Agrégateur de flux

Les concessions de service de transport aérien sont qualifiées de délégations de service public lorsqu’elles sont conclues par une collectivité territoriale. Cette qualification entraîne l’application des règles de la commande publique.

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La protection des résidents de longue durée sur le territoire d’un État membre contre les mesures d’éloignement s’étend à l’ensemble de ces mesures, indépendamment de leur nature. Un résident de longue durée ne peut donc pas être expulsé pour le seul motif qu’il a été condamné à une peine privative de liberté supérieure à un an.

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La Convention franco-algérienne du 27 août 1964 impose au juge, fût-il premier saisi, devant qui est invoquée une décision rendue dans l’autre État, de vérifier, au besoin d’office, si cette décision remplit les conditions prévues pour jouir de plein droit de l’autorité de chose jugée.

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This volume (2017, 295 pp., € 79.00, ISBN 978-3-8487-3736-9) is a collection of edited papers (all in English) presented on the occasion of the 6th Seoul-Freiburg Law Faculties Symposium held in Freiburg (Germany) in June 2016. Since its inception in 1996, the cooperation and academic exchange between the Law Faculties of the Seoul National University (SNU) and the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg has flourished and contributed substantially to the mutual understanding of legal thought and research in the two legal cultures and jurisdictions, keeping alive the old and precious tradition of maintaining a close relationship between Korean and German law. Like previous symposia, the 2016 Symposium on the „Relationship between Legislature and Judiciary“ was devoted to a rather broad and abstract subject which is of fundamental relevance for both countries, covering constitutional law, legal theory, private law (including private international law), criminal law, commercial law, and administrative law. The symposium was supported by the Thyssen Foundation (Cologne).

The volume is edited by Jan von Hein, Hanno Merkt, Sonja Meier, Alexander Bruns, Yuanshi Bu, Silja Vöneky, Michael Pawlik, and Eiji Takahashi. It contains contributions by Un Jong Pak, Matthias Jestaedt, Ralf Poscher, Hong Sik Cho, Kye Joung Lee, Frank Schäfer, Jinsu Yune, Jan von Hein, Sank Won Lee, Ok-Rial Song, Boris Paal, Maximilian Haedicke, Seongwook Heo, and Dongjin Lee.
Further information is available on the publisher’s website here.

A post suited to be this year’s last, given the religious context of the current holiday period: Wahl AG advised late November in C-426/16. See my previous posts on the issue. A European Regulation (1099/2009) provides for an unclear, and conditional,  exemption from a requirement of stunning animals for religious slaughter. (Regularly the practise is also called ‘ritual’; including in current Opinion. ‘Religious’ must be the preferred term).

Practised in particular by the Jewish (Shechita; leading to ‘kosher’ meat) and Muslim (Zabihah; with halal meat) faith, a core aspect of the practice is that animals are not stunned prior to slaughter. The science on the effect of stunned or unstunned slaughter is equivocal. What is certain is that neither stunned nor unstunned slaughter, when carried out incorrectly (well documented in the case of stunned slaughter) aids the welfare of the animal.

The Flemish Minister responsible for animal welfare announced that, from 2015 onwards, he would no longer issue approvals for temporary slaughter plants at which religious slaughtering could be practised during the Islamic Feast of the Sacrifice because such approvals in his view were contrary to EU legislation, in particular the provisions of Regulation 1099/2009. The muslim community objects to the discontinuation of temporary slaughter plants.

The Advocate-General’s Opinion is lengthy, and there is a lot to chew on.  There is little point in rehashing all the AG’s points: readers are best referred to the Opinion itself. Of note however is

• Firstly, the AG’s attempt strictly to delineate the issue.

The case he suggests is simply about what material conditions, in terms of equipment and operating obligations, must accompany unstunned slaughter in order for it to comply with the relevant EU rules. He suggests a rephrasing of the referring court’s questions in that direction. Along these lines he also in substance refuses to entertain the questions as to the validity of Regulation 1099/2009 itself, or the exemption from the duty to use approved slaughterhouses under the Regulation’s ‘cultural’ exception. (See footnote 13). In my view the Regulation is very vulnerable on this issue: sporting and cultural events are entirely excluded from its scope of application; religious rites are subject to a qualified exemption. That to me cannot survive a discrimination test.

The Brussels court had given the case a much wider scope: it suggested that the contested Flemish decision creates a limitation on the exercise of freedom of religion and undermines Belgian customs relating to religious rites, since it obliges Muslims to perform the ritual slaughter of the Islamic Feast of the Sacrifice in slaughterhouses that have been approved in accordance with Regulation No 853/2004. In the opinion of that court, this limitation is neither relevant nor proportionate in order to attain the legitimate objective of protecting the welfare of animals and human health (at 20). The AG however sees no limitation of freedom of religion at all, resulting from the general obligation to use approved slaughterhouses.

• Despite the attempt at delineation, the background to the case is undeniable and filters through in the Opinion.

If only because the AG has to complete the analysis should the CJEU disagree with his view that freedom of religion is not being limited, he does review the legality of a total ban on slaughtering other than in plants that have been approved in accordance with the rules established in Annex III to Regulation No 853/2004.

First of all he refers to European Commission audits of the previously approved temporary slaughterhouses to make the point that they protected animal welfare sufficiently. He directly criticises the Regulation for its arguably disproportionate criteria in this respect: see in particular at 127.

Religious slaughter falls squarely within the European Convention of Human Rights Article 9’s freedom of religious expression. It is clear that the AG believes that the ban on unstunned slaughter other than in approved abattoirs, in the name of animal welfare or otherwise,  offends freedom of religious expression to such a degree that it simply must not pass: para 133 and the preceding argumentation is very clear.

The AG’s reasoning holds all the more for a total ban un unstunned slaughter full stop. That is the clear implication of this Opinion and one which must be welcomed.

Guten Rutsch ins neue Jahr!

Geert.

By virtue of Article 42 Law 4509/2017, a new provision has been added to the Code of Civil Procedure, bearing the title of the EU Regulation. Article 738 A CCP features 6 paragraphs, which are (partially) fulfilling the duty of the Hellenic Republic under Article 50 EAPO. In brief the provision states the following:

• 1: The competent courts to issue a EAPO are the Justice of the Peace for those disputes falling under its subject matter jurisdiction, and the One Member 1st Instance Court  for the remaining disputes. It is noteworthy that the provision does not refer to the court, but to its respective judge, which implies that no oral hearing is needed.
• 2: The application is dismissed, if

1. it does not fulfil the requirements stipulated in the Regulation, or if
2. the applicant does not state the information provided by Article 8 EAPO, or if
3. (s)he does not proceed to the requested amendments or corrections of the application within the time limit set by the Judge.

Notice of dismissal may take place by an e-mail sent to the account of the lawyer who filed the application. E-signature and acknowledgment of receipt are pre-requisites for this form of service.

The applicant may lodge an appeal within 30 days following notification. The hearing follows the rule established under Article 11 EAPO. The competent courts are the ones established under the CCP.

• 3: The debtor enjoys the rights and remedies provided by Articles 33-38 EAPO. Without prejudice to the provisions of the EU Regulation, the special chapter on garnishment proceedings (Articles 712 & 982 et seq. CCP) is to be applied.
• 4: If the EAPO has been issued prior to the initiation of proceedings to the substance of the matter, the latter shall be initiated within 30 days following service to the third-party.

If the applicant failed to do so, the EAPO shall be revoked ipso iure, unless the applicant has served a payment order within the above term.

• 5: Upon finality of the judgment issued on the main proceedings or the payment order mentioned under § 4, the successful EAPO applicant acquires full rights to the claim.
• 6: The liability of the creditor is governed by Article 13 Paras 1 & 2 EAPO. Article 703 CCP (damages against the creditor caused by enforcement against the debtor) is applied analogously.

Some additional remarks related to the Explanatory Report would provide a better insight to the foreign reader.

1. There is an explicit reference to the German and Austrian model.
2. The placement of the provision (i.e. within the 5th Book of the CCP, on Interim Measures) clarifies the nature of the EAPO as an interim measure, despite its visible connotations to an order, which is regulated in the 4th chapter of the 4th Book, on Special Proceedings. Nevertheless, the explanatory report acknowledges resemblance of the EAPO to a payment order.
3. There is no need to provide information on the authority competent to enforce the EAPO, given that the sole person entrusted with execution in Greece is the bailiff.

The initiative taken by the MoJ is more than welcome. However, a follow-up is imperative, given that Article 738 A CCP does not provide all necessary information listed under Article 50 EAPO.