Agrégateur de flux

Licenciement - Sanction disciplinaire

Affaire des "décrocheurs" des portraits du Président de la République

DEI / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal annule les décisions par lesquelles la Commission a constaté qu’une sentence arbitrale fixant un tarif d’électricité prétendument préférentiel ne comportait pas l’octroi d’un avantage au producteur d’aluminium Mytilinaios

Altice Europe / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal rejette le recours d’Altice Europe contre la décision de la Commission par laquelle lui ont été imposées deux amendes d’un montant total de 124,5 millions d’euros dans le cadre de l’acquisition de PT Portugal

On 9 September 2021, the Court of Justice handed down its judgment in UM (C‑277/20), in which, for the first time, it sheds light on doubts concerning the applicability of the EU Succession Regulation to donations mortis causa. The preliminary questions originate from the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof). In the judgment, the Court of Justice shared the view presented earlier this year in the opinion delivered by Advocate General de la Tour. This post is a slightly modified version of an Op-Ed published on EU Law Life.

Facts of the Case

ZL, a German national, had entered into a contract with his son UM and UM’s wife XU in 1975. Under the contract, where Austrian law was chosen as applicable, it was provided inter alia that ZL undertakes to erect a house on his immovable property located in Austria which would transfer mortis causa to XU and UM in equal shares. The transfer would occur on the death of ZL, but not before the house has been completed. If UM and XU were to divorce, the transfer mortis causa would be construed as having been made to UM alone. ZL expressly declared that the immovable property was to be transferred as a donation mortis causa. ZL authorised the transfer of ownership to be recorded in the Austrian Land Register upon production of a death certificate and proof that the conditions listed in the contract were fulfilled. Prior to the death of ZL in 2018, UM and his wife had divorced, and she had subsequently died.

Succession proceedings were commenced in Germany, the place of ZL’s habitual residence. For the purposes of those proceedings, UM applied to the court in Austria to be registered as the owner of the immovable property in question. Before the case reached the Austrian Supreme Court, the courts of two instances took the view that Austrian law is applicable and, therefore, in the absence of proof of satisfaction of the conditions laid down in the contract, rejected UM’s application. The Austrian Supreme Court decided to submit a preliminary request to the Court of Justice to clarify whether the donation mortis causa might be classified as an agreement as to succession covered by the material scope of the Succession Regulation and, in the affirmative, whether the choice of Austrian law as applicable remains valid.

Donation Mortis Causa as an Agreement as to Succession

To understand the first question posed to the Court of Justice, it is important to recall that pursuant to Article 3(1)(a) of the Succession Regulation, “succession” is defined as “succession to the estate of a deceased person”. It covers “all forms of transfer of assets, rights and obligations by reason of death”. This transfer may be “through intestate succession” or “under a disposition of property upon death”. At the same time, a disposition of property upon death means, inter alia, an “agreement as to succession” (Article 3(1)(d)), which is “an agreement … which, with or without consideration, creates, modifies or terminates rights to the future estate or estates of one or more persons party to the agreement” (Article 3(1)(b)).

Having the above in mind, the Court of Justice noted that the notion of an agreement as to succession must be given an autonomous interpretation (para. 29) and that it “refers generally to any agreement which, inter alia, creates rights to the future” estate (para. 30). The Court of Justice further cited the definition of succession provided for in Article 3(1)(a) of the Succession Regulation to conclude that “a contract under which a person provides for the future transfer, on death, of ownership of immovable property belonging to him or her and which confers rights in his or her future estate on other parties to that contract, constitutes an “agreement as to succession” within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b)” of the Regulation (para. 32). Referring to its previous judgment in Oberle (C-20/17), the Court of Justice stated that its conclusion is supported by the principle of unity of the succession (para. 33).

The Court also recalled that Article 1(2)(g) of the Succession Regulation excludes from its scope assets transferred otherwise than by succession, for example gifts, but it noted that this exclusion should be interpreted strictly (para. 34). As a result, where “a disposition of property contained in an agreement relating to a succession consists (…) in a donation, but does not take effect until the death of the deceased”, it is covered by the scope of the Regulation (para. 35).

When it comes to the differentiation between donations inter vivos and mortis causa, the opinion is more elaborate than the judgement. It even refers to Article 1(2)(d) of the 1989 HCCH Succession Convention and its explanatory reportunderlying that even though the Convention never entered into force it inspired many provisions of the Regulations (para. 38 of the opinion). As a result, it plays an important role while interpreting the Regulation itself. The report states that the notion of “disposition of property upon death” excludes inter vivos dispositions having immediate proprietary effect. When it comes to disposition of property upon death “it is upon the death of the person so disposing, and not in any respect at any earlier time, that the disposition (or transfer) takes place” (para. 41 of the explanatory report).

The opinion indicates also that Article 1(2)(g) of the Succession Regulation should be read together with recital 14 thereof, which explains that the law applicable to the succession “determines whether gifts or other forms of dispositions inter vivos giving rise to a right in rem prior to death should be restored or accounted for the purposes of determining the shares of the beneficiaries” (para. 36 of the opinion). This suggests that donations excluded from the scope of the Regulation are only those that might be classified within a broader term of “dispositions inter vivos giving rise to a right in rem prior to death”. A contrario, dispositions giving rise to a right in rem after the death are not covered by the exclusion provided for in Article 1(2)(g) of the Succession Regulation. The Court of Justice seems to share this view but does not justify it in such detailed manner as the opinion.

Given the above, the Court of Justice concluded that “a contract under which a person provides for the future transfer, on death, of ownership of immovable property belonging to him or her to other parties to the contract is an agreement as to succession” within the meaning of the Succession Regulation. As a result, the agreement at hand should be covered by the material scope of the Succession Regulation.

Choice of the Applicable Law to the Donation Mortis Causa

Knowing that, the second question that the Court of Justice had to answer was whether it is possible to choose the law applicable to the succession of an asset indicated in the donation mortis causa, as in the contract at hand the Austrian law was chosen as applicable.

It must be noted that, in accordance with the Succession Regulation, the law applicable to succession is the law of the last habitual residence of the deceased (Article 21(1)), subject to the operation of the escape clause (Article 21(2)) unless the deceased has chosen the law applicable in the disposition of property upon death in accordance with Article 22. The Regulation contains also transitional provisions, as according to Article 84 thereof its rules apply from 17 August 2015 (Article 84) but only to the succession of persons who died from that date onwards.

Pursuant to Article 83(2) of the Regulation, where the deceased had chosen the law applicable to his succession prior to 17 August 2015, that choice remains valid if it meets the conditions laid down in the Regulation itself or in the rules of private international law which were in force, at the time the choice was made, in the state of either the “habitual residence” or (one of) “nationality” of the deceased.  That is the expression of favor validitatis principle, which aims to prevent the choice of applicable law to succession made in the past from becoming invalid due to the change in law, namely, replacement of domestic international succession rules by the Succession Regulation.

The doubt before the Court of Justice was whether Article 83(2) of the Succession Regulation may apply to the choice of the applicable law (namely, Austrian law) contained in the donation mortis causa contract signed in 1975. The answer was negative. The Court of Justice held that Article 83(2) concerns only “the validity of the choice of law applicable to the succession as a whole”, whereas (it seems that) “the choice of Austrian law concerned only the agreement as to succession concluded by the deceased in the main proceedings in respect of one of his assets and not the succession as a whole, with the result that the condition for applying Article 83(2) of that regulation cannot be considered satisfied in such circumstances (para. 39)”.

This seems a reasonable conclusion, provided that the Succession Regulation is built on the unitary principle, meaning that one single law governs succession. This principle applies functionally, meaning that one single law governs succession “from the opening of the succession to the transfer of ownership of the assets forming part of the estate to the beneficiaries” (recital 42 of the Regulation) and territorially, meaning that one single law governs succession “irrespective of the nature of the assets and regardless of whether the assets are located in another Member State or in a third State” (recital 37).

Additionally, it might be added that the choice of applicable law with respect to agreements as to succession (Article 25) relates only to the question of their admissibility, substantive validity, and their binding effects between the parties, including the conditions for their dissolution. This should not be equated with the choice of law applicable to succession as a whole (which governs succession in general, for example, the question of liability for debts – Article 23(2)(g)).

Conclusion

To conclude, it was rightly confirmed in the UM judgment that, in accordance with the Succession Regulation, a donation mortis causa giving rise to a right in rem after the death of the donor constitutes an agreement as to succession within the meaning of this regulation. Additionally, in general, in a succession case there might be more than one disposition of property upon death, including agreements as to succession providing for donations mortis causa of particular assets, but there can only be one single law applicable to succession as a whole, which governs “all civil-law aspects of succession to the estate of a deceased person” with respect to all the assets of the deceased.

Advocate General Rantos opined two weeks ago in C-581/20 Skarb Państwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej reprezentowany przez Generalnego Dyrektora Dróg Krajowych i Autostrad v TOTO SpA – Costruzioni Generali et al. – I propose we shorthand the case as ‘TOTO’.

Following public procurement, the Polish treasury granted the works for the construction of a stretch of motorway to an Italian consortium. In the contract, choice of court is made for Poland. The necessary guarantees eg for payment of fines in the event of late completion, were underwritten by a Bulgarian insurance company, whose guarantee is subject to Polish law. The consortium  to no avail sought negative declaratory relief (with a view to obtaining a finding that no fines are due under the contract) and injunctive relief (with a view to prohibiting the Polish authorities from exercising the guarantee) with the Polish court with substance matter jurisdiction. However it subsequently secured the injunctive relief from a Bulgarian court with Article 35 Brussels Ia provisional measures jurisdiction. This relief expressed itself inter alia in custodial attachment of the guarantees which the Polish authorities had sought to exercise with a European Order for Payment form. That Bulgarian relief is now before the Bulgarian Supreme Court.

The questions before the court are  whether the provisional measures can at all be ordered under the A35 gateway given that they might concern acta iure imperii and not civil and commercial matters; and if the matter is within the scope of BIa, whether the A35 court may still order such measures if the court with subject-matter jurisdiction has denied them. Finally, whether if the issue is within the scope of BIa, the ordinarily applicable Bulgarian rule that no such relief may be ordered against public authorities, must be set aside.

The Advocate-General suggests the Court settle the questions mainly by recourse to the lis pendens rule of A29 ff of the Regulation, rather than by the alternative of focusing on the ‘provisional’ nature of the measures imposed by the A35 court. A29 ff do not limit their application to substance matter proceedings hence if and when the lis pendens conditions are met, the court last seized must (identical cases) or may (related cases) relinquish its jurisdiction. The opposite is true, as well: if the A35 court has been seized first, the court with subject-matter jurisdiction has been gazumped at least for provisional measures.

The AG also (55 ff) suggests that choice of court must be read to include authority for the chosen court to issue provisional measures, but not (unless expressly agreed; an issue of contractual interpretation which must be left to the national judge to assess) the exclusion of other courts to exercise their A35 jurisdiction.

Finally if the court with subject-matter jurisdiction has taken a definitive decision viz the provisional measures, that decision travels under Title III BIa and A45 does not seem to offer room to object to recognition and enforcement. Should that decision not yet be definitive, the ordinary lis pendens rules must apply.

This is a case with rather important contractual drafting and civil procedure consequences.

Geert.

EU Private International law, 3rd ed 2021, 2.512ff, 2.550 ff, 5.584 ff.

 

Opinion Rantos AG this morning in C-581/20 TOTO: Brussels Ia, Jurisdiction.
Relationship (including lis pendens) between A35 provisional measures court, and court with substantive jurisdiction.https://t.co/ei9WcXeUGY pic.twitter.com/8q8IAVCbvD

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) September 9, 2021

I am delighted to announce the publication of the last edition of the Code de droit international privé luxembourgeois. The main purpose of the book is to gather all the norms applicable in Luxembourg in the field (international conventions, European regulations and national legislation).

A new feature of the book is to include references to case law. Now that Luxembourg courts have made many of their judgments publicly available, it was possible to identify many cases which have applied the most important of these norms and offered interesting interpretations. The book also identifies interesting cases in those fields where the law is entirerly judge made, such as choice of law in filiation or matrimonial matters (for anybody married before the entry into force of the Matrimonial Regulations).

The code is a perfect companion to my treatise on Luxembourg private international law. The first volume, which is dedicated to choice of law in the fields of obligations, property and corporations, was published a year ago (Droit international privé luxembourgeois, vol. 1 : Conflits de lois – Théorie générale, Obligations, Biens, Sociétés).

The next volume will be dedicated to international litigation and arbitration in Luxembourg, and will hopefully be published soon after the Luxembourg parliament will pass a new law on arbitration.

République tchèque / Pologne
Environnement et consommateurs
Parce qu’elle n’a pas cessé les activités d’extraction de lignite dans la mine de Turów, la Pologne est condamnée à payer à la Commission européenne une astreinte journalière d’un montant de 500 000 euros

In its judgments delivered in the cases WB, C-658/17 and E.E., C-80/19, the Court of Justice already addressed the question whether a notary dealing with succession-related matters is a “court” for the purposes of the Succession Regulation. In these cases, however, the requests for a preliminary ruling originated from the proceedings pending before the national courts.

By contrast, in the case OKR, C-387/20, the request for a preliminary ruling is brought before the Court by a Polish notary [or, to be more specific, by a notarial clerk/assistant (fr. “clerc de notarie”, pl. “zast?pca notarialny”), yet this nuance does not seem to affect the outcome of the case at hand].

The case itself concerns a Ukrainian national living in Poland who is the joint owner of an estate situated in that Member State. A Polish notary is requested to draw up a notarial will which would contain a choice-of-law clause opting for Ukrainian law and modify the legal order of succession. The notary refuses to perform the notarial act on the ground that the choice of Ukrainian law in the will would be unlawful.

The refusal to perform the notarial act in question is challenged by an appeal brought by the interested party: under Polish law, such appeal is lodged through the refusing notary who may still perform the notarial act, if he or she deems the appeal justified. In the request for a preliminary ruling it is argued that within this framework the notary acts as an authority of first instance.

On its merits, the request for a preliminary ruling revolves around the choice of law under Article 22 of the Succession Regulation and a bilateral agreement with Third State that takes precedence over the Regulation and does not explicitly provide for choice of law in matters of succession.

However, as noted by Carlos Santaló Goris in his outline of the request for a preliminary ruling, the case provokes a no less intriguing question whether a Polish notary faced with an appeal is a “court” within a meaning of Article 267 TFEU and as such can submit a preliminary reference to the Court.

That question is addressed by the Court in its order delivered early this September. It receives a negative answer and, as a consequence, the request for a preliminary ruling lodged by a notary is considered to be inadmissible.

Even a cursory reading of the order reveals that, for the Court, a notary faced with an appeal against his or her refusal is not deciding a legal dispute and is not delivering a decision of judicial nature. Therefore, according to the Court, the notary is not engaged in exercise of a judicial function: he or she only confirms the refusal to perform a notarial act or performs the notarial act accordingly to the initial request of the interested party (paragraphs 25 and 28).

Those findings lead to the conclusions that, “for the purposes of the present reference for a preliminary ruling”, a notary (scil. a notarial clerk/assistant) cannot be classified as a “court” within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU (paragraph 34).

It is noteworthy that in this order the Court makes it clear that the notion of “court” in the meaning of Article 3(2) of the Succession Regulation is broader in scope than the notion of “court” in the sense of Article 267 TFEU (paragraph 31).

The order is available here (no English version yet).

Last week Costa Rica signed the HCCH Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (2019 HCCH Judgments Convention). The HCCH news item is available here.

It should be noted that in order to consent to be bound by the treaty, Costa Rica would need to deposit an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval. In the meantime, a signatory State has the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force (article 18 of the UN Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

Costa Rica made the following declaration: “in accordance with article 14, paragraph 3, of the Convention, the Republic of Costa Rica declares that it shall not apply Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Convention.”

Article 14(1) of  the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention states the following:  “No  security,  bond  or  deposit,  however  described,  shall  be  required  from  a  party  who  in  one Contracting State applies for enforcement of a judgment given by a court of another Contracting State on the sole ground that such party is a foreign national or is not domiciled or resident in the State in which enforcement is sought.” Article 14(3) of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention allows States to file a declaration stating that they will not apply Article 14(1).

In this regard, it should be noted that many HCCH Conventions contain a similar provision. This is particularly the case of the  HCCH 1980 Access to Justice Convention, whose objective is precisely, as its name suggests, to promote access to justice by ensuring that “the mere status as an alien or the absence of residence or domicile in a State are not grounds for discrimination with regard to access to justice in that State” (HCCH outline of this Convention).

The HCCH 1980 Access to Justice Convention strikes the right balance by eliminating such a requirement and at the same time allowing the enforceability of orders for costs (Chapter II, arts 14-17). The latter is somewhat similar to Article 14(2) of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention and undoubtedly was a source of inspiration during the negotiations.

The interesting fact is that Costa Rica is a party to the HCCH 1980 Access to Justice Convention. Thus, Costa Rica is not allowed to impose any security, bond or deposit on the basis of a person being a foreign national or of not having his or her domicile or residence in Costa Rica if the conditions of Article 14 of the HCCH 1980 Access to Justice Convention are met, at least in its relations with the Contracting States to the said Convention.

Nevertheless, the declaration of Costa Rica underlines the fact that some States continue to impose such a requirement (although admittedly this requirement is fading away in some regions of the world). And thus the promotion of the HCCH 1980 Access to Justice Convention and all other HCCH Conventions that promote the principle of non-discrimination continue to be all the more relevant.

***

The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention is not yet in force. In accordance with its article 28: “This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of the period during which a notification may be made in accordance with Article 29(2) with respect to the second State that has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession referred to in Article 24.”

There are currently four signatory States: Costa Rica, Israel, Uruguay and Ukraine. The act of signing a treaty does not count towards the timeline specified in article 28 of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention as it is not an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

 

On 9 September 2021 the Court of Justice pronounced its judgment in the case RK (C-422/20) concerning the mechanism of the transfer of jurisdiction under the Succession Regulation. The judgement also gives an insight into transitional provisions of the regulation. The preliminary questions originate from the Higher Court in Cologne (Oberlandesgericht Köln). The opinion on the case was delivered earlier this year by Advocate General Szpunar. The case was already commented here by Matthias Weller.

Facts of the Case

A mutual will was drafted in 1990 in German language, in which CR and her husband (German national) designated each other as heirs. After the death of the husband, last habitually resident in Spain, CR applied to a German court for, inter alia, a European Succession Certificate. The jurisdiction of German courts was successfully contested by RK, the deceased’s brother. Hence, CR commenced proceeding in Spain. On CR’s request, the Spanish court decided not to hear the case noting that German courts are better placed to do so, due to practical circumstances, including CR’s residence and location of assets. CR filed another application to German court accompanying it with the decision of the Spanish court.

Transfer of Jurisdiction Mechanisms

It is worth reminding that pursuant to Article 4 of the Succession Regulation, the courts of the Member State of the last habitual residence of the deceased are competent in succession matters. Also, the law applicable is designated by this connecting factor (Article 21(1)), which allows for the coincidence of ius and forum so desired by the Regulation. It may happen however that the deceased has chosen (one of) national laws as applicable, which results in the distortion of the ius and forum principle. To avoid this (at least to certain extent), the Regulation, as explained by recital 27 “provides for a series of mechanisms”, which should restore the situation, in which the competent court applies its own succession law as applicable. These mechanisms are provided for in Articles 5 – 9 of the regulation and consist of the “transfer” of jurisdiction to the courts of the Member State the law of which was chosen as applicable by the deceased.

In accordance with one of the mechanisms, based on Article 6(a), the court seized pursuant to Article 4, may at the request of one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if a court of another Member State is “better placed to rule on the succession” given “practical circumstances of the succession, such as the habitual residence of the parties and the location of the assets”. In such case, pursuant to Article 7(a), the “national” courts “have jurisdiction to rule on the succession”, provided that “a court previously seised has declined jurisdiction in the same case” pursuant to Article 6.

Declining of Jurisdiction

In the RK case, the Oberlandesgericht Köln has doubts if it may assume that the Spanish court declined its jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6(a), given that this is not clearly stated in its decision. Answering this first question, the Court of Justice underlined that it is not crucial that the declining of jurisdiction is express, as long as refraining from hearing the case indicates that the court will not hear it, because another court was found to be better placed to do so (para. 37). This conclusion is justified by the aim of creating in the EU an area of freedom, security and justice based in the mutual trust between Member States (para. 37). The Court of Justice found that the regulation does not provide for the form, in which the declining of jurisdiction should be pronounced (para. 36). It also noticed that the Spanish court used the expression of the Spanish language version of the regulation, namely “to refrain from hearing” (abstenerse de conocer), instead of “to decline jurisdiction”, which is used in other language versions, including the German one. The difference in the wording in the language versions of the regulation and the resulting differences in the wording of decisions should not be relevant, when the intention of the declining court is clear enough.

Assuming jurisdiction after decline

The Oberlandesgericht Köln had also doubts if before assuming jurisdiction pursuant to Article 7(a) it may verify whether the prerequisites for declining jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6(a) were met. Namely whether a valid choice of applicable law was made, whether there was an application for “transfer” filed by one of the parties and whether it was examined if another court is in fact better placed to hear the case (para. 41).

Answering the second question, the Court of Justice underlined that no such verification may be exercised (para. 52). The Court of Justice classified the decision on declining jurisdiction as a “judgement” subject to automatic recognition in other Member States, without any possibility of reviewing it as to its substance (para. 45-47). Such conclusion is justified by the principle of mutual recognition of judgements and mutual trust (para. 48). It seems that as an effect of such recognition the court seized pursuant to Article 7(a) must assume jurisdiction (compare para. 58 in fine of the opinion).

The Court of Justice does not give clear response to the doubt that resonates in the opinion whether the decision on declining jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6(1) is binding the court seized pursuant to Article 7(1) as to the determination of law applicable, as declining jurisdiction assumes the exitance of a valid choice of applicable law made by the deceased. On one hand, the court of a Member State assuming jurisdiction pursuant to Article 7(1) should be able to assess independently, which law is applicable (para. 36 opinion). On the other hand, one should not differentiate between a choice of applicable law, which is valid for the purpose of declining jurisdiction and a choice, which is valid for the purpose of establishing applicable law (para. 46 of the opinion). The opinion seems to opt for the “stronger” effect of the judgement, including the determination as to applicable law (para. 46 in fine of the opinion).

Choice of Applicable Law Presumption

As already mentioned, the prerequisite for declining jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6(1) is that “the deceased had chosen as the law to govern his succession the law of a Member State of which he was a national (recital 27)”. In the case at hand, the mutual will of 1990 contained no such choice. As, pursuant to Article 84, the Succession Regulation applies from 17 August 2015 to the succession of persons who die starting from that day (Article 83(1)), it contains transitional provisions relating to dispositions of property upon death made before 17 August 2015 of a deceased person, whose succession is governed by the Succession Regulation.

Pursuant to Article 83(4), in case of a disposition of property upon death made prior to 17 August 2015, there is a presumption that the deceased has chosen as applicable the law, in accordance with which this disposition was made, provided that this law could be chosen pursuant to the regulation (namely, it is a national law of the deceased). For example, in the commented case, assuming that the mutual will was indeed made in accordance with German law (at least, as mentioned in the judgment, it was prepared in German language), German law is presumed to be chosen by the deceased, who was a German national at the moment of making the choice and/or at the moment of death. Unfortunately, the Court of Justice is silent on how to determine whether the disposition was made “in accordance with” a given succession law.

The answer to the third preliminary question posed by the Oberlandesgericht Köln concerns the above provision of Article 83(4). The Court of Justice stated that the choice of applicable law, which is the prerequisite for transfer mechanism of Article 6(1) may result from the operation of the above presumption (para. 61). However, as results from the answer to previous questions, the court assuming jurisdiction pursuant to Article 7(1) is not allowed to verify the existence of the prerequisite.

Conclusion

It seems that in RK the Court of Justice provides for practical solutions, considering specificities of procedural laws of Member States and understanding that declining jurisdiction may be pronounced in different forms. The conclusion that no control may be exercised over the decline decision pursuant to Article 6(1) also seems perfectly in line with mutual trust principle as implemented in the instruments on EU judicial cooperation in civil matters. It is not entirely clear however whether this decision has a binding effect on courts of other EU Member States also with respect to the determination of applicable law, as a valid choice made by the deceased is a prerequisite for such decision. Additionally, one may regret that the Court of Justice have not elaborated on what does it mean that a disposition of property upon death was made “in accordance with the law” of a given state for the purpose of Article 83(4).

Sanchez-Bordona AG Opined last week in C-296/20 Commerzbank AG v E.O, a case on the consumer section of the Lugano Convention however in essence on the international element required to trigger consumer protection in private international law. The distinguishing feature of this case lies in the fact that, at the time when the contract was concluded, both parties were domiciled in the same State (Germany), whereas, when recovery was sought through the courts, the customer was domiciled in Switzerland.

The international nature of the situation therefore came about subsequently rather than being present at the outset.

The Advocate General is absolutely right to point to the objective of the consumer section of Lugano, and indeed Brussels Ia, to protect the consumer as the economically weaker party; and in C-98/20 mBank, the Court held that the consumer’s domicile needs to be determined at the time of the instigation of the suit, not the conclusion of the contract (or a later date in the proceedings) even in those circumstances where the consumer failed to inform the professional party of the change of domicile.

The AG however also insists on the predictability of forum both as claimant and as defendant, for the economic operator.

His provisional conclusion therefore (73-74), following analysis of the travaux, is that the international element needs to be present at the outset. However then comes the oddity of A17(3) Lugano, which mirrors A19(3) Brussels Ia:

‘The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an agreement [conferring jurisdiction]:… 3. which is entered into by the consumer and the other party to the contract, both of whom are at the time of conclusion of the contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same State bound by this Convention, and which confers jurisdiction on the courts of that State, provided that such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that State.’

[With respect to the last element of this Article, it is indeed by no means certain that national law allows for such agreement and the AG (87) notes same].

The Jenard Report viz the Brussels 1968 Convention explains that that rule was included for reasons of equity to benefit a seller or lender domiciled in the same State as the buyer or borrower in the case where the latter establish themselves abroad after the contract has been concluded. The AG opines that the purely domestic setting of A17(3) must not be extended to the remainder of the consumer section, instead keeping it confined to the particular circumstances of that subsection.

In subsidiary fashion, the AG proposes that if the CJEU does not follow him on the generally required international element at the outset, it limit the extensive  application of the consumer section to cases where the economic operator pursues in the State of the consumer’s new domicile a trade or profession such as that which gave rise to the conclusion of the contract.

Interesting.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.222 ff.

Opinion SÁnchez-Bordona this morning in C‑296/20 Commerzbank. Jurisdiction, #Lugano Convention. International element required to trigger consumer section.https://t.co/9wM8T3Po4m pic.twitter.com/WJvKsOuz4l

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) September 9, 2021

Marketa Trimble (University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law) has posted The Public Policy Exception and International Intellectual Property Law on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

Public international law affects private international law (conflict of laws) in a myriad of ways. This article discusses potential effects of international intellectual property (“IP”) law on the application of the public policy exception, which is used as a limitation on the application of foreign law and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The article describes the function of the exception and its treatment in existing academic projects on IP law issues in private international law. It provides examples of the uses of the exception in IP cases and contemplates the frequency of the use of the exception in such cases. The article reviews international IP treaties, including IP chapters of free trade agreements, as possible sources of relevant public policies and evaluates whether a foreign IP law compliance with international intellectual property treaties could serve as a factor in the public policy exception analysis. The article suggests that courts give some weight in the public policy exception analysis to a finding of a foreign IP law’s compliance with international IP treaties but recognizes that the proposed approach would need to be nuanced and account for diverse circumstances.

The article is forthcoming in the Annali Italiani del Diritto D’Autore, Della Cultura e Dello Spettacolo.

Observations à l’occasion de l’ordonnance n° 2021-958 du 19 juillet 2021 concernant les échanges d’informations financières pour lutter contre certaines infractions pénales.

en lire plus

Aldricus – Salah satu kebutuhan yang diperlukan anak adalah mainan. Beberapa ayah bunda pasti pernah merasakan rewelnya anak saat tidak diberi mainan kan ? akan tetapi terkadang sebagai orang tua ayah bunda juga merasa khawatir, terhadap beberapa mainan anak yang bisa berbahaya dan tidak bermanfaat. Selain itu juga kebanyakan harganya hal. Eits tenang kami punya jawabanya, yaitu Lego selain manfaatnya yang mengedukasi. Bisa mendorong kreativitas dan imajinasi anak. Lego juga mudah didapatkan dan sangat terjangkau bagi dompet ayah bunda. Berikut kami rangkum daftar lego murah mulai dari harga 100 Ribuan :

1. LEGO Ninjago 70661 Spinjitzu Zane Blocks & Stacking Toys

Lego ini  diperuntukan untuk anak usia 7 tahun keatas dan didesain fun & playfun loh parents. Karena bentuknya yang didesain seperti ninja, membuat anak kalian semangat dalam memainkanya. Dan tentu saja bukan hanya diperuntukan untuk anak laki-laki, tapi juga untuk perempuan. Selain itu, lego ini memiliki 3 attachment untuk mode serangan, kecepatan, dan pertahanan. Membuat anak mampu menciptakan teknik tertentu, kemungkinan tidak terbatas, sehingga lebih mendorong kreativitas anak. Harganya cukup terjangkau dimulai dari 130.000rban aja lo parents.

2. Mainan Lego Block isi 714 Pcs Edukasi

Lego block merupakan mainan yang dapat disusun secara bebas, sehingga mampu melatih saraf motorik anak. Selain bentuk block dalam paketnya juga tersedia roda, sehingga anak bisa membuat mobil, kereta dan lainya. Harganya sangat murah loh parents dengan isi 714 Pcs di bandrol dengan harga 133.000.

3. MR Block 406 PCs

MR Block merupakan Lego Block yang banyak dijumpai di marketplace. Item yang dapat dijumpai dalam satu paket bermacam-macam. Mulai dari orang-orangan, dan ada juga block berbentuk mobil. Banyaknya variasi item yang ada di MR Block ini sudah tentu mendorong anak-anak untuk lebih kreatif dalam mengimajinasikan pikiranya. Selain itu MR Block juga mampu meningkatkan sosialisasi dengan teman-teman. Harga MR Block dengan isi 406 Pcs ini dibandrol dengan cukup terjangkau lo parents dimulai dengan 175.000.

Masih banyak lagi lego yang harganya sekitar seratus ribuan. Kita tinggal memilihnya di toko mainan terdekat.

The post Lego Murah Harga 100 Ribuan appeared first on Aldri Blog.

Further to CoL’s posts on recent case law of the ECJ last week, we allow ourselves to draw CoL readers’ attention to the judgment of the ECJ of 9 September 2021, C-422/20 – RK ./. CR, on the interpretation of jurisdictional provisions of the European Succession Regulation (ESR), upon reference by the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Cologne, Germany. Neither the ECJ’s judgment, nor AG Maciej Szpunar’s Opinion of 8 July 2021 is yet available in English translation. The following summary draws on the original German texts.

The referring national court asked (1) whether it is required, for a declaration of lack of jurisdiction by the court previously seised as provided for in Article 7(a) ESR, that the latter court expressly declines jurisdiction, or whether an implicit declaration suffices if it is clear by interpretation that that court has in fact declined jurisdiction? The national court further asked (2) whether the court of a Member State whose jurisdiction is to emerge from a declaration of lack of jurisdiction by another Member State court is entitled to examine whether the conditions for such a declaration were in fact fulfilled. In particular, the referring court asked (a) whether the second court may examine whether the testator validly chose the applicable law in accordance with Article 22 ESR, whether (b) a request for a declaration of lack of jurisdiction, as required by Article 6(a) ESR has been brought by one of the parties in the first proceedings, and (c) whether the first court correctly assessed that the courts of the Member State of the chosen law are better placed to rule on the succession. In a last question, the referring court asked (3) whether Articles 6(a) and 7(a) ESR are applicable if the testator has not made an express or implied choice of law in a testamentary disposition before 17 August 2015 but the law applicable to the succession may be inferred from Article 83(4) ESR.

The ECJ held that (1) no express declaration of lack of jurisdiction is required under Article 6(a) ESR, as long as the first court’s intention can be clearly inferred from its decision, that (2) the second court has no competence to review the first court’s declaration of lack of jurisdiction and (3) that Articles 6(a) and 7(a) ESR remain applicable if the applicable law may only be inferred from Article 83(4) ESR.

As to the first question, the Court made clear that certain differences in the Spanish language version of the ESR in Article 6(a) – “abstenerse de conocer” (in translation something like: “abstain from assuming jurisdiction”) – on which the Spanish first court had relied – are of no relevance for the autonomous interpretation of the ESR, to be exercised acccording to general and well established principles in light of all of its language versions and its objectives (para. 30). These do not require any particular form for a declaration under Article 6(a), and requiring such a form would jeopardize the objective of the ESR as laid down in Recital 27 Sentence 1, i.e. “to ensure that the authority dealing with the succession will, in most situations, be applying its own law”.

In relation the second question, the Court made reference to AG Spzunar’s Opinion (para. 39) and confirmed the latter’s finding that no second review may take place of the first court’s decision under Article 6(a) ESR (paras. 40 et seq.), not least because such as decision is a “decision” in the sense of Article 3(1) (g) ESR that falls within the scope of Chapter IV of the ESR on the recognition of decisions of the courts of other Member States (para. 42). The Court concludes that the first court’s decision under Article 6(a) ESR is binding for the second court both in its result – declaration of lack of jurisdiction – as well as in relation to its underlying findings about the conditions that Article 6(a) ESR requires. In the latter respect the Court made expressly reference to its earlier judgment of 15 November 2012, C-456/11 – Gothaer Versicherung, which means that its notion of a European res iudicata developed there is to be extended to the type of conditions found fulfilled by the first court here: “Any other interpretation would jeopardize the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust on which the system of the ESR grounds” (para. 45, translation is my one).

For answering the third question the Court explained that Article 83(4) ESR contains a presumption of a choice of law by the testator that is to be attributed the same effects as a choice of law directly undertaken under the ESR (para. 53).