Agrégateur de flux

The HCCH Experts’ Group on International Transfer of Maintenance Funds met last week via videoconference. The Expert Group discussed topics such as the move away from cheques, the covering of costs related to the transfer of funds (with a view to their abolition), the implementation of bundled payments to reduce costs of transfers, etc. A résumé of these discussions may be found in the Aide-mémoire, available at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/abad87fe-7177-4dce-8393-cf32d240cc0d.pdf

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=789

From March 3 to May 13, 2021, the University of Milan will host a series of webinars dealing with cross-border civil and commercial litigation in Europe, as part of the three-year project funded by the European Union and named “Jean Monnet Module on Multilevel, Multiparty and Multisector Cross-Border Litigation in Europe“.

The cycle of seminars will be divided into three modules, focusing, respectively, on relations and conflicts between national judges, European courts and international tribunals; on collective redress, addressed from a European, comparative and transnational perspective and in the context of different legal sectors; on the main procedural issues arising out of transnational litigation in financial law, IP law, labor law and family law disputes, as well as on the the current EU works on judicial cooperation and on the latter’s prospects after Brexit. A short module will provide participants with basic hints on written and oral legal advocacy.

The seminars, held by Italian and foreign experts with remarkable experience (not only academic, but also professional and institutional) in the sector, also due to their involvement in international research works and legislative reform projects coordinated by the European Commission, are aimed at Italian and foreign under- and post-graduate students, as well as professionals (the latter being entitled to continuing legal education credits).

To register (for the entire program or only for some modules), please fill in and submit, no later than Monday, March 1, 2021, the registration form retrievable here.

See here the Full Programme.

The author of this post is Ségolène Normand, Postgraduate Student in Private Law at the University of Valenciennes.

Digital technology has been investing all areas of society and its potential seems unlimited. At the global level, public institutions are progressively transforming in favour of eGovernment which involves rethinking both organisation and process, so that public services can be delivered online, quickly and at a lower cost for individuals and businesses (see for instance here). States are also investing massively in the digitisation of their justice system and national courts have to adapt to this new paradigm, irrespective of the type of disputes – domestic or cross-border – they are dealing with. Digitalisation has no borders.

Against this backdrop, the use of new technologies can facilitate the resolution of cross-border disputes, as it helps justice being faster, more accessible and efficient. The distance between courts and litigants may be removed by online hearings and proceedings. Digitalisation also makes cross-border judicial cooperation easier, in particular through the dematerialisation of circulation of procedural documents between courts, legal professionals and litigants. This trend has recently been illustrated by the recast of the Taking of evidence and Service Regulations (announced here) within the European Union (“EU”) and is one of the axioms of the modernisation of the European judicial area in civil matters (see here).

A seminar on Digital technology in family matters organised by the Academy of European Law (ERA) on 27 January 2021 gives me the opportunity to focus on digital justice in cross-border dispute resolution. What are the main tendencies of digital justice for international families worldwide? Does digitalisation lead to different ways and results in the legal and judicial treatment of family matters, as in other fields of private law?

On the one hand, digitalisation can contribute to promoting family mobility and ease dispute resolution. For instance, the translation of judgements by artificial intelligence (AI) may simplify the recognition of families’ documents in the receiving States. On the other hand, family legal issues often involve vulnerable parties and, therefore, deserve a specific attention within the process of digitalisation of justice.

This ERA seminar gave interesting insights on digitalisation of family justice, that I propose to share with the readers of the blog. The seminar brought together practitioners (professors, judges, lawyers, mediators…) from different jurisdictions, in order to present their national, as well as international experiences on digitalisation of family justice (1), the use of e-Codex in European cross-border procedures (2) and finally on legal tech and AI in family matters (3). The report is limited to some aspects of their contributions, with a private international law perspective.

Several speakers presented various national digital progress in family law.

First, Annette Kronborg (Southern University of Denmark) screened the “mandatory digital application” and the “recovery of maintenance obligation” in Denmark. Unlike other Members States, Denmark introduced early the digitalisation in the family justice system. In fact, the first policy paper on digitalisation was introduced in 2001. The establishment in 2014 of a “mandatory digital application” introduced a digital communication between citizens and public authorities through a software application. And since 2015, a new digital authority has been centralising maintenance debts. But, according to the speaker, it must be reformed to be more efficient.

Second, Bregje Dijksterhuis (Molengraaff Institute for Private Law) explained the online divorce proceeding in the Netherlands. Thanks to “Rechtwijzer”, spouses can divorce online. It is up to them to decide what type of measures for their divorce they want. The project is a success for the user; nevertheless, lawyers criticise the lack of information on spouse’s rights.

Third, Yuko Nishitani (Kyoto University) presented the project of online marriages and divorces in Japan. Indeed, since the pandemic, Japan’s authorities plans to digitalise marriage and divorce as well as replace traditional administrative (paper) documents. Moreover, Japanese authorities envisage a legislative reform following the Resolution of European Parliament of 8 July 2020 on the international and domestic parental abduction of EU children in Japan. Since there is no possibility under Japanese law to obtain shared or joint custody, there is a significant number of unsolved parental child abduction cases where one of the parents is an EU national and the other is a Japanese national.

Joanna Guttzeit (Judge at the District Court Berlin & Liaison Judge of the International Hague Network of Judges and the EJN in Civil and Commercial Matters) focused on cross-border family procedures and online hearings.

In the EU, the general statutory duty to hear in-person the participants to the proceeding (especially children) for family courts can lead to the refusal of recognition for judgements in the field of parental responsibility in case of online hearings. This results from Article 23 of the Brussels II bis Regulation. Traditionally, families travelled to the courts to be heard. But with the advent of new technologies, family courts could proceed to online hearings if a family member is unable to travel. However, some EU Member States might refuse to recognise the judgment in such circumstances.

The pandemic speeds up online-hearing in many European countries, such as Spain, Poland and Germany. However, online hearing should be exceptional and never become the “normal rule”, in particular within proceedings implying children. The procedures have to guarantee the welfare of children. Some States, like Germany, are really strict on this point. This is the reason why the EU Members States should harmonise their procedures by following European guidelines.

Then, Cristina Gonzàlez Beilfuss (University of Barcelona) discussed digitalisation of cross-border judicial procedures.

Undeniably, the pandemic shows that digital development in Europe could be a real opportunity to improve cross-border judicial cooperation. This is why the European Commission promotes national reforms in the field. The use of new technologies is, according to the Commission, the more efficient way to encourage exchanges between competent authorities in the area of mutual legal assistance. A vast majority of participants during the seminar, thought this communication should be predominantly digital in the future, while a minority thought it should be exclusively digital.

Actually, the main issue is the assessment of the legal effect or admissibility of the electronically determined document and the applicable law. It should be governed by the law of the requesting State. Pr. Gonzàlez Beilfuss proposed to harmonise the diffusion methods of electronic documents between the courts of the EU Member States to have a more predicable cross-border proceeding for international families. Regarding the legal effect, it cannot be denied on the sole ground that it is an electronic means of obtaining a judgment.

To conclude this session, Xavier Thoreau (Council of the European Union) presented e-CODEX and the new EU initiatives for the digitalisation of justice systems (here and here).

E-CODEX is a project established by the European Commission, in order to facilitate secure exchanges of data between legal professionals and litigants in different EU Member States. It consists of a package of software components that enable the connectivity between national systems. In cross-border proceeding, e-CODEX allows to establish a bridge between national systems. For the Commission, e-CODEX is the reference for secure digital communication in cross-border legal proceedings.

More than half of the participants rarely or never received in the context of their legal practice requests in electronic format by e-CODEX. According to Xavier Thoreau, this is problematic and shows that EU ambition to use the e-CODEX system to support national digitalisation of cross-border as well as domestic justice may take a long time. This is also supported by the fact that the EU has only a “subsidiary jurisdiction” in domestic family procedure.

Markus Hartung and Ulrike Meising (lawyers) presented with Alan Larking (Family Law Patners, Brighton) the potential of AI and legal tech in the lawyer’s work.

AI and legal tech are great tools to help lawyers. From now on, they have an unlimited access to the law. In particular, they have an easier access to the law of other Member States, which is useful in the presence of foreign components in legal disputes. Increasingly, online applications with algorithms rank the dispute resolution models. For example, some law firm websites provide clients with a form to fill in online and an algorithm proposes a legal solution. Digital cross-border dispute resolution is possible since online applications are capable to adapt to each family model. However, a lawyer should always control the solution introduced by the algorithm.

Finally, Bérénice Lemoine (Council of the European Union) concluded with some thoughts on legal tech in family matters. Yet, the development of digitalisation of family justice in Europe is still far from uniform. For instance, only 24% of EU Member States integrate the issuance of “multilingual standard forms” of the Regulation on Public Documents, whereas in 54% of Member States, the possibility does not exist. Indeed, European citizens are not required to provide an official translation of family documents. They can ask the authorities of the EU country that issued their document to provide a “multilingual standard form” to facilitate its recognition in the receiving State. In the same vein, in 15% of Members States, official court documents cannot be served electronically on citizens and businesses. And for a third of them, evidence submitted in digital format is not deemed admissible. According to Bérénice Lemoine, it is not only necessary to encourage Member States to use already available legal tech and quickly develop them, but also to start the digital Justice transformation in those States which are less advanced, with the aim of having a more efficient resolution cross-border family procedure. For that, the EU offers a financial support (see Tool 1 of COM/2020/710 final).

Non-lieu à renvoi

Non-lieu à renvoi

The post below was written by Andrew Dickinson, Fellow of St Catherine’s College and Professor of Law, University of Oxford. It is the the first contribution to an on-line symposium devoted to the fate of the 1968 Brussels Convention: further contributions will be published on this blog in the coming days.

The symposium follows a lively exchange prompted by a post by Matthias Lehmann (Brexit and the Brussels Convention: It’s All Over Now, Baby Blue?), which attracted comments by Eduardo Álvarez-Armas, Apostolos Anthimos, Gilles Cuniberti, Burkhard Hess, Costanza Honorati, Alex Layton, François Mailhé and Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti.

Readers are encouraged to share their comments to the contributions. Those wishing to submit a full contribution to the on-line symposium are invited to get in touch with Pietro Franzina at pietro.franzina@unicatt.it.

In recent months, rumours have circulated in social media and the blogosphere that the Brussels Convention (*see below) is to launch a “Brexit revival tour” in the courts of its Contracting States. This appears, in part at least, to be an exercise in wishful thinking by supporters of closer judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters between the EU’s Member States on the one hand and their former partner, the UK, on the other.

More recently, the permanent representative of the UK Government, the operator of the UK venues, has written to the Secretary-General of the EU Council to deny their involvement in any revival. Although other members have hitherto remained silent, their longstanding representative, the European Commission, has already expressed its own opinion that there is no role for the Convention in the post-Brexit landscape. In its view, “EU rules on enforcement will not apply to judicial decisions where the original proceedings have been instituted after the end of the [Brexit] transition period”. In the preceding paragraph of its statement, the Commission makes clear that its reference to “EU rules on enforcement” includes the 1968 Brussels Convention, and that the Withdrawal Agreement concluded between the EU and UK should be read in that light.

This appears an opportune moment, as a longstanding afficionado of the Convention, to express my own view: that a comeback tour would as undesirable as it is improbable. Before summarising my reasons for reaching that conclusion, two important points are worth clarifying.

First, despite speculation to the contrary, the Convention has not been “terminated”. As Recital (23) and Article 68 of the Brussels I Regulation make clear, the Convention still applies to the territories of the Member States that fall within Convention’s territorial scope while being excluded from the Regulation by Article 299 of the EC Treaty (now TFEU, Article 355 – see Recital (9) and Article 68 of the Recast Brussels I Regulation. Performances have continued, for example, in Aruba and New Caledonia.

The question which presents itself, therefore, is whether the arrangements put in place by the Convention no longer (from 1 January 2021) apply to relations between the UK, on the one hand, and the other Contracting States or whether the Convention applies with renewed vigour to those relationships now that the EU treaties and the Brussels Regulations no longer apply to the UK. That is a question of modification or suspension, not of termination.

Secondly, although Convention is a treaty, it is not one that is removed from the EU’s legal system: instead, it exists as a satellite and, like a moon orbiting a planet, is subject to the gravitational pull of EU law. Although formally concluded outside the framework of the original EEC/EC Treaty, the Convention is inexorably linked to that Treaty (and the treaties that replaced it):

• through Article 293 (ex-Article 220) of the EC Treaty (which inspired and justified the Convention);
• through its role in strengthening the legal protection of persons in the context of the common, later internal, market: as the Commission stated when it proposed the formation of the Convention between the EEC’s original members, “a true internal market between the six States will be achieved only if adequate legal protection can be secured” (Jenard Report, [1]);
• through the role of the European Court Justice in interpreting its provisions under the 1971 Protocol: from the outset, the ECJ has treated the Brussels Convention as an instrument within the province of EC law and not merely as a standalone international treaty falling to be interpreted according to the rules and principles of public international law: see eg Mund & Fester v Hatrex International Transport, [11]-[12].

If interpretation of the Brussels Convention does fall within the province of EU law, there is no need to treat questions concerning its modification or suspension differently. Indeed, as the question of the Brussels Convention’s status depends upon the interpretation and effect of the EU treaties and of the Brussels Regulations (see below), it is not difficult to see the matter as having its centre of gravity in European Union’s own (autonomous) legal order rather than in public international law (see Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [44]-[46]). Principles of customary international law, and of the Vienna Conventions insofar as they describe or establish those principles, accordingly, take on a subsidiary role as part of the set of general principles of EU law (Wightman, [70]-[71]).

With these points in mind, let me identify briefly the main reasons for opposing the renewed application of the Brussels Convention to govern jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matters involving the UK and the other Contracting States from 1 January 2021 onwards:

1. As a matter of first impression, the argument in favour of the “Brexit revival tour” is not a promising one. It involves two linked propositions: (i) the Brussels Convention automatically springs back to occupy the legal domain formerly controlled by the Brussels Regulations, which themselves no longer apply to the UK following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU resulting in the cessation of the EU treaties (TEU, Article 50(3)); and (ii) it does so because the Brussels I Regulation (and Recast Brussels I Regulation) merely suspended the Convention’s operation as between the (then) Member States (subjection to the exceptions expressly set out) for the period in which the Regulations remained in force.
2. The first proposition seems counterintuitive: a convention expressly contemplated by the EC Treaty, concluded to achieve close co-operation in the field of civil justice between Member States and to facilitate the functioning of the common (internal) market supposedly acquires new vigour when one of the participating Member States chooses to remove itself from the EU on terms that bring an end to its participation in the internal market and that make no provision for continued co-operation in civil justice matters.
3. Although the Brussels Convention was, admittedly, concluded for an unlimited period (Article 67), this was done at a time when the EC Treaty did not (at least expressly) contemplate that a Member State might withdraw from the Community. As its Preamble emphasises, the parties to the Convention acted in their capacity as parties to the EC Treaty.
4. The Preamble to the 1978 Convention of the Accession of the UK, alongside Denmark and Ireland, to the Brussels Convention records that the three States had “in becoming members of the Community” undertaken to accede to the Brussels Convention (see Article 3(2) of the Accession Treaty). Article 39 of the 1978 Convention refers to the UK as a “new Member State”. This highlights the awkward nature of the proposition that the Convention should spring back on the occasion of the UK becoming a former Member State.
5. As to the second proposition, the Brussels I Regulation was also adopted at a time when the EC Treaty (amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam) did not (at least expressly) contemplate that a Member State might withdraw. Its recitals refer to the progressive establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice to facilitate the internal market (Recital (1)), to the work done within the EU’s institutions to revise the Brussels Convention (Recital (5)), to the need to replace the Convention with a Community legal instrument (Recital (6)) and to the desire to ensure continuity between the Convention and the Regulation (Recital (19)). These matters, as well as the explicit reservation of the Convention’s application to overseas territories to which the Regulation did not apply (Recital (23)), point overwhelmingly to a movement in one direction only, with the Regulation permanently overriding the Convention within the Regulation’s sphere of operation.
6. Although the language of Article 68 of the Brussels I Regulation (in the English language version: “supercede”, “replaces”; in the French, “remplace”; in the German, “tritt … an die Stelle”, “ersetzt”) is not unambiguous, a contextual and teleological interpretation of this provision strongly favours the conclusion that the intention of the EU and of its Member States was that the Regulation would permanently replace the Convention in relations between the Member States (rather than suspending its operation for the period in which the Regulation remained in force).
7. Admittedly, if one reaches that conclusion, it rather begs the question why (if Article 68 of the Regulation adopted in 2000 had overridden the Convention once and for all), the legislator considered it necessary to carry that provision forward into Article 68 of the Recast Brussels I Regulation. This can, however, be explained as a sensible measure to account for the relationship of the three instruments and the need for continuity from the original Convention, via the original Regulation to the recast Regulation (see Recitals (7)-(9) and (34) of the recast Regulation). (In any event, for reasons of legal certainty, the relationship between the Convention and the original Brussels I Regulation should be determined without reference to the later, recast Regulation.)
8. Understandably, the thirteen Member States who joined the EU after the enactment of the Brussels I Regulation were not required in their accession treaties to join the Brussels Convention. A reading of Article 68 of the Regulation that merely suspended the Convention in relations between the UK and the other Contracting States would produce an arbitrary and unsatisfactory schism between “old” and “new” Member States. It would also undermine the exclusive external competence of the EC/EU in this field generated by the adoption of the Regulation.
9. Although its supporters still rightly endorse its virtues, the Brussels Convention is, uncontroversially, “old technology”. Recital (5) of the original Brussels I Regulation accepted the need to update it, and the EU’s approach to questions of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments evolved further with the recast Regulation.
10. At a time when parties to the Lugano Convention are pressing for an update to bring it into line with the recast Regulation and a review of the Regulation lies in the not too distant future, it offends common sense to suggest that the EU’s acquis should be interpreted in a way that produces the result that fourteen of the EU’s Member States and its one former Member State are required to re-establish close (but outdated) treaty relations in the field of civil justice, while the others must deal with the UK on the basis of national law rules alone.
11. The UK and the Commission are right to reject the revival of the Brussels Convention. It is best for all of us that we live with our warm memories of its back catalogue, and use them to press for closer civil justice cooperation in the future between the legal systems of the UK and the EU. The 2007 Lugano Convention is the right place to start.

(*) The Brussels Convention (or to use the full title Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters), initially formed in 1968, and reformed on a number of occasions since (most recently in 1998, has 15 members (“Contracting States”) being the first fifteen Member States of the European Communities. Member States joining the European Union after 1998 (13 in total) are not members of the Convention.

As announced earlier on this blog, the Private International Law Interest Group of the Italian Society of International Law and EU Law organises a series of webinar titled Private International Law in Europe: Current Developments in Jurisprudence.

The webinar scheduled to take place on 19 February 2021 on State Immunity and Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters in Recent Court of Justice Rulings, with Alexander Layton and Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe has been rescheduled. It will take place on 1 March 2021, 4 to 6 PM (CET).

To attend the webinar, please write an e-mail to sidigdipp@gmail.com.

Written by Marcus Teo (Sheridan Fellow (Incoming), National University of Singapore)

The law in Singapore on Mareva injunctions supporting foreign proceedings is on the move again. The High Court’s recent decision in Allenger v Pelletier [2020] SGHC 279, issued barely a year after the Court of Appeal’s decision in Bi Xiaoqiong v China Medical Technologies [2019] 2 SLR 595; [2019] SGCA 50 (see previous post here) qualifies the latter, confounding Singapore’s position on this complex issue even further.

Pelletier sold shares to buyers in Florida while allegedly misrepresenting the company’s value. The buyers obtained arbitral awards against him, then obtained a bankruptcy order against him in the Cayman Islands. By this time, however, Pelletier had initiated several transfers, allegedly to dissipate his assets to Singapore among other jurisdictions. The buyers then initiated proceedings to clawback the transfers in the Cayman courts, and obtained a worldwide Mareva injunction there with permission to enforce overseas. Subsequently, the buyers instituted proceedings in Singapore against Pelletier in Singapore based on two causes of action – s 107(1) of the Cayman Bankruptcy Law (the “Cayman law claim”), and s 73B of Singapore’s Conveyancing and Law of Property Act (the “CLPA claim”) – and applied for a Mareva injunction to freeze his Singapore assets.

Senior Judge Andrew Ang acknowledged that “the Mareva injunction remains, at its very core, ancillary to a main substantive cause of action.” (Allenger, [125]). In doing so, he remained in step with Bi Xiaoqiong. Ang SJ eventually held that Mareva could be sustained based on the CLPA claim. However, he reasoned that the Cayman law claim could not; it is this latter point that is of relevance to us.

Ang SJ first held that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Cayman law claim, because Singapore’s courts have unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction over any claim based on statute or common law, whether local or foreign. The statute that defined the court’s civil jurisdiction – Section 16(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (“SCJA”) – implicitly retained the position at common law, that the court possessed a generally “unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction”, while expressly defining only the court’s in personam jurisdiction over defendants ([45], [51]-[52]). The only limits on the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, then, were those well-established in the common law, such as the Mozambique rule and the rule against the justiciability of foreign penal, revenue and public law claims ([54]). This was a conception of international jurisdiction organised primarily around control and consent rather than sufficient connections between causes of action and the forum, although Ang SJ’s recognition of the abovementioned common law exceptions suggests that a connection-based notion of jurisdiction may have a secondary role to play.

However, Ang SJ then held that the court could not issue a Mareva injunction against Pelletier, because, as all parties had accepted, Singapore was forum non conveniens. This is where the difficulty began, because the court’s reasoning here was anything but clear. At times, Ang SJ suggested that Singapore being forum non conveniens precluded the existence of the court’s jurisdiction over Pelletier; for instance, he dismissed the buyer’s arguments for a Mareva injunction based on the Cayman law claim on grounds that “Singapore court would first have to have in personam jurisdiction over a defendant before it could even grant a Mareva injunction” ([145]). At other times, however, Ang SJ suggested that Singapore being forum non conveniens only prevented the court from “exercising its jurisdiction” over Pelletier ([123], emphasis added). The former suggestion, however, would have been misplaced: as Ang SJ himself noted ([114]), Pelletier had voluntarily submitted to proceedings, which gave the court in personam jurisdiction over him. That Ang SJ would otherwise have refused the buyers leave to serve Pelletier should also have been irrelevant: Section 16(1) of the SCJA, mirroring the position at common law, gives Singapore’s courts “jurisdiction to hear and try any action in personam where (a) the defendant is served with a writ of summons or any other originating process … or (b) the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the [court]” (emphasis added).

Ang SJ’s objection, then, must have been the latter: if a court will not to exercise its jurisdiction over a defendant, it should not issue a Mareva injunction against him. This conclusion, however, is surprising. Ang SJ considered himself bound to reach that conclusion because of the Court of Appeal’s holding in Bi Xiaoqiong that “the Singapore court cannot exercise any power to issue an injunction unless it has jurisdiction over a defendant” (Bi Xiaoqiong, [119]). Yet, this hardly supports Ang SJ’s reasoning, because Bi Xiaoqiong evidently concerned the existence of jurisdiction, not its exercise. There, the Court of Appeal simply adopted the majority’s position in Mercedes Benz v Leiduck [1996] 1 AC 284 that a court need only possess in personam jurisdiction over a defendant to issue Mareva injunctions against him. It was irrelevant that the court would not exercise that jurisdiction thereafter; even if the court stayed proceedings, it retained a “residual jurisdiction” over them, which sufficed to support a Mareva injunction against the defendant (Bi Xiaoqiong, [108]). Indeed, in Bi Xiaoqiong itself the court did not exercise its jurisdiction: jurisdiction existed by virtue of the defendant’s mere presence in Singapore, and the plaintiff itself applied to stay proceedings thereafter on grounds that Singapore was forum non conveniens (Bi Xiaoqiong, [16], [18])

Ang SJ’s decision in Allenger thus rests on a novel proposition: that while a defendant’s presence in Singapore can support a Mareva against him even when Singapore is forum non conveniens, his submission to proceedings in Singapore cannot unless Singapore is forum conveniens, though in both situations the court has in personam jurisdiction over him. Moreover, while Ang SJ’s decision may potentially have been justified on grounds that the second requirement for the issuance of Mareva injunctions in Bi Xiaoqiong – of a reasonable accrued cause of action in Singapore – was not met, his reasoning in Allenger, in particular the distinction he drew between presence and submission cases, was directed solely at the first requirement of in personam jurisdiction. On principle, however, that distinction is hard to defend: in both scenarios, the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant derives from some idea of consent or control, and not from some connection between the substantive cause of action and the forum. If like is to be treated alike, future courts may have to relook Ang SJ’s reasoning on this point.

What was most surprising about Allenger, however, was the fact that Ang SJ himself seemed displeased at the conclusion he believed himself bound to reach. In obiter, he criticised Bi Xiaoqiong as allowing the “‘exploitation’ of the principle of territoriality by perpetrators of international frauds” (Allenger, [151]), and suggested that Bi Xiaoqiong should be overturned either by Parliament or the Court of Appeal ([154]). In the process, he cited Lord Nicholls’ famous dissent in Leiduck, that Mareva injunctions should be conceptualised as supportive of the enforcement of judgments rather than ancillary to causes of action (Leiduck, 305). The tenor of Ang SJ’s statements thus suggests a preference that courts be allowed to issue free-standing Mareva injunctions against any defendant with “substantial assets in Singapore which the orders of the foreign court … cannot or will not reach” (Allenger, [151]). Whether the Court of Appeal will take up this suggestion, or even rectify the law after Allenger, is anyone’s guess at this point. What seems clear, at least, is that Singapore’s law on Mareva injunctions supporting foreign proceedings is far from settled.

La directive 2012/13/UE n’exige pas que les personnes visées par un mandat d’arrêt européen (MAE) aux fins de poursuites pénales soient informées des voies de recours ouvertes dans l’État d’émission, notamment pour contester la légalité de l’arrestation, et disposent de l’accès aux pièces du dossier avant la remise aux autorités de cet État.

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La Cour de cassation apporte un éclairage important quant à la mise en œuvre d’un mandat d’arrêt européen dont la contestation étend la procédure au-delà de la période de transition relative au retrait du Royaume-Uni hors de l’Union européenne.

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Union européenne - Urbanisme

Union européenne - Urbanisme

Union européenne - Urbanisme

The first issue of the Journal du droit international for 2021 has just been released. It contains two articles and several case notes relating to private international law. Both articles deal with the topical issue of corporate social responsibility.

In the first article, Bernard Teyssié (University of Paris II – Panthéon-Assas) discusses the legal scope of the OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises (“Les principes directeurs de l’OCDE à l’intention des entreprises multinationales”)

The English abstract reads:

The OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises carry rules of conduct which, on a literal reading, are not binding. The recommendations made are designed to identify, prevent, exclude or, at least, mitigate the negative impacts generated by the activity of multinational enterprises or their suppliers and subcontractors in the social and corporate social responsability area. However, the reach of these recommandations is increased by the obligation imposed on any State, which has acceded to the Guidelines, to establish a national Point of contact to deal with complaints alleging a breach of the laid down Principles. The role of these Points of contact in fact confers a binding effect upon the enacted rules, contrary to what it is officially declared.

In the second article, Catherine Kessedjian (University of Paris II – Panthéon-Assas) analyses the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration drawn up under the auspices of the Center for International Legal Cooperation (CILC) (“The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration ou comment l’arbitrage et la médiation peuvent renforcer le respect des droits de l’homme par les entreprises“).

The English abstract reads:

Many recognize that access to justice is the Achilles’ heel of corporate respect for human rights. This is why, at the end of 2019, a group of jurists from various backgrounds proposed a set of arbitration rules specific to this area, which mixes public and private interests. The exercise was not easy. The purpose of the article that follows is to evaluate these rules in the light of the particularities of the subject matter and the concrete findings that have been made thanks to the procedures conducted before national courts in a few countries, some of which are still ongoing. Certain points are identified that could justify amendments to the rules when and if a revision is initiated. 

A full table of contents can be downloaded here.

La décision de demande de renseignements visée à l’article 18, § 3, du Conseil du 16 décembre 2002 relatif à la mise en œuvre des règles de concurrence prévues aux articles 101 et 102 du TFUE peut être prise par la Commission postérieurement à la procédure de communication des griefs. Elle constitue un acte préparatoire à une éventuelle décision de constatation d’infraction et présente ensuite, pour ce qui concerne la disposition prévoyant une astreinte, un caractère provisoire supposant, afin que puisse être contesté son montant, une décision définitive de condamnation au paiement de cette astreinte.

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Preuve - Enregistrement

The Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law is currently recruiting new members for its team. Two fully-funded positions as Research Fellow (PhD candidate; m/f) for the Research Department of European and Comparative Procedural Law are currently open:

• Fixed-term contract for 2 years; contract extension is possible; 40 hrs/week; Luxembourg

Your tasks

The Research Fellow will conduct legal research (contribution to common research projects and own publications), particularly in the field of European and Comparative Procedural Law, while playing a central role in undertaking and developing team-driven projects within the Institute and in partnership with international collaborators.

The successful candidate will have the opportunity to contribute to the development of the Department of European and Comparative Procedural Law led by Prof. Dr. Dres h.c. Burkhard Hess and, in parallel, work on her/his PhD project. A supervision by Prof. Dr. Dres h.c. Hess of the successful candidate’s PhD thesis is also a possibility.

Your profile

Applicants shall have obtained at least a Master’s degree in Law with outstanding results: they must have ranked within the top 5-10 % of their class and shall have a deep knowledge of domestic and EU procedural law.

The successful candidate should demonstrate a great interest in academic research and have a high potential to develop excellence. Proficiency in English is compulsory (written and oral); further language skills (notably in French and German) are an advantage.

Documents required

A detailed CV comprising of a list of publications; copies of academic records; a PhD project description of no more than 1-2 pages with the name of the prospective PhD supervisor and the name of the institution awarding the PhD certificate; the name and contact details of two referees.

You may apply online until 28 February 2021.

Contact: recruitment@mpi.lu

The Max Planck Institute Luxembourg strives to ensure a workplace that embraces diversity and provides equal opportunities.

Réglementation - durée du travail