
Aldricus – Rambut kering dan mengembang adalah salah satu masalah yang paling tidak diinginkan bagi setiap perempuan. Penampilan akan terlihat tidak rapi dan kepercayaan diri pun bisa menurun. Saat mengalami masalah seperti ini, solusinya adalah menggunakan conditioner untuk rambut kering dan mengembang.
Namun sebelum menuju ke solusinya, ada baiknya untuk mengetahui dulu penyebab masalah tersebut. Untuk lebih jelasnya, silahkan simak penjelasan berikut ini:
Penyebab Rambut Kering dan MengembangRambut dapat menjadi kering dan mengembang karena kurangnya produksi minyak di kulit kepala. Meski demikian, ada juga beberapa faktor luar yang dapat menyebabkan hal itu terjadi. Dilansir dari situs Alodokter, berikut ini beberapa hal di antaranya:
1. Terlalu Sering Mencuci RambutMencuci rambut adalah hal penting untuk menjaga kebersihan rambut dan kulit kepala, namun mencucinya terlalu sering justru akan membuat rambut menjadi kering dan rusak. Cucilah rambut sebanyak 1-2 kali seminggu atau ketika dirasa sudah kotor.
2. Tidak Memberikan Perlindungan yang Cukup pada RambutSinar matahari, angin, serta udara panas dan kering dapat merusak rambut, apalagi jika rambut terpapar terlalu lama olehnya. Pasalnya, rambut adalah bagian yang rentan terhadap kandungan polusi di udara serta debu dan bakteri yang terbawa angin.
3. Tidak Menggunakan Conditioner Setelah KeramasMenjaga kesehatan rambut tidak cukup hanya dengan keramas. Dengan penggunaan conditioner setelah keramas membuat kadar minyak alami di rambut tetap terjaga sehingga membuatnya tetap sehat.
Conditioner juga membantu menjaga kelembaban rambut. Saat ini tersedia berbagai produk conditioner yang diformulasikan khusus untuk mencegah rambut kering dan mengembang.
Rekomendasi Conditioner TerbaikSunsilk Soft & Smooth Conditioner adalah conditioner untuk rambut kering dan mengembang terbaik yang paling direkomendasikan. Dilengkapi formula Activ-Infusion yang mengandung Vitamin E, soy milk protein, dan argan oil. Sunsilk Soft & Smooth Conditioner membuat rambut lebih lembut, halus, dan harum hingga 48 jam!
Jaga selalu kesehatan rambut agar tetap tampil percaya diri. Gunakan conditioner untuk rambut kering dan mengembang serta padukan dengan shampo yang cocok dengan karakteristik rambut masing-masing. Lindungi rambut dari paparan sinar matahari dan udara panas dengan mengenakan pelindung kepala saat beraktivitas di luar.
The post Inilah Rekomendasi Conditioner untuk Rambut Kering dan Mengembang Terbaik appeared first on Aldri Blog.
The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered this week (29 March) its judgment in case C-132/20 (BN and alii), which is about the Rule of Law and Fair Trail requirements for Courts composed for part of judges originally appointed under totalitarian (Communists) regimes or by a body created on the ground of legislation later declared unconstitutional. The judgment is currently available in selected EU official languages only (and therefore not in English). Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):
“1) L’article 19, paragraphe 1, second alinéa, TUE, l’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne ainsi que l’article 7, paragraphes 1 et 2, de la directive 93/13/CEE du Conseil, du 5 avril 1993, concernant les clauses abusives dans les contrats conclus avec les consommateurs, doivent être interprétés en ce sens que la circonstance que la première nomination d’un juge dans un État membre à un tel poste ou sa nomination ultérieure dans une juridiction supérieure résulte d’une décision adoptée par un organe d’un régime non démocratique qu’a connu cet État membre avant son adhésion à l’Union européenne, y compris lorsque les nominations de ce juge dans des juridictions après que ce régime a pris fin étaient fondées notamment sur l’ancienneté acquise par ledit juge au cours de la période durant laquelle ledit régime était en place ou lorsqu’il a prêté le serment judiciaire uniquement lors de sa première nomination en tant que juge par un organe de ce même régime, n’est pas en soi de nature à susciter des doutes légitimes et sérieux, dans l’esprit des justiciables, quant à l’indépendance et à l’impartialité de ce même juge, ni, partant, à remettre en cause la qualité de tribunal indépendant et impartial, établi préalablement par la loi, d’une formation de jugement dans laquelle il siège.
2) L’article 19, paragraphe 1, second alinéa, TUE, l’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux ainsi que l’article 7, paragraphes 1 et 2, de la directive 93/13 doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils ne s’opposent pas à ce que soit qualifiée de tribunal indépendant et impartial, établi préalablement par la loi, une formation de jugement relevant d’une juridiction d’un État membre dans laquelle siège un juge dont la première nomination à un poste de juge ou sa nomination ultérieure dans une juridiction supérieure est intervenue soit à la suite de sa sélection comme candidat au poste de juge par un organe composé sur le fondement de dispositions législatives ultérieurement déclarées inconstitutionnelles par la juridiction constitutionnelle de cet État membre, soit à la suite de sa sélection comme candidat au poste de juge par un organe régulièrement composé mais au terme d’une procédure qui n’était ni transparente, ni publique, ni susceptible de faire l’objet d’un recours juridictionnel, dès lors que de telles irrégularités ne sont pas d’une nature et d’une gravité telles qu’elles créent un risque réel que d’autres branches du pouvoir, en particulier l’exécutif, puissent exercer un pouvoir discrétionnaire indu mettant en péril l’intégrité du résultat auquel conduit le processus de nomination et semant ainsi, dans l’esprit des justiciables, des doutes sérieux et légitimes quant à l’indépendance et à l’impartialité du juge concerné ».
The Court of Justice delivered last week (24 March 2022) its judgment in case C‑723/20 (Galapagos BidCo. Sàrl), which is about the Insolvency bis Regulation:
“Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings must be interpreted as meaning that the court of a Member State with which a request to open main insolvency proceedings has been lodged retains exclusive jurisdiction to open such proceedings where the centre of the debtor’s main interests is moved to another Member State after that request has been lodged, but before that court has delivered a decision on it. Consequently, in so far as that regulation is still applicable to that request, the court of another Member State with which another request is lodged subsequently for the same purpose cannot, in principle, declare that it has jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings until the first court has delivered its decision and declined jurisdiction”.
I have just blogged on the Leuven public law blog, on the independent expert penal’s Ecocide proposal, here. I am reposting here for completeness’ purposes.
Geert.
In Farrar & Anor v Miller [2022] EWCA Civ 295, the issue is whether a firm of solicitors which has been acting for a claimant in litigation pursuant to a damages-based agreement can validly take an assignment of their client’s cause of action.
It is the common law of champerty which militates against law firms acting ostentatiously as a party with a purely commercial interest in the litigation and it is their role as officers of the court which is cited as being core of the hesitation (see inter alia the EP study on third party litigation funding here). In England and Wales it was the rules against maintenance and champerty that, prior to 1990, led to solicitors ia not being able to conduct litigation pursuant to conditional fee agreements -CFAs.
Statute then intervened to change this in narrowly defined circumstances (CFAs and damages-based agreements only) however that did not lift the common law’s general opposition to same and it is this opposition which both the first instance judge and the Court of Appeal refer to to reject the possibility of assignment: [52]
the Assignment is neither a conditional fee agreement nor a damages-based agreement: what section 58(1) and section 58AA(2) show is that Parliament, being well aware of the common law rules, decided to go so far towards relaxing them as sections 58 and 58AA provide and no further.
Permission to appeal with the Supreme Court is being sought.
Geert.
Litigation funding. common law principles of assignment, including champerty
Whether solicitors acting pursuant to damages-based agreement can validly take assignment of client's cause of action
Farrar & Anor v Miller [2022] EWCA Civ 295https://t.co/On1VyazyO8 pic.twitter.com/hvG1kU07bO
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 12, 2022
I have reported on conflict of laws (jurisdictional and applicable law) angles to the EP’s draft proposals on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence before. As I discuss in those posts (more analysis is on NOVA’s site here), many of the suggested routes created more difficulties than they solved. In the eventual February proposal (with 71 recitals: that is poor legislative drafting), the conflict of laws ambitions are much reduced. Leigh Day have a good summary of the issues here. Thank you Jorian Hamster for poking me to put my thoughts to paper.
The jurisdictional ambition is now merely expressed in terms of regulatory scope. On p.15 under the proportionality assessment, the proposal justifies its public international scope using the effects doctrine:
The EU turnover criterion for third-country companies creates a link to the EU. Including only turnover generated in the Union is justified since such a threshold, appropriately calibrated, creates a territorial connection between the third-country companies and the Union by the effects that the activities of these companies may have on the EU internal market, which is sufficient for the Union law to apply to third-country companies.
Proposed A2(1) focuses on ‘EU corporations’ (“companies which are formed in accordance with the legislation of a Member State) and proposed A2(2) looks at non-EU corporations (“companies which are formed in accordance with the legislation of a third country”), each with relevant thresholds distinguishing between quantitative (turnover) and qualitative (risk sectors: textiles, agriculture, extractive industries) criteria.
I am not sure why the lex incorporationis is preferred as the trigger criterion. Domicile as defined in Brussels Ia‘s Article 63 could be more attractive, seeing as it captures corporations with statutory seat outside of the EU but with their central administration or principal place of business here.
‘Turnover generated in the EU’ is bound to provoke some discussions however experience from in particular competition law should be able to help here.
The most obvious anchor point for applicable law is proposed A22. This sets out the requirement for Member States to define rules governing the civil
liability of the company for damages arising due to its failure to comply with the due diligence requirements, and then suggests in (5)
Member States shall ensure that the liability provided for in provisions of national law transposing this Article is of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the law of a Member State.
The intention of this Article is to make the national civil liability rules which Member States are due to ensure in follow-up of the future Directive, so-called ‘overriding mandatory law’ aka ‘lois de police’ aka ‘lois d’application immédiate’ under A16 Rome II. The challenge for the EU to harmonise private law, such as civil liability rules, shows in this formulation. The EC makes recourse to a Directive, not a Regulation, since (p.17)
The proposed instrument is a Directive, since Article 50 TFEU is the legal basis for company law legislation regarding the protection of the interests of companies’ members and others with a view to making such protection equivalent throughout the Union. Article 50 TFEU requires the European Parliament and the Council to act by means of directives.
Hence rather than formulating the future Directive’s liability provisions itself as of overriding EU law nature (a possibility expressly foreseen in Rome I’s rules on applicable law for contracts, but not impossible I believe within Rome II), the Directive will oblige Member States to ensure the lois de police character of their future rules implementing the Directive. I understand the difficulty yet I think the proposal could shortcut the discussion (and avoid difficulties in case a Member State fails to declare the lois de police nature) by declaring ‘Member States’ provisions of national liability law transposing this Article are of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the law of a Member State.’
(the latter part I believe is simply redundant).
In claims based on tortious liability, the Directive is most likely to be used to help establish fault (by action or omission). The remainder of the action (solidarity between various tortfeasors, damage calculation etc) will remain subject to the lex causae otherwise applicable. In claims based on unjust enrichment (a business and human rights route much worth exploring for supply chain cases) the Directive will most likely remain of smaller use seeing as these claims do not aim to establish liability, however the paper trail which the Directive will ensure, may be of documentary use here, too.
Geert.
At first sight few conflict of laws anchors in EU's proposed due diligence law
EU turnover as threshold is reminiscent of EU competition law
Registered office as compliance anchor
A22 qualifies the Dir as lois de police viz Rome I, II
71 recitals – yukhttps://t.co/JV1dip9gfW pic.twitter.com/Obhkn3qXR8
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 23, 2022
Al Assam & Ors v Tsouvelekakis [2022] EWHC 451 (Ch) shows the way many claims involving EU Member States facts or defendants are likely to go, until the novelty of newly found forum non freedom wears off perhaps: with intensive forum non conveniens-based jurisdictional challenges.
The defendant is domiciled in England and Wales. The claimants are the settlors of 2 Cypriot trusts who claim for the losses suffered in connection with the trusts’ investments. The trusts were both established under the International Trusts Law of the Republic of Cyprus.
As in Klifa v Slater, the forum non test, following Spiliada and VTB v Nutritek, [12] involves two limbs: Under limb 1 of the test, the Defendant must establish that the courts of Cyprus are both (i) “available” and (ii) are clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English courts as a forum for determining the dispute. If the Defendant can establish that limb 1 of Spiliada is satisfied, it becomes necessary to consider limb 2. Limb 2 requires a consideration of whether, even if the courts of Cyprus are an available forum that is clearly or distinctly more appropriate for the trial of the action than the courts of England, justice nevertheless requires that a stay of the English proceedings should not be granted.
On availability, there is a bit of to and fro and each other’s Cypriot law legal experts, particularly on the territorial jurisdiction under residual Cypriot rules. However the conclusion [26] is that the Cypriot courts are ‘available’.
Obiter, Richards DJ discusses whether if there is no availability under Cypriot law, there might be availability if there is a submission to jurisdiction and/or an agreement /choice of court.
Discussion here was first whether A26 Brussels Ia could remedy the lack of territorial jurisdiction under Cypriot law. Unlike A25 choice of court, A26 does not include language making the defendant’s domicile in the EU a precondition for its application. At [32] the conclusion for the purpose of these proceedings is that there is a real risk that the Cypriot courts will not have jurisdiction on the basis of A26.
The discussion then [33ff] turns to the Cypriot courts being the clearly or distinctly a more appropriate forum with the conclusion being in the negative.
Helpfully, and suggested by counsel, the judge puts the following structure to the analysis:
a) personal connections ([39]: defendant’s residence in England remains a relevant factor pointing towards the English courts being the appropriate forum);
b) factual connections (held: correspondence between the parties will be of more relevance than the physical location of parties in Cyprus);
c) evidence/convenience/expense (conflicting factors here but none leading overwhelmingly to Cyprus);
d) applicable law (most likely Cypriot law for many of the claims however ia given the similarity with English law, this is not an overwhelmingly relevant issue [56] and some Swiss law will have to be applied anyways); and
e) the “overall shape of the litigation”, held [59] not to be Cypriot.
Limb 2, the requirements of justice, is considered obiter under two angles [61]: delays and the possibility of statutes of limitation kicking in. On the delays, [67] comity and caution to express chauvinistic views upon a friendly jurisdiction argue against a finding of unavailability of justice on this ground, particularly as the experts’ views on this were inconclusive; the possibility of statute of limitation is held [68] largely to be of the claimants’ own making (ia because they had started but discontinued proceedings in Cyprus. Limb 2 therefore, had it mattered, would not have been satisfied and had limb 1 been met, a stay of the proceedings in England would have been ordered.
Geert.
Defendant domiciled in E&W. Claimants (settlors of 2 Cypriot trusts sue for losses suffered in connection with Trusts' investments. Forum non argument dismissed. Another lengthy discussion following Brexit
Al Assam ea v Tsouvelekakis [2022] EWHC 451 (Ch) https://t.co/Sd7TJSkG3k
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 8, 2022
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