The XXIII Annual Conference of the Italian Society of International and EU Law (SIDI-ISIL) will take place at the University of Ferrara on 7 and 8 June 2018.
The conference’s theme is Codification in International and EU Law.
One session of the Conference will deal with The coordination between different codification instruments (8 June 2018, 9 am – 1 pm). Speakers will be selected through a call for papers.
Scholars of any affiliation and at any stage of their career are invited to submit proposals relevant to the session topic, including (but not limited to) the following:
The deadline for submitting proposals is 10 January 2018.
By Stephan Walter, Research Fellow at the Research Center for Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution (TCDR), EBS Law School, Wiesbaden, Germany, and attendee of the 2017 Summer Courses on Private International Law at the Hague Academy of International Law
On 13 October 2017, the Alumni of the Hague Academy of International Law/Hamburg, the German section of Attenders and Alumni of the Hague Academy of International Law, A.A.A., hosted their annual meeting. At the invitation of Professor Karsten Thorn (Bucerius Law School, Hamburg), who lectured a Special Course on “The Protection of Small and Medium Enterprises in Private International Law” at the Academy during the 2016 Summer Courses, the meeting was held at Bucerius Law School, Hamburg. The academic programme consisted of four presentations, two of them dealt with issues of Private International Law after Brexit.
Professor Karsten Thorn’s presentation on “European Private International Law after Brexit” was divided into two parts. In the first part he discussed direct legal consequences of Brexit on Private International Law in relations between the United Kingdom (in particular England) and Germany. He highlighted the importance of Union Law and especially the duties to recognise derived from the fundamental freedoms for the rise of England as a legal hub. Therefore, Brexit would have grave consequences for the attractiveness of England in a number of legal areas. This would apply, for example, to company law. Whereas under Union Law the recognition of a company established in accordance with the law of one Member State must not be refused by another Member State, each Member State would apply its own rules on this issue post-Brexit. This could also impact companies established before Brexit, although it was disputed whether this would infringe their legitimate expectations and if so, whether this protection was subject to a certain time limit. In any event, the companies should act rather sooner than later to avoid any legal uncertainty. Comparable issues would arise in insolvency law. First and foremost, there would be – in contrast to the current legal situation – no duty for a Member State’s court to recognise a decision of an English court on the existence of the centre of the debtor’s main interests (COMI) in England anymore. Again, each Member State would apply its national rules on the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings. Secondly, an English scheme of arrangement, a court-approved private debt restructuring solution, would likely not be recognised by the Member States after Brexit. By contrast, fewer negative consequences would arise with regard to the right to a name because even now Article 21 TFEU only guaranteed the recognition of a name rightfully obtained in the EU citizen’s State of nationality or residence and this freedom is further limited by the Constitution of the recognising Member State. Finally, he highlighted the negative impact of Brexit on procedural law. Post-Brexit, English decisions will no longer benefit from mutual trust in the EU Member States. A revival of bilateral treaties with Member States or instruments of the Hague Conference could only serve as sectoral solutions. Under these conditions, he presumed an increased usage of arbitration in the UK post-Brexit, not least because the United Kingdom is a Contracting State to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Moreover, he pointed out that English courts would return to traditional instruments of the English procedural law such as anti-suit injunctions. The second part of his presentation dealt with indirect consequences of Brexit on the European Private International Law. Firstly, he submitted that a number of provisions in EU legislation can be regarded as legal transplants from English law. This applies, e.g., to Article 9 paragraph 3 Rome I Regulation and Article 6 lit. a EU Succession Regulation. In his opinion, post-Brexit at least the former provision will be discarded after a revision of the respective EU legislation. Secondly, he turned to the question of the usage of English as working language of the EU bodies. He stated that most EU legislation was drafted in English. Because legal English was very different to the legal language used in all other Member States this was still noticeable in the official translations. Therefore, English shaped the spirit of the EU legislation. Although he believed that English would still be the dominant language in the EU bodies after Brexit, he argued that the continental legal thinking could gain more significance.
In her presentation on “Pluralism of Legal Sources with regard to International Choice of Court Agreements”, Caroline Lasthaus (Bucerius Law School, Hamburg) examined – after a brief overview of the interplay between the German autonomous national rules on jurisdiction, the Brussels I Regulation Recast, the 2007 Lugano Convention and the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention –options of the United Kingdom to foster the enforcement of choice of court agreements in favour of UK courts post-Brexit. An accession to the 2007 Lugano Convention would require either the membership of the United Kingdom in the European Free Trade Association or a unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties. However, both options were, in her opinion, unlikely. Furthermore, the rules of the 2007 Lugano Convention would be outdated and the United Kingdom would have to accept the CJEU’s jurisdiction over questions of interpretation of the Convention. Therefore, she scrutinised whether an accession to the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention could be a suitable solution. The accession itself would not raise any difficulties, since the United Kingdom could accede to the Convention unilaterally. Hence, the decisive question was whether the Convention would serve the needs of the United Kingdom. Lasthaus argued that neither the applicability of the Convention only to international exclusive choice of court agreements nor the exclusion of agreements with a consumer would make the Convention less attractive for the United Kingdom. Moreover, both the Brussels I Regulation Recast and the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention would allow the choice of a neutral forum. However, she stressed that the Convention was rather strict with regard to the formal requirements of an agreement, whereas the Brussels I Regulation Recast followed a much more flexible approach. Even though a violation of formal requirements would not lead to the agreement to be null and void by virtue of the Convention, the Convention’s rules on recognition and enforcement would not apply to judgements rendered based on such an agreement. Finally, one crucial downside of the Convention would be the necessity of an exequatur procedure with regard to the judgements rendered based on a choice of court agreement. This would lead to higher costs for the litigants and to a longer procedure. As a result, she conceded that an accession to the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention could not mend all the consequences of the non-applicability of the Brussels I Regulation Recast post-Brexit. Nonetheless, an accession would still make sense for the United Kingdom and could also boost the conclusion of a worldwide Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements.
Both presentations were followed by lively discussions among the speakers and participants. It was agreed that the implementation of existing EU legislation into domestic law could not cushion the consequences of Brexit, especially because the fundamental freedoms would no longer apply to the United Kingdom. Additionally, it became clear once more that the final outcome of Brexit is still uncertain. In this vein, it is noteworthy from a Private International Law point of view that there was some disagreement on whether the United Kingdom would need to accede to the Convention at all or if it would still be a Contracting State of the Convention after Brexit by way of a succession of State.
I was recently asked to shortly analyse the key issues of the UK government’s policy paper on providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework with the EU after Brexit from a dispute resolution perspective. The text of the inteview is available here.
In [2017] EWHC 2401 (Comm) Team Y&R v Ghossoub, Laurence Rabinowitz QC discussed a number of issues, most particularly anti-suit in the context of an exclusive jurisdictional clause (anti-suit not granted). He summarised the applications as follows:
‘The first application, brought by the claimants to the anti-suit claim, is for an interim injunction seeking to restrain Mr Ghossoub, the defendant to those proceedings, from pursuing related proceedings commenced by him in Hong Kong against four of those claimants until the trial of the anti-suit claim. The second application, brought by Mr Ghossoub as defendant to the anti-suit claim, seeks to set aside two orders made by the Court related to service on him of the anti-suit claim. The first, made by Phillips J dated 20 May 2015, granted permission to serve the anti-suit claim out of the jurisdiction. The second, made by HHJ Waksman QC sitting as a High Court judge dated 8 September 2016, granted permission to serve the claim form and other documents by an alternative method of service. The third application, brought by Mr Ghossoub as defendant to the defaulting shareholder claim, in effect mirrors his application in the anti-suit claim to set aside the service out and service by an alternative method orders.’
Anti-suit would be aimed at courts ex-EU hence the Brussels I antimony against them (per Gasser, among others) does not apply. Incidentally, I do not think that necessarily needs to exclude any EU /CJEU grip on the substantive issue at all: in the current, Recast Regulation, neither party needs to be domiciled in the EU for choice of court to be made in favour of a court established in the EU. This does create an EU interest in the issue of third-party impact of choice of court, and consequently on the use of anti-suit to support or reject such impact.
Now, at para 78 ff Mr Rabinowitz considers the issue of third parties. Not at issue is whether choice of court is binding upon, or may be invoked by such parties (in EU law considered eg in Refcomp, Profit Sim, Assens Havn, Leventis). Rather, whether an exclusive jurisdiction clause should be understood to oblige a contractual party to bring claims relating to the contract in the chosen forum even if the claim is one against a non-contracting party. This would support the idea of ‘one-stop shopping’ which is prevalent eg in English law albeit mostly vis-a-vis the various litigious relations between two and the same parties.
One can see merit in obliging parties bound by choice of court, to bring all related claims to one and the same court. Except of course, as Mr Rabinowitz points out, third parties are quite likely to be in a position to be able to bring the case before a different court, thus putting the contractual party at a disadvantage; moreover, even if the contractual party does bring the claim to the courts at England, these may not in fact have jurisdiction: in such circumstances, insisting on third-party proceedings to be brought before the English courts becomes silly. (My words, not Mr Rabinowitz’).
Taking these and also the entire contractual context into account, the High Court holds that choice of court in the contract at issue does not extend to claims against non-contracting third parties, and dismisses anti-suit.
Take your time to read the judgment: it gives very good context to what to some might seem like a very awkward starting point.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9.
Au visa de l’article 6, § 1, de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, la Cour de cassation renforce son contrôle sur la durée raisonnable de la détention provisoire d’un accusé en attente de son procès en appel, obligeant les juges à caractériser les diligences particulières ou les circonstances insurmontables l’expliquant.
For more information and the programme, please click here.
For the registration page, please click here.Procédure civile
On 30 October 2017 the Jean Monnet Module on European Civil Procedure will host its annual conference on ‘Corti europee e giudici nazionali’ in Milan. The conference language is Italian. For further information see here.
On 3-4 November 2017 the LUISS «Guido Carli» University School of Law, with the support of the International Law Association (Italian Branch) and the auspices of the International Insolvency Institute, will host in Rome a conference on «Cross-Border Business Crisis: International and European Horizons».
Three bilingual (English/Italian) sessions are scheduled: I) International and European Policies on Business Crisis (Chairperson: Luciano Panzani); II) Regulation 2015/848 within the European System of Private International Law (Chairperson: Stefania Bariatti); III) Cross-Border Insolvency and Italian Legal Order: Old and New Challenges (Chairperson: Sergio M. Carbone).
Speakers include academics and practitioners (Massimo V. Benedettelli, Giorgio Corno, Domenico Damascelli, Luigi Fumagalli, Anna Gardella, Lucio Ghia, Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, Antonio Leandro, Maria Chiara Malaguti, Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, Alberto Mazzoni, Paul Omar, Antonio Tullio, Robert van Galen, Francesca Villata, Ivo-Meinert Willrodt).
Most of them are members of the ILA-Italy Study Group on «Cross-Border Insolvency and National Legal Orders» and will discuss the findings of their research during the conference.
Program and details on registration are available here
I reviewed the High Court’s decision in Lungowe here. The Court of Appeal has now confirmed jurisdiction against the non-UK based defendants on largely the same, if slightly more structured and expanded arguments as the High Court. (Per Owusu, jurisdiction against the UK-based defendant is undeniable; the non-UK defendants need to be joined on the basis of residual English conflicts law).
Ekaterina Aristova has analysis of Simon LJ’s leading judgment here – I am happy to refer. Of particular note is the much more reserved approach of the Court of Appeal on the merits issue of the claim. As I noted in my review of Okpabi v Shell at the High Court, in that case Fraser J looked in serious detail into the issue of merits: not, I believe, justified at the jurisdictional stage. Appeal against Fraser J’s finding will be heard by the Court of Appeal.
Geert.
European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Headings 8.3.1.1., 8.3.2
Un acte de naissance établi aux Comores ne peut pas produire effet en France s’il n’est pas légalisé par le consul de France aux Comores ou par le consul des Comores en France.
Cour d'appel de Paris, pôle 5, 27 mars 2017
Pourvoi c./ Cour d'appel de Paris, Pôle 2, 28 mars 2017
Cour d'appel de Cayenne, chambre sociale, 28 novembre 2016
Copropriété
Copropriété
Cour d'appel de Douai, 4e Chambre, 14 février 2017
Cour d'appel de Metz, Chambre des Appels Correctionnels, 29 mars 2017
Tribunal de grande instance/d'instance de Créteil, 10e correctionnelle, 02 octobre 2017
Theme by Danetsoft and Danang Probo Sayekti inspired by Maksimer