Agrégateur de flux

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Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle MARQ
Le Tribunal de l’UE annule le refus d’enregistrer, en tant que marque de l’Union, une marque figurative incluant les symboles de devises « € » et « $ »

Anna Bizer, doctoral student at the University of Freiburg, and I have just published an article on “Social Media and the Protection of Privacy: Current Gaps and Future Directions in European Private International Law” in the International Journal of Data Science and Analytics. The article considers the current situation in European private international law regarding the protection of privacy and personality rights in social media. When privacy infringements occur on the internet, difficult questions as to determining jurisdiction and the applicable law arise. This field is so far only partially governed by European Union law and still leaves a gap that must be filled by the domestic choice-of-law rules of the member states. The article addresses these problems taking into account the recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The full text is available here.

By Prof. Burkhard Hess, Max Planck Institute Luxembourg.

An interesting perspective concerning the Achmea judgment of the ECJ[1] relates to the way how the Court addresses investment arbitration from the perspective of European Union law. This paper takes up the judgment from this perspective. There is no doubt that Achmea will disappoint many in the arbitration world who might read it paragraph by paragraph while looking for a comprehensive line of arguments. Obviously, some paragraphs of the judgment are short (maybe because they were shortened during the deliberations) and it is much more the outcome than the line of arguments that counts. However, as many judgments of the ECJ, it is important to read the decision in context. In this respect, there are several issues to be highlighted here:

First, the judgment clearly does not correspond to the arguments of the German Federal Court (BGH) which referred the case to Luxembourg. Obviously, the BGH expected that the ECJ would state that intra EU-investment arbitration was compatible with Union law. The BGH’s reference to the ECJ argued in favor of the compatibility of intra EU BIT with Union law.[2] In this respect, the Achmea judgment is unusual, as the ECJ normally takes up positively at least some parts of the questions referred to it and the arguments supporting them. In contrast, the conclusion of AG Wathelet were much closer to the questions asked in the preliminary reference.

Second, the Court did not follow the conclusions of Advocate General Wathelet.[3] As the AG had pushed his arguments very much unilaterally in a (pro-arbitration) direction, he obviously provoked a firm resistance on the side of the Court. In the Achmea judgment, there is no single reference to the conclusions of the AG[4] – this is unusual and telling, too.

Third, the basic line of arguments developed by the ECJ is mainly found in paras 31 – 37 of the judgment. Here, the Court sets the tone at a foundational level: the Grand Chamber refers to basic constitutional principles of the Union (primacy of Union law, effective implementation of EU law by the courts of the Member States, mutual trust and shared values). In this respect, it is telling that each paragraph quotes Opinion 2/13[5] which is one of the most important (and politically strongest) decisions of the Court on the autonomy of the EU legal order and the role of the Court itself being the last and sole instance for the interpretation of EU law.[6] Achmea is primarily about the primacy of Union law in international dispute settlement and only in the second place about investment arbitration. Mox Plant[7] has been reinforced and a red line (regarding concurrent dispute settlement mechanisms) has been drawn.

Although I don’t repeat here the line of arguments developed by the Grand Chamber, I would like to invite every reader to compare the judgment with the Conclusions of AG Wathelet. In order to understand a judgment of the ECJ, one has to compare it with the Conclusions of the AG – also in cases where the Court does (exceptionally) not follow the AG. In his Conclusions, AG Wathelet had tried to integrate investment arbitration into Union law and (at the same time) to preserve the supremacy of investment arbitration over EU law even in cases where only intra EU relationships were at stake. Or – to put it the other way around: For the ECJ, the option of investors to become quasi-international law subjects and to deviate of mandatory EU law by resorting to investment arbitration could not be a valuable option – especially as their home states (being EU Member States) are not permitted to escape from mandatory Union law by resorting to public international law and affiliated dispute resolution mechanisms. Therefore, from a perspective of EU law the judgment does not come as a surprise.

Finally, this judgment is not only about investment arbitration, its ambition goes obviously further: If one looks at para 57 the perspective obviously includes future dispute settlement regimes under public international law and their relationship to the adjudicative function of the Court. One has to be aware that Brexit and the future dispute resolution regime regarding the Withdrawal Treaty is in the mindset of the Court. In this respect the wording of paragraph 57 seems to me to be telling. It states:

“It is true that, according to settled case-law of the Court, an international agreement providing for the establishment of a court responsible for the interpretation of its provisions and whose decisions are binding on the institutions, including the Court of Justice, is not in principle incompatible with EU law. The competence of the EU in the field of international relations and its capacity to conclude international agreements necessarily entail the power to submit to the decisions of a court which is created or designated by such agreements as regards the interpretation and application of their provisions, provided that the autonomy of the EU and its legal order is respected[8].”

Against this background of European Union law, the Achmea judgment appears less surprising than the first reactions of the “arbitration world” might have implied. Furthermore, the (contradictory[9]) statement in paras 54 and 55 should be read as a sign that the far reaching consequences with regard to investment arbitration do not apply to commercial arbitration (Eco Swiss[10] and Mostaza Claro[11] are explicitely maintained).[12] Finally, it is time to start a discussion about the procedural and the substantive position of individuals in investment arbitration in the framework of Union law. As a matter of principle, EU investors should not expect to get a better legal position as their respective home State would get in the context of EU law. Investment arbitration does not change their status within the Union. In this respect, Achmea is simply clarifying a truism. And, as a side effect, the disturbing Micula story should now come to an end, too.[13]

Footnotes

[1] ECJ, 3/6/2018, case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, EU:C:2018:158.

[2] BGH, 3/3/2016, ECLI:DE:BGH:2016:030316BIZB2.15.0

[3] Conclusions of 9/19/2017, EU:C:2017:699. The same outcome had occured in case C-536/13, Gazprom, EU:C:2015:316, which was also related to investment arbitration.

[4] The Court only addresses the issue whether the hearing should be reopened because some Member States had officially expressed their discomfort with the AG’s Conclusions, ECJ, 3/6/2018, case C-284/16, Amchea, EU:C:2018:158, paras 24-30.

[5] ECJ, 12/18/2014, Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the EU to the ECHR), EU:C:2014:2454.

[6] For the political connotations of Opinion 2/13, cf. Halberstam, “‘It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!’ A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and a Way Forward.” German L.J. 16, no. 1 (2015): 105 ff.

[7] ECJ, 5/30/2015, case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2006:345.

[8] Highlighted by B.Hess.

[9] Both, commercial and investment arbitration are primarily based on the consent of the litigants, see Hess, The Private Public Divide in International Dispute Settlement, RdC 388 (2018), para 121 – in print

[10] ECJ, 6/1/1999, case C?126/97, Eco Swiss, EU:C:1999:269.

[11] ECJ, 10/26/2006, case C?168/05, Mostaza Claro, EU:C:2006:675.

[12] It is interesting to note that the concerns of the ECJ (paras 50 ss) regarding the intervention of investment arbitration by courts of EU Member States did not apply to the case at hand as German arbitration law permits a review of the award (section 1059 ZPO). The concerns expressed relate to investment arbitration which operates outside of the NYC without any review of the award by state court, especially in the context of articles 54 and 55 ICSID Convention.

[13] According to the ECJ’s decision in Achmea, the arbitration agreement in the Micula case must be considered as void under EU law. However, Micula was given by an ICSID arbitral tribunal and, therefore, there is no recognition procedure open up a review by state courts of the arbitral award, see articles 54 and 55 ICSID Convention.

Thank you Michael Wise for alerting me to [2017] NSWSC 1759 Live Group v Rabbi Ulman in which Sackar J at the NSW Supreme Court displays both sensitivity and adroitness in addressing the relationship between a Beth Din (a Jewish court) and the courts in ordinary.

The case I imagine will be of interest for those studying church and state relations. It would seem to conclude that a Beth Din (or equivalents in other faiths) threat to impose religious sanctions on an unwilling party, will be considered contempt of the courts in ordinary and thus a no-go zone. However that as such the State courts should not hesitate to support arbitration through religious courts by compelling those who agreed to it in commercial relations, to submit to it. (Sackar J does highlight features of the particular case as not meeting natural justice requirements).

Geert.

 

 

 

 

SNCF Mobilités / Commission
Aide d'État
La France doit récupérer un montant de plus de 642 millions d’euros (hors intérêts) dans le cadre d’une aide d’État accordée à la société Sernam

flightright
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La compagnie aérienne qui n’a réalisé dans un État membre que le premier segment d’un vol avec correspondance peut être attraite devant les juridictions de la destination finale située dans un autre État membre en vue d’une indemnisation pour cause de retard

Thank you Stephen Pittel for flagging 2017 SCC 33 Douez v Facebook Inc.  Stephen also discusses the forum non conveniens issue and I shall leave that side of the debate over to him. What is interesting for comparative purposes is the Supreme Court’s analysis of the choice of court clause in consumer contracts, which it refuses to enforce under public policy reasons, tied to two particular angles:

• ‘The burdens of forum selection clauses on consumers and their ability to access the court system range from added costs, logistical impediments and delays, to deterrent psychological effects. When online consumer contracts of adhesion contain terms that unduly impede the ability of consumers to vindicate their rights in domestic courts, particularly their quasi-constitutional or constitutional rights, public policy concerns outweigh those favouring enforceability of a forum selection clause.’ (emphasis added)

Infringement of privacy is considered such quasi-constitutional right.

• ‘Tied to the public policy concerns is the “grossly uneven bargaining power” of the parties. Facebook is a multi-national corporation which operates in dozens of countries. D is a private citizen who had no input into the terms of the contract and, in reality, no meaningful choice as to whether to accept them given Facebook’s undisputed indispensability to online conversations.’

With both angles having to apply cumulatively, consumers are effectively invited to dress up their suits as involving a quasi-constitutional issue, even if all they really want is their PSP to be exchanged, so to speak. I suspect however Canadian courts will have means of sorting the pretended privacy suits from the real ones.

A great judgment for the comparative binder (see also Jutta Gangsted and mine paper on forum laboris in the EU and the US here).

Geert. (Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.2.

 

By Stephan Walter, Research Fellow at the Research Center for Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution (TCDR), EBS Law School, Wiesbaden, Germany.

Today, the CJEU has rendered its judgement in Slovak Republic v Achmea BV (Case C-284/16). The case concerned the compatibility with EU law of a dispute clause in an Intra-EU Bilateral Arbitration Treaty (BIT) between the Netherlands and the Slovak Republic which grants an investor the right to bring proceedings against the host state (in casu: the Slovak Republic) before an arbitration tribunal. In concrete terms, the German Federal Court of Justice referred the following three questions to the CJEU (reported here):

Does Article 344 TFEU preclude the application of a provision in a bilateral investment protection agreement between Member States of the European Union (a so-called BIT internal to the European Union) under which an investor of a contracting State, in the event of a dispute concerning investments in the other contracting State, may bring proceedings against the latter State before an arbitration tribunal, where the investment protection agreement was concluded before one of the contracting States acceded to the European Union but the arbitration proceedings are not to be brought until after that date?

If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative:

Does Article 267 TFEU preclude the application of such a provision?

If Questions 1 and 2 are to be answered in the negative:

Does the first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU preclude the application of such a provision under the circumstances described in Question 1?

In his Opinion, Advocate General Wathelet answered all three questions in the negative and therefore affirmed the EU law compatibility of such a provision. Most notably (and rather surprisingly for many legal commentators), he concluded that the BIT’s arbitration system did not fall outside the scope of the preliminary ruling mechanism of Article 267 TFEU. Hence, an arbitral tribunal established under the BIT was in his opinion eligible to refer questions on the interpretation of EU law to the CJEU.

The CJEU did not follow the Opinion of the Advocate General and held:

Articles 267 and 344 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a provision in an international agreement concluded between Member States, such as Article 8 of the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, under which an investor from one of those Member States may, in the event of a dispute concerning investments in the other Member State, bring proceedings against the latter Member State before an arbitral tribunal whose jurisdiction that Member State has undertaken to accept.

The Court based this finding on a violation of Article 267 TFEU, Article 344 TFEU and Article 19 paragraph 1 subparagraph 2 TEU. An arbitral tribunal established under the BIT is in the Courts opinion an exception to the jurisdiction of the courts of the contracting states of the BIT. Thus, it does not form part of the judicial system of the Netherlands or Slovakia (para. 45) and cannot be classified as a court or tribunal “of a Member State” within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU (para. 46 et seq.). Consequently, it has no power to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling (para. 49). A subsequent review of the award by a court of a Member State (which could refer questions on the interpretation of EU law to the CJEU) is not enough to safeguard the autonomy of EU law since such a review may be limited by the national law of the Member State concerned (para. 53). Unlike in commercial arbitration proceedings such a limited scope of review does not suffice in the case of investment arbitration proceedings because these arbitration proceedings do not originate in the freely expressed wishes of the parties. They derive from a treaty by which Member States agree to remove from the jurisdiction of their own courts, and hence from the system of judicial remedies which Article 19 paragraph 1 subparagraph 2 TEU requires them to establish in the fields covered by EU law, disputes which may concern the application or interpretation of EU law (para. 55).

As the Court already found a violation of the provision with regard to the questions 1 and 2 it did not have to address the third question.

The judgement can be found here.

Irrecevabilité

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Thank you colleagues at Hogan Lovells for flagging [2018] HKCFI 277 Supreme Tycoon in which the Hong Kong Court of First Instance ruled that the common law power to recognise and assist foreign insolvency proceedings extends to voluntary liquidations.

In so ruling, the court rejected the Privy Council obiter finding in Singularis. Shaun Langhorne, Chris Dobby & Mabel Koo (see the HL link above) highlight the Court’s rather convincing arguments in not following the Privy Council, including one I like a lot namely that the principle of modified universalism, the rationale underlying the common law power of assistance, and the purpose of cross-border insolvency assistance do not prima facie call for a distinction between compulsory and voluntary winding-up.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.1.

 

Achmea
DISC
La clause d’arbitrage incluse dans l’accord conclu entre les Pays-Bas et la Slovaquie sur la protection des investissements n’est pas compatible avec le droit de l’Union

SEGRO
Libre circulation des capitaux
Le fait de priver de leur droit d’usufruit des personnes n’ayant pas un lien de parenté proche avec les propriétaires de terres agricoles en Hongrie est contraire au droit de l’Union

Ce 8 février 2018, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme s’est prononcée sur la conventionnalité de mesures de surveillance prises du temps où la France ne s’était pas encore dotée d’un dispositif législatif encadrant le recours à la géolocalisation.

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Le 20 février 2018, la médiatrice européenne, Emily O’Reilly, a annoncé la mise en place d’une nouvelle procédure accélérée pour le traitement des plaintes relatives aux demandes d’accès aux documents des institutions de l’Union.

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