A brief post on the judgment of the CJEU in C-561/20 United Airlines. The CJEU held that the EU flight delay compensation rules of Regulation 261/2004 apply to a flight operated by non-EU airline on behalf of EU airline, even when the delay relates to flight segment outside the EU. On the issue of international jurisdiction, the Court engages with customary international law questions, referring ia to its C-366/10 ATAA judgment which I discussed here.
The CJEU firstly [51] repeats that since
a principle of customary international law does not have the same degree of precision as a provision of an international agreement, judicial review must necessarily be limited to the question whether, in adopting the act in question, the institutions of the European Union made manifest errors of assessment concerning the conditions for applying such a principle
I do not think its poor view on the lucidity of customary international law is justified, however its finding that only manifest errors may lead to illegality does of course mean the CJEU does not have to worry about all the nuts and bolts of territorial jurisdiction. It suffices [52] that there is a close connection with the territory of the EU since the Regulation specifies that connecting flights fall within the scope of that regulation on the ground that the passengers have started their journey from an airport located in a Member State. [53]:
The regulation applies to a long delay caused in a leg of a flight operated in a third country only in limited and clearly defined circumstances in which the flight concerned, taken as a whole, is operated from an airport located in the territory of a Member State. Such a flight and its passengers thus retain a close connection with the territory of the European Union, including for the leg of the flight operated outside the European Union.
Flights which are wholly operated in a third country or between two third countries, without any connection with EU territory [55].
Geert.
#CJEU: EU #flightdelay rules apply to flight operated by non-EU airline on behalf of EU airline, even when delay relates to flight segment outside the EU.
Once text of full judgment available, we can see how much the Court engages with AG discussion of territoriality, int law. https://t.co/rGqA1n2idi
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 7, 2022
BRG NOAL GP SARL & Anor v Kowski & Anor [2022] EWHC 867 (Ch) continues the current trend of forum non conveniens applications galore, following Brexit. In the case at issue, with Luxembourg suggested as the appropriate forum, applicable law determination, under (retained) Rome I’s ‘characteristic performance’ rule plays a core role.
Applicable law needs to be determined essentially viz an undertaking as I understand it, by a, validly removed, investment fund General Partner, not to torpedo the subsequent orderly continuation of the fund. The core commitment reads
“I, [name], hereby acknowledge that [NOAL GP] is the managing general partner (“General partner”) of [the Fund] with effect from 27 August 2021 and unconditionally and irrevocably undertake (a) not to assert otherwise, or to induce or procure an assertion to the contrary or otherwise challenge or question the validity of its appointment or induce or produce such challenge or question, in any applicable forum and (b) to cooperate with and assist the General Partner in completing a full, orderly and timely transfer of the control of the Partnership and all of its assets and any obligations to the General Partner”.
Claimant [57] suggests the specific Undertaking in and of itself meets the CJEU Handte definition of a stand alone contractual obligation, however Smith J does not specifically hold on this for in her view even if this were correct, the overall contractual construction would have an impact on the applicable law consideration, seeing as in her view:
no choice of law was made; no default ‘passe partout’ contract as listed in A4(1) Rome I applies; A4(2) Rome I’s ‘characteristic performance’ test does not lead to an answer ([61]: there is no ‘characteristic performance’] and at any rate even if there were, the judge would have applied A4(3)’s escape clause to lead to Luxembourg law; and the ‘proper law of the contract’ per A4(4) Rome I ‘clearly’ [63-64] leads to Luxembourgish law.
In conclusion, a stay is ordered and the forum non application is successful. In my view the judge jumped too easily to Articles 4(3) and (4), denying Article 4(2)’s or even Article 3 choice of law’s effet utile. It is not unusual for judges to let their predetermination to apply A4(3) and /or (4) determine their A4(2) search for a lex contractus. Yet that frequency does not make the judgment right.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 3rd ed, 2021, Heading 3.2.6.2.
Another extensively litigated forum non conveniens jurisdictional challenge, with core role for applicable law determination, retained A4 Rome I 'characteristic performance'
Stay in favour of Luxembourg proceedings
BRG NOAL v Kowski [2022] EWHC 867 (Ch) https://t.co/j3jAekQVXG
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 12, 2022
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When CJEU Bolagsupplysningen was held, I flagged immediately (I was not alone) that the judgment would necessarily create follow-up litigation.
At the level of the CJEU itself, Mittelbayerischer Verlag somewhat reigned in the consequences of Bier and Shevill, albeit not directly related to the discussions in Bolagsupplysningen. In Gtflix, the Court confirmed that each Member State where damage has occurred, will continue to have locus damni jurisdiction even if the claimant requests rectification of the information and the removal of the content placed online in another jurisdiction: one with full jurisdiction as either the Handlungsort or the place of the claimant’s centre of interests.
In England and Wales, Saïd v L’Express (a first instance case) held that it follows from Bolagsupplysningen that so far as internet publications are concerned, a claimant who is seeking injunctive relief (removal, correction in particular) may do so only in the places with full jurisdiction. This was implicitly confirmed in Napag, also a first instance case.
This conclusion has now been overturned by the Court of Appeal in Mincione v Gedi Gruppo Editoriale SPA [2022] EWCA Civ 557. This is a libel case brought by an Italian national with acquired British citizenship who is resident in Switzerland. He sues the Italian-domiciled publisher of a daily newspaper and weekly magazine, both of which are published predominantly in Italy and in the Italian language.
The first instance judge, Mincione v Gedi Gruppo Editoriale SpA [2021] EWHC 2006 (QB) had followed Said and Napag. The Court of Appeal notes that as a result of the Withdrawal Agreement it is bound by Bolagsupplysningen, it having been held before Brexit, and that it ‘can have regard to’ ([65]) Gtlfix.
Warby J, seeking support in Gtflix, holds injunctive jurisdiction to restrain a harmful internet publication that has either occurred or “may occur”, does exist for the locus damni court yet only in respect of publication that may occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the court concerned. It can justify a domestic internet injunction, even for a ‘mosaic’ (locus damni) court, yet not to grant an injunctive remedy that would inevitably take effect extraterritorially.
The first instance judgment therefore is overturned on legal substance but largely confirmed in practical reality: [72]. Current proceedings are largely held in substance, albeit not in form, to be a claim for a single and indivisible remedy. That is because a domestic internet injunction, prohibiting further publication, in this case however limited it might be in form, would, on the undisputed evidence, inevitably have extraterritorial effect. In future, technology might mean that an order framed as a domestic internet injunction would or could take territorial effect only. Yet in current technological reality, it is said that ordering removal would immediately have extraterritorial substantive effect. Those with knowledge of the technology may have more to say about this. Update 29 04 4:50 PM: the first instance judgment suggests this is related to the limited E&W jurisdiction, while the order would impact other parts of the UK, too: [98]: geo-blocking can only be done at a UK level, and the removal of a YouTube video can also be only done at a UK level (not: the E&W level).
The only part of the claim where jurisdiction for injunctive relief, if claimant is found at trial to have been libelled, will be possible, is for a so-called ‘section 12’ internet injunction: an order to publish a summary of the eventual judgment. That is because in the view of the the Court of Appeal, this relief can be targeted to the current subscriber basis of the publication outlets in England and Wales only.
Per Soriano, post Brexit a claimant will have to show that England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place to bring an action, with locus damni per SC Brownlie the tort gateway. Bolagsupplysningen will therefore not echo for much longer in E&W, and I doubt therefore that the SC will hear an appeal if it were sought.
Geert.
EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.439 ff.
Court of Appeal overturns on the implications of #CJEU Bolagsupplysningen – jurisdiction to remove offensive articles published on the internet
Review on the blog shortly
Mincione v Gedi Gruppo Editoriale SPA [2022] EWCA Civ 557 https://t.co/UEZHfsSyy0
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 29, 2022
In JJH Enterprises Ltd (Trading As ValueLicensing) v Microsoft Corporation & Ors [2022] EWHC 929 (Comm) Picken J makes a debatable point in his discussion of a forum non conveniens application by defendants, Microsoft.
In the proceedings ValueLicensing claim damages arising from alleged breaches of competition law by Microsoft. The claim is a ‘stand alone’ one, not a ‘follow-on’ one. There is no underlying infringement decision of the European Commission (or any domestic competition regulator) on which ValueLicensing can rely to establish that an infringement of competition law has been committed.
Some of the Microsoft entities firstly seek summary dismissal of the case against them, arguing they cannot be held liable for an alleged infringement of either Article 101 or 102 TFEU as a result of an overall Microsoft ‘campaign’ in which they did not demonstrably take part. Here [31] ff there is interesting discussion ia of Provimi (Roche Products Ltd. & Ors v Provimi Ltd [2003] EWHC 961 (Comm)), which held that an entity that implements an agreement in breach of A101 to which a member of the same undertaking is a party can be held liable for the infringement even though the implementer itself does not know of the infringement. Specifically, whether Provimi was wrongly decided following from Cooper Tire Europe Ltd v Bayer Public Co Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 864 – this is an issue for which CJEU referral is not possible post Brexit.
The judge however refers to the broader concept of ‘undertaking’ in the A101-102 sense following eg CJEU C-882/19 Sumal SL v Mercedes Benz Trucks Espana SL. Sumal, Picken J holds [44], is relevant authority both pre and post Brexit.
Quite how parties see a difference in the lex causae for the competition law infringement pre and post Brexit is not clear to me. Post Brexit it is said to be ‘English law’ (held to include 101-102 TFEU prior to Brexit), full stop, while post Brexit that law is said to be determined by (retained) Article 6 Rome II, which for same of the claim will be English law as being one of the ‘affected markets’ per A6 Rome II.
It is in the forum non application that the judge posits [78] that an important consideration of England as the more appropriate forum, is
it is clear that Microsoft UK’s position at trial will be that in certain material respects English law has taken a divergent path from EU law. In such circumstances, it would be wholly inappropriate, and certainly undesirable, for a court in Ireland to be determining whether Microsoft UK is right about this. On the other hand, there would be no difficulty with the Court here applying EU competition law, either as part of English law (in respect of the pre-Brexit period and, if that is what the Court determines is the case, also in respect of the post-Brexit period) or as part of the laws of other EU/EEA member states, since the Court here is very experienced in doing just that.
If it is true that under forum non, only English courts can be held properly to determine the direction of English law post Brexit, the hand of many a claimant in forum non applications will surely be strengthened.
Geert.
Forum non conveniens
Interesting point [75] that E&W are the most appropriate forum, given that it must be EN courts determining whether EN law differs substantially from EU law post #Brexit
JJH Enterprises (ValueLicensing) v #Microsoft [2022] EWHC 929https://t.co/XP3z4nX8KV
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 19, 2022
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The post Manfaat Masker Charcoal Untuk Kulit Wajah yang Sehat appeared first on Aldri Blog.
In Amir Soleymani v Nifty Gateway LLC [2022] EWHC 773 (Comm) Abrose J largely rejected jurisdiction for the English courts in a claim following auction brought by a UK-based digital artwork collector. Another part of the claim was stayed pending arbitration in New York.
Faced with a clause in Nifty’s general terms and conditions that provide for binding arbitration in New York and for New York law to be the governing law of the contract, claimant seeks a declaration that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to it being unfair under the UK Consumer Rights Act 2015. Alternatively, he argued the governing law clause is invalid on the same statutory ground, and that a contract arising from the auction is void for illegality pursuant to the UK Gambling Act 2005.
Of note is that the US based arbitrator, in the proceedings initiated by Nifty, is considering himself (with procedural and discovery orders having been issued) broadly similar issues under consumer protection provisions of the ADR provider.
At [34] the qualification of NFTs as ‘art’ or merely ‘technology’ [‘the nature of NFTs as assets, and whether they are artwork, with the Claimant’s position being that he was trading in digital art whereas the Defendant maintained that an NFT is merely a unique string of code stored on a blockchain ledger that makes a digital artwork accessible, and marks authenticity’] is announced as potentially relevant for substance but not for current application.
The discussion largely takes place under retained EU law (s15b of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (as amended)). The judge holds [55] that the claim falls within the arbitration exception of (retained) Brussels Ia seeing as, as she qualifies it
The principal focus and subject matter of Mr Soleymani’s claim is whether he is legally obliged to arbitrate.
Recital 12 BIa is called upon in support. Claimant ([49]-[50] in particular are a good summary of the position) essentially argues such a view is incompatible with the effet utile of the consumer title. I believe that point has merit and one imagines it will be on this point that appeal will be sought (Bitar v Banque Libano-Francaise was offered in some support).
Whether the contract is a ‘consumer’ contract is still discussed [62] ff viz the claim for declaratory relief regarding the unfairness of the arbitration clause under the Gambling Act. The judge holds [79] that on the evidence put forward, Claimant has the better of the argument as to whether the Defendant was directing commercial activities to England (and the UK more generally). However she decides to grant the defendant a stay (which would not have been possible pre-Brexit) in favour of the unfairness issues being discussed in the New York arbitration. (These issues may later return to a UK court in the shape of an ordre public opposition to enforcement of the award in the UK).
I will of course notify if and when permission to appeal will have been granted.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.3.2, and 2.2.9.2.
No doubt permission to appeal will be sought in this case involving unfair commercial practices act, consumer protection, #arbitration exception of Brussels Ia https://t.co/aGB7eReFQU
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 6, 2022
I reviewed Pikamae AG’s Opinion in C-568/20 J v H Limited here. The issue is whether, exequatur having been abandoned in Brussels Ia, arguments as to whether the a judgment issued in a third, non EU Member, State of origin be at all covered by Brussels Ia may be raised by way of an Article 45 objection to recognition and enforcement.
The CJEU has now held and first of all clarifies its findings in C-129/92 Owens Bank. [36]: Owens Bank does not mean that a decision adopted on the basis of a judgment emanating from a third State, in accordance with the rules on jurisdiction and procedure of a Member State, may never fall within the scope of that regulation. [26] it is sufficient (but also necessary, GAVC) that they be judicial decisions which, before their recognition and enforcement are sought in a State other than the State of origin, have been, or have been capable of being, the subject, in that State of origin and under various procedures, of an inquiry in adversarial proceedings. This re-emphasises the audi alteram partem principle such as emphasised eg in CJEU Zulikarpašić. It also means that ‘exequatur sur exequatur ne vaut‘ is not quite dead, as has been suggested – a mere confirmative order of an ex-EU judgment without adversarial proceedings would not enjoy free movement.
At [29] the Court moreover instructs, with reference to the principle of mutual trust, that the courts in the State of recognition, must not apply the definition restrictively. In the case at issue [32] the High Court order at issue in the main proceedings was, at the very least, the subject of a summary hearing in the Member State of origin, hence it qualifies as a ‘judgment’.
While the Court effectively acknowledges that this amounts to Brussels Ia-sanctioned recognition and enforcement of non-EU judgments through the backdoor (‘on the substance, that [UK, GAVC] order was made so as to give effect to judgments delivered in a third State which are not, as such, enforceable in the Member States’: [33]), A45’s grounds of refusal, including infringement of ordre public, remain available: [45]
Such an infringement may, inter alia, lie in the fact that the party against whom enforcement is sought was not able to defend him or herself effectively before the court of origin and to challenge the decision sought to be enforced in the Member State of origin
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 3rd ed 2021, 2.573.
CJEU this morning, Brussels Ia, recognition and enforcement by EU MS of money judgment issued in third State, may only constitute 'judgment' enjoying Part III recognition & enforcement if audi alteram partem principles are methttps://t.co/HldcLYDgSZ
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 7, 2022
Clarke v Kalecinski & Ors [2022] EWHC 488 (QB) concerns a claim for damages for personal injury sustained during cosmetic surgery undergone by claimant on 7 January 2015. Claims is against the surgeon (domiciled and habitually resident in Poland; but also registered with the UK General Medical Council) who performed the breast and thigh procedures in Poland, and against the Clinic (a company incorporated in Poland in which the surgeon and his wife are the sole shareholders and directors), where the operations were carried out and she received pre-and post-operative treatment. Claimant also sues the insurer of the Clinic.
Jurisdiction is not disputed. Both surgeon and clinic are being sued under the consumer title of Brussels Ia. The insurance company is being sued under CJEU Odenbreit: subject to the applicable law of the tort and the existence under same of a direct right of action against an insurer, section 3 BIa gives claimant a right to sue in claimant’s domicile.
Claimant sues both surgeon and clinic, both in contract and in tort. She seeks to hold the clinic either directly or vicariously liable for the failures of the surgeons who treated her – one other Polish surgeon was involved in her care – and the nurses who cared for her at the clinic in Poland. Total potential liability for the insurance company, under the indemnity of the clinic (they do not insure the surgeon) is limited to approximately £38,500.
Proper law of the contract is English law, per A6(1) of the consumer title of Rome I. This is not disputed. It had been anticipated by claimant until trial that it was also a matter of agreement that the proper law of the claim in tort was Polish law, per Rome II. However in its skeleton argument, for the first time, the insurer raised an issue about the adequacy of claimant’s pleading arguing they had failed to plead the Polish law upon which they relied, so the proper law of the tortious claim was by default, English law. That was rejected by the judge on the basis of the exchange between parties.
At [104] ff Foster J discussed the application of A17 Rome II: the judge must take into account as a matter of fact, the rules of safety and conduct in force at the place and time of the event, i.e. Poland. However [107] the judge insists on the importance of the English standard of care
where it is a term of the contract that the first defendant would operate to the same standard as a UK surgeon, skilled in this specialism, and registered with the GMC, it is that standard, that applied to the activities in issue here. The care offered by the clinic likewise. [emphasis in the original]
Those terms of the contract were deduced by the judge [77]:
[claimant] does not allege that she signed any contract or document, save for a consent form which the court has not seen. However, in my judgement the substance of the representations on the website upon which Ms Clarke clearly relied, were incorporated into the contract between her and the clinic together with Mr Kaleciński. In my judgement this was one contract but involving both parties: the surgeon and all the other care givers at the clinic, by means of the clinic (Noa Clinic Uslugi Sp. z o.o), those incorporated representations were to the following effect. The first defendant would carry out the surgery and he would carry it out to the standard to be expected of a GMC registered surgeon proficient in plastic surgery.
This emphasis by the judge imparts once again the relevance of language, no doubt for marketing purposes, for the consequential legal obligations. Foster J moreover holds [108]
That standard applies to the tortious duty also by reason of the representations made to which reference is made above.
and [109] she holds
the findings of [the expert] are couched in such stringent terms that they cover any surgical and indeed clinical practice whether governed by local Polish customs or not. The conclusions of [the expert] put paid to any subtlety of distinction between local custom and English practice that might … in other circumstances be considered relevant. What took place fell so far below acceptable standards I cannot accept the contention that local standards or practices might have rendered the egregious failings in this case acceptable as a matter of contractual or tortious obligation.
The judge’s findings on A17 Rome II are interesting. Yet I find her conclusions on website representations even more relevant.
Geert.
1/2 Medical wrongdoing
Claim v two defendants under consumer title, one Odenbreit claim [action v wrongdoer's insurer], insurance title Brussels Ia
Applicable law in contract Rome I, tort Rome II, issue ia re A17 RII: standards of performance expected of Polish professionals
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 9, 2022
The Dutch court of first instance held at the end of March (English version of the judgment is here) on the merits of Esther Kiobel’s case against Shell, proceedings which she unsuccessfully tried to bring in the US under the ATS and then pursued in The Netherlands as I reported at the time.
In my earlier post I pointed out that the Dutch court narrowly construed the case that could be pursued in the Netherlands: Only limited claims, of the Nigerian daughter’s involvement in the bribing of witnesses, were allowed to continue. Those claims have now been dismissed.
The judgment is fairly succinct, many points having discussed at length in the interim jurisdictional and case-management decision. Witnesses’ recent interviews (by the Dutch courts, but without cross-examination. Not because it was not offered but because counsel did not feel the need to proceed with it) were cross-checked against earlier statements which had been entered as evidence in the US proceedings. The court [2.26] holds that
the alleged involvement of the SPDC in witness bribery is not proven with the statements of the witnesses produced by the claimants. This is also true when viewing these witness statements in conjunction.
As I pointed out here in reply to Lucas Roorda, if I were claimant’s counsel looking for appeal grounds, I would study the Dutch court’s application of Nigerian common law evidentiary standards for upholding civil liability.
The court’s approach to the witness statements is that they cannot sustain SPDC bribery involvement. The evidence of SPDC staff presence at relevant meetings (often in police stations) is, when not held to be factually (albeit on minor points) contradicted by earlier statements (going back 20 years for some of them), found to be circumstantial only. Witnesses point to people that were referred and /or pointed to when Shell-related employment (as a reward) was discussed, briefcases held by people with the outward, corporate appearance of Shell staff, people driving off in cars with corporate stickers formerly used by Shell. None of this satisfied the court’s evidentiary requirements without however proper discussion of what, under Nigerian law, that standard would require.
Geert.
Dutch court holds #Shell is not complicit in Nigerian security forces treatment of Esther Kiobel and others’ family members.
An issue of evidence rather than grand #bizhumanrights legal principle. https://t.co/z1rn2akUVc
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 23, 2022
Aldricus – Birkenstock sudah ada sejak lama dan masih sangat populer. Mereka tidak hanya bergaya, tetapi juga cukup mendukung, menjadikannya sandal yang luar biasa. Birkenstock dapat membantu mereka yang mengalami sakit kaki atau kesusahan. Sepatu ini memiliki beberapa keunggulan untuk individu dari berbagai usia. Akan bermanfaat bagi kaki Anda untuk memakai sandal Birkenstock dalam waktu lama.
Apa saja manfaat menggunakan brand ini? Birkenstock sesuai dengan bentuk kaki AndaSandal Birkenstock menyesuaikan dengan karakteristik kaki Anda. Secara khusus, gabus dan lateks alam digunakan untuk membuat alas kaki. Ini berbentuk seperti kaki yang sehat, mendukung struktur dan kontur alami kaki dengan mendistribusikan kekuatan secara merata di sekitar lengkungan.
Kenyamanan yang luar biasaSalah satu perhatian paling penting saat membeli sandal adalah kenyamanan. Untungnya, ini adalah salah satu keuntungan Birkenstock terbesar. Alas kaki mereka dibuat khusus agar pas dengan kaki Anda. Mereka menjadi lebih nyaman saat Anda memakainya untuk waktu yang lama. Ini berarti bahwa jika seseorang mencoba sandal Anda, mereka akan jauh lebih tidak nyaman daripada Anda.
Birkenstocks mendukung berbagai masalah penyelarasan kakiAnda harus lebih memperhatikan kaki Anda sekarang jika Anda ingin menghindari masalah kaki di tahun-tahun berikutnya. Salah satu manfaat Birkenstock terbaik adalah dapat membantu dalam perawatan masalah kaki yang populer. Birkenstock memiliki insole ortopedi yang memberikan kemampuan, dukungan, dan bantalan pada kaki Anda. Akibatnya, sandal ini dapat mencegah kapalan , bunion, kuku kaki yang tumbuh ke dalam, dan masalah nyeri kaki lainnya.
Tahan lamaDaya tahan sandal Anda sangat penting. Anda harus mempertimbangkan apakah sandal ini akan bertahan lama atau akan cepat kotor dan memerlukan perawatan atau bahkan penggantian secara berkala. Ini sangat penting jika Anda sering bepergian sepanjang musim panas, karena Anda tidak ingin sepatu Anda berantakan di tengah perjalanan.
Bergaya dan SerbagunaBirkenstock tersedia dalam berbagai desain dan warna. Mereka sangat mudah beradaptasi dan dapat digunakan dengan hampir semua aktivitas atau pakaian. Mereka cocok untukseharian di pantai, berjalan-jalan di sekitar kota, dan bahkan mendaki. Ini adalah sandal klasik dengan sentuhan kontemporer. Birkenstock telah ada di pasaran selama lebih dari 200 tahun dan masih kuat. Keuntungan dan kemampuan beradaptasi mereka hanya meningkat.
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