Flux européens

Roumanie / Commission
Citoyenneté européenne
La Cour confirme la décision de la Commission d’enregistrer la proposition d’initiative citoyenne européenne « Minority SafePack - one million signatures for diversity in Europe »

Commission / Grèce (Récupération d’aides d’État - Ferronickel)
Aide d'État
La Grèce est condamnée à payer une somme forfaitaire de 5,5 millions d’euros et une astreinte de plus de 4 millions d’euros par semestre de retard pour ne pas avoir récupéré les aides d’État octroyées à Larco

Deutsche Telekom / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal accorde à Deutsche Telekom une indemnité d’environ 1,8 million d’euros à titre de réparation du préjudice qu’elle a subi en raison du refus de la Commission européenne de lui verser des intérêts moratoires sur le montant de l’amende qu’elle a indûment payé dans le contexte d’une infraction aux règles de la concurrence

Deutsche Telekom / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal accorde à Deutsche Telekom une indemnité d’environ 1,8 million d’euros à titre de réparation du préjudice qu’elle a subi en raison du refus de la Commission européenne de lui verser des intérêts moratoires sur le montant de l’amende qu’elle a indûment payé dans le contexte d’une infraction aux règles de la concurrence

Kazakhstan Kagazy Plc & Ors v Zhunus & Ors [2021] EWHC 3462 (Comm), sees Henshaw J unpicking the follow-up to a trial of applications and claims made by the Claimants for the purpose of enforcing an unsatisfied judgment for approximately US$300 million, handed down in December 2017.

The relevant part of the complex judgment, for the purposes of the blog, is a ‘tracing claim’: claimant argue that monies stolen from them by one of the defendants can be traced or followed into a variety of assets said to be held by companies within Cypriot trusts structures for the benefit of said defendant and his family. What is being traced are shares in Exillon, an oil company which Mr Arip developed after he fled Kazakhstan for Dubai. The proceeds of the shares went partially into the purchase of real estate, with another (substantial) part remaining liquid in a Swiss bank account.

Defendants submit that the tracing claim is governed by Kazakh law, and that that law does not recognise the concept of tracing. The judge, with respect, and perhaps he was echoing submissions, takes a rather unstructured approach to the conflict of laws analysis from which the judgment subsequently never recovers. Many first instance judgments in the UK intuitively start by quoting a relevant section from Dicey (whose 16th ed I am told might be out end of 2022), and then somehow engineer the analysis around it. In the case at issue, the Dicey rule that is zoomed in on [85], is disputes over real property, which are subject to lex situs (lex rei sitae). At [88] the judge then refers to Akers v Samba in which the Supreme Court, albeit at the jurisdictional level, held “the situs or location of shares and of any equitable interest in them is the jurisdiction where the company is incorporated or the shares are registered”. [89]:

It would follow that, insofar as relevant, questions of title to the Exillon shares, whose proceeds (a) were used to purchase the Properties and (b) remain in the form of the £72 million in the BJB account in Switzerland, would be likely to be governed by Manx law, Exillon having been incorporated in the Isle of Man.  A possible alternative would be English law on the basis that the shares were traded on the London Stock Exchange.  The parties have in any event agreed that, so far as relevant to these claims, Manx law is the same as English law.

[91] some role for Kazakh law is suggested to still exist when considering whether the English law preconditions for a tracing claim are met.  ‘It is generally a pre-condition of tracing in equity that there be a fiduciary relationship which calls the equitable jurisdiction into being’. [92] The law applicable to a cause of action or issue determines whether a person is required to hold property on constructive or resulting trust, hence it is necessary to consider whether duties imposed by the relevant foreign law are to be regarded as fiduciary.

Only in an afterthought [94] does the judge consider the lex causae governing unjust enrichment, equitable claims and negotiorum gestio, per Rome II as retained in UK law (and in Dicey). [The judgment is not in fact clear on when the claim was introduced and therefore might be subject to acquired as opposed to retained EU law].

The lex causae for the qualification of the current claims (proprietary restitution) as one of these entries in Rome II [96] is matter of factly presented as English law. [99] the judge dismisses the relevance of the succinct Rome II analysis for, harking back to his first reference to Dicey, the fundamental nature of the Claimants’ claim in the present case is held to be a proprietary one hence Dicey’s lex situs rule is said to apply without a need to consider Rome II.

Surely the right order is to qualify the claim, using autonomous EU interpretation, under (retained) Rome I cq Rome II and with reference to CJEU authority- with of course some of the recent qualification issues following CJEU Hrvatske Sume thrown in. Subsequently to only consider the English common law to the extent statutorily retained EU law does not govern the issue. The approach in the judgment is unsatisfactory and in that respect joins Fetch.AI Lrd & Anor v Persons Unknown Category A & Ors [2021] EWHC 2254 (Comm) , which Amy Held and Matthias Lehmann discuss critically this morning.

Geert.

Kazakhstan Kagazy Plc & Ors v Zhunus & Ors [2021] EWHC 3462 (Comm) (21 December 2021)
Includes somewhat fuzzy discussion of applicable law to (share) tracing and ownership claims, as well as unjust enrichment etc and Rome IIhttps://t.co/6GCjwBJCqY

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 22, 2021

Thelen Technopark Berlin

Malgré le fait que la Cour ait déjà constaté que la réglementation allemande fixant des montants minimaux d’honoraires pour les prestations des architectes et des ingénieurs (HOAI) est contraire à la directive « services », une juridiction nationale, saisie d’un litige opposant des particuliers, n’est pas tenue, sur le seul fondement du droit de l’Union, de laisser inappliquée cette réglementation allemande

Wiener Landesregierung (Révocation d'une assurance de naturalisation)
Citoyenneté européenne
La révocation d’une assurance de naturalisation doit respecter le principe de proportionnalité lorsqu’elle empêche de recouvrer la citoyenneté de l’Union

I am hoping to tackle some of the pre-Christmas queue this week, kicking off with the Opinion (no English version available) of Pikamae AG in C-568/20 J v H Limited. The case concerns the enforcement of a 2019 decision of the England & Wales High Court [I believe that judgment is Arab Jordan Investment Bank Plc & Anor v Sharbain [2019] EWHC 860 (Comm). The dates do not quite correspond (6 days of) but the amounts and line of argument do].

Clearly the UK were still a Member State at the time. The English decision was based, in turn, on two Jordanian judgments of 2013. It had rejected, on the basis of the English common law (judgments issued outside the EU are not subject to EU recognition and enforcement rules), the arguments against enforcement in the UK. The judge subsequently issued an Article 53 Brussels Ia certificate.

The issue is not whether a judgment merely confirming a non-EU judgment, may be covered by Article 53 Brussels Ia. CJEU Owens Bank has already held they cannot (see Handbook, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.573). The issue is rather whether, exequatur having been abandoned in Brussels Ia, arguments as to whether the judgment in the State of origin be at all covered by Brussels Ia, may be raised by way of an Article 45 objection to recognition and enforcement.

CJEU Diageo Brands, among others, has confirmed the narrow window for refusal of recognition on the basis of ordre public. The AG suggests wrong decisions on the scope of application of BIa, leading to incorrect A53 certificates, may fall within that category. Far from upsetting the principle of mutual trust, he suggests it is a necessary ‘safety valve’, a “soupape de sécurité » (40) which assist with said mutual trust. The AG qualifies the opinion by suggesting the issuing of an A53 certificate for a judgment that merely enforces an ex-EU judgment, is a grave error in the scope of application of the Regulation.

Should the CJEU confirm, discussion of course will ensue as to what are clear errors in the scope of application, or indeed in the very interpretation of Brussels Ia.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed 2021, Heading 2.2.17.1.

Opinion Pikamae AG yday, #CJEU C-568/20
Member State court may refuse recognition of other MS (UK, pre #Brexit) High Court judgment if said judgment merely enforces judgment from a third State, Jordan. Brussels Ia Title 3 'judgments' must emanate from a MShttps://t.co/NkJ6zh9FU9

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 17, 2021

Entrée en fonctions de trois nouveaux membres du Tribunal de l’Union européenne

Regione Puglia
Liberté d'établissement
Un État membre peut, dans les limites géographiques qu’il a fixées, octroyer à un même opérateur plusieurs permis de prospection, d’exploitation et d’extraction d’hydrocarbures, tels que le pétrole et le gaz naturel, pour des zones contiguës à condition de garantir à tous les opérateurs un accès non discriminatoire à ces activités et d’apprécier l’effet cumulé des projets susceptibles d’avoir un impact notable sur l’environnement

Allemagne - Ville de Paris e.a. / CommissionC-178/19 P Hongrie - Ville de Paris e.a./Commission
Environnement et consommateurs
La Cour annule l’arrêt du Tribunal sur l’annulation partielle du règlement de la Commission fixant des valeurs d’émissions pour les essais en conditions de conduite réelles des véhicules légers neufs

MIUR et Ufficio Scolastico Regionale per la Campania
DFON
Professeurs de religion catholique : la nécessité d’un titre d’aptitude délivré par une autorité ecclésiastique ne justifie pas le renouvellement de contrats à durée déterminée

Mahmudov & Anor v Sanzberro & Ors [2021] EWHC 3433 (QB) tackles the issue of libel tourism. As Collins Rice J puts it [3]

underlying the contest of law is a contest of two mainstream policies embodied in modern defamation law: on the one hand, the need for the law to keep up with the borderless realities of the internet, and on the other the need for international libel to be dealt with by the courts best able fairly to do so (or, to put it less neutrally, to prevent ‘libel tourism’).

The case is held under Brussels Ia for the claim was introduced on 31 December 2020, ‘IP completion day’.  Parties mostly seem at loggerheads over the implications of CJEU C-509/09 eDate. Claimants suggest eDate establishes a stand-alone full jurisdictional gateway for the Member State where the aggrieved has his or its centre of interests – CoI. Defendant claims [19]

there is still a binary choice, as per Shevill: to sue either (a) where a defendant is domiciled or (b) where a completed tort (the harmful event) occurred. The effect of eDate, they say, is that claimants taking the second route in their CoI country can now get global relief rather than being limited to compensation for harm arising in that individual state. CoI is not jurisdictional in the pure sense of introducing a freestanding basis for bringing an action somewhere; it is jurisdictional only to the limited or secondary (but nevertheless important) extent of the nature and quantum of the relief that may be sought.

Parties oddly seem in agreement that Shevill v Presse Alliance (No.2) [1996] AC 959 reaffirmed ([11] in Mahumdov]

that what constituted the ‘harmful event’ was to be determined by the national court applying its own substantive law. In other words, the preliminary jurisdictional question for the High Court in a libel case brought against a non-domiciled defendant was whether a claimant could show to the requisite standard that all the components of a tort actionable in the UK were present

I find that debatable to say the least, and in fact that consensus has an important impact on the judge’s final conclusion, which rejects CoI as a stand-alone gateway: [28] the judge sides with the defendants for the claimant’s reading would imply ‘an autonomous meaning of the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ ‘. The latter, many might argue, must be the implication of the CJEU’s overall application of Brussels Ia. At [34] Napag Trading is offered in support however the judge I feel in Mahmudov should  have made a clearer distinction (as the judge did in Napag Trading) between the EU-governed jurisdictional gateway for tort, and the (England and Wales) governed Civil Procedure Rules test for a ‘good arguable case’. As I note in my review of Napag Trading, these CPR rules may still form a formidable procedural hurdle, however properly distinguishing between them is important, among others for costs reasons.

Geert.

Mahmudov & Anor v Sanzberro & Ors [2021] EWHC 3433 (QB) (17 December 2021)#libel tourism
Held E&W courts do not have jurisdiction per #CJEU Brussels Ia, Shevill, eDate etchttps://t.co/9vP1s5TJZd

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 20, 2021

The CJEU (Grand Chamber) delivered on 21 December 2021 its judgment in case C‑251/20 (Gtflix Tv), which is about Brussels I bis:

« Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that a person who, considering that his or her rights have been infringed by the dissemination of disparaging comments concerning him or her on the internet, seeks not only the rectification of the information and the removal of the content placed online concerning him or her but also compensation for the damage resulting from that placement may claim, before the courts of each Member State in which those comments are or were accessible, compensation for the damage suffered in the Member State of the court seised, even though those courts do not have jurisdiction to rule on the application for rectification and removal ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=251510&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=5320006

Earlier on, on 16 September 2021, AG Hogan had suggested: “Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that a claimant who relies on an act of unfair competition consisting in the dissemination of disparaging statements on the internet and who seeks both the rectification of the data and the deletion of certain content and compensation for the non-material and economic damage resulting therefrom, may bring an action or claim before the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content published online is or was accessible, for compensation only for the damage caused in the territory of that Member State. In order, however, for those courts to have the requisite jurisdiction it is necessary that the claimant can demonstrate that it has an appreciable number of consumers in that jurisdiction who are likely to have access to and have understood the publication in question” (https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=246102&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2104).

The CJEU (Grand Chamber) delivered on 21 December 2021 its judgment in case C‑124/20 (Bank Melli Iran v Telekom Deutschland GmbH), which is about Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 (Protection against the effects of the extraterritorial application of legislation adopted by a third country):

« 1. The first paragraph of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 […] must be interpreted as prohibiting persons referred to in Article 11 of Regulation No 2271/96, as amended, from complying with the requirements or prohibitions laid down in the laws specified in the annex to that regulation, even in the absence of an order directing compliance issued by the administrative or judicial authorities of the third countries which adopted those laws.

2. The first paragraph of Article 5 of Regulation No 2271/96, as amended by Regulation No 37/2014 and Delegated Regulation 2018/1100, must be interpreted as not precluding a person referred to in Article 11 of that regulation, as amended, who does not have an authorisation within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 5 of that regulation, as amended, from terminating contracts concluded with a person on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, without providing reasons for that termination. Nevertheless, the first paragraph of Article 5 of the same regulation, as amended, requires that, in civil proceedings relating to the alleged infringement of the prohibition laid down in that provision, where all the evidence available to the national court suggests prima facie that a person referred to in Article 11 of Regulation No 2271/96, as amended, complied with the laws specified in the annex to that regulation, as amended, without having an authorisation in that respect, it is for that same person to establish to the requisite legal standard that his or her conduct was not intended to comply with those laws.

3. Regulation No 2271/96, as amended by Regulation No 37/2014 and Delegated Regulation 2018/1100, in particular Articles 5 and 9 thereof, read in the light of Article 16 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding the annulment of the termination of contracts effected by a person referred to in Article 11 of that regulation, as amended, in order to comply with the requirements or prohibitions based on the laws specified in the annex to that regulation, as amended, even though that person does not have an authorisation, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 5 of the same regulation, as amended, provided that that annulment does not entail disproportionate effects for that person having regard to the objectives of Regulation No 2271/96, as amended, consisting in the protection of the established legal order and the interests of the European Union in general. In that assessment of proportionality, it is necessary to weigh in the balance the pursuit of those objectives served by the annulment of the termination of a contract effected in breach of the prohibition laid down in the first paragraph of Article 5 of that regulation, as amended, and the probability that the person concerned may be exposed to economic loss, as well as the extent of that loss, if that person cannot terminate his or her commercial relationship with a person included in the list of persons covered by the secondary sanctions at issue resulting from the laws specified in the annex to that regulation, as amended ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=251507&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5321152

AG Pikamae delivered on 16 December 2021 his opinion in case C‑568/20 (J), which is about the incorrect use of Brussels I bis by the court of origin. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version).

Question : « À la suite de la délivrance, par la juridiction de l’État membre d’origine, du certificat prévu à l’article 53 du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 (2), attestant du caractère exécutoire de la décision rendue et de l’applicabilité de ce règlement, la juridiction de l’État membre requis, saisie d’une demande de refus d’exécution de cette décision par la personne contre laquelle l’exécution est sollicitée, peut-elle y faire droit au motif d’une appréciation erronée quant au caractère applicable dudit règlement, dans la mesure où la procédure suivie devant la juridiction de l’État membre d’origine visait à déclarer exécutoires des jugements rendus dans un État tiers ? ».

Suggested response : «  Les articles 45 et 46 du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 12 décembre 2012 […] doivent être interprétés en ce sens que la juridiction de l’État membre requis, saisie d’une demande de refus d’exécution, peut y faire droit au motif que la décision et le certificat, prévu à l’article 53 de ce règlement, adoptés par la juridiction de l’État membre d’origine violent l’ordre public de l’État membre requis dès lors que l’erreur de droit invoquée constitue une violation manifeste d’une règle de droit considérée comme étant essentielle dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union et donc dans celui de cet État. Tel est le cas d’une erreur affectant l’application de l’article 2, sous a), et de l’article 39 dudit règlement exigeant que la décision dont l’exécution est demandée soit rendue dans un État membre.
Lorsqu’il vérifie l’existence éventuelle d’une violation manifeste de l’ordre public de l’État requis, du fait de la méconnaissance d’une règle de fond ou de forme du droit de l’Union, le juge de cet État doit tenir compte du fait que, sauf circonstances particulières rendant trop difficile ou impossible l’exercice des voies de recours dans l’État membre d’origine, les justiciables doivent faire usage dans cet État membre de toutes les voies de recours disponibles afin de prévenir en amont une telle violation ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=251315&mode=req&pageIndex=2&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=FR&cid=5321152

The Court of Justice delivered on 9 December 2021 its judgment in case C‑708/20 (BT v Seguros Catalana Occidente, EB), which is about Article 13 Brussels I bis:

« Article 13(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of a direct action brought by the injured person against an insurer in accordance with Article 13(2) thereof, the court of the Member State in which that person is domiciled cannot also assume jurisdiction, on the basis of Article 13(3) thereof, to rule on a claim for compensation brought at the same time by that person against the policyholder or the insured who is domiciled in another Member State and who has not been challenged by the insurer ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=250867&mode=req&pageIndex=4&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=5332111

The Court of Justice delivered on 9 December 2021 its judgment in case C‑242/20 (Hrvatske Sume), which is about Brussels I.

Context: “proceedings between, on the one hand, HRVATSKE ŠUME d.o.o., Zagreb, a company established in Croatia, successor in title to HRVATSKE ŠUME javno poduzeće za gospodarenje šumama i šumskim zemljištima u Republici Hrvatskoj p.o., Zagreb, and, on the other, BP Europa SE Hamburg, a company established in Germany, successor in title to Deutsche BP AG, in turn successor in title to The Burmah Oil (Deutschland) GmbH, concerning the recovery, on the basis of unjust enrichment, of an amount unduly paid in enforcement proceedings which were subsequently declared invalid”.

Decision: « 1. Article 22(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that an action for restitution based on unjust enrichment does not come within the exclusive jurisdiction provided for by that provision, even though it was brought on account of the expiry of the time limit within which restitution of sums unduly paid in enforcement proceedings may be claimed in the context of the same enforcement proceedings.

2. Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that an action for restitution based on unjust enrichment does not fall within the scope of the ground of jurisdiction laid down in that provision ».

Note paragraph 36 : « In the absence of any application for enforcement, an action for restitution based on unjust enrichment does not come within the scope of Article 22(5) of Regulation No 44/2001 ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=250865&mode=req&pageIndex=5&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=5334182

AG Saugmandsgaard Oe had previously, on 9 September 2021, delivered the following opinion: « Article 5(1) and Article 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 [..] must be interpreted as meaning that a claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment:
– is not a matter ‘relating to a contract’ within the meaning of the former provision, except where it is closely linked to a prior contractual relationship existing, or deemed to exist, between the parties to the dispute; and
– is not a matter ‘relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’ within the meaning of the latter provision » (https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=245764&mode=req&pageIndex=23&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=2104).

AG Campos Sanchez-Bordona delivered on 2 December 2021 his opinion in case C‑645/20 (V A), which is about the Succession Regulation.

Context: “1. The Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France) asks the Court of Justice whether the authorities of a Member State (2) in which the deceased has assets must establish of their own motion their jurisdiction to rule on the succession as a whole under Article 10 of Regulation No 650/2012.

2. The uncertainty has arisen in the course of a dispute over succession rights between the children of a deceased French citizen whose last habitual residence in France is contested, on the one hand, and the person who was the deceased’s wife (but not the mother of his children) at the time of his death, on the other.

3. None of the parties disputes the nationality of the deceased at the time of his death, or that he was the owner of a property situated in France. The disagreement lies only in where he was habitually resident when he died

4. At first instance, a French court declared that it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim brought by the deceased’s children, who had applied for the appointment of an administrator for the estate.

5. On appeal, however, the relevant court held that the French judicial authorities lacked jurisdiction over the succession as a whole, as the deceased’s last place of residence had been in the United Kingdom.

6. On appeal in cassation, the appellants claim that, in any event, the French courts should have declared that they had jurisdiction on their own initiative, which is the issue that forms the subject of the referring court’s question”.

Suggested response: “Article 10(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case where the deceased did not have his last habitual residence in any Member State of the European Union, the court of a Member State in which a dispute in a matter of succession has arisen must declare of its own motion that it has jurisdiction to settle the succession as a whole if, in the light of facts alleged by the parties which are not in dispute, the deceased was a national of that State at the time of his death and was the owner of assets located there”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=250423&mode=req&pageIndex=5&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=5334182

On 25 November 2021, the CJEU delivered its judgment in case C‑289/20 (IB v FA), which is about Article 3 Brussels II bis.

Decision: “Article 3(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 […] must be interpreted as meaning that a spouse who divides his or her time between two Member States may have his or her habitual residence in only one of those Member States, with the result that only the courts of the Member State in which that habitual residence is situated have jurisdiction to rule on the application for the dissolution of matrimonial ties”.

Note: the Court has clearly indicated, in the preceding paragraphs, the particular State it believes the spouse to be resident in (subject to the national court’s assessment):

“59 In the present case, as is apparent from the documents before the Court, it is common ground that IB, a national of the Member State of the national court seised, satisfied the condition – laid down in the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 – of having resided in that Member State for at least six months immediately before lodging his application for the dissolution of matrimonial ties. It is also established that, since May 2017, IB has been carrying out, on a stable and permanent basis, a professional activity of indefinite duration in France during the week, and that he stays in an apartment there for the purposes of that professional activity.

60 That evidence indicates that IB’s stay in the territory of that Member State is stable and also shows, at the very least, IB’s integration into a social and cultural environment within that Member State”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=250046&mode=req&pageIndex=6&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=5338385