Master Zhanggong has not been returned to the Chinese village committees yet, since the Dutch defendants have lodged an appeal. This article argues that, in the light of the classification of frozen embryos in Shen v. Liu, mummies should be classified as ‘a transitional existence between a person and a property’. A new classification calls for a new choice of law rule. In this regard, the 2004 Belgian Private International Law Act might serve as a model, according to which the lex originis rule prevails over the traditional lex situs rule, unless the original owner chooses the application of the traditional lex situs or the lex originis rule does not provide protection to the good faith purchaser. The Chinese Private International Law should embrace such approach, since the application of the lex originis may facilitate the return of cultural relics, including but not limited to those containing human remains such as mummies, to their culturally affiliated community, ethnic or religious groups.

—

[1] This is a shortened version of the article published in the Chinese Journal of Comparative Law with open access https://doi.org/10.1093/cjcl/cxac006. Related blogposts are Buddha Mummy Statue case and Conflict of Laws of Cultural Property.

[2] Chinese Village Committees v. Oscar Van Overeem, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2018:8919, point 3.1.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., point 4.2.5.

[5] J. Huang, ‘Protecting Non-indigenous Human Remains under Cultural Heritage Law’, 14 Chinese Journal of International Law 2015, p. 724.

[6] E.H. Ayau and H. Keeler, Injustice, Human Rights, and Intellectual Savagery, in Human Remains in Museums and Collections, DOI: https://doi.org/10.18452/19383, p. 91.

[7] Ibid.

[8]  Mr and Mrs Shen v. Mr and Mrs Liu, Jiangsu Province Yixing Municipality People’s Court, (2013) Yi Min Chu Zi No 2729; Jiangsu Province Wuxi Municipality Intermediate People’s Court, (2014) Xi Min Zhong Zi No 01235.

[9]  Ibid.

[10] Ibid. The third party also stated that after the embryos are taken out, the only way to keep the embryos alive is surrogacy, which is illegal in China, thus both parties have no right to dispose the embryos.

[11] Ibid. Since the first-instance court held that embryos cannot be transferred or inherited, the case was dismissed in accordance with Article 5 of the General Principle of Civil Law and Article 3 of the Inheritance Law of the PRC.

[12] Ibid. The appellate court analyzed that after the death of Shen and Liu, their parents were the only subjects and most-related parties that care about the fate of embryos. Thus, it was appropriate to rule that the parents of Shen and Liu have the right to supervise and dispose the embryos. However, such supervision and disposal should abide by the law, and must not violate public order and good morals nor infringe the interests of other people.

[13] While birth means a definite initiation into human society, death indicates a final termination of a natural person, which both involve the dignity of an individual human or even humankind. H.G. Koch, ‘The Legal Status of the Human Embryo’, in E. Hildt and D. Mieth (eds.), Vitro Fertilisation in the 1990s, Routledge 1998, p. 3.

[14] T. Szabados, ‘In Search of the Holy Grail of the Conflict of Laws of Cultural Property: Recent Trends in European Private International Law Codifications’, 27 International Journal of Cultural Property 2020, p. 335.

[15] D. Fincham, ‘How Adopting the Lex Originis Rule Can Impede the Flow of Illicit Cultural Property’, 32 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 2008, p.116.

[16] Ibid, p.130.

 

A new book entitled Blurry Boundaries of Public and Private International Law: Towards Convergence or Divergent Still? and co-edited by Dr Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit (of the University of Tasmania) and Dharmita Prasad (Jindal Global Law School, O.P Jindal Global University) has just been released by Springer.

The description states that the book examines interactions and discusses intersectionality between public international law and private international law. With contributions from scholars from the USA, Canada, Australia, India, and the EU, this book brings out truly international perspectives on the topic. The contributions are arranged in four themes — Public international law and private international law: historical and theoretical considerations of the boundary; Harmonisation of private international law by public international law instruments: evaluation of process, problems and effectiveness; Case studies of intersectionality between public international law and private international law; and Future trends in the relationship between public international law and private international law.

The Foreword by Ralf Michaels is followed by these chapters:

Chapter 1: Public International Law and Private International Law: Setting scene for intersectionality – Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit and Dharmita Prasad
Chapter 2 – Private International Law’s origins as a branch of the universal law of nations – Marco Basile
Chapter 3 – Recognition – A story of how the two worlds meet – Dulce Lopes
Chapter 4 – Forum non conveniens in Australia – how much weight should be given to comity? – Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit
Chapter 5 – International rule of law and its relation to harmonisation – Dharmita Prasad
Chapter 6 – A quest for the missing link in the resolution of international investment disputes affecting host states’ citizens under public and private international law – Richard Mlambe
Chapter 7 – Visualising the role of international rule of law in claim funding by third parties – Gautam Mohanty
Chapter 8 – Article 79 CISG: Testing the effectiveness of the CISG in international trade through the lens of the COVID-19 outbreak – Nevena Jevremovic
Chapter 9 – Determination of legal effects of COVID-19 related export bans and restrictions on international sale of goods contracts: Interplay between public and private international law – Burcu Yuksel Ripley and Ulku Halatci Ulusoy
Chapter 10 – Private International Law vs Public International Law: Competing complimentary intersectionality in CISG Article 79? Peter Mazzacano
Chapter 11 – Blocking Statutes: Private individuals finding themselves in interstate conflicts – Marcel Gernert
Chapter 12 – When public international law meets EU private international law: an insight on the European Court of Justice case law dealing with immunity vis-à-vis the application of the Brussels Regime – Maria Barral Martinez
Chapter 13 – Children’s rights law and private international law: What do referencing patterns reveal about their relation? – Tine Van Hof
Chapter 14 – Ringfencing data? – Perspectives on sovereignty and localisation from India – Sai Ramani Garimella and Parthiban B
Chapter 15 – Private international law and public international law – increasing convergence or divergence as usual? – Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit and Dharmita Prasad

For further details of the book please refer to the respective Springer webpage.
It is worthy of mention that the editors are in the process of planning an online “book launch” event at some point within the second quarter of 2022. Details once finalised will also be announced in this portal.

The environment is on – almost – everybody’s mind.  In particular companies committed to sustainable investment are becoming an increasingly relevant economic factor. Accordingly, their business models are now also frequently the subject of court proceedings, raising  new legal questions, including those concerning private international law. The CJEU has recently had to decide on such a question.

Facts

The Swiss investment firm ShareWood had a clever idea to turn ecological concerns into money: They offered to plant trees in Brazil, harvest them after a couple of years and sell the timber for a profit. Investors were promised ownership of individual trees. They would also rent a piece of land for as long as ‘their’ trees were standing on it. The contracts were expressly submitted to Swiss law.

Soon the relations between the firm and their investors turned sour. Some Austrian residents complained that ShareWood had failed to transfer ownership of the trees to them and sued the firm in Vienna.

Proceedings

The Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) considered the law applicable to this dispute. In particular, it was unsure whether the case fell under Article 6(4)(c) of the Rome I Regulation, which makes an exception from the consumer conflicts provisions in the case of “a contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of immovable property”.

Holding of the CJEU

The CJEU, in a decision dated 10 February 2022, flatly rejects the applicability of Article 6(4)(c) of the Rome I Regulation.

First, the CJEU denies that the contracts concern “a right in rem in immovable property”. Although the investors aimed to acquire property, they targeted the trees and not the immovable property. The Court admits the existence of national provisions under which the tree is considered as being part of the immovable property on which it stands, but wilfully ignores them by applying its famous principle of autonomous interpretation. The Court refers instead to the specific purpose of the contracts, which is to generate income from the sale of the timber. In its view, the trees “must be regarded as being the proceeds of the use of the land on which they are planted” (para 28), and thus not as forming part of the real estate.

Second, the CJEU also denies that the contracts relate to the “tenancy of immovable property” and hence does not fall under the second prong of Article 6(4)(c) of the Rome I Regulation,  despite the fact that the investors rented the land on which their tree stands. The Court of Justice revives here some of its case law regarding the exclusive jurisdiction for such tenancy agreements under the old Article 16(1)  of the Brussels Convention. Specifically, it cites its decision in Klein, where it had ruled that the application of this provision requires “a sufficiently close link between the contract and the property concerned”. The Court now holds that this link would not exist where the lease is intended “merely to enable the sales and services elements provided for in the contract to be carried out” (para 37).

The result is that the choice of law in the contracts could not overcome the mandatory rules in force at the consumers’ habitual residence (Article 6(2) Rome I Regulation). In the specific case, the chosen Swiss law was thus superseded by the mandatory rules of Austrian law.

Comment

The Court of Justice may have oversimplified things a bit. It neglected the fact that the investors pursued a double goal: they wanted not only to make money on the sale of the timber, but also to own the trees while they were growing as a kind of legally protected contribution to the fight against climate change. To ensure this second goal, the contracts stipulated that this ownership would not start after the trees were harvested, but long before. Moreover, the connection with the tenancy of the land was way more straightforward than in  Klein, where a membership in a club had been acquired. Here, the land served the purpose of  growing a specific tree. There was thus a much stronger connection to a particular piece of land.

Conclusion

Despite these weaknesses, the CJEU judgment may still be defended on the grounds  of consumer protection. Indeed, financial profit was a key driver of the whole contractual arrangement and not just a side-issue. In a case like this, the link to the immovable property does not outdo the need for consumer/investor protection. Article 6(4)(c) of the Rome I Regulation should be restricted to those cases that primarily are about rights in immovable property and are not also motivated by a substantial financial purpose. This is the lesson to be learned from ShareWood Switzerland.

If the financial purpose would be dominant, one could think about qualifying the contracts as financial instruments under Art. 6(4)(d) of the Rome I Regulation. Yet this characterisation is difficult given the regulatory definition of this notion (see Annex I C of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II)). Contracts like the present ones thus fall between the boundaries  of Article 6(4)(c) and (d) of the Rome I Regulation, which is good news for consumers because the rules of Article 6(1) and (2) of the Rome I Regulation, favourable to them, will apply.

Many thanks to Amy Held, Felix Krysa and Verena Wodniansky-Wildenfeld for reviewing this post.

Préfet du Gers et Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
DGEN
Selon l’avocat général Collins, les ressortissants britanniques qui ont joui des droits de la citoyenneté européenne ne conservent pas ces avantages après le retrait du Royaume-Uni de l’Union européenne

TGSS (Chômage des employés de maison)
SOPO
La législation espagnole qui exclut les employés de maison des prestations de chômage alors qu’il s’agit presque exclusivement de femmes est contraire au droit de l’Union

A (Contrats d’assurance « unit-linked »)
Liberté d'établissement
La Cour précise la portée de l’obligation d’information précontractuelle en matière de contrats collectifs d’assurance-vie « unit-linked »

Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli et Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze
Liberté d'établissement
Lutte contre la consommation de tabac chez les jeunes : les États membres peuvent imposer des sanctions administratives aux opérateurs économiques violant l’interdiction de vente aux mineurs, telles que la suspension de leur licence d’exploitation pour 15 jours

The Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law is currently recruiting. A fully-funded position as Research Fellow (PhD candidate) for the Department of European and Comparative Procedural Law, led by Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Burkhard Hess, is open:

   Fixed-term contract for 2 years; contract extension is possible; full-time based in Luxembourg

The successful candidate will conduct legal research (contribution to common research projects and own publications), particularly in the field of European and Comparative Procedural Law, while playing a central role in undertaking and developing team-driven projects within the Institute, in partnership with renowned international academics.

You may apply online until 20 March 2022 by submitting a detailed CV, including a list of publications (if applicable); copies of academic records; a PhD project description of no more than 1-2 pages with the name of the foreseen PhD supervisor and the name of the institution awarding the PhD certificate.

The Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law strives to ensure a workplace that embraces diversity and provides equal opportunities.

Govern d'Andorra / EUIPO (Andorra)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Le Tribunal confirme que le signe figuratif ANDORRA ne peut faire l’objet d’un enregistrement en tant que marque de l’Union européenne pour plusieurs produits et services

United Parcel Service / Commission, ASL Aviation Holdings, ASL Airlines (Ireland)/Commission
Droit institutionnel
Le Tribunal rejette deux recours indemnitaires introduits par UPS et ASL Aviation Holdings

Gary Born (Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP) and Cem Kalelioglu (Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP) contributed an article on choice-of-law agreements in international contracts to Volume 50, Number 1, of the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law.

Choice-of-law agreements are widely used in international business transactions, with a substantial majority of all cross-border commercial and investment contracts containing a choice-of-law provision. Virtually all legal systems, and many treaties and other international legal instruments, recognize the presumptive validity of such agreements. Nonetheless, there are significant variations in the treatment of international choice-of-law provisions, including with respect to issues of validity, enforceability, and interpretation, which can lead to a degree of unpredictability in the application of such provisions. This uncertainty undermines the basic purposes of choice-of-law agreements and private international law more generally.

This Article examines the treatment of international choice-of-law agreements under both national and international law. In particular, the Article considers the rules governing the validity and enforceability of such agreements, the exceptions to their presumptive validity and enforceability, and the interpretation of international choice-of-law provisions.

The Article argues that the basic rule of presumptive validity of choice-of-law provisions in international commercial and investment contracts now has the status of a general principle of law and is therefore binding on states as a matter of international law and, in any event, should be adopted as a matter of national policy. This Article also argues that, although there are substantial similarities in the treatment of exceptions to the validity of international choice-of-law provisions in different national and other legal systems, important differences persist. These differences undermine the purposes of such agreements, and thereby impede international trade and investment. The Article examines these differences and proposes heightened uniformity in the rules governing the recognition of international choice-of-law agreements in commercial and investment contracts. Among other things, choice-of-law agreements (i) should not be subject to any “reasonable relationship” requirement, (ii) should be presumptively valid where a non- national legal system is selected and (iii) should be unenforceable on public policy grounds only in exceptional circumstances.

The Article also contends that similar differences exist with respect to the interpretation of international choice-of-law agreements in different legal systems, and that these differences frustrate the intentions of commercial parties. The Article proposes rules of interpretation of international choice-of-law provisions, including presumptions that choice-of-law agreements select only the “local law,” not the “whole law,” of a jurisdiction and that choice-of-law provisions be interpreted liberally, to include most issues of procedure and remedy, as well as non-contractual issues. These uniform rules of interpretation would better serve the objectives of commercial parties and purposes of private international law regimes and the international legal system than does existing treatment of international choice-of-law provisions.

The article is freely accessible here.

The Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan plans to invite young scholars to present the outcome of their doctoral research on any topic within the field of private international law, transnational law or the law of international arbitration, at a dedicated seminar that will be held annually in Milan (the MECSI Seminar). Each MECSI Seminar will revolve around one scholar, selected by a jury constituted for this purpose.

Exceptionally, two MECSI Seminars will take place in 2022. The first will be held on 9 March 2022 at 5 pm. The speaker will be Augustin Gridel, who is a teaching fellow at the Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas. He will deliver a presentation titled Financial Markets and Financial Instruments in Private International Law. Professor Francesca Villata, of the University of Milan, will act as a discussant.

Those interested in presenting their doctoral research at the second MECSI Seminar of 2022, scheduled to take place in November 2022, are encouraged to send an e-mail to Pietro Franzina (pietro.franzina@unicatt.it) by 15 July 2022.

Applicants must be aged less than 35 and may come from any country. They must have already discussed their PhD dissertation at the time when the application is submitted (however, no more than two years must have passed since the dissertation was discussed). Applications must include a copy of the dissertation, an abstract of the dissertation in English and a CV of the author in English.

Applications must also include a proposal for the seminar presentation consisting of a title followed by abstract of about 1.500 words. The subject matter of the presentation must relate to, but should not necessarily coincide with, the topic of the thesis: the applicant may choose, for instance, to concentrate on one aspect of his or her research, or discuss developments occurred after the dissertation was discussed.

All documents accompanying the application must be in pdf format. The selection process involves, for those shortlisted, a Zoom interview.

The Catholic University of the Sacred Heart will cover the travel expenses of the selected scholar up to 600 Euros, and will take care of his or her accommodation at one of the guest houses of the University for up to two nights. During their stay in Milan, the selected scholar will also be invited to give a 45 minute lecture in English to the students attending the course of Private International Law on a topic unrelated to their PhD research.

Sea Watch
Transport
Selon l’avocat général Rantos, les navires privés exerçant une activité régulière de recherche et de sauvetage en mer peuvent faire l’objet d’un contrôle de conformité aux normes internationales assuré par l’État du port

Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides (Unité familiale - Protection déjà accordée)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Un État membre peut exercer sa faculté de déclarer une demande de protection internationale irrecevable au motif que le demandeur s’est déjà vu accorder le statut de réfugié par un autre État membre

Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd e.a.
Liberté d'établissement
Cigarettes à filtre : la méthode établie par l’ISO pour déterminer les niveaux d’émission maximaux de goudron, de nicotine et de monoxyde de carbone, à laquelle renvoie le droit de l’Union, est valide et opposable aux producteurs de cigarettes

Openbaar Ministerie (Tribunal établi par la loi dans l’État membre d’émission)
DFON
Refus d’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen : la Cour précise les critères permettant à une autorité judiciaire d’exécution d’apprécier le risque éventuel de violation du droit fondamental de la personne recherchée à un procès équitable

RS (Effet des arrêts d’une cour constitutionnelle)
Droit institutionnel
Le droit de l’Union s’oppose à une règle nationale en vertu de laquelle les juridictions nationales ne sont pas habilitées à examiner la conformité avec le droit de l’Union d’une législation nationale qui a été jugée constitutionnelle par un arrêt de la cour constitutionnelle de l’État membre