Flux européens

44/2022 : 10 mars 2022 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-177/20

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 03/10/2022 - 09:55
ˮGrossmaniaˮ
Libre circulation des capitaux
Les personnes déchues, en méconnaissance du droit de l’Union, de leurs droits d’usufruit sur des terres agricoles en Hongrie doivent pouvoir réclamer la réinscription de ces droits au registre foncier ou une compensation

Catégories: Flux européens

Suppipat v Siam Bank. Unsatisfactory discussion of legal advice privilege and lex fori.

GAVC - jeu, 03/10/2022 - 07:07

Suppipat & Ors v Siam Commercial Bank Public Company Ltd & Ors [2022] EWHC 381 (Comm) repeats (and indeed refers to) the inadequate discussion of applicable law and privilege in PJSC Tatneft v Bogolyubov which I discuss here.

The application is for an order prohibiting respondents from using or deploying in these proceedings certain documents covered by legal professional privilege and/or containing confidential information, copies of which the respondents obtained pursuant to subpoenas in Thailand.

It is not in dispute apparently [26] and in any event Pelling J would have concluded that whether a document is capable of being privileged is a question to be determined as a matter of English conflicts law by the lex fori, which in this case is English law. That follows not undisputedly from the Rome Regulation which applies to the proceedings as either acquired or retained EU law (it is not clear when the claim form was issued).

The next question that arises is whether the Documents should be treated as privileged in this litigation notwithstanding that they have been obtained by the respondents lawfully by operation of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction in Thailand. This question is discussed as one of an alleged breach of an obligation of confidence (the subpoena in Thailand does not mean that the documents have entered the public domain) and the law that should apply to that obligation which both parties suggest must be discussed under Rome II. Thai law according to the defendants ([38-39] an unjust enrichment /restitution claim under Article 10; alternatively locus damni under the general rule of Article 4 with Thailand as the locus damni, it being the place of disclosure) , however claimants maintain that the issue is to be resolved applying English law for essentially all the reasons set out in the authorities deciding that English law applies to the question whether a particular document is privileged or not.

 

 

Pelling J [40] ff agrees with the claimants and holds that even if Rome II were to apply, both A16 Rome II’s overriding mandatory law rule and A26’s ordre public rule would trump Thai law given the robust nature of legal advice privilege in English law. That statement leads to an incorrect application of both Articles (for starters, A26 requires case-specific, not generic application).

The Rome II discussion cuts many corners and is certainly appealable. The judge’s views put the horse before the cart. Neither Article 16 nor Article 26 are meant to blow a proper Rome II analysis out off the water. Nor as I flagged, does the judgment do justice to the proper application of A16 and 26.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 4.81.

Documents must be treated as privileged under English lex fori notwithstanding they were obtained lawfully by court order of competent jurisdiction in Thailand
Considers comity and extraterritoriality

Suppipat v Siam Commercial Bank [2022] EWHC 381 (Comm)https://t.co/dJivtUuef4

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 4, 2022

Permission to appeal refused on cost issues in Malawi sexual exploitation case. Court of Appeal confirms a forum non conveniens defence cannot be brought via a cost order.

GAVC - jeu, 03/10/2022 - 06:06

Lord Justice Coulson the other week refused [PGI Group Ltd v Thomas & Ors (Application for Permission to Appeal) [2022] EWCA Civ 233] permission to appeal against the High Court’s refusal to grant a capped cost order – CCO in the Malawi exploitation and abuse case.

Coulson LJ firstly grants that the judge may have expressed himself more clearly on some of the technical aspects of the costs in the case however did not misapply relevant CPR rules. Secondly, on the more substantive element of the case the Court of Appeal held that the judge was right to ignore the much lower cost implications of possible Malawi proceedings for to do so, as I flagged in my post on the High Court judgment, would bring in a forum non conveniens defence via the back door of cost orders: [45]:

The costs of pursuing the claim in Malawi must be irrelevant to the making of a CCO in the UK. If a claim is validly brought in the UK, then that brings with it the reasonable/proportionate costs of pursuing those proceedings in the UK.

A good judgment.

Geert.

Lord Justice Coulson refusing permission to appeal against judgment rejecting CCO Capped Cost Order in Malawi #bizhumanrights case

PGI Group v Thomas & Ors (Application for PTO) [2022] EWCA Civ 233 https://t.co/EpGrJi6Smq

For first instance judgment see https://t.co/Em5jyZADeM pic.twitter.com/C7M8ENEETa

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 25, 2022

 

Mahmood v The Big Bus Company. At cruise-speed getting to choice of law under the Rome Convention.

GAVC - jeu, 03/10/2022 - 05:05

Mahmood v The Big Bus Company [2021] EWHC 3395 (QB) is a good illustration of the applicable law process under the 1980 Rome Convention and its inclusion on the blog is mostly for pedagogic /teaching purposes. It even might be a good illustration of the bootstrap principle (meaning an issue on the very existence of the contract needs to be determined by the putative lex contractus) except [94] parties agree that whatever the conclusion as to the applicable law, UAE law can be deemed to be the same as English law in relation to the validity, construction, and effect of the Heads of Terms.

On 27 July 2001, during discussions in London regarding a possible joint venture to operate tour buses in Dubai, the parties signed a document entitled “Heads of Terms”.

Claimant says the Heads of Terms gave rise to a binding contract between the parties, which the Defendant subsequently breached.  The claim is resisted by the Defendant, arguing that, whether assessed under the law of England and Wales or under the law of the UAE, the claim is time-barred.  In the alternative, the Defendant contends there was no binding contract between the parties, or, if there was, that it was superseded by events that took place in 2002, or that the Claimant acted in repudiatory breach of any such contract, whereas the Defendant itself did not breach a contractual obligation owed to the Claimant.  It further disputes that there is any basis for the damages claimed by the Claimant in these proceedings.

The blog’s interest in in the first Q only and this is where [65] ff Eady J does a good job at applying the Convention without verbosity. Reference is best made to the judgment itself.

Geert.

Mahmood v The Big Bus Company [2021] EWHC 3395 (QB)
Ia choice of law for English or UAE law under 1980 Rome Convention
Held EN law expressly chosen, alternatively characteristic performance leading to same result, ditto proper law of the contracthttps://t.co/jizbet52aR

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 16, 2021

Protecting employees under Rome I (and the Convention). The French SC takes a fork in the road view on setting aside choice of law.

GAVC - mer, 03/09/2022 - 13:01

I am in blog queue clear-out mode today. Thank you Maxime Barba for flagging the French SC’s December judgment on the application of Rome I’s (in fact the Rome Convention but the provisions have not materially changed) protective regime for employees. At issue is a contract for which parties had chosen Moroccan law, with the Court of Appeal setting aside that choice under A6 Rome Convention, now A8 Rome I, in favour of the French law’s provisions for dismissal, binding upon the employer by virtue of a collective labour agreement.

As Maxime notes, an interesting reference is the SC’s view on what law has to be considered ‘more favourable’. This weighing is a consequence of A6 stipulating

in a contract of employment a choice of law made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law which would be applicable under paragraph 2 in the absence of choice.

Clearly setting aside only occurs when the default law (the one that applies in the absence of choice) is more favourable to the employee. How though does one assess that more protective character? Piecemeal, checking every part of the employment relationship? Or more ‘global’, which would mean the exercise might let the employee down on some of the consequences. And once the comparison made, how much of the offending law does one set aside? The SC first of all notes that

[12] D’abord, la détermination du caractère plus favorable d’une loi doit résulter d’une appréciation globale des dispositions de cette loi ayant le même objet ou se rapportant à la même cause.

The judge’s exercise must limit itself to those parts of labour law which are at issue in the dispute: not an overall comparison, in other words. However as I understand the judgment, the employer had argued that once the comparison made (here: French law including a longer list of dismissal without cause than Moroccan law), the judge must only give sectional priority to the default law: here: the judge, it is argued, must treat the end of the relationship as one without cause, but must then resurrect Moroccan law’s consequences to such dismissal without cause. The SC on the other hand puts a fork in the road: once the road to French ‘dismissal without cause’ taken, French consequences for same apply. (The SC does in the end annul on the basis of a wrong calculation of the severance package, under French law).

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 3.2.5.

French SC on mandatory default employment law under Rome I trumping choice of law made. https://t.co/jFHE9ZQPol

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 9, 2021

Open Rights Group. The Court of Appeal on grace periods, the consequences of judicial review and remedies for breach of (supreme) retained EU law.

GAVC - mer, 03/09/2022 - 12:12

A posting that is long overdue but over at GAVC law  we have lots of things coming our way and the inevitable consequence is a bit of a queue on the blog. Open Rights Group & Anor, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2021] EWCA Civ 1573 was held end of October and discussed remedies for breach of retained EU law, that is in essence, EU law which has force in law in the UK by virtue of the Government’s copy /paste exercise following Brexit.

In April 2021 the CA had held that that the “Immigration Exemption” (which disapplies some data protection rights where their application would be likely to prejudice immigration control) of the UK Data Protection Act 2018 is contrary to Article 23 GDPR and Article 23 of the UK GDPR: [2021] EWCA Civ 800.  However in that judgment the CA had not specified at that stage what form of relief should be granted. It does now.

The claim form sought a declaratory order, the effect of which would be to “disapply” the Immigration Exemption. The Government argue it be granted a grace period to make regulations adding to or varying the provisions. The complicating factor is that even retained EU law enjoys supremacy (not by virtue of EU law but by virtue of the Government’s choice to do so). That means that any conflict between the GDPR and domestic legislation (including primary legislation) must be resolved in favour of the former: the domestic legislation must be overridden, treated as invalid or, in the conventional language, disapplied.

[15] A quashing order would not meet with the UK constitutional understanding and its limits to the rule of judges. However must supremacy, post Brexit, mean the courts must inevitably make an immediately binding order? Warby LJ sets out the principles of EU retained law as they follow from domestic legislation (the ‘EUWA’) at [23]:

(1) A UK court must now decide any question as to the validity, meaning or effect of any retained EU law for itself: it is no longer possible to refer any matter to the CJEU: EUWA s 6(1)(b).

(2) But the general rule is that the court must decide any such question in accordance with any retained case law and any retained general principles of EU law that are relevant: EUWA s 6(3). “Retained EU case law” and “retained general principles” mean principles laid down and decisions made by the CJEU before IP completion day.

(3) When it comes to principles laid down or decisions made by the CJEU after IP completion day, the court is not bound (EUWA s 6(1)) but “may have regard” to them (EUWA s 6(2)).

(4) The position is different in a “relevant court”, which includes the Court of Appeal. Subject to an exception that does not apply here, a relevant court is not absolutely bound by any retained EU case law: EUWA s 6(4)(ba) and Regulations 1 and 4. It can depart from that law; but the test to be applied in deciding whether to do so is “the same test as the Supreme Court would apply in deciding whether to depart from the case law of the Supreme Court”: EUWA 6(5A)(c) and Regulation 5.

(5) The test the Supreme Court applies is the one laid down by the House of Lords in its Practice Statement [1966] 1 WLR 1234, when Lord Gardiner LC said

“Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules. Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so. In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law. This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in this House.”

Relevant CJEU authority is LibertyLa Quadrature, A v Gewestelijke Stedenbouwkundige Ambtenaar van het Department ruimte Vlaanderen (Case C-24/19) (“Gewestelijke”), and B v Latvijas Republikas Saeima Case C-439/19, EU-C-2021-504 (“B v Latvia”). [24] Gewestelijke was decided before IP completion day. We are not absolutely bound by them, but we should decide this case in accordance with the principles they set out, unless we think it right to depart from those cases for the reasons set out by Lord Gardiner. B v Latvia was decided after IP completion day, so we can “have regard” to it.

[26] Warby LJ suggests 3 options:

One is to hold that since the power to suspend relief in respect of substantive laws that is identified in Gewestelijke is one that can only be exercised by the CJEU, it cannot be exercised at all in E&W. This is rejected [27] as an unduly mechanistic and literal approach, tending to subvert rather than promote the legal policy that underlies this aspect of the CJEU jurisprudence: it would remove from the judicial armoury a power that is, by definition, essential. 

An alternative would be what Warby LJ called “the Regulation 5 approach”: to apply the principles laid down in the 1966 HoL Practice Statement and depart from the CJEU case-law, holding that the power which, in that jurisprudence, is reserved to the CJEU should now be treated as available to at least some UK Courts. This [28] enable a court to perform one of its essential tasks: averting legal disorder and is an option which Warby LJ suggests is open to the Court of Appeal.

A third option is to follow and apply the CJEU jurisprudence as to the existence and limits of the power to suspend, but not that aspect of the case-law that reserves the exercise of that power to the European Court. That [31] is Warby LJ’s preferred route however he decides (and the other LJs agree) that there is at this time no need to choose between both options for in essence they lead to the same result in the case at issue. The Court concludes that the Government were given time until 31 January 2022 for the Data Protection Act 2018 to be amended so as to remedy the incompatibility. Whether the Government have done so, I leave to data privacy lawyers to verify.

Underhill LJ emphasises one point [57] ‘that, as Warby LJ says at para. 13 of his judgment, our power to suspend our declaration – in practice, to suspend the disapplication of the Immigration Exemption – derives entirely from retained EU law. It was not argued that the Court had any equivalent power at common law.’

This is an important judgment viz the application of retained EU law but also wider, viz the consequences of judicial review which is a hot topic at the moment in more than just the UK.

Geert.

Important Court of Appeal judgment on retained EU law and its effet utile (here: in the context of the 'UK' #GDPR).
What kind of remedies are available under UK law after a finding that retained EU law has been breached?
Open Rights Group https://t.co/4QVGVNA1NJ pic.twitter.com/p74inLB6MT

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 29, 2021

43/2022 : 8 mars 2022 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-205/20

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mar, 03/08/2022 - 09:54
Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld (Effet direct)
Liberté d'établissement
Détachement de travailleurs : le juge national doit s’assurer que les sanctions pour la violation d’obligations administratives soient proportionnées

Catégories: Flux européens

42/2022 : 8 mars 2022 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-213/19

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mar, 03/08/2022 - 09:51
Commission / Royaume-Uni
Ressources propres des Communautés TVA
Le Royaume-Uni a manqué à ses obligations concernant le contrôle douanier et la mise à disposition de ressources propres de l’Union en n’adoptant pas les mesures nécessaires pour lutter contre des fraudes relatives à des importations sous-évaluées de produits textiles et de chaussures en provenance de Chine

Catégories: Flux européens

41/2022 : 3 mars 2022 - Conclusions de l'avocat général dans l'affaire C-873/19

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 03/03/2022 - 10:01
Deutsche Umwelthilfe (Réception des véhicules à moteur)
Environnement et consommateurs
Avocat général Rantos : les associations de protection de l’environnement agréées doivent pouvoir contester en justice une réception CE par type de véhicules équipés de « dispositifs d’invalidation » susceptibles d’être interdits

Catégories: Flux européens

40/2022 : 2 mars 2022 - Informations

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mer, 03/02/2022 - 10:41
Statistiques judiciaires 2021 : en dépit de la pandémie, l’institution judiciaire de l’Union a pu garantir pleinement la continuité de ses activités

Catégories: Flux européens

Skat v Solo Capital Partners. When faced with Dicey rule 3, I’ll see your tax claim and raise it to a fraud one.

GAVC - mer, 03/02/2022 - 10:10

I reviewed the first instance judgment in Skat v Solo Capital Partners here and concluded that it endangered the effet utile of Brussels Ia (and Lugano). Justice Baker had concluded that all SKAT’s claims were inadmissible as a consequence of Dicey Rule 3. The Court of Appeal has now largely reversed, [Skatteforvaltningen v Solo Capital Partners Llp [2022] EWCA Civ 234] thereby resurrecting a £1,4 billion claim.

SKAT (Danish customs and excise) seeks the return of amounts it says it was wrongly induced to pay out as tax refunds. SKAT is not seeking to recover due and unpaid dividend tax or indeed any tax, because the foundation of its argument is that in the case of the alleged fraud defendants there was no liability to pay tax, no shares, no dividends, no tax and no withholding tax. There was never a taxpayer/tax authority relationship between the Solo etc Applicants or the alleged fraud defendants and SKAT. The mere fact that the alleged fraud is committed in the context of taxation or against a foreign tax authority is insufficient to bring the matter within the rule [SKAT’s counsel arguments, [30]-[31]). To allow the defendants to escape their liability, not in a tax fraud but in a general conspiracy, would also run counter the fraus omnia corrumpit principle [ditto, 62], a point which Flaux C agrees with obiter [146] in a case of a major international fraud..

Flaux C is much less verbose than the submissions before him. Yet again a jurisdictional point was allowed to be litigated to great length – albeit one may appreciate counsel and clients’ energy on those issues given the value of the claim.

[127] the basis of the claim is fraudulent misrepresentation. It is not a claim to unpaid tax or a claim to recover tax at all. It is a claim to recover monies which had been abstracted from SKAT’s general funds by fraud [128]. Even though SKAT may be an emanation of the Danish state, the Dicey revenue rule does not apply [128], neither does the wider sovereign powers rule within Dicey Rule 3:

‘In bringing a claim to recover the monies of which it was defrauded, SKAT is not doing an act of a sovereign character or enforcing a sovereign right, nor is it seeking to vindicate a sovereign power. Rather it is making a claim as the victim of fraud for the restitution of monies of which it has been defrauded, in the same way as if it were a private citizen.’ [129]

This latter reasoning falls short I find of proper criteria to guide its future application, although more is said at [130]: the claim to recover the money is at the core of the Chancellor’s reasoning here and that claim is a straightforward money claim, and [133] ‘the claims are ones which could just as well be brought by a private citizen’. That is the kind of argument which echoes CJEU authority on civil and commercial and to my mind the Court of Appeal could have helped us all by pointing out more specifically to what degree Dicey Rule 3 be informed by CJEU authority on ‘civil and commercial’, regardless of Brexit.

That there would be a detailed examination of the Danish tax regime and possible criticism of it and of SKAT’s systems and control, does not somehow convert the claim into one to enforce that tax regime. Recognition of foreign revenue laws is permissible under Dicey Rule 3 [138].

The position of one of the defendants, ED&F Man, is different in the sense that there is no allegation that they were implicated in a fraud. Although it is alleged that misrepresentations were made by them, the misrepresentations are said to have been negligent.

SKAT has to accept that as against those defendants the claim is inadmissible by virtue of Dicey Rule 3 unless it can satisfy the Court: (i) that the claim is a “civil and commercial matter” not a “revenue matter” for the purposes of Article 1(1) of the Brussels Recast Regulation; and (ii) that the operation of Dicey Rule 3 is precluded because, contrary to the judge’s analysis, it would impair the effectiveness of the Brussels Recast Regulation.

Contrary to the conclusion the judge reached the Court of Appeal finds that the claim against ED&F Man is a “revenue matter” falling outside the Brussels Recast Regulation. Here the Court of Appeals applies parity of reasoning with its assessment of the other claims: [150]:

Whilst the test for the application of Dicey Rule 3 may not be identical to that for determining what is a “revenue etc matter” for Article 1(1) of the Brussels Recast Regulation, it can be seen that its application leads to the same answer. If Dicey Rule 3 applies (as SKAT has to accept it does in relation to the claim against ED&F Man) then by the same reasoning, the basis for the claim by SKAT against those defendants is either a right which arises from an exercise of public powers or a legal relationship characterised by an exercise of public powers, from which it necessarily follows that the claim is a revenue matter outside the Brussels Recast Regulation.

Unfortunately therefore the effet utile argument (that application of Dicey rule 3 impairs the effectiveness of BIa /Lugano, as I had argued in my earlier post) is not discussed [153].

The title of this piece of course hints at the relevance of claim formulation. It is also exaggerated: SKAT cannot conjure up fraud elements out of nowhere to reinvent a tax claim as one in mere tortious and fraudulent misrepresentation. However it is clear that in cases that are somewhat murky, claim formulation will be crucial to navigate Dicey Rule 3.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 2.28 ff.

Thank you Ali Malek QC (successful for defendants) for bringing this AM's CA's judgment in SKAT to my attention.
Dicey rule 3, foreign public law, revenue matters
Appeal only partially succeedshttps://t.co/UQwg8caiGf
Review of the first instance judgmenthttps://t.co/r7WXwAoaXl

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 25, 2022

Hill v Generali. Assigned and /or subrogated claims continue to cast doubt on the application of Brussels Ia’s insurance title.

GAVC - ven, 02/25/2022 - 11:11

Hill v Generali Zrt [2021] EWHC 3381 (QB) is an appeal from the County Court and discussed whether a subrogated claim by an insurer (Admiral) can be brought in the name of an English motorist in an English court together with his claim for uninsured losses against a Hungarian insurer (Generali) in respect of a pre-Brexit accident in Germany. The county court judge held that it could not but acknowledged that the question was not free from doubt and granted the motorist permission to appeal. Upon appeal the opposite conclusion was reached.

The case once again therefore concerns Brussels Ia’s insurance title which was recently at play at the CJEU in Betty Tattersal aka Seguros Catalana Occidente. Pepperall J summarises the ordinary application of the insurance title as follows [8]

Re the insured losses (the repair costs): __Generali can be sued in Hungary, being its place of domicile, or Germany, being the place of the accident: A4(1), 7(2), 11(1)(a) and 12 BIa___As the insured, Mr Hill can also sue Generali in England & Wales, being his place of domicile: A11(1)(b).___ As the insurer, and subject to being permitted to join an action already proceeding in another jurisdiction, Admiral cannot take advantage of the more favourable rules as to jurisdiction available to the policyholder, the insured and beneficiaries. 

There is therefore no dispute as to Mr Hill’s right to sue for his uninsured losses (the devaluation of the car) in England & Wales. The issue is whether Admiral’s subrogated claim:  is a claim brought by the insured such that it may be pursued in England & Wales under Article 11(1)(b); or is a claim that must be treated as brought by the insurer such that it cannot, subject to questions of joinder, be pursued in E&W.

Relevant recitals echo the general principles with which the CJEU approaches the issue: [10]:

“15 The rules of jurisdiction should be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile. Jurisdiction should always be available on this ground save in a few well-defined situations in which the subject-matter of the dispute or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different connecting factor …

16 In addition to the defendant’s domicile, there should be alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on a close connection between the court and the action or in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice. The existence of a close connection should ensure legal certainty and avoid the possibility of the defendant being sued in a court of a Member State which he could not reasonably have foreseen …

18 In relation to insurance, consumer and employment contracts, the weaker party should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules.

21 In the interests of the harmonious administration of justice it is necessary to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable judgments will not be given in different Member States. There should be a clear and effective mechanism for resolving cases of lis pendens and related actions …”

Part of the challenge is the different way in which claims are assigned /and or subrogated across jurisdictions [23]. In many European legal systems insurers take an assignment of the insured’s claim and sue to recover their outlay in their own names. In the common law’s approach the claim for insured losses remains vested in the insured.

CJEU Sovag is discussed for the joinder elements of the case and CJEU Kabeg is said not to be a right fit for in that case the insurer was the assignee of the claim for insured losses and able to sue in its own name.

The judge reaches his conclusion that the subrogated claim may be brought in E&W on the echo of SOVAG, hence underlining [34] the policy of minimising multiple proceedings and ensuring that irreconcilable judgments are not given but also in demonstrating practicality. The CJEU arguably in Betty Tattersal (the judge did not have the benefit of that judgment) took a different direction  on related issues and I find them both equally persuasive. It is time the insurance section be sorted out and the current EC evaluation of BIa would be a good trigger for same.

Geert.

1/2 Hill v Generali Zrt [2021] EWHC 3381 (QB)#travellaw, Brussels Ia, insurance
Subrogated claim by insurer can be brought in name of EN motorist in E&W court together with his claim for uninsured losses against a Hungarian insurer in respect of pre-Brexit accident in Germany

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 17, 2021

39/2022 : 24 février 2020 - Conclusions de l'avocat général dans l'affaire C-673/20

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 02/24/2022 - 10:25
Préfet du Gers et Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
DGEN
Selon l’avocat général Collins, les ressortissants britanniques qui ont joui des droits de la citoyenneté européenne ne conservent pas ces avantages après le retrait du Royaume-Uni de l’Union européenne

Catégories: Flux européens

37/2022 : 24 février 2022 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-389/20

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 02/24/2022 - 10:05
TGSS (Chômage des employés de maison)
SOPO
La législation espagnole qui exclut les employés de maison des prestations de chômage alors qu’il s’agit presque exclusivement de femmes est contraire au droit de l’Union

Catégories: Flux européens

36/2022 : 24 février 2022 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans les affaires jointes C-143/20, C-213/20

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 02/24/2022 - 10:04
A (Contrats d’assurance « unit-linked »)
Liberté d'établissement
La Cour précise la portée de l’obligation d’information précontractuelle en matière de contrats collectifs d’assurance-vie « unit-linked »

Catégories: Flux européens

38/2022 : 24 février 2022 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-452/20

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 02/24/2022 - 09:53
Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli et Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze
Liberté d'établissement
Lutte contre la consommation de tabac chez les jeunes : les États membres peuvent imposer des sanctions administratives aux opérateurs économiques violant l’interdiction de vente aux mineurs, telles que la suspension de leur licence d’exploitation pour 15 jours

Catégories: Flux européens

35/2022 : 23 février 2022 - Arrêt du Tribunal dans l'affaire T-806/19

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mer, 02/23/2022 - 11:32
Govern d'Andorra / EUIPO (Andorra)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Le Tribunal confirme que le signe figuratif ANDORRA ne peut faire l’objet d’un enregistrement en tant que marque de l’Union européenne pour plusieurs produits et services

Catégories: Flux européens

34/2022 : 23 février 2022 - Arrêts du Tribunal dans les affaires T-834/17, T-540/18

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mer, 02/23/2022 - 11:21
United Parcel Service / Commission, ASL Aviation Holdings, ASL Airlines (Ireland)/Commission
Droit institutionnel
Le Tribunal rejette deux recours indemnitaires introduits par UPS et ASL Aviation Holdings

Catégories: Flux européens

33/2022 : 22 février 2022 - Conclusions de l'avocat général dans les affaires jointes C-14/21, C-15/21

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mar, 02/22/2022 - 10:18
Sea Watch
Transport
Selon l’avocat général Rantos, les navires privés exerçant une activité régulière de recherche et de sauvetage en mer peuvent faire l’objet d’un contrôle de conformité aux normes internationales assuré par l’État du port

Catégories: Flux européens

30/2022 : 22 février 2022 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-483/20

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mar, 02/22/2022 - 10:15
Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides (Unité familiale - Protection déjà accordée)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Un État membre peut exercer sa faculté de déclarer une demande de protection internationale irrecevable au motif que le demandeur s’est déjà vu accorder le statut de réfugié par un autre État membre

Catégories: Flux européens

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