Agrégateur de flux

Carlos Santaló Goris, Researcher at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law and Ph.D. candidate at the University of Luxembourg, offers a summary and a compelling analysis of the Czech domestic legislation regarding the EAPO Regulation.

Introduction

On 22 January 2021, the Czech Chamber of Deputies approved “the government act amending Act No. 6/2002 Coll., on courts, judges, lay judges and the state administration of courts and amending certain other acts (the Courts and Judges Act), the wording of later regulations, and other related laws, according to the Chamber of Deputies 630 as amended by the Chamber of Deputies”. The reform is now pending before the Czech Senate.

The first legislative implementation of the EAPO Regulation in the Czech national law

This act introduces the very first amendment of the Czech domestic legislation regarding Regulation No 655/2014, establishing a European Account Preservation Order (“EAPO Regulation”).

The act foresees the concentration of all the applications for EAPOs in one single court, and namely the Prague 1 District Court (Obvodní soud pro Prahu 1). Nowadays, based on the information available in the e-justice portal, the competent court corresponds to the territorially competent court in the debtor’s domicile. However, if the debtor lives outside the Czech Republic, the competent court is the one of the district where the debtor is domiciled.

The upcoming reform envisaged with the act will also affect the application mechanism to gather information on the bank accounts established in Article 14 of the EAPO Regulation. Creditors can also request to investigate if debtors hold bank accounts in the other Member States. Each Member State has an information authority which is charge of searching for the information on the bank accounts. Member States had to notify the Commission with the names of the information authorities by 16 July 2016.

Currently, there is no central information authority in the Czech Republic. Any district court with territorial competence over the debtor’s domicile is an information authority for the purposes of the EAPO Regulation. When the debtor is not domiciled in the Czech Republic, the information authority is the competent court in the district where the bank, which holds the accounts, is located. This can result in challenges for the courts of other Member States searching the information. In case the creditor even ignores the name of the debtor’s bank, how can the competent authority to provide the information on the bank accounts be identified? One Luxemburgish judge has experienced this very dilemma.

The information on the bank accounts is obtained directly from the banks. Czech courts submit a request to “all banks in its territory to disclose, upon request by the information authority, whether the debtor holds an account with them” (Article 14(5)(b) of the EAPO Regulation).

Eventually, if the reform is approved by the Czech Senate, the information authority will also be centralized in the Prague 1 District Court.

The reasons behind the implementation

According to Dr. Katerina Valachová, the member of the Czech Chamber of Deputies who sponsored the amendments concerning the EAPO Regulation, the reform is due to “the complexity of the legislation on the EAPO, as well as the short deadlines set by the EAPO Regulation”. Having a single court for all the EAPO applications will help in terms of specialization. Furthermore, since most of the headquarters of the banks that operate in the Czech Republic are located within the area of the Prague 1 District Court when the court acts as an information mechanism, it can obtain the information on the bank accounts from the banks faster.

The Czech reform in the European context

Establishing a central authority to gather information on the bank accounts is the most common solution followed among those Member States in which the EAPO Regulation applies. Only four out of the twenty-six Member States (France, Finland, Latvia, and the Netherlands), have opted for a complete decentralized information authority. Two other Member States, Austria, and Italy adopted a hybrid approach: they have a central authority when the debtor is domiciled abroad and a decentralized authority when the debtor is domiciled in the country.

However, establishing a centralized court to handle all EAPO applications is a less common choice among other Member States. Only three countries have appointed centralized courts to issue EAPOs: Austria, Slovakia, and Finland.

The Czech Republic’s two neighbouring Member States, Slovakia and Austria, introduced a partial centralization of the EAPOs applications. In Slovakia, the Banská Bystrica District Court (Okresný súd Banská Bystrica) handles all the EAPO applications when the debtor’s “general territorial affiliation cannot be determined” within the Slovakian territory. In Austria, the Vienna Inner City District Court (Bezirksgericht Innere Stadt Wien) is responsible for issuing all the EAPOs when requested before initiation of the proceedings on the merits and before the enforcement of the judgment on the merits of the claim.

Finland has gone a step further than Austria and Slovakia. Similarly, to the ongoing Czech reform, it appointed one sole court – the district court of Helsinki – responsible for issuing all EAPOs.

Outside the EAPO Regulation scheme, we can also find examples of domestic “centralized courts” responsible for other European civil proceedings. For instance, in Germany the European Payment Order (“EPO”) was centralized in the Local Court in Wedding, Berlin. In 2019, France the French legislator approved the creation of a centralized court, which will handle all the EPO applications.

A more efficient application of the EAPO Regulation

Establishing a centralized court for the EAPO Regulation in Czechia is very welcome among those of us who want the EAPO Regulation to become a successful instrument. The future central court will become specialized with the EAPO Regulation, an instrument that can result too complex and requires a certain amount time for its adequate understanding. The centralization will also assure a coherent and uniform application of the EAPO Regulation at the Czech national level. Moreover, in case an issue on the interpretation of the text of that Regulation arises, that centralized court might be more willing to make a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) than regular judges who might not encounter many applications for EAPOs. The ECJ has itself expressly acknowledged the benefits of the centralization in the context of the Maintenance Regulation. In fact, in C-400/13, Sanders and Huber, the ECJ affirmed that “a centralization of jurisdiction, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, promotes the development of specific expertise, of such a kind as to improve the effectiveness of recovery of maintenance claims, while ensuring the proper administration of justice and serving the interests of the parties to the dispute” (C-400/13, Sanders and Huber, 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2461, para. 45).

Hopefully, in the future more Member States will follow the example of Czechia or Finland and will concentrate the application of the EAPO in a sole court in their territories.

 

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on 11 February 2021 at 8:00 am (Mexico City time – CST), 3:00 pm CET time. The topic of the webinar is the HCCH Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children – a perspective from Europe and will be presented by Professor Beatriz Campuzano Díaz (in Spanish).

The details of the webinar are:

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82362628717?pwd=QWNSdTRVWHY0dllhNzlINEthTUZnQT09

Meeting ID: 823 6262 8717

Password: BMAAMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX/about

Cecilia Rizcallah (ULB & University of Saint-Louis, Belgium) has just published a monograph on the principle of mutual trust in EU Law, based on her doctoral thesis: Le principe de confiance mutuelle en droit de l’Union européenne – Un principe essentiel à l’épreuve d’une crise de valeur, Bruylant, 2020.

The author has provided the following abstract in English:

The legal structure of the European Union “is based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the Union is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU”, states the Court of Justice of the European Union. Among these common values, fundamental rights, the rule of law and democracy occupy a central position. This “premiss”, according to the Court, “implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States”.

Yet, as we all know, the European Union is currently facing a “crisis of values”. This crisis results from the increasingly frequent questioning, in the European Union, of the values on which it is allegedly based. The semantics of mutual trust between Member States has nevertheless never been more present in official speeches. Like the dictum according to which “we never talk as much about water as in the desert”, should the rise of the discourses on mutual trust be seen as an “excess of vocabulary” symptomatic of the climate of mistrust between Member States?

 This question, prompted by the success of the principle of mutual trust at a time when the context reveals fundamental divisions between Member States as to the meaning of European integration and the values on which it is based, is at the heart of this book.

In order to provide some answers, the first part of the book proposes to “clear the ground” and offer a cross-cutting definition of the principle of mutual trust in Union law, which applies both to internal market law and to the law of the Area of freedom, security and justice. It is the presumptive mechanism that seems, in this respect, to offer the best description of the principle under consideration.

The book then analyses the apparently consubstantial link between this principle and the founding values of the Union. Constituting an uncertain foundation and an imperfect limit to mutual trust, the EU founding values have an ambivalent relationship with the principle under consideration.

Finally, this book concludes with a third part which analyses the essential role played by the principle of mutual trust in Union law, at the crossroads of the imperatives of unity, diversity and equality. Because of the risks entailed by this principle regarding EU founding values, the book, however, argues in favour of moving mutual trust from the rank of postulate to that of method.

More details are available here, including a foreword by Eleanor Sharpston (Former Advocate General at Court of Justice of the European Union).

Since mutual trust is of particular interest for EU Private international law experts, Cecilia will soon provide the readers of this blog with a special focus on the principle of mutual trust in the field of EU judicial cooperation in civil matters, based on her doctoral research.

L’enfant, né sur le territoire d’un établissement cédé, postérieurement à l’expiration du délai d’option pour souscrire une déclaration de nationalité, n’est pas soumis aux dispositions du traité de cession. Il a un statut autonome de celui de son père, lui permettant de revendiquer la nationalité française sur le fondement du droit interne. 

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The U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision yesterday in Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp. This is the case we previewed here concerning the Guelph treasure, allegedly taken by Nazis from its Jewish owners via a coerced sale for a fraction of its value prior to World War II. The heirs of the rightful owners and the government had agreed to conciliate the claim before a German Commission, which found that the taking had not been coerced. Dissatisfied with the decision, the heirs sued in Washington under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which provides that a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction of the U.S. courts in cases “in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue.” The District Court and the DC Circuit held that Germany was not immune, and the Supreme Court granted Germany’s petition for review. There were a number of issues at play in this case, but Germany’s primary argument was that a state does not violate international law by expropriating the property of its own nationals.

The Court, in a unanimous decision by Chief Justice Roberts, sided with Germany. When the FSIA was enacted in 1976, Roberts said, it was “clear” that a taking of property violated international law only when a state took an alien’s property. The text of the statute also “places repeated emphasis on property and property-related rights, while injuries and acts we might associate with genocide are notably lacking.” Put simply, the Court viewed the statute as linked to direct expropriation of alien property, and not as a way for U.S. courts to hear any claims arising under international law. Repeating a theme against asserting U.S. jurisdiction to acts occurring abroad, Justice Roberts stressed that “United States law . . . does not rule the world,” and noted that the Court will interpret our laws to “to avoid, where possible, “producing friction in our relations with [other] nations.”

Due to its decision on the expropriation exception, the Court did not need to decide whether comity provided an independent basis for dismissal. The court also issued a one-sentence opinion vacating a lower-court ruling in Republic of Hungary v. Simon, a similar lawsuit brought by Holocaust survivors seeking compensation for Hungary’s confiscation of Jewish property.

Procédure civile

Procédure civile

Appel civil

Procédures civiles d'exécution

On 22 February 2021, from 5 to 7 pm CET, the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan will host a webinar titled The Fundamental Rights of Persons with Cognitive Disabilities in Cross-border Situations – Time for Italy and Spain to Join the Hague Adults Convention.

The Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults is currently in force for thirteen States. As the Hague Conference on Private International Law is preparing to host a Special Commission to review the practical operation of the Convention, scheduled to take place in 2022, other States – including Italy and Spain – are considering ratification.

The purpose of the webinar is to give an account of the domestic rules of private international law governing the protection of adults in Spain and Italy, and explore the benefits that joining the Convention would entail in the two countries for the adults concerned, the competent authorities and legal practitioners, including notaries.

In carrying out this exercise, regard will be had, in particular, to the experience of Portugal, which became a party to the Convention in 2018.

The organisers also seek to collect the views of stakeholders, notably human rights organisations with a focus on the rights of those with cognitive disabilities, regarding the issues surrounding the protection of such rights in cross-border situations, and the role that the Convention may play in enhancing such protection.

Speakers include Philippe Lortie (First Secretary of The Hague Conference on Private International Law), Salomé Adroher Biosca (Comillas Pontifical University), Pietro Franzina (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart) and Geraldo Maciel Rocha Mendes Ribeiro (University of Coimbra).

Attendance is free. No prior registration is required.

For more information, including the link to access the webinar, see here.

Lyle & Scott Ltd v American Eagle Outfitters, Inc [2021] EWHC 90 (Ch) entertains ia the question whether the governing law for passing-off claims involving an eagle trademark, fall under Article 6 or 8 Rome II. The application is for an earlier order allowing service of jurisdiction, to be set aside.

Parties had agreed a ‘memorandum’ (which may or may not be a ‘contract’ – it is further referred to in the judgment as a ‘contract’) following a disagreement on whether each corporation’s eagle (L&S’s being trademarked in the UK and various EU Member States; AEO’s not being trademarked here, I understand) incorporated in apparel involved infringement of trademark and passing off.

AEO are domiciled in the US  and have no physical presence in the UK (or, one assumes, anywhere in the EU (the litigation was initiated pre-Brexit); their apparel is offered via online sales.

Jurisdiction is decided on the basis of the laws of E&W. Applicable law comes into the discussion for per Lord Mance at 46 in VTB v Nutritek,

“The governing law, which is here English, is in general terms, a positive factor in favour of trial in England, because it is generally preferable, other things being equal, that a case should be tried in the country whose law applies. However, that factor is of particular force if issues of law are likely to be important and if there is evidence of relevant differences in the legal principles or rules applicable to such issues in the two countries in contention as the appropriate forum…”.

Miles J discusses the governing law issue at 64 ff. Claimant argue the claim comes under A8 Rome II: infringement of intellectual property rights, English law, lex loci protectionis. Defendants argue they fall under A4 (by way of A6(2): Act of unfair competition), and that A4(3) is engaged to make the applicable law that of the state of Pennsylvania, because of the ‘contractual’ relationship.

At 72 Miles J agrees with the classification under A6, holding ia that ‘(t)he cause of action protects the goodwill of traders against deceptive conduct; goodwill is not an intellectual property right; and passing off is not the infringement of a right.’ Unlike the judge I do not think Rome II’s recital is of much help here and I suspect more can be made of the comparative law insights (common law and civil law) offered.

The next question is whether the claim falls within A6 (2). In Miles J’s succinctly expressed view it does, at 73: ‘The act of unfair competition alleged (passing off) affects exclusively the interests of a specific competitor (L&S). It follows that Art. 4 applies.’ As I have often noted, I find it very difficult to think of acts of unfair competition do not ultimately also impact the consumers of those involved.

The final hurdle then is whether A4(3) is engaged to displace E&W law as the lex loci damni, which at 75 the judge holds is not the case. Parties have not agreed on a governing law for the ‘contract’, they have conducted previous proceedings on the basis of that law being the laws of Pennsylvania. However even if the lex contractus is probably Penn law, and English law probably the lex causae for the passing off claim, Miles J holds this should not have an impact at the jurisdictional level: particularly seeing as there is no immediate reason to assume E&W courts will have great difficulty in applying Penn law to what on the contractual substance does not seem an overly complicated case.

Application dismissed, service out of jurisdiction stands.

This case once again highlights the level of complication resulting from having inserted different heads of applicable law into Rome II – a phenomenon which as I recently reported, might soon be expanded upon.

Geert.

EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, Chapter 4, Heading 4.5.2, 4.6.2, 4.6.4.

Horatia Muir Watt, Lucia Biziková, Agatha Brandão de Oliveira, Diego P. Fernández Arroyo and Megan Ma (Sciences Po Law School) have edited Le tournant global en droit international privé, published by Pedone.

This is the French version of Global Private International Law – Adjudication without Frontiers, that the same team of authors had published in 2019 with Edward Elgar.

Global Private International Law is a groundbreaking casebook, combining the expertise of over sixty international and interdisciplinary contributors who analyze key legal proceedings in order to provide a comprehensive study of the impact of globalisation on the law.

Providing a unique and clearly structured tool, this book presents an authoritative collection of carefully selected global case studies. Some of these are considered global due to their internationally relevant subject matter, whilst others demonstrate the blurring of traditional legal categories in an age of accelerated cross-border movement. The study of the selected cases in their political, cultural, social and economic contexts sheds light on the contemporary transformation of law through its encounter with conflicting forms of normativity and the multiplication of potential fora.

Key Features:

• the specific global scope allows the reader to gain a contextualised understanding of legal transformation

• each case has two commentaries from different viewpoints, ensuring a nuanced perspective on the implications of the global turn in private international law and its importance for adjudication

• an astute combination of theory and practice ensures readers gain an understanding of the relevance of innovative legal theories in interpreting concrete cases in a changing world

• comparative material and ground-breaking analysis make this book eminently suitable for use with students and a useful tool for researchers and courts confronted with novel topics or issues.

The French book includes a foreword of Paul Lagarde and an introductory chapter of Horatia Muir Watt which are freely available here, together with the table of contents.

The first chapter of the English book can be freely accessed here.

Non-lieu à renvoi

Etat

FIGC et Consorzio Ge.Se.Av.
Liberté d'établissement
Une fédération sportive nationale, telle que la Fédération italienne de football, peut être soumise aux règles de passation des marchés publics dès lors qu’elle exerce des activités d’intérêt général ayant un caractère autre qu’industriel ou commercial

Fussl Modestraße Mayr
Liberté d'établissement
L’interdiction de diffuser, dans le cadre des programmes de télévision allemands émis au niveau national, de la publicité au seul niveau régional pourrait être contraire au droit de l’Union