Agrégateur de flux

The author of this post is Carlos Santaló Goris, research fellow at the MPI Luxembourg and Ph.D. candidate at the University of Luxembourg.

Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 establishing the European Payment Order (‘EPO’) introduced the first EU uniform civil procedure. The EPO Regulation aimed at facilitating the cross-border recovery of debt within the EU.

According to statistics published by the Spanish General Council of the Judiciary, in 2017, Spanish courts issued a total 655 EPOs. In 2018, the number of EPOs increased 898,32%, up to 5.884 EPOs. In 2019, the number of EPOs continued increasing, skyrocketing to the gargantuan number of 29.120 EPOs. In 2020, though there was a decrease with respect to the previous year, Spanish courts still issued 21.636 EPOs.

Just for the sake of comparison: during the same period there were much fewer applications for EPOs. in Germany: 3.706 applications in 2018, 3.577 in 2019, and 3.582 in 2020.

What is the reason behind the abnormal increase in the number of EPOs issued by Spanish courts between 2017 and 2019? In my view, the answer is to be found in the difference between the EPO and the Spanish payment order regarding the courts’ possibility (obligation) to assess the fairness of contractual terms in consumer claims under Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.

Under the Spanish payment order, a court receiving an application for a payment order involving a consumer party had to evaluate the fairness of the contractual terms of the relation between the creditor and the consumer. Mandatory review was the conequence of the ECJ judgment, C‑618/10, Banco Español de Crédito. According to the ECJ, “Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which does not allow the court before which an application for an order for payment has been brought to assess of its own motion, in limine litis or at any other stage during the proceedings, even though it already has the legal and factual elements necessary for that task available to it, whether a term concerning interest on late payments contained in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is unfair, in the case where that consumer has not lodged an objection” (para. 57).

Unlike the Spanish payment order procedure, the EPO follows a non-documentary procedure. Creditors do not have to provide any documents – only the application standard form. In particular, they do not have to provide the contract on which the claim is based; they are only required to describe “the circumstances invoked as the basis of the claim” and a “description of evidence supporting the claim” (Article 7(2) EPO Regulation). The ECJ had made it clear “that Article 7 of Regulation No 1896/2006 governs the requirements exhaustively to be met by an application for a European order for payment can ensure that the objective of the regulation is attained” (C-215/11, Szyrocka, para. 32). Furthermore, according to the Spanish act implementing the EPO Regulation any documents other than the standard form would be inadmissible when applying for the EPO (23rd final provision of Spanish Code of Civil Procedure). Based on the information that creditors provide in the EPO application, Spanish courts could not examine the fairness of the contractual terms as they would in the national payment order. Aware of this, more creditors started to apply for EPOs, thus provoking the increased number of applications.

Since the EPO Regulation only applies to cross-border claims, many claims which initially had a purely domestic origin had to be “transformed” into cross-border ones. According to Article 3 of the EPO Regulation, the cross-border dimension of a claim is established when “at least one of the parties is domiciled or habitually resident in a Member State other than the Member State of the court seised.” To satisfy this prerequisite, domestic creditors assigned the debt to a new creditor in another Member State (often vulture funds or companies specialized in debt recovery).

The flood of EPO applications in consumer claims did not pass by unnoticed by Spanish judges. Three Spanish courts submitted requests for preliminary rulings to the ECJ asking whether judges could ask the EPO applicant for additional documents in order to conduct an ex officio review of the fairness of the contractual terms. Two of those preliminary references led to the ECJ judgment C‑453/18 and C‑494/18, Bondora. In this decision, the ECJ determined that “a ‘court’, within the meaning of that regulation, seised in the context of a European order for payment procedure, to request from the creditor additional information relating to the terms of the agreement relied on in support of the claim at issue, in order to carry out an ex officio review of the possible unfairness of those terms and, consequently, that they preclude national legislation which declares the additional documents provided for that purpose to be inadmissible” (para. 54).

Bondora opened the door the examination of the fairness of the contractual terms in the context of the EPO procedure. From the creditors’ perspective, this judgment put a virtual end to the comparative advantage that the EPO Regulation had over the Spanish payment order in claims against consumers.

But, has the Bondora decision already impacted the number of EPO applications? Difficult to say. The decision was published in December 2019. In 2020, there was a decrease of 7.515 EPOs rendered by Spanish courts as compared to 2019. However, the number of EPOs still remained highly superior to the average amount of yearly EPOs issued by Spanish courts before 2018. More likely, the COVID-19 pandemic explains the decline. It is only in the coming years where we might see whether Bondora has caused the EPO Regulation to lose its charm among Spanish creditors or not.

By Neerav Srivastava

The Rule in Antony Gibbs[1] (‘the Rule’) provides that if the proper law of a contract is Australian, then a discharge of the debt by a foreign jurisdiction will not be a discharge in Australia unless the creditor submitted to the foreign jurisdiction.[2] The Rule is much maligned, especially in insolvency circles, and has been described as “Victorian”.[3] In ‘Heritage and Vitality: Whether Antony Gibbs is a Presumption’[4] I seek to defend the Rule.

The article begins by arguing that, in the modern context, that the Rule should be recognised as a Presumption as to party intentions.

Briefly, Gibbs was decided in the 1890s. At the time, the prevailing view was that the proper law of a contract was either the law of the place of the contract or its performance.[5] This approach was based on apportioning regulatory authority between sovereign States rather than party intentions. To apply a foreign proper law in a territory was regarded as contrary to territorial sovereignty. Freedom of contract and party intentions were becoming relevant to proper law but only to a limited extent.[6]

As for Gibbs, Lord Esher’s language is consistent with the ‘Regulatory Approach’:

It is clear that these were English contracts according to two rules of law; first, because they were made in England; secondly, because they were to be performed in England. The general rule as to the law which governs a contract is that the law of the country, either where the contract is made, or where it is to be so performed that it must be considered to be a contract of that country, is the law which governs such contract …[7]

Notice that the passage makes no reference to party intentions.

By the early 20th century, the position had evolved in that it was generally accepted that party intentions determined the proper law.[8] Even so, it was not until the late 1930s that the Privy Council stated that the position was “well-settled”.[9] Party intentions has evolved into being the test for proper law universally.[10]

Under the modern approach, party intentions as to proper law are a question of fact and not territorial. Parties are free to choose a proper law of a jurisdiction with which they have no connection.[11] As a question of fact, party intentions are better understood as a ‘Presumption’. Further, the Presumption might be displaced. The same conclusion can be reached via an implied term analysis.

The parties can also agree that there is more than one proper law for a contract. That, too, is consistent with party autonomy. Under depeçage, one law can govern a contract’s implementation and another its discharge.[12] Likewise, the Second Restatement in the US[13] and the International Hague Principles allow a contract to have multiple proper laws.[14]

The second part of the article addresses criticisms of Gibbs by cross-border insolvency practitioners. In insolvency, issues are no longer merely between the two contracting parties. The body of creditors are competing for a share of a company’s remaining assets. Under pari passu all creditors are to be treated equally. If a company is in a foreign liquidation, and its discharge of Australian debt is not recognised by an Australian court, Gibbs appears inconsistent with pari passu. Specifically, it appears that the creditor can sue in Australia and secure a disproportionate return.

That is an incomplete picture. While the foreign insolvency does not discharge the debt in Australia, when it comes to enforcement comity applies. Comity is agitated by a universal distribution process in a foreign insolvency. Having regard to comity, the Australian court will treat local and international creditors equally.[15] If creditors are recovering 50% in a foreign insolvency, an Australian court will not allow an Australian creditor to recover more than 50% at the enforcement stage. Criticisms of the Presumption do not give due weight to enforcement.

Gibbs has been described as irreconcilable with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 1997 (the 1997 Model Law),[16] which is generally[17] regarded as embodying ‘modified universalism’. That, it is submitted, reflects a misunderstanding.

Historically, in a cross-border insolvency “territorialism” applied.[18] Each country collected assets in its territory and distributed them to creditors claiming in those insolvency proceedings. In the past 200 years, universalism has been applied.[19] Under ‘pure universalism’, there is only one process for collecting assets globally and distributing to all creditors. Modified universalism:

accepts the central premise of [pure] universalism, that assets should be collected and distributed on a worldwide basis, but reserves to local courts discretion to evaluate the fairness of the home-country procedures and to protect the interests of local creditors …[20]

Modified universalism can be understood as a structured form of comity.[21] It asks that all creditors be treated equally but is a tent in that it allows States to choose how to protect the interest of creditors. A State may choose to couple recognition of the foreign insolvency – and the collection of assets in its jurisdiction – with the discharge of creditors’ debts. However, the 1997 Model Law does not require a State to follow this mechanism.[22] Under the Anglo-Australian mechanism (a) a debt may not be discharged pursuant to Gibbs (b), but creditors are treated equally at the enforcement stage. It is a legitimate approach under the tent that is modified universalism.

[1] Antony Gibbs & Sons v Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399.

[2] Albert Venn Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England With Reference To The Conflict of Laws (Stevens, 1896) rule 113.

[3] Varoon Sachdev, “Choice of Law in Insolvency Proceedings: How English Courts’ Continued Reliance on the Gibbs Principle Threatens Universalism” (2019) 93 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 343.

[4] (2021) 29 Insolvency Law Journal 61. Available at Westlaw Australia.

[5] Alex Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law (CUP, 2018) 53, citing Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co v Shand (1865) 16 ER 103.

[6] Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (CUP, 2009), 53.

[7] Antony Gibbs & Sons v Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399, 405 (Gibbs).

[8] Alex Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law (CUP, 2018) 56, Lord Collins et al, Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th ed, 2017), [32-004]–[32-005].

[9] Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277.

[10] Martin Davis et al, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia (Lexis Nexis, 2019), [19.6]; Lord Collins et al, Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th ed, 2017), [32-004]–[32-005], [32-042]; and Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts promulgated by the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 2015.

[11] Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277, Martin Davis et al, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia (Lexis Nexis, 2019), [19.15].

[12] Club Mediterranee New Zealand v Wendell [1989] 1 NZLR 216, Olex Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Co Ltd [1998] 3 VR 380.

[13] Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188.

[14] Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts promulgated by the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 2015.

[15] Galbraith v Grimshaw [1910] AC 508, Chapman v Travelstead (1998) 86 FCR 460, Re HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (2005) 190 FLR 398.

[16] In Australia the 1997 Model Law was extended to Australia by the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth).

[17] Adrian Walters, “Modified Universalisms & the Role of Local Legal Culture in the Making of Cross-border Insolvency Law” (2019) 93 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 47, 64.

[18] Although Rares J has pointed out, “centuries earlier, maritime lawyers had developed a sophisticated and generally harmonious system of dealing with cross-border insolvencies”: Steven Rares, “Consistency and Conflict – Cross-Border Insolvency” (Paper presented at the 32nd Annual Conference of the Banking & Financial Services Law Association, Brisbane, 4 September 2015).

[19] Re HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, [30]; [2008] UKHL 21.

[20] Jay Lawrence Westbrook, “Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies” (1991) 17 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 499, 517.

[21] UNCITRAL, Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency (2014) [8].

[22] Akers v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 223 FCR 8; [2014] FCAFC 57. See too Re Bakhshiyeva v Sberbank of Russia [2019] Bus LR 1130 (CA); [2018] EWCA 2802.

The author of this post is Christelle Chalas, who is an Associate Professor at the University of Lille. 

The French law on the compliance with the Republican Principles (projet de loi confortant le respect des principes de la République) introduces a new paragraph in Article 913 of the French Civil Code aiming at re-establishing a right of ‘compensatory levy’ (droit de prélèvement compensatoire) on property situated in France for the benefit of children who would not benefit from a reserved share of inheritance.

Its scope is limited to cases where either the deceased or one of his or her children is a national of a Member State of the European Union or a person whose habitual residence is in such a State.

The new text reads:

Lorsque le défunt ou au moins l’un de ses enfants est, au moment du décès, ressortissant d’un État membre de l’Union européenne ou y réside habituellement et lorsque la loi étrangère applicable à la succession ne permet aucun mécanisme réservataire protecteur des enfants, chaque enfant ou ses héritiers ou ses ayants cause peuvent effectuer un prélèvement compensatoire sur les biens existants situés en France au jour du décès, de façon à être rétablis dans les droits réservataires que leur octroie la loi française, dans la limite de ceux-ci.

The law was eventually adopted by the National Assembly on 23 July 2021. The bill had been rejected twice by the Senate in April 2021 (see here) and then on 20 July 2021, but the National Assembly had voted twice in favour of its adoption (in February and July 2021, see here). Under the French legislative system, the Assembly’s deliberations ultimately prevail. The constitutionality of the bill was immediately challenged before the Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel) (see below).

A compensatory levy was instituted in French inheritance law by the law of the 14 July 1819 but it was found to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Council in 2011 (see here) on the ground that it disregarded the principle of equality by establishing an inequal treatment based on nationality between the heirs designated by the foreign inheritance law.

Although the new text avoids this obvious violation of the principle of equality by granting this right to all heirs whatever their nationality or residence, it raises several problems that threaten its validity.

These problems are interesting because they illustrate the small margin of freedom that national legislators still enjoy in particular with regard to European law. From a domestic perspective, issues of constitutionality also arose.

Regarding the conformity of Article 913 with the French Constitution, it is submitted that the main concern is the appropriateness of the “droit de prélèvement” with regard to the purpose of the law. It was said during the discussion in the Senate, and shown in French doctrine (Revue critique de DIP 2021, issue 2, announced here) that there is a high risk that the provision misses its target.

The purpose of Article 913 is to steer against the effects of an applicable foreign inheritance law that would discriminate between heirs according to their sex or religion. More specifically, the government did not hide that the provision aims at protecting female heirs from the inheritance laws of Muslim countries. But, since Article 913 does not limit its application to discriminatory foreign laws, but is concerned with foreign laws which “do not permit any reserved share mechanism”, the provision could reach situations that in no way threaten “Republican Principles” (here, equality) and, conversely, Article 913 could miss situations that do threaten these principles. Indeed, the laws of common law countries could be concerned as they do not provide for reserved shares, while, on the contrary, Article 913 could possibly not apply to Muslim laws since they might provide for a reserved share.

One can also be very critical about the weakness of the required connection with France: by rendering the mechanism available to all children heirs as long as only one of them, or the deceased, is a national of a Member State of the EU or is resident in one of theses states, it is very easy to imagine situations in which the protection of the French law will appear inappropriate, if not illegitimate. The real object of the law remains unclear and this raises concerns about the adequacy of the compensatory system set in place. This could be a reason for unconstitutionality.

Furthermore, if the only purpose of Article 913 is to fight against discriminatory foreign laws, the public policy exception should be efficient enough. The French Supreme Court for civil and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) could transpose its own jurisprudence on repudiation to the context of reserved share in inheritance law.

The other advantage of the public policy exception is that it allows a concrete and factual assessment of the result produced by the application of the foreign law.  For example, the family provisions of English law would be spared by the public policy exception while it is not sure that the new text would not receive application in this case.

Unfortunately, it does not seem that any of the parties who participated in the challenge of the constitutionality of the law raised any argument with respect to the new provision. On August, 13th, 2021, the Constitutional Council delivered its decision without addressing the issue.

The conformity of Article 913 with the European Succession Regulation could also be questioned on several grounds.

Article 23 of the Regulation provides that “the law determined pursuant to Article 21 and Article 22 shall govern the succession as a whole. That law shall govern in particular, … the disposable part of the estate, the reserved shares and other restrictions on the disposal of property upon death as well as claims which persons close to the deceased may have against the estate or the heirs”. By putting in place a right of compensatory levy on property situated in France, Article 13 sets a new exemption on the applicable law designated by the Regulation.

The European Court of justice might not accept this type of circumvention of the applicable law, in particular when the deceased person has chosen its national law in accordance with Article 22. Recital 38 of the Preamble to the Regulation specifies that the choice of law is limited to the national law of the deceased precisely with the objective “to avoid a law being chosen with the intention of frustrating the legitimate expectations of persons entitled to a reserved share”. A limited and voluntary infringement to the reserved share is thus admitted by the Succession Regulation.

Article 913 would also possibly run against Recital 37 that states that the succession should be govern by a predictable law with which it is closely connected. Predictability and necessity of a close connection between the applicable law and the succession are clearly challenged by the French draft provision. Recital 37 also recommends that “for reasons of legal certainty and in order to avoid the frag­mentation of the succession, that law should govern the succession as a whole”. On the contrary, the compensatory levy instituted by French law results in the application of several inheritance laws.

The only solution would be to consider that the French compensatory levy right falls under the public policy exception set out in Article 35 of the Regulation. But neither here can there be certainty. As is well known, the Court of Justice supports a very restrictive application of the public policy exception, which is reinforced by the requirement in Article 35 that the application of a provision of the law specified by the Regulation should be “manifestly incompatible” with the public policy of the relevant State. Through its control, The European Court of Justice limits any misuse of the concept of public policy that would have the effect of impeding the effectiveness of European regulations.

In this respect, it seems that the nuanced jurisprudence of the French Supreme Court, which limits the exclusion of foreign law to cases where a child heir is in a situation of economic insecurity or need, is more in line with the requirement of Article 35.

Non lieu à renvoi

Irrecevabilité

The third issue of 2021 Lloyds’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly was published today. It features one article and a book review on private international law.

M Teo,  “A Negotiation-Based Choice of Law Rule for Contractual Formation”

A Briggs, “Book Review – The Private International Law of Authentic Instruments”

Non lieu à renvoi

Contrôle judiciaire

Séquestration

Tribunal judiciaire d'Evry

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel de Rouen du 17 juin 2021

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel de Rouen du 17 juin 2021

The Faculty of Law, Brawijaya University, Indonesia is organizing a one-day international online seminar on Private International Law in Islamic Countries – Developments and Challenges. The main purpose of the seminar is to examine and discuss the current situation of private international law in Islamic countries especially from the point of view of the influence of religion (Sharia/Islamic law) on the regulation of private international relationships.

Participation is free but online registration (here)  is kindly requested to receive the link to the conference, which will be emailed shortly before the event.

After registering, attendees will receive a confirmation email containing information about joining the webinar. The event will also be live streamed via YouTube (here). E-certificate for attendance will also be issued for attendees to prove that they joined the online seminar.

Details about the forthcoming seminar are as follows:

Date: 24 August 2021

Time: 13:00 (Western Indonesia Time); 14:00 (Brunei & Hong Kong Time); 15:00 (Japan Time)

Program (details can be found here):

1. Admittance for Key-note Speaker, Invited Speakers, and Seminar
2. Opening Ceremony by the Dean of the Faculty of Law, Brawijaya
3. Keynote Speech by Professor Yun Zhao, Representative of the HCCH Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
4. Seminar Presentation (Moderator: Cyndiarnis, SH. MKn)

• • a. Associate Professor Béligh Elbalti, Ph.D., Graduate School of Law and Politics, Osaka University (The Influence of Islamic Law Principles on the Treatment of International Private Relationships – Family Law as Example)
  • b. Nobumichi Teramura, Assistant Professor of the Institute of Asian Studies, and University of Brunei Darussalam (Shariah as the Law Applicable to an International Commercial Contract: Challenges and Opportunities in Australia and Brunei)
  • c. Afifah Kusumadara, SH. LL.M. SJD., Faculty of Law, Brawijaya University (The connecting factors to determine the applicable law and the court jurisdiction in Indonesia: The interference of religion)

5. Question and Answer
6. Photo Session and Closing
7. Announcement by the M.C. concerning:

• • Certificates of Participation
  • Seminar materials

Any enquiries should be directed to seminar_pil@ub.ac.id. The organisers are looking forward to having fruitful discussion with and exchange of ideas among all participants.

A foreign judgment that cannot be enforced is useless no matter how well it is/was written. The fact that a foreign judgment can be readily enforced aids the prompt settlement of disputes and makes international commercial transactions more effective.  The importance of the enforcement of foreign judgments cannot be over-emhpasised because international commercial parties are likely to lose confidence in a system that does not protect their interests in the form of recognising and enforcing a foreign judgment.

Today Hart published a new private international law monograph focused on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Its title is “The Hague Judgments Convention and Commonwealth Model Law: A Pragmatic Perspective.” The author of this monograph is Dr Abubakri Yekini of the Lagos State University. The monograph is based on his PhD thesis at the University of Aberdeen titled “A Critical Analysis of the Hague Judgments Convention and Commonwealth Model Law from a Pragmatic Perspective.”

The abstract of the book reads as follows:

“This book undertakes a systematic analysis of the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention, the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005, and the 2017 Commonwealth Model Law on recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments from a pragmatic perspective.

The book builds on the concept of pragmatism in private international law within the context of recognition and enforcement of judgments. It demonstrates the practical application of legal pragmatism by setting up a toolbox (pragmatic goals and methods) that will assist courts and policymakers in developing an effective and efficient judgments’ enforcement scheme at national, bilateral and multilateral levels.

Practitioners, national courts, policymakers, academics, students and litigants will benefit from the book’s comparative approach using case law from the United Kingdom and other leading Commonwealth States, the United States, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The book also provides interesting findings from the empirical research on the refusal of recognition and enforcement in the UK and the Commonwealth statutory registration schemes respectively.”

I have had the benefit of reading this piece once and can confidently recommend it to anyone interested in the important topic of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The pragmatic approach utilised in the book makes the work an interesting read. My prediction is that this book will endure for a long time, and will likely be utilised in adjudication.

Mandat d'arrêt européen

In the judgment in TeamBank dated 19 January 2019, the CJEU ruled that Article 14 of the Rome I Regulation does nothing to identify the law governing the effects of assignment in relation to third parties. The court referred, inter alia, to Article 27(2) of the Rome I Regulation, which tasked the Commission to report on this issue and propose an amendment to the Regulation. In the meantime, the question will be governed by national conflict-of-laws rules.

But by which one? This interesting point was subsequently decided in a judgment by the Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) Saarbrücken (Germany), which had requested the preliminary ruling from the CJEU.

The legal situation in Germany in this respect is somewhat unclear. Until 2009, the Introductory Act to the German Civil Code (EGBGB) featured a rule on the law applicable to assignment in its former Article 33. Although this provision did not explicitly address third-party effects, it was interpreted by the courts and most authors as submitting them to the law of the assigned claim. Yet Article 33 EGBGB was repealed in 2009 by the German legislator because it considered the rule as no longer necessary due to entry into force of the Rome I Regulation.

Thus, the important gap of the Rome I Regulation regarding third-party effects of assignment, which the CJEU had correctly identified in TeamBank, became all the more significant. To close it, the Court of Appeal Saarbrücken refers to the old EGBGB rule and its long-standing interpretation. In the eyes of the court, the repeal of the provision does not matter, given the advantages of applying the law of the assigned claim to third-party effects. Specifically, the court highlights the rule’s contribution to the goal of legal certainty, which could not be achieved by other connecting factors. Moreover, it explicitly rejects the habitual residence of the assignor in this context, as it would not allow the same degree of predictability in the case of sequential assignments.

Applying this conflicts rule, the court determines the law of Luxembourg as governing the third-party effects in the present litigation. To recall: In the underlying case, a Luxembourgish civil servant habitually resident in Germany had twice assigned her salary claims against her employer, first to a bank in Germany and thereafter to a bank in Luxembourg, before becoming bankrupt. The debtor was only informed of the second assignment. Afterwards, the two banks had a dispute about the rights to the salary.

The Court of Appeal starts by considering the validity of the first assignment from the point of view of German substantive law, which governs the assignment under Art 14(2) Rome I Regulation. However, these considerations were ultimately futile. Only thereafter did the court address the real issue, i.e. the law applicable to the third-party effects of the assignment.

Since the claim assigned was governed by Luxembourgish law, the court held the same to be applicable to the dispute between the banks before it. Based on an expert opinion, the court considers only the second assignment, which had been notified to the debtor, as valid under Luxembourg law. The fact that the previous assignment is valid under German law without any notice to the debtor would not matter as Luxembourgish law governs the third-party effects of both assignments.

The Court of Appeal does not fail to acknowledge that under the European Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignment of claims, the connecting factor will be different because the habitual residence of the assignor takes centre stage (see Article 4(1) of the Proposal). However, the court also points to the various exceptions to this rule in Article 4(2) and (3) of the Proposal. Moreover, it points to the rule for priority conflicts in Article 4(4) of the Proposal. The court takes the view that the latter rule would have yielded the same result it had reached in the present case, i.e. the applicability of the law of Luxembourg.

It is respectfully submitted that the court erred on this last point. Article 4(4) of the Proposal contains a rule for priority conflicts that may arise where two assignments are covered by Article 4(1) and Article 4(2) or (3) of the Proposal. It therefore presupposes the applicability of two diverging connecting factors – habitual residence on the one hand, and the law governing the claim on the other. This, however, was not the case in the situation faced by the Court of Appeal, in which the one and the same rule and connecting factor – that of the habitual residence under Article 4(1) of the Proposal – would have been applicable. Had the Proposal already been adopted, it would thus have resulted in the applicability of German law and, consequently, the validity of the first assignment.

The case offers two take-aways: First, there is still considerable support in national courts for the law of the assigned claim as the relevant connecting factor for third-party effects of assignment. The long-awaited Regulation of the Commission will thus have to entail significant changes in the attitudes.

Second, the case illustrates that the complex Commission’s Proposal lends itself to misunderstandings, even in its – easier – original form. One of the major challenges will be to educate lawyers about its meaning and secure its correct application by courts throughout the Union.

Many thanks to Verena Wodniansky-Wildenfeld and Amy Held for their contribution to this post.

Yesterday (10 August 2021), the Hague Conference issued a press release according to which, on 23 July 2021, New Zealand ratified the Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, which will enter into force for it on 1 November 2021.

Source : https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=814

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on 12 August 2021 at 5:00 pm (Mexico City time – CDT), 12:00 am (CEST time). The topic of the webinar is two thesis on private international law and will be presented by Professor Leonel Pereznieto Castro (in Spanish).

The details of the webinar are:

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84229739402?pwd=bXlib3IzQnkvUjlzS0VTbVQvcEpLQT09

Meeting ID: 842 2973 9402

Password: BMAAMEDIP

Participation is free of charge. This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX

AMEDIP is also giving a series of lectures in a course addressed to judges and judicial officers, among others. This course consists of 100 hours of lectures on Private International Law and is being organized by the Federal Judicial School of Mexico. The program is available here.

As this course deals with a broad range of topics, it will have an impact on the better understanding of Private International Law in the Mexican judicial branch and may lead to better decision making in international cases. For more information, click here.

The Brazilian Association of Internationalist Lawyers (ABRINTER) will hold on August 11 and 12 its 1st Cycle of Lectures with the theme “Perspectives and Challenges of the New Borderless Law Practice” (in Portuguese).

The event brings 27 lectures on various topics involving law and international private law practice, and celebrates the cooperation protocols signed by the Brazilian association and the Federation of Young Lawyers from Mexico (Mexico) and the Algarve Law Association (Portugal).

Registration is free of charge. To register access the ABRINTER’s website: https://www.abrinter.adv.br/

Online Event on 11 and 12 August

The Brazilian Association of Internationalist Lawyers (ABRINTER) will hold on August 11 and 12 its 1st Cycle of Lectures with the theme “Perspectives and Challenges of the New Borderless Law Practice” (in Portuguese).

The event brings 27 lectures on various topics involving law and international private law practice, and celebrates the cooperation protocols signed by the Brazilian association and the Federation of Young Lawyers from Mexico (Mexico) and the Algarve Law Association (Portugal). This online event involves lawyers from Brazil, Mexico, and Portugal.

Registration is free of charge. To register access the ABRINTER’s website: https://www.abrinter.adv.br/“