Flux européens

Roos e.a. / Parlement et ID e.a./Parlement
SANT
Le président du Tribunal ne suspend pas la décision du Parlement européen conditionnant l’accès à ses bâtiments à la présentation d’un certificat Covid-19 numérique de l’UE

LR Ģenerālprokuratūra
Privilèges et immunités
Lorsqu’une autorité pénale constate que les comportements d’un gouverneur d’une banque centrale d’un État membre sur lesquels elle enquête n’ont manifestement pas été accomplis par celui-ci en sa qualité officielle, la procédure à son égard peut être poursuivie dès lors que l’immunité de juridiction ne s’applique pas

London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Limited v Kingdom of Spain & Anor (M/T ‘Prestige’ Nos. 3 and 4) [2021] EWCA Civ 1589 is yet another judgment in the Prestige series on which I have reported before (use of the search tag ‘Prestige’ brings you to 4 earlier posts). I often refer to the comparative advantage of civil procedure in England and Wales, inter alia relating to the speed of procedures. Current litigation most certainly does not fit that bill: it is slow, opaque and dense with issues, arguments have been allowed to run in a convoluted way, and a certain amount of consolidation would have been in order, I submit.

The judgment in this post is the appeal against the judgment of Henshaw J on arbitration and State immunity, and the judgment of Butcher J on service, state immunity and the insurance title of Brussels Ia.

In summary, Henshaw J’s judgment stands (he had held Spain does not have immunity in respect of these proceedings; that the permission to serve the arbitration obligation our of jurisdiction, granted earlier to the Club should stand; and that the court should appoint an arbitrator);  Butcher J’s judgment also largely stands, but for his decision on the ‘Award Claims’ (the Club seeking liability and damages for breach of the State’s obligation to honour the arbitration award which had declared the State bound to pursue its claims in London arbitration). The Court of Appeal held, as did Butcher J, that the arbitration exception applies to the Award Claims (an unlikely analogy featured with CJEU Assens Havn) and that jurisdiction for them must be determined in accordance with domestic law principles [84], however unlike the first instance judge it found [126] there is no serious issue to be tried on the award claims.

Geert.

 

EU Private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.84 ff.

London Steam-Ship Owners' MIA v Spain [2021] EWCA Civ 1589 (4/11/2021)
Various appeals, partially allowed, re the Prestige oilspill. State immunity, #arbitration etc. Background here https://t.co/LgOFOXsRmo
Six complex findings, see below. More next weekhttps://t.co/ItT0tFTO3U pic.twitter.com/LrxhXIRPLy

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 5, 2021

Puigdemont i Casamajó e.a. / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
Le viceprésident du Tribunal de l’Union européenne rejette la nouvelle demande de suspension de la levée de l’immunité parlementaire de MM. Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó et Antoni Comín i Oliveres ainsi que de Mme Clara Ponsatí i Obiols

Ditto Ltd v Drive-Thru Records LLC [2021] EWHC 2035 (Ch) discusses the contract and tort gateways for jurisdiction in England and Wales (they need to be met for claimant to hold onto an earlier granted permission for ‘service out’ of the jurisdiction). The dispute concerns the world of music catalogues, advance royalties and (marketing) services rendered, or not, in regard to the  catalogued artists. Defendants are both based in California, claimant is England-incorporated. Concurrent proceedings are underway in New York.

Of interest to the blog is firstly the contractual gateway, which is to some degree assessed under retained EU law, for as part of its argument, claimant argues the lex contractus is English law.  That determination of the applicable law is done under (retained( EU law and Francis DM holds that it is not English law. No choice of law had been made per Article 3, which (in the absence of any protected categories) brings us into the cascade of A4 Rome I. It is worthwhile to repeat counsel argument in full [56-57]

Ms Lacob [for defendants] contended that the law of the agreements should be determined in accordance with paragraph (2) as being that of the State of California. That was on the basis that the party which was required to effect the characteristic performance of each of the agreements was Drive-Thru and War Road respectively, and their country, or (in this case) territorial unit, of habitual residence, being the place where they had their central administration, was California. She identified the performance which was characteristic of each of the agreements as being Drive-Thru and War Road’s obligations to licence the exploitation of their portfolio works, to remaster and remix their recordings or the release new recordings, as the case may be, and (in the case of War Road) to sign up new bands; in contrast, Ditto’s only obligation was to pay money which was not the performance which was characteristic of the agreements.

Mr Kitson for Ditto [claimant] took issue with this. He pointed to the fact that Drive-Thru and War Road themselves contended in the New York proceedings that Ditto was in breach of its obligations (whether express or implied) under the agreements to take possession of the recordings and to distribute the same so as to earn royalties for the parties’ joint benefit. Thus, he argued, the performance characteristic of the agreement was not all on the side of Drive-Thru and War Road.

The reference to the arguments in the New York proceedings is interesting for it suggests ‘form’. However the judge agreed [58] with defendants that

these agreements are ones under which there were substantial performance obligations (other than simply the payment of money) on both sides. In reality, the agreements were joint ventures for the development and exploitation of Drive-Thru’s and War Road’s existing and future portfolio works for their mutual benefit. They are the type of agreements which Mann J refers to in his judgment in Apple Corps at paragraph 54 where it is not possible to identify a characteristic performance provided by one only of the parties.

Even the centre of gravity rule (recital 19, which the judge does not refer to) does not assist here hence the analysis needs to jump to A4(4)’s ‘proper law of the contract’ rule.  [59]

What then is the country or territorial unit with which the agreements are most closely connected? On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that it is the State of California. That was where Drive-Thru and War Road were based and where for the most part they would perform their obligations under the agreements. In contrast, Ditto’s own obligations relating to the digital distribution of the portfolio works were not ones which, on the evidence, fell to be performed in England to any particular extent, even if Ditto’s central administration was based in England. Instead, Ditto’s rights to exploitation of the portfolio works, and any corresponding obligations relating to the distribution of such works, were worldwide, reflecting the global reach of the Ditto Music brand.

Conclusion is that California law is the lex contractus.

The contractual gateway was however found to have been fulfilled on the basis of CPR PD6B paragraph 3.1 ‘contract made within the jurisdiction’. The judge finds that the contracts were ‘made’ both in CAL and in E&W [54] although he does lament [48] the artificial nature of the issue as the law currently stands: were contracts are ‘made’. I find this is especially relevant in a contemporary context of electronic correspondence, Zoom meetings and the like. Where a contract is ‘made’ seems fairly nugatory these days.

The tort gateway is discussed without reference to UKSC Brownlie for that was en route at the time of the discussions in current case. It is at any rate held to be met [[71] for claimant has quite clearly sustained damage in England as a result of the alleged misrepresentations.

At [72] ff follows an interesting, brief discussion on the location of intellectual property with finally the curtain drawn on English proceedings as a result of forum non [80 ff].

Geert.

 

1/2 Ditto v Drive-Thru Records [2021] EWHC 2035 (Ch) (17 November 2021)
Permission to serve out set aside
Contract gateway discussed viz retained EU law, A4(4) Rome I (leading to CAL law)
Tort gateway upheld: damage sustained in E&W
Obiter discussion of…

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 18, 2021

IB (Résidence habituelle d’un époux - Divorce)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Compétence juridictionnelle pour connaître d’une demande en divorce : la Cour précise le sens et la portée de la notion de « résidence habituelle » d’un époux

StWL Städtische Werke Lauf a.d. Pegnitz
Rapprochement des législations
Inbox advertising : l’affichage dans la boîte de réception électronique de messages publicitaires sous une forme qui s’apparente à celle d’un véritable courrier électronique constitue une utilisation de courrier électronique à des fins de prospection directe au sens de la directive 2002/58

Delfarma
Libre circulation des marchandises
Le droit de l’Union s’oppose à une réglementation nationale prévoyant l’expiration de plein droit, sans examen d’un éventuel risque pour la santé et la vie des personnes, d’une autorisation d’importation parallèle d’un médicament un an après l’expiration de l’autorisation de mise sur le marché du médicament de référence 

État luxembourgeois (Informations sur un groupe de contribuables)
Rapprochement des législations
Coopération administrative dans le domaine fiscal : une demande d’informations peut concerner un groupe de personnes identifiables, mais non nominativement et individuellement identifiées

Aldricus – Jasa rental catering begitu diperlukan untuk mengsukseskan acara terutama acara besar untuk kantor anda. Meskipun pandemic belum juga berakhir, tetapi tidak ada salahnya anda mencoba peruntungan membuka jasa rental catering untuk usaha pertama anda, asalkan protocol Kesehatan yang dilakukan sudah sebenar-benarnya untuk jasa rental catering yang anda buka sebagai usaha pertama anda. Perhatikan hal berikut ini untuk memilih jasa rental catering terbaik yang dikutip dari co create id.

Tips Memilih jasa rental catering terbaik pertama untuk acara anda di PaDi UMKM yaitu Lakukan Riset & Sampling, Lakukan survei terlebih dahulu mengenai apa saja yang saat ini sedang diminati oleh banyak orang. Kemudian, lakukan sampling untuk mengetahui apakah masakan kamu enak dan gak membosankan. Cara ini juga bisa membantu kamu menentukan variasi menu.

Tips Memilih jasa rental catering terbaik kedua untuk acara anda di PaDi UMKM yaitu Tawarkan Beberapa Pilihan Paket, Berikan beberapa pilihan paket agar calon pembeli bisa memilih sesuai dengan keinginan. Contohnya, pilihan paket diet, paket hemat, paket vegetarian, atau paket lainnya. Berikan harga yang lebih murah dibanding harga satuan, agar mereka tertarik untuk mencoba katering kamu.

Tips Memilih jasa rental catering terbaik ketiga untuk acara anda di PaDi UMKM yaitu Lakukan Kesepakatan, Kesepakatan yang harus diperhatikan antara lain jam pengantaran katering. Dalam hal ini, sebaiknya kamu gak terlambat, karena keterlambatan bisa mengurangi nilai usaha sehingga ada kemungkinan pembeli memutuskan untuk gak memperpanjang kerja sama dengan kamu.

Tips Memilih jasa rental catering terbaik keempat untuk acara anda di PaDi UMKM yaitu Perhatikan Pelanggan, Kamu juga perlu masukan mengenai masakan yang telah dibuat. Sering-seringlah melakukan survei terhadap pelanggan. Seluruh masukan dan kritik dari pelanggan bisa kamu gunakan untuk mengembangkan usaha katering.

Tips Memilih jasa rental catering terbaik kelima untuk acara anda di PaDi UMKM yaitu Minta Testimoni, Testimoni bisa menjadi semacam kesaksian kalau konsumen puas terhadap masakan yang mereka dapat. Testimoni tersebut bisa digunakan sebagai tanda bahwa katering kamu enak dan terpercaya. Dengan ini, kamu jadi punya nilai lebih untuk memasarkannya ke tempat-tempat baru. Dalam beberapa bulan setelah usaha berjalan, bukan gak mungkin pemasukan dan pengeluaran kamu masih belum teratur. Ada banyak kemungkinan yang akan memengaruhi hal ini, misalnya belum memiliki banyak pelanggan setia dengan jadwal pemesanan yang teratur. Kalau begini, ada baiknya kamu memiliki tabungan khusus untuk memisahkan omzet usahamu dari simpanan pribadi. Jadi seluruh pengeluaran dan pemasukan usaha kateringmu bisa lebih terkontrol. Terlebih, jika sewaktu-waktu kateringmu mendapat pesanan dalam jumlah yang lebih banyak, kamu bisa mengambilnya kapan saja sebagai modal tambahan.

The post CALON PEMBELI, PASTIKAN JASA CATERING ANDA MEMILIKI PROGRAM INI KETIKA MELAKUKAN PENJUALAN appeared first on Aldri Blog.

Conseil / Hamas
Relations extérieures
La Cour confirme les actes du Conseil maintenant le Hamas sur la liste européenne des organisations terroristes

IS (Illégalité de l’ordonnance de renvoi)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Le droit de l’Union s’oppose à ce que, à la suite d’un pourvoi dans l’intérêt de la loi formé par le procureur général, une juridiction suprême nationale constate l’illégalité d’une demande de décision préjudicielle introduite par une juridiction inférieure, au motif que les questions posées ne sont pas pertinentes ni nécessaires pour la solution du litige au principal

SpaceNet,Telecom Deutschland,Commissioner of the Garda Síochána
Rapprochement des législations
L’avocat général Campos Sánchez-Bordona rappelle que la conservation généralisée et indifférenciée des données relatives au trafic et des données de localisation afférentes aux communications électroniques n’est autorisée qu’en cas de menace grave pour la sécurité nationale

O’Loan and Scott v MIB and AIG (Fintan O’Loan and Elisabeth Scott v Motor Insurance Bureau and AI Europe SA) involves the same Loi Badinter that was also the subject of Marshall v MIB. I was alerted to the case buy Ian Denham’s post. Judgment is as yet unreported and I am grateful to Ian for having sent me copy.

The contested claim is the one of Ms Scott v AIG. She was the front seat passenger of the hire car, insured by AIG and driven by Mr O’Loan, her partner, when the car was driven into by an uninsured, French registered car. Ms Scott therefore turns to the driver, her partner (in reality, the insurer of the hire car), to have her damage covered under the strict liability (no need to show fault) rule of the French Loi Badinter.

To get to French law however she needs to overcome Article 4(2) Rome II’s provision that in case victim and party claimed to be liable are habitually resident in the same country at the time the damage occurs, the laws of that country apply. A4(3) is the portal to that escape route:

(3) Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly closer connection with another country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question.

It was conceded by both parties [12] that the district judge cut quite a few corners on the A4(3) analysis and Platts J therefore started afresh. Winrow v Hemphill of course was referred to, as was Owen v Galgey (the conclusions of which I disagreed with).

The judge notes (as does the Handbook: para 4.39) that it is important to identify what is meant by “the tort/delict’ in A4(3) before considering whether that tort/delict is more closely connected with a country other than England. A4(3) holds that ‘the tort’ (not individual elements of the tort, such as the event and/or the damage and /or anything singular at all) needs to be ‘more closely connected’.

I disagree with the judge [23] that ‘the tort’ or ‘delict’ clearly refers to the event which caused the damage, or ‘the incident’ [24]. In the case of a tortious obligation ‘the tort’ arguably refers to the classic 3 elements of event, damage, and causal link between the two (all three here clearly referring to France). I do agree it does not refer to the cause of action which arises from the incident [24]. While linguistically speaking that may be caught be ‘the tort’ for it would be one of its consequences, it would also mean that remedies available, or not, for instance would play a role in determining lex causae. Where Rome II envisages such assessment, it says so explicitly: such as in Article 7’s environmental damage rule.

The judge’s reasons for opting for displacement are [30]

I therefore consider the connection with France to be manifestly closer than the connection with England: the collision was in France; it was between two vehicles registered in France; the damage was caused in France in that the initial injury was suffered in France. Further, the circumstances were such that the claim of first claimant is to be dealt with under French law.

That last element is in slight contradiction I find to the judge’s consideration signalled above, that an advance on (remedies available or not under the) lex causae, must not play a role. If that is the case for claimant seeking to overturn A4(2)’s presumption, arguably there must not be a role either for the lex causae of other claims involved in the case.

Of note is the judge’s emphasis on the vehicles both being registered in France. If that is an element, travellers of countries without strict liability rules, might have a strong incentive indeed to hire cars rather than drive their own when driving in EU Member States with strict liability rules such as the Loi Badinter.

Appeal dismissed, for the result is the same (French law applies) even if the route to it was quite different from the first judge.

I do not think the analysis on ‘the tort’ is quite there yet.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 4.5.2 (para 4.39 ff).

Of much note and my review shall be on the blog soon. (There is a queue, plus the posts inevitably are playing snakes and ladders with my day jobs). https://t.co/JxrMg02Sxh

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 15, 2021

 

Governor of Cloverhill Prison e.a.
Relations extérieures
Les dispositions concernant le régime du mandat d’arrêt européen à l’égard du Royaume-Uni prévues dans l’accord de retrait et concernant le nouveau mécanisme de remise dans l’accord de commerce et de coopération entre l’Union européenne et cet État tiers sont contraignantes pour l’Irlande

Commission / Hongrie
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
En sanctionnant pénalement l’activité d’organisation visant à permettre l’ouverture d’une procédure de protection internationale par des personnes ne remplissant pas les critères nationaux d’octroi de cette protection, la Hongrie a violé le droit de l’Union

Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Le droit de l’Union fait obstacle au régime en vigueur en Pologne permettant au ministre de la Justice de déléguer des juges dans des juridictions pénales supérieures, délégation à laquelle ce ministre, qui est en même temps le procureur général, peut à tout moment mettre fin sans motivation

In Silverman v Ryanair DAC (Rev1) [2021] EWHC 2955 (QB), claimant was injured whilst going down stairs at an airport terminal in England. The claim is subject to EU private international law. Jurisdiction for the English courts in this personal injury claim is not disputed.

Under A5 Rome I, contracts for carriage of goods are subject to the ordinary lex voluntatis rule, while for carriage of passengers, parties can only choose from a limited selection of leges contractus. The standard approach is for  general terms and conditions to select the law of the carrier’s habitual residence or his place of central administration, which is entirely kosher under Rome I. Unless the booking qualifies as package travel, it essentially means that passengers are generally less protected than ordinary consumers under A6 Rome I.

In the case of Ryanair, the default choice inevitably leads to Irish law, except in this case (because Irish law would lead to higher damages), the airline unusually seeks to divert from its default choice of law.  The airline’s relevant clause, reads

8.2.4: Governing Law: “Except as otherwise provided by the Convention or applicable law, your contract of carriage with us, these Terms and Conditions of Carriage and our Regulations shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of Ireland and any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Irish Courts.”

The Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air 1999 is unaffected by Rome I as a result of the Regulation’s A25, which gives clear priority to multilateral Conventions at least if the Convention concerned also includes non-EU Member States. The Convention also operates to make the choice of court provision invalid, as discussed ia in CJEU  C-213/18 Adriano Guaitoli et al v Easyjet.

Claimant however argues that assessment of quantum of damages is not regulated by Montreal and therefore remains subject to the lex voluntatis. This is where the second line of Ryanair’s defence comes in, namely an attempt to qualify the claim as one in tort, subject to Rome II’s lex loci damni rule, rather than Rome I’s lex voluntatis.

In essence therefore the question is a matter of Treaty interpretation viz the Montreal Convention (what does it mean to regulate in its provisions on liability and damages), subsequently secondary EU law interpretation viz Rome I and II (qualification: is it a claim in contract or tort, and once that held, does the lex casuae indicated by the relevant Regulation, cover quantum of damages).

Master McCloud turns to international comparison not by way of binding authority but pro inspiratio seeing as the case concerns an international Convention [52]. Scalia J’s ‘Pass-through’ approach to the lex fori’s choice-of-law rules in Zicherman (1996) is the approach also followed in this judgment. The judge uses the formulation by Bader Ginsburg J in El Al Israel: that Warsaw drafters intended to resolve whether there is liability, but to leave to domestic law (the local law identified by the forum under its choice-of-law rules or approaches) determination of the compensatory damages available to the suitor.”

Comparative case-law analysis makes sense. However one would have thought a starting point should have been analysis of the Convention and its travaux itself. Master McCloud does get to that when considering the rather awkward , counsel-inspired idea that there needs to be a discussion of the law that applies to the interpretation of the Convention. Determining the ‘Applicable law to matters of interpretation of the Convention’ might perhaps make sense in a dualist jurisdiction like the UK?

At [59] the judge holds the lex causae for interpretation of the Convention is the lex fori, English law therefore. At [61] he calls this

Convention law as understood by this court, ie the lex fori in that rather special international sense.’

Here I am lost.

The judge then employs the ‘natural language’ approach to determine what parts of the Montreal liability scheme parties can and cannot contractually be negotiated away.

Only the liability issues that have ‘passed through’ to the lex fori are then considered with a view to determining the qualification exercise: is the claim one in contract or one on tort. The judge raises the possibility that the claimant could have construed the claim as being a ‘Convention claim incorporated in the contract’ [64] however he holds that claim is not brought on that footing:

‘the Claim and Particulars are clear: they plead a claim for damages for breach of the Convention, they do not plead a claim in the law of contract’ [64].

That, I would submit, is wrong. The claim is subject to European conflict of laws rules. These require the judge to qualify the claim subject to the autonomous interpretation of ‘contract’ and ‘non-contractual obligation’ as most recently discussed by the CJEU in Wikingerhof. While I am the first to acknowledge claim formulation is a powerful tool to manage qualification (indeed Wikingerhof confirms as much), I do not think deference to claimant may be as large as suggested here.

The judge proceeds with the non-contractual nature (causing injury to the claimant through negligence [65]), points out that the Convention covers both contractual and non-contractual claims [66] and seeks support in his analysis on tort and contract in Prof. Thomas Kadner Graziano’s 2016 paper in the Yearbook of Private International Law. With respect, I do not think Thomas’ paper supports the conclusions in this case.

At [72][73] the judge then rather summarily and using A4(3) Rome II displaces the lex loci damni for the ‘passed through’ claim, in favour of Irish law, the lex contractus to the contract of carriage. Once the Rome II path chosen (of which, per above, I am not convinced), I do not think the lex loci damni may be pushed aside quite as concisely as this.

The relationship between international Conventions and European conflicts rules is not always straightforward. Yet here I think it has been presented a touch too convolutedly.

Geert.

Silverman v #Ryanair (Rev1) [2021] EWHC 2955 (QB)
Aviation law, whether airline can disapply its own choice of law & how #Montreal Convention interacts with the choice of law rules of the Forum, here: Rome I and II (and A4(3) escape clause for the latter https://t.co/EWJ7njH5ED

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 12, 2021

HR Rail
SOPO
Emploi des personnes handicapées : selon l’avocat général Rantos, un employeur est tenu, au titre des aménagements raisonnables, de réaffecter un travailleur devenu inapte à occuper son poste de travail à un autre poste lorsqu’il dispose de la compétence, de la capacité et de la disponibilité requises, et lorsqu’une telle mesure n’impose pas à cet employeur une charge disproportionnée

Dublin City Council
Libre circulation des personnes
La Cour précise la portée de la notion de « temps de travail » pour une période de garde sous régime d’astreinte